0. College of Business Administration University of Missouri-St. Louis
Will the Use of Credit Default Swaps Affect Firm Risk and Value? Evidence from U.S. Life and Property/Casualty Insurance Companies
Hung-Gay Fung
College of Business Administration
University of Missouri-St. Louis
Min-Ming Wen
College of Business and Economics
California State University, Los Angeles
Gaiyan Zhang

1. Motivation Financial Crisis in 2008
AIG was on the edge of falling apart
 the (ab)use of CDS?
Insurance companies have been among the most active market participants in the credit derivatives market
According to British Bankers’ Association (2006), insurers worldwide held an 18% market share for selling CDS protection; 6% of the CDS market for buying credit protection.
This study examines the use of CDS in the pre-crisis period. (from )

2. CDS trading motives Why do insurers sell CDS?
income generation (for taking credit risks)
replication (similar to bond holdings for receiving fixed payment by taking credit risks; but with a more flexible choice in maturity)
speculation (simply for transaction purpose)
Why do insurers buy CDS?
hedging (managing credit risks embedded in bond portfolios)

3. CDS and Risk: Literature Review
Existing studies on CDS usage have primarily focused on risk-hedging and/or risk-taking behaviors by banks and hedge funds.
Credit derivatives use by banks (Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009), Shao (2010))
 Shao (2009) finds an increase in the risk profiles for bank protection sellers but no evidence that bank protection buyers have higher risk.
 Instefjord (2005) risk-sharing benefits from credit derivatives may encourage banks to take more risk
 Morrison (2005) finds that credit derivatives can reduce banks’ incentives to monitor their loan portfolios.

4. CDS and Risk
Credit derivatives use by hedge funds (Chen, 2010)  the use of credit derivatives decreases total risk for hedge funds.
Derivative use by insurers (Colquitt and Hoyt 1997; Cummins, Phillips, and Smith 1997, 2001).  not CDS specifically!

5. Research Questions How does the use of CDS affect firm risks?
CDS Buy position reduces credit risk if it is for hedging purpose  can this be transferred to risk-reduction as a whole?
CDS Buy position carries investment risk if it is for transaction purpose  how does it affect firm’s risks?
CDS sell position increases credit risk if it is for income generation purpose  how does it affect firm’s risks?
CDS sell position reduce asset-liability duration risk  can it be transferred to the reduction of firm’s risks?
How does the use of CDS affect firm risks?
How are the effects of CDS use on firm risks transferred to the effects on firm value?

6. Research Design CDS use  Buyers v.s. sellers Risk Measures
 total risk, market risk, and idiosyncratic risk
Firm value measure
 Tobin’s Q (market-based measure), ROA (accounting-based measure)

7. Main Findings: CDS & Risk

8. Main Findings: CDS & Firm Value

9. Data
Data sources: the merge of NAIC derivative data, CompuStat and CRSP.
Data uniqueness: the detailed nature of the data on credit derivatives use reported by insurance companies to NAIC
Our focus: the behaviors of 44 distinct insurers who participate in the CDS market and have CompuStat and CRSP data available.
33 Life insurers and 11 PC insurers.
firm-year observations are 427 (Life) and 666 (PC).
the total number of transaction observations: 4,889 (Life) and 1,639 (PC)
CDS non-users: 212 publicly-listed insurers including 85 (Life) 127 (PC).

10. Methodology and Empirical Results
Simultaneous Equation Model on Risk Analysis: potential endogeneity between risk and derivative use (Graham and Rogers, 2002)

11. Table 1. Summary of CDS Transactions for Life and PC Insurers
2010Taiwan_Presentation_Tables.doc

12. Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample (CDS_users & Non_CDS Users)
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of risk, firm value, and other control variables used in the analysis.
Panels A and B are for the samples of Life and PC insurers, respectively.
2010Taiwan_Presentation_Tables.doc

13. Table 3.
Table 3 compares medians and means of risk, firm value, and other firm characteristic variables between insurers – CDS users, CDS net buyers, CDS net sellers – and those non-CDS users.
2010Taiwan_Presentation_Tables.doc
Life insurers with CDS transactions: have a larger systematic risk, lower idiosyncratic risk, and lower total risk than those of non-CDS users.
Both net buyers and net sellers have significantly higher systematic risk, lower idiosyncratic risk, and lower total risk than non-CDS users.

14. Table 3
Life Insurers: non-CDS users have larger Tobin’s Q, market-to-book value of equity, and return on asset than CDS users, net buyers, net sellers.
PC Insurers:
No significant difference in total risk between CDS users and non-users.
CDS users have higher systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk than those of non-CDS users.
Net buyers have significantly higher systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk than non-CDS users.
No significant difference in total risk between net buyers and non-users.
Net sellers show significantly higher market risk and higher idiosyncratic risk than non-users,
No significant difference in total risk between net sellers and non-users.
CDS users have lower Tobin’s Q, lower market-to-book equity value, and lower ROA than non-users.
CDS net buyers and net sellers also have lower Tobin’s Q, market-to-book equity value, and ROA than non-users.

15. Summary of Univariate Analysis
Life and PC CDS users (regardless of their positions as net buyers or net sellers) have higher market risk than non-users
 a positive relation between the market risk of insurers and their participation in the CDS market.
Second, Life CDS users have lower idiosyncratic risk and total risk than non-users.
Finally, Life and PC CDS users have lower firm values.

16. Table 4. Risk Models

17. Table 4. Risk Models 2010Taiwan_Presentation_Tables.doc
Panel A1: (risk equation, Life insurers): participation in CDS transactions significantly increases total risk; Net sellers dummy variable significantly increase total risk
 writing CDS contracts increases Life insurers’ total risk.
 buying CDS protection has insignificant effects on Life insurers’ total risk.
In the CDS equation: CDS use and participation positions are positively and significantly related to total risk.
 those insurers with higher total risk are more likely to engage in CDS transactions, both as net sellers and as net buyers, holding other things constant.
Panel B1 (PC insurers) are quite similar to those for Life insurer sample;
both net buyers and net sellers have significantly higher total risk.

18. Table 5: Regression Model on Firm Performance

19. Table 5: Regression Model on Firm Performance
2010Taiwan_Presentation_Tables.doc

20. Table 5: Regression Model on Firm Performance

21. Contributions
We extend a series of studies on derivative usage by insurance companies by focusing on credit derivatives, credit default swaps on particular
Our paper complements the study on bank and hedge fund use of credit derivatives
Shed light on the opaque and largely unregulated CDS market
This study shows:
CDS utilization alters the risk profile of both Life and PC insurers by increasing each dimension of risk.
CDS utilization deteriorates the financial performance.
Our findings support the effort of the NAIC working with the insurance regulators to monitor more closely how insurance companies engage in derivative transactions.