1. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Presented by Sam Sciacca – Working Group C1 Chair Substations C0 Subcommittee IEEE Standard for Substation IED Cyber Security IEEE- 1686

2. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Purpose of Document Define cyber security functions and features Serve as a procurement specification for new IEDs or analysis of existing IEDs Produce a common reference point for terms and verbiage regarding cyber security

3. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Reasons for the Effort Increased cyber security requirements NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP 002-1 through 009-1) Confusion among users and vendors as to what IED cyber security should include

4. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back NERC CIP Goals oriented – security, reliability, accountability Does not require the application of specific technologies Provides no baseline of product features (Claims of products to be “NERC CIP Compliant” or “Conform to NERC CIP standards” are baseless) Concerned with both intentional and unintentional acts

5. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Underlining Premises of IEEE-1686 Substation cyber security programs will be company- specific Determination of what devices require cyber security is outside of the scope of the effort Not all features will be required in every program Addresses only embedded security features of the IED and the IED configuration software

6. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Objectives of IEEE-1686 Establish a suite of IED features and functions which can be incorporated in a cyber security program Define the features and functions in a non-ambiguous manner Serve as the format of a procurement or evaluation specification Raise vendor awareness as to desirable features and functions which they may wish to consider providing in new generations of equipment.

7. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Proper Use of IEEE-1686 Requires 3 important elements: 1. Proper citation of the standard. 2. Table of Compliance to the standard 3. Analysis and verification by the User of the IED offering

8. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Improper Citation of IEEE-1686 “IED must conform to all applicable sections of IEEE-1686”

9. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back IEEE-1686 IED Requirements Strong password construction No undisclosed bypass or “back door” Multiple access levels Non-modifiable audit trail Supervisory permissive control IEEE 37.231 compliance (Firmware Control) Alarm Generation

10. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back IEEE-1686 IED Configuration Software Concepts Authentication/copy control Multiple access levels - View Configuration Data - Change Configuration Data - Full Access (User/ID Password changes) IED Communications Port Enabling/Disabling

11. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back IEEE-1686 Audit Trail Login Manual Log Out Timed Log Out Config Access Config Change Supervisory Permission Value Forcing Firmware Change UserID/Password Change Audit Log Access Time/Date Change Alarm Incident

12. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back IEEE-1686 IED Alarm Events Unsuccessful login attempt Reboot Use of unauthorized configuration software

13. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back IEEE-1686 Status Approved and available for use

14. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Identified Areas of Further Work Definition and recommended practice for strong or multifactor authentication Definition and recommended practice for substation electronic perimeters

15. Click anywhere to continue Click here to go back Substations C0 Subcommittee Data Acquisition Processing and Control Systems Subcommittee (“SCADA Subcommittee”) Michael Dood, Chair Open to IEEE-PES Members and Guests Meets at Substation Annual Meeting (Spring), IEEE-PES Annual Meeting, and most PSRC meetings