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Evaluating the Impact of Performance- related Pay for teachers in England Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen.

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Presentation on theme: "Evaluating the Impact of Performance- related Pay for teachers in England Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen."— Presentation transcript:

1 Evaluating the Impact of Performance- related Pay for teachers in England Adele Atkinson, Simon Burgess, Bronwyn Croxson, Paul Gregg, Carol Propper, Helen Slater, Deborah Wilson

2 12 April Background Improving education outcomes key priority for governments, but evidence suggests poor returns from simply raising school resources. One alternative mechanism: incentives for teachers, but rel. little evidence on impact. 1999: UK government introduced performance related pay scheme for teachers (the Performance Threshold). Performance assessed across five criteria, inc. pupil progress (value-added).

3 12 April What we do in this paper Quantitative evaluation of the impact of this PRP scheme for teachers on pupil test score gains. Design –Longitudinal teacher-level data and a difference-in- difference research design. –Link pupils to their teachers for each subject; collect prior attainment data for each pupil. –So control for teacher and pupil fixed effects. –Also control for differences in teacher experience. Incentive scheme had significant effects on pupil progress.

4 12 April Outline of the talk Current evidence (in paper, not here) The National Curriculum The PRP scheme Data Evaluation methodology Results Conclusion

5 12 April The National Curriculum Centralised system of control over national exams and teacher pay scales. All pupils tested at the end of each Key Stage of the National Curriculum. KS1 and KS2 tests taken at ages 7 and 11; KS3 and KS4 (GCSE) taken at ages 14 and 16. KS1, 2, 3 tests taken in English, maths, science. These subjects compulsory also at KS4. We focus on KS4 and value added between KS3 and KS4.

6 12 April The PRP scheme Labour administration 1998 Green Paper: range of reforms to education, inc. performance-related element to teacher pay. The Performance Threshold introduced in 1999/2000; first applications in July The Performance Threshold itself was one element of larger pay reform, designed to affect teacher effort, as well as recruitment and retention.

7 12 April The PRP scheme II Prior to the PRP scheme, all teachers paid on unified basic salary scale which had 9 full points. Position on scale depended on qualifications and/or experience; progress through annual increments. Plus additional management points available. 1999/2000: approx. 75% of teachers at top of scale, at spine point 9.

8 12 April The PRP scheme III After the reforms, teachers on spine point 9 could apply to pass the Performance Threshold. 2 effects: –Annual bonus of £2,000. –Move onto the Upper Pay Scale (UPS): additional spine points, each of which related to performance.

9 12 April The PRP scheme IV To pass the Threshold, teachers had to demonstrate effectiveness in five areas, including pupil progress (value added). Forms submitted by July Assessed by headteacher and external assessor. Initial Threshold payments funded out of a separate, central budget; no quota or limit. The vast majority of eligible teachers both applied and were awarded the bonus.

10 12 April Was it incentive pay? Wragg et al (2001) survey of 1000 schools –In these schools, 88% of the eligible teachers applied, and of these 97% were awarded the bonus –Unconditional pay increase - little effect on teacher effort. But –Ex ante (Marsden) survey suggests teachers believed it to be real –UPS element clearly performance related

11 12 April Teacher survey before implementation

12 12 April Data requirements Control for pupil prior attainment to measure progress or value added: –KS3-GCSE; English, maths, science. Longitudinal element: –Follow same teachers through two complete KS3- GCSE teaching cycles (before and after scheme introduced). Link pupils to teachers: –Obtain class lists direct from schools.

13 12 April Sample First approached schools in Onerous data requirements; problems with school information systems; teacher and headteacher turnover. Final sample: –18 schools. –181 teachers (145 eligible; 36 not eligible). –Approx. 23,000 pupils. No presumption that sample is representative.

14 12 April Evaluation Methodology Pupil i; teacher j; teaching cycle t. Teacher effectiveness, X; test score, g; value-added v.

15 12 April Teacher mean scores: Difference between two tranches:

16 12 April Differencing between eligible and ineligible teachers. D(x) operator means: D(x) E(x| I=1) – E(x| I=0) This is the difference-in-difference. If This yields:

17 12 April For value-added: And same steps as before yield the following as the diff-in-diff:

18 12 April Key issues Parameters of interest are: – for gross test score – for value added Role of experience profile: –If f(W) is linear, no problem, as D f(W) = 0 –If concave, diff-in-diff underestimates parameters of interest, as D f(W) < 0.

19 12 April Experience Profile

20 12 April Key issues (cont.) Experimental design and pupil assignment: No grouping on effort. Timing of class assignment.

21 12 April Results Difference-in-difference results Regressions Robustness checks Interpretation and evaluation

22 12 April Table 2: D-inD analysis: GCSEs

23 12 April Table 3: D-in-D VA Means

24 12 April Experience Difference Potentially need to control for systematic differences in experience: ideal: non- parametrically defined experience- effectiveness profile. Not enough data to do that, so define a novice teacher dummy picking out teachers with least experience.

25 12 April Table 4: GCSE Analysis

26 12 April Table 5: Value Added Analysis

27 12 April Table 6: Subject Differences

28 12 April Robustness checks Leave out novices to just compare eligibles and ineligibles with pretty similar experience. Ceiling effects on marks: just look at pupils in bottom 75% of KS3 distribution Robust to these

29 12 April Evaluation One standard deviation in the teacher-mean change in GCSE is 1.29, and 0.58 for VA –Coefficients on eligibility of for GCSE change and for VA change –As percentages of a standard deviation these are 69% and 73% Alternatively, eligibility dummy is 67% of the novice teacher dummy for GCSE change, and 78% for VA change.

30 12 April Conclusions Rich data, research design which controls for teacher and pupil effects Results: around 0.5 GCSE grade per pupil Caveats –Was it incentive pay and the experience- effectiveness profile –Extra effort or effort diversion?

31 12 April Additional slides

32 12 April Table 2: Summary teacher stats

33 12 April Table 3: Summary pupil stats

34 12 April Table 4: Comparative stats

35 12 April Data requested from schools

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39 12 April Table 12: Distributional Impacts

40 12 April Table 13: Robustness checks

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