Presentation on theme: "Health and Safety Executive Presentation to NuLeaf - Manchester Town Hall – 20 July 2012 HM Superintending Inspector Head of Discipline – Radiological."— Presentation transcript:
Health and Safety Executive Presentation to NuLeaf - Manchester Town Hall – 20 July 2012 HM Superintending Inspector Head of Discipline – Radiological Protection (RP), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Charles Temple
2 Presentation overview About ONR ONR Chief Inspectors Fukushima Reports. Aspects considered by ONR in assessing the extent of the detailed emergency planning zone (DEPZ) from a HIRE Report of Assessment. ONRs expectations for extendibility of Off-site Emergency Plans. Preparedness for beyond design basis accidents including ways of addressing these in the programme of nuclear emergency exercises. Planning controls for developments in the vicinity of nuclear licensed sites. Stress Tests in Other European States.
3 ONR became an agency of the Health and Safety Executive on 01 April 2011 The new body brings together the regulation of nuclear safety, security, safeguards and safe transport of radioactive materials. ONRs mission is to secure the protection of people and society from the hazards of the nuclear industry About ONR
4 Following Fukushima accident, Secretary of States Request: - Identify lessons to be learnt by the UK nuclear industry - Co-operate and co-ordinate with international colleagues, to include stress test requirements Interim report published May 2011 Final report published October conclusions and 36 recommendations ONR Chief Inspectors Reports
5 Interim report conclusion 1 No reason for curtailing operation of NPP or other nuclear facilities in the UK. Interim Report Recommendation 2 UK Government to review of the Japanese response. Interim Report Recommendation 3 Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group to review UKs national nuclear emergency arrangements. Interim Report Recommendation 6 ONR to consider … programme of emergency exercises overseen by the regulator. ONR Chief Inspectors Reports Key Conclusions / Recommendations
6 Some Key Issues: Extendibility Radiation/Reassurance monitoring Central Government Response Prolonged event (including Recovery) Safety / Security integration ONR Chief Inspectors Reports Key Conclusions / Recommendations
7 New Technical Assessment Guide (Draft for Trial Use) to be published in August. Guidance to ONRs assessors Will be available on website: ONR Assessment of DEPZ from HIRE Report of Assessment
8 Operator –Determines whether REPPIR applies. –Determines whether there is potential for a radiation emergency. –If so, undertakes Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluation (HIRE). –Submits Report of Assessment (RoA) to ONR. –If a Reasonably Foreseeable Radiation Emergency might arise, provides information to LA who formulates Off-Site Emergency Plan (OSEP). –Reviews REPPIR submission within 3 years of RoA and provides results to ONR.
9 ONR Assessment of DEPZ from HIRE Report of Assessment ONR –Undertakes technical assessment of the RoA. –Determines the area of the DEPZ under Reg 9(1). –In doing so, liaises with organisations including the Operator, LA, emergency services and local public groups. –May approve the withholding of certain parts of a REPPIR submission, for example, where public security or national defence would be compromised.
10 ONR Assessment of DEPZ from HIRE Report of Assessment Radiation Emergency – an event that is likely to result in a member of the public receiving an effective dose of 5 mSv in year following the emergency. DEPZ is informed (not prescribed) by technical assessment of area off-site in which a member of the public may receive 5mSv dose) –Recognises uncertainties with completeness, frequency and consequences associated with severe accident analysis. –DEPZ need not be circular. Initiating events include unauthorised behaviour by the public – which includes attempted terrorism or sabotage, ONR expects licensees analysis to be based on best estimates approach – ie. not unduly conservative. Guidance considers multi-plant sites and potential for simultaneous common-cause events.
11 ONR Assessment of DEPZ from HIRE Report of Assessment What is a Reasonably Foreseeable event? –less than likely but realistically possible (REPPIR guidance) –case law outside nuclear industry refers to material risks –Not defined numerically because: we believe that numerical evaluation implies undue precision some radiation emergencies are not amenable to probabilistic safety assessment. –We expect HIRE reports to address uncertainties in selecting reasonably foreseeable fault sequences.
12 ONR Assessment of DEPZ from HIRE Report of Assessment In determining the size of the DEPZ ONR will take the following approach: –Review the HIRE report to determine the adequacy of the technical argument: in particular with regard to the choice and extent of the worst case reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency and the extendibility scenarios presented. ONR will liaise with the operator as required to resolve technical issues. –Review the proposed DEPZ in light of legal precedent, relevant good practice and Public Inquiries. –Review site specific factors which may impact the size and shape of the DEPZ. –Liaise and consult with the LA and other relevant organisations such as the operator, emergency services and local public groups. –Write to the LA stating the requirements for the DEPZ.
13 Extendibility Extendibility is needed.. –due to uncertainties in the predicted severity of a nuclear accident –Because consequences can vary with time. REPPIR guidance recognises extendibility as good practice in dealing with accidents beyond the reasonably foreseeable. HIRE RoA should explore and present the types of accident that are larger but less likely than the chosen reference accident. ONR expects arrangements in Off-site Emergency Plans for extendibility to be less detailed than those for reasonably foreseeable events (ie within the DEPZ), but to provide a framework for extending the response.
14 Extendibility ONR current expectations (NEPLG Consolidated Guidance, Chapter 9) is based on : –Evacuation out to 4 km –Sheltering / KI tablet administration out to 15 km This is a one-size-fits-all approach. Disproportionate to hazard. We are developing a new approach based on international guidance (IAEA GS-R-2).
15 Extendibility HIREs should include technical information relevant to extendibility to enable emergency planners to consider, for example, –The number and distribution of population affected. –The infrastructure affected. –Monitoring distances required. –Evacuation and sheltering requirements. –Additional resource needs. –Possible provision and co-ordination from adjacent Local Authorities.
16 Preparedness for beyond design basis accidents including nuclear emergency exercises ONR and others are working with DECC to develop a national strategic framework which is seeking to identify and implement areas with scope for improvement. There is particular focus on improving the interface between emergency arrangements close to nuclear sites and those in place for wider civil contingencies in the UK. The programme of national exercises is published on ONRs website at:
17 Preparedness for beyond design basis accidents including nuclear emergency exercises Emergency Exercises Extendibility scenario has previously been successfully tested: –Exercise Madonna, based on an event at Heysham Power Station, in 1997 Off-site response to severe accidents has previously been tested: –Prolonged exercise was held in 2002 based on an event Bradwell Power Station.
18 Preparedness for beyond design basis accidents including nuclear emergency exercises Emergency Exercises A successful modular exercise to test extendibility of an off-site plan was recently held based on a postulated event at Hunterston. An exercise to test Reassurance Monitoring Arrangements has been arranged based on a postulated event at Heysham.
19 Planning controls for developments in the vicinity of nuclear licensed sites Long-standing Government siting policy requires Planning Authorities to consult ONR before granting planning permission for developments around nuclear installations. ONR has previously provided all councils in England Wales and Scotland with details of relevant zones and consultation criteria. We are currently reviewing our arrangements for advising on land use planning applications. Our primary aim will continue to be ensuring the protection of people and society from the hazards of the nuclear industry.
20 Planning controls for developments in the vicinity of nuclear licensed sites ONR advice will be based upon the size and type of the proposed development and whether the Local Authority can accommodate it into its emergency planning arrangements. In particular we expect Local Authorities to consult with the multi- agencies involved in implementing an off-site emergency plan to ensure that it remains credible. Hence population density will always be a limiting factor in developing credible emergency planning arrangements.
21 Planning controls for developments in the vicinity of nuclear licensed sites Whilst demographics is one of a number of important factors for the siting of new reactors, its applicability to existing sites that are in close proximity to large populations (Aldermaston, Devonport, Barrow etc.) is less meaningful. In such cases ONR believes that it is more appropriate to consult with the Local Authority to establish whether such proposals can be accommodated with the existing off-site plan.
22 We are likely to propose moving towards a position where: –The Inner Consultation Zone is coterminous with the DEPZ. –The Outer Planning Zone is coterminous with the intermediate extendibility zone. In the Inner Consultation Zone: –ONR would not usually object to industrial development so long as: The activity does not constitute an external hazard to the nuclear facility; and The emergency planning authorities raise no concerns. Planning controls for developments in the vicinity of nuclear licensed sites
23 Beyond the Inner Planning Zone but within outer consultation zone (ie. typically in the intermediate extendibility zone): –ONR will not advise against proposals so long as consultation with the multi-agencies has confirmed that the development can be accommodated within the extendibility arrangements of the off-site plan (evacuation, sheltering, reception centres, KI tablet distribution etc.) Planning controls for developments in the vicinity of nuclear licensed sites
24 Stress Tests in Other European States. UK National Final Reports –for Nuclear Power Plant: –for Non-Nuclear Power Plant: ENSREG Peer Review Report for UK Nuclear Power Plants: –http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/Country%20Report%20UK% 20Final.pdf
25 Stress Tests in Other European States –ENSREG Peer Review Report for European Nuclear Power Plants: al%20Report_0.pdf ENSREG - European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
26 Stress Tests in Other European States. Findings of ENSREG Peer Review for European Nuclear Power Plants: Review process compliance with ENSREG Recommendations –Submissions generally timely and well done. –External Hazards Design Basis Accidents for External Events generally ok. Problem: Margin Assessments for Extreme Accidents – Cliff Edges. Problem acute for extreme weather. WENRA to develop guidance in this area. –Electrical Power and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Submissions generally of good quality –Accident management Submissions generally of good quality
27 Stress Tests in Other European States. Licensing Basis and Plant Compliance –Plant compliance verified by inspections and walk-downs in accordance with current licensing safety case basis. –Scope for more systematic search for non-conformities. –Periodic Safety Review important – at least every 10 years or when new relevant information comes to light.
28 Stress Tests in Other European States. Margins, Cliff-edges and areas for possible improvement. –Evaluation of seismic and flooding margins inconsistent. ENSREG incremental approach not followed in many cases. Regulators to encourage countries to adopt this approach. –Electrical Power and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Submissions generally detailed Fuel can heat up within 1 – 10h if cooling lost without mitigation. With recovery action, fuel heats up within periods extending > 72h. Several improvement actions implemented or being developed. –Accident management Prevention measures better developed than mitigation measures. Mitigation arrangements vary from initial consideration to advanced. Maintaining containment integrity is key.
29 Stress Tests in Other European States. Measures to improve Robustness –Flooding and Seismic Several improvements identified: –Physical flood protection measures including »increased height of openings into protected rooms »use of temporary flood protection dams). –Electrical Power and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink All countries identified measures to improve robustness including: –Additional power / water supplies to be provided by mobile units –Extended battery capacity –Additional sources of water –Extended / additional supplies of fuel –Improved access to valves
30 Stress Tests in Other European States. Measures to improve Robustness –Accident Management Measures already identified should be implemented. For water-cooled reactors, includes measures to: –Depressurize the primary circuit to prevent high pressure core melt –Prevent a hydrogen explosion –Prevent containment over-pressurisation Extend Severe Accident Management to cover –Long-duration events on multi-plant sites –Devastated site conditions –Operation in harsh environments (including radiation / contamination)
31 Stress Tests in Other European States. Summary: –National regulators have already been proactive in demanding improvements in these areas. –Implementation scale and progress rates vary widely. –Action plans for further analysis and improvement plans are in place or being developed in all countries. –Overall compliance with ENSREG specifications was quite good. –Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) to: Develop guidance on natural hazards assessments, margins beyond the design basis and cliff-edge effects. Underline the importance of Periodic Safety Reviews Ensure that regulators consider the implementation of measures to – protect containment integrity. –prevent accidents and limit their consequences in case of extreme natural hazards.
32 Stress Tests in Other European States. Measures to improve Robustness –Accident Management Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) in place for operating reactors –Only some countries have SAMGs for shut-down reactors, spent fuel ponds or multi-unit events. These should be developed. –Equipment such as monitoring instrumentation and communications should be robust and protected from natural hazards. –On-site emergency centres to be designed against extreme natural and radiological hazards. –Necessary additional staff and resources should be made available (bearing in mind devastation from natural disasters).