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Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen.

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Presentation on theme: "Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen."— Presentation transcript:

1 Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for teachers in England
Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen Slater, Deborah Wilson

2 Background Improving education outcomes key priority for governments, but evidence suggests poor returns from simply raising school resources. One alternative mechanism: incentives for teachers, but rel. little evidence on impact. 1999: UK government introduced performance related pay scheme for teachers (the “Performance Threshold”). Performance assessed across five criteria, inc. pupil progress (value-added). Boo! 12 April 2007

3 What we do in this paper Quantitative evaluation of the impact of this PRP scheme for teachers on pupil test score gains. Design Longitudinal teacher-level data and a difference-in-difference research design. Link pupils to their teachers for each subject; collect prior attainment data for each pupil. So control for teacher and pupil fixed effects. Also control for differences in teacher experience. Incentive scheme had significant effects on pupil progress. 12 April 2007

4 Outline of the talk Current evidence (in paper, not here)
The National Curriculum The PRP scheme Data Evaluation methodology Results Conclusion 12 April 2007

5 The National Curriculum
Centralised system of control over national exams and teacher pay scales. All pupils tested at the end of each Key Stage of the National Curriculum. KS1 and KS2 tests taken at ages 7 and 11; KS3 and KS4 (GCSE) taken at ages 14 and 16. KS1, 2, 3 tests taken in English, maths, science. These subjects compulsory also at KS4. We focus on KS4 and value added between KS3 and KS4. 12 April 2007

6 The PRP scheme Labour administration 1998 Green Paper: range of reforms to education, inc. performance-related element to teacher pay. The ‘Performance Threshold’ introduced in 1999/2000; first applications in July 2000. The Performance Threshold itself was one element of larger pay reform, designed to affect teacher effort, as well as recruitment and retention. 12 April 2007

7 The PRP scheme II Prior to the PRP scheme, all teachers paid on unified basic salary scale which had 9 full points. Position on scale depended on qualifications and/or experience; progress through annual increments. Plus additional management points available. 1999/2000: approx. 75% of teachers at top of scale, at spine point 9. 12 April 2007

8 The PRP scheme III After the reforms, teachers on spine point 9 could apply to pass the Performance Threshold. 2 effects: Annual bonus of £2,000. Move onto the Upper Pay Scale (UPS): additional spine points, each of which related to performance. 12 April 2007

9 The PRP scheme IV To pass the Threshold, teachers had to demonstrate effectiveness in five areas, including pupil progress (value added). Forms submitted by July Assessed by headteacher and external assessor. Initial Threshold payments funded out of a separate, central budget; no quota or limit. The vast majority of eligible teachers both applied and were awarded the bonus. 12 April 2007

10 Was it incentive pay? Wragg et al (2001) survey of 1000 schools But
In these schools, 88% of the eligible teachers applied, and of these 97% were awarded the bonus Unconditional pay increase - little effect on teacher effort. But Ex ante (Marsden) survey suggests teachers believed it to be ‘real’ UPS element clearly performance related 12 April 2007

11 Teacher survey before implementation
12 April 2007

12 Data requirements Control for pupil prior attainment to measure progress or value added: KS3-GCSE; English, maths, science. Longitudinal element: Follow same teachers through two complete KS3-GCSE teaching cycles (before and after scheme introduced). Link pupils to teachers: Obtain class lists direct from schools. 12 April 2007

13 Sample First approached schools in 2000.
Onerous data requirements; problems with school information systems; teacher and headteacher turnover. Final sample: 18 schools. 181 teachers (145 eligible; 36 not eligible). Approx. 23,000 pupils. No presumption that sample is representative. 12 April 2007

14 Evaluation Methodology
Pupil i; teacher j; teaching cycle t. Teacher effectiveness, X; test score, g; value-added v. 12 April 2007

15 Difference between two tranches:
Teacher mean scores: Difference between two tranches: 12 April 2007

16 This is the difference-in-difference. If
Differencing between eligible and ineligible teachers. D(x) operator means: D(x)  E(x|DI=1) – E(x|DI=0) This is the difference-in-difference. If This yields: 12 April 2007

17 And same steps as before yield the following as the diff-in-diff:
For value-added: And same steps as before yield the following as the diff-in-diff: 12 April 2007

18 Key issues Parameters of interest are: Role of experience profile:
g3b for gross test score m2b for value added Role of experience profile: If f(W) is linear, no problem, as DDf(W) = 0 If concave, diff-in-diff underestimates parameters of interest, as DDf(W) < 0. 12 April 2007

19 Experience Profile 12 April 2007

20 Key issues (cont.) Experimental design and pupil assignment:
No grouping on effort. Timing of class assignment. 12 April 2007

21 Results Difference-in-difference results Regressions Robustness checks
Interpretation and evaluation 12 April 2007

22 Table 2: D-inD analysis: GCSEs
12 April 2007

23 Table 3: D-in-D VA Means 12 April 2007

24 Experience Difference
Potentially need to control for systematic differences in experience: ideal: non-parametrically defined experience-effectiveness profile. Not enough data to do that, so define a ‘novice’ teacher dummy picking out teachers with least experience. 12 April 2007

25 Table 4: GCSE Analysis 12 April 2007

26 Table 5: Value Added Analysis
12 April 2007

27 Table 6: Subject Differences
12 April 2007

28 Robustness checks Leave out novices to just compare eligibles and ineligibles with pretty similar experience. Ceiling effects on marks: just look at pupils in bottom 75% of KS3 distribution Robust to these 12 April 2007

29 Evaluation One standard deviation in the teacher-mean change in GCSE is 1.29, and 0.58 for VA Coefficients on eligibility of for GCSE change and for VA change As percentages of a standard deviation these are 69% and 73% Alternatively, eligibility dummy is 67% of the novice teacher dummy for GCSE change, and 78% for VA change. 12 April 2007

30 Conclusions Rich data, research design which controls for teacher and pupil effects Results: around 0.5 GCSE grade per pupil Caveats Was it incentive pay and the experience-effectiveness profile Extra effort or effort diversion? 12 April 2007

31 Additional slides 12 April 2007

32 Table 2: Summary teacher stats
12 April 2007

33 Table 3: Summary pupil stats
12 April 2007

34 Table 4: Comparative stats
12 April 2007

35 Data requested from schools
12 April 2007

36 12 April 2007

37 12 April 2007

38 12 April 2007

39 Table 12: Distributional Impacts
12 April 2007

40 Table 13: Robustness checks
12 April 2007

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