Presentation on theme: "Climate Change Policies: Roles of Developing Countries"— Presentation transcript:
1 Climate Change Policies: Roles of Developing Countries Anil MarkandyaBath UniversityDecember 10, 2006
2 Variations of the Earth’s Surface Temperature: 1000 to 2100
3 Global Carbon Cycle For every 1 t of carbon emitted from fossil fuels 10 t are taken up and emitted by terrestrial ecosystems7 t are taken up and emitted and by ocean ecosystems¼ t is emitted from land clearing
4 The Balance each year... We cannot ignore sinks in UNFCCC 6.3 Gt from fossil emissionsca. 1.6 Gt emitted from land-clearing1.7 Gt net uptake into ocean systems and c. 3.0 Gt into terrestrial systemsLeaving a net 3.2 Gt in the atmosphereWe cannot ignore sinks in UNFCCC
7 Background Consensus on Climate Change Suggests An increase in global mean temperatures of C by 2100A global mean rise in sea level of 14 to 94 cmThese are wide ranges. Even wider ranges apply at the regional levelChanges in rainfall and extreme events is predicted to increase
8 Background Information Consensus on Impacts Suggests A modest impact on agricultural production but with very wide variations (Positive to highly negative).Changes in fisheries with possible benefits in some areas, losses in others.Loss of land in low-lying areas. With some action a 1 meter rise would cause loss of 6% of Netherlands, 17.5% of Bangladesh.
9 Background Information Consensus on Impacts Further Suggests Health impacts are significant: increase in malaria and infectious waterborne diseases.Increase in magnitude and frequency of natural disasters.Impacts on tourism, negative in winter sports, positive in some sea resorts.Possible conflicts as different groups attempt to claim land and water resources
10 Global Climate Change Impacts Health ImpactsMortality, infectious disease, respiratory diseaseIncrease in vector-borne diseases in the tropicsAgricultural inputsCrop yieldsIrrigation demandsagricultural productivity declines in Africa, Latin AmericaClimate ChangeTemperaturePrecipitationSea level riseForest Impactscomposition, geographic range, health and productivityWater Resource ImpactsQuantity, quality of supply; Competition over resourcesArid and semi-arid areas in Africa, Middle East will become more water scarceGlobal climate change relates to all three of the above objectives relating to improved health conditions, enhanced livelihoods and reduced vulnerability.Impacts on Coastal AreasErosion, inundation of coastal areas, cost of protectionlow-lying delta areas and small island states threatened by sea level riseSpecies and Natural AreasLoss of habitat and speciesForests and coral reefs vulnerable
11 Valuation of Impacts in Money Terms Can we value the damages in money terms?Question is highly controversial. Yet some attempts have been made.Main effects are health, sea-level rise and agriculture.Problem of time period is critical. Most damages over next 100 years will occur from Hence discount rate is very important.Degree of uncertainty is very high.
13 Impact Valuation : Open Framework Model: $ Billion
14 Valuation of ImpactsVery sensitive to the discount rate. Going from 1-5% reduces damages by factor of 20Major impacts are in Asia, Africa, followed by Latin America. Europe and N. America have very small impacts. At country level impacts vary by even more.Type of damages: agriculture and water, followed by health are man direct effects. Disasters are main indirect effects.Valuation remains controversial
15 Valuation of ImpactsModels presented are not too dissimilar but there are some who argue that damages could be much greater.At 3% discount rate damages range from $43 to $74 trillion over 100 years. Annual world GNP was about $30 trillion in So annual damages are about 1-2% of world GNP, which is significant but should not be insurmountable.Damages amount to $20-60tC at 3% discount rate. This would amount to 1.7 to 5.1cents/kWh or cents/litre of diesel.
16 Some Recent Meta-analyses Joel Smith and Sam Hitz: “Estimating the Global Impacts from Climate Change,” OECD Background Paper ENV/EPOC/GSP(2002)12/FINAL, Paris (2003)Joel Smith, “A Synthesis of Potential Climate Change Impacts on the US,” Pew Center, Washington, DC (2004)Richard Tol, “The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Assessment of the Uncertainties,” Energy Policy, 33: (2005)Richard Tol, “Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 21:47-73 (2002).
17 Tol: Meta-analysis of Marginal Damage Cost per tonne of C Source: Tol (2005)
18 Issues in Valuation Discount rate Valuation of loss of life Why estimates have been declining?Certain values have been ignored.
20 Policy Implications Major impacts are in relatively poor countries Major actions for mitigation are needed in industrialized countries.Effects are over a long periodUncertainties are critical.Impacts are not independent of measures takenAll these factors make action difficult to agree upon.
21 AdaptationAction to adapt is necessary whatever measures for reducing greenhouse gases are agreed on.Uncertainty and risk aversion play a critical role in determining adaptation strategy.Measures have been classified w.r.t. purpose (whether planned or autonomous) and with respect to timing (reactive or anticipatory). Autonomous, reactive adaptation does not need government intervention. Planned anticipatory intervention does
22 Adaptation Options Measures include infrastructure investments (e.g. sea defences)incentives to discourage land use in vulnerable areasInvestment in R&D for malaria control and other diseasesDevelopment of better early warning mechanisms to reduce damages caused by extreme weather conditions.Investment in development of crops suited to new climate
23 Adaptation PolicyThe need for adaptation is greatest in countries least able to afford it. At Rio it was accepted that some assistance should be provided to them.Idea that penalties for non-compliance would go to an adaptation fund was proposed. This has been taken up partly in the flexibility mechanisms (Clean Development Mechanism)Whatever policies are put in place, we have to ensure that the incentives for cost effective action remain in place (e.g. sea walls may be less cost effective than relocation but external assistance will only pay for former.
24 Mitigation Mitigation measures reduce GHGs. Current emissions are about 1 tC/capita/year. South average is 0.5 TC. North average is 3tC.2100 target is tC/capita/year. By end of next century this implies around half of current levels. This will need a ‘renewables transition’ (but we have time!)South catches up with North in 2016 w.r.t. to emissions, 2056 w.r.t. to concentrations and 2118 w.r.t. to radiative forcing.
25 Aside – How Much are We Doing in Renewables? UK!
26 Mitigation Measures to reduce emissions fall into: Energy efficiencyClean energy productionCarbon sequestration.It is expected that energy efficiency will make the major contribution in the next decade, whereas physical carbon sequestration will be the last category to come on line.
27 Mitigation In Kyoto Time Frame Under the Kyoto Agreement industrialised countries agreed to reduce emissions by 5.2% w.r.t levels by Or about 150 mn. tons carbon/year (39 Annex I countries)No reduction commitment by non Annex I countries.Agreement on the importance of flexibility mechanismsEmissions trading between Annex I countriesPermission to transfer/acquire emissions from projects between Annex I countries (JI) (Art 6)Permission for Annex I countries to acquire emissions from non Annex I (CDM) (Art 17).
28 Kyoto Protocol- Recent Developments Ratification by Russia brought KP into effectUSA has not ratified and so is not party to the Protocol but is looking at alternative ways to reduce GHGsVoluntary Programs (PCA)About 25 states are pursuing some kind of GHG reduction policy. Proposals range from carbon sequestration to stationary source emissions reductions.Wyoming: Carbon sequestrationCalifornia: GHG registry, mobile source limits.MA., NH: Four pollutant legislation – Nox, SO2, CO2, Mercury. Limits on all four.
29 Mitigation MeasuresThe cost of mitigation is the difference in costs between the reference situation and a new one characterised by lower emissions (IPCC, 1999).Two approaches to estimating costs of mitigation.”Top-down" studies analyse aggregate behaviour based on prices and use of macro instruments such as carbon taxes.At the sector and project level mitigation costs studies use "bottom-up" models based on detailed performance characteristics and technology prices.
30 Mitigation MeasuresBottom Up models come up with lower cost estimates than top down models.National estimates also differ.For a 20% reduction in emissions ”bottom-up" studies estimate negligible to slightly negative costs. Top down models estimate costs of up to 5-7% of GDP.Differences arise because ofImplementation costs (not allowed for in B-U models)Technological possibilities (not allowed for in T-D models)
31 Mitigation: Co-Benefits Measures to reduce GHGs have co-benefits in the form of lower emissions of PM, Sox, Nox, etc.In the case of Russia estimates of such benefits are estimated at as much as $16 per ton of carbon.In the case of the EU the estimate is that these benefits could be as much as 17% of the costs of the GHG reduction.The implication of co-benefits are:Give special incentives for projects that reduce use of emissions of coal, high sulphur oil.Developing country reductions per ton of carbon are worth more than in developed countries where emissions of PM, Sox, Nox, etc. are better controlled.
32 Flexibility Mechanisms Flexibility reduces costs because it allows Parties to exploit differences in abatement costs.Particularly large between industrialised and developing countries.E.g. Japanese estimates of marginal abatement cost per ton of carbon to meet their target is $234 while that for USA is $153, with the EU in between $198. For developing countries estimates of options are in range of $0-25 per ton.
33 Flexibility Mechanisms: Cost Savings GDP Changes in 2010 Under Different Scenarios
34 Key Issues for KP with flexibility mechanisms Agreement on baselines (ALL)Carbon leakage (CDM)Guarantee of additionality (CDM)Proceeds of CDM projectsTreatment of sequestration and Land UseLinks between different mechanismsRoles of private and public sectors (e.g. Carbon Funds at World Bank)Flexibility no to fully replace domestic actions
35 Key Issues for the Kyoto Protocol Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry How have LULUCF activities been included in the Kyoto Protocol?What are the key decisions?What is the potential of LULUCF activities to reduce net emissions?3
36 Key Issues for the Kyoto Protocol Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Definitions of a forest, afforestation, reforestation and deforestationHow to address the harvesting/regeneration cycle and aggradation/ degradation (Art. 3.3 or 3.4)How to deal with permanence under Articles 3.3 and 3.4?What activities are eligible under Article 3.4?whether to limit credits under Article 3.4whether business-as-usual uptake can be creditedWhat needs to be monitored?Which, if any, LULUCF activities are eligible in the CDM?afforestation, reforestation, slowing deforestation, forest/range-land/cropland management, agroforestryhow to address the issues of permanence, baselines, leakage and sustainability criteria under the CDM
37 Key Issues for the Kyoto Protocol Article 12: CDM Emission reductions ... shall be certified by operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties... on the basis of:(a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved;(b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and(c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.Does this include sinks? Does it refer to gross or net emissions? Current text suggests allowing afforestation and reforestation, but no other LULUCF activities25
38 Key Issues for the Kyoto Protocol Emissions Trading 25
39 Why emissions trading?Reaching a given target at minimum costEconomic argumentEnvironmental argumentEnvironmental effectiveness and minimum cost are two core building for any long-term climate policy
40 Why EU emissions trading? Is a scheme restricted in terms of geography,sectors and gases worthwhile?Yes, it‘s better than no ET at allOne needs to start somewhereInternational, broad ET scheme won‘t fall from sky in revolutionary fashion, but will rather be the outcome of an evolution. EU ETS is a first and major step in this direction.
41 A product of an intense debate voluntary vs. mandatory participationdemand will create supply, but supply won’t create demandabsolute vs. relative targetscredits vs. allowancessimplicity vs. complexity
42 EU Emissions Trading Scheme an entity-based domestic cap and trade emissions allowance programmeTiming:three-year mandatory start-up phase from 2005 to 2007five-year mandatory Kyoto phase from 2008 to 2012 ctd.Allocation method:Member States may auction up to 5% for 2005 to 2007Member States may auction up to 10% for 2008 to 2012Common allocation criteria:transparency, comments by the public, scrutiny by the Commission
43 EU Emissions Trading Scheme ctd. Coverage:five major downstream sectors with thresholdsstart with carbon dioxideMonitoring:In accordance with EU-wide plant level monitoring guidelinesCurrency:Allowances, linked to Kyoto Assigned Amount Units and entitling emission of 1 tonne of CO2equivalentSanctions:Financial penalty of €40 / €100 per non-surrendered allowance (tonne of CO2)Making up for a shortfall in following year
44 Implementing the EU ETS identify covered installationscap-and-trade infrastructuremonitoringregistriesinitial allocation of allowancesdata-intensiveunpopular aim is scarcity
45 EU ETS as a driver for innovation carbon constrained world - from threat to opportunitycreate an enabling environment that rewards innovation directly in the marketit is early days to draw lessons
46 The EU ETS and international developments While some countries question whether they should accept / respect GHG emission targets …and others discuss (for years) whether and how to design an ET scheme …Europe has opted for pragmatic learning by doing …and is determined to make the EU ETS a success
47 Mitigation Options In Longer Time Frame: Three Messages 60% cuts feasible—and options more abundant than thought:full range of renewables, hydrogen, fuel cells, efficiency…..nuclear…Costs not prohibitive: < 0.5% to 2.0% of GDP by 2050, or a few month’s growth in 50 yearsResults consistent with those of many other studiesInnovation holds the key Importance of innovation policy—at national and international levelsTo begin with the main messages on UK energy policies and climate change, the UK’s position was summed up in the Energy White Paper of 2003.This was a framework document for policy, not a policy document itself, since policies were already in place when it was produced, and they continue to be updated and revisited. I will comment on the policies later, but let me state the three main messages:The document was partly a response to the report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (2000), which had proposed that the UK aim for 60% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions by (The UK is already of course committed to the Kyoto Targets). After an extensive analysis the paper concluded that 60% cuts were technically and economically feasible. In particular:There was a wide range of technological options available or emerging that could be developed further, including renewables, carbon capture and storage, nuclear power and energy efficiencyThe transition to a low carbon economy need not be disruptive to economic growth.These results were consistent with many other national and international studies2 Innovation to develop and reduce the costs of low carbon technologies and practices holds the key. Hence:3 Much importance is attached to innovation policy—quite apart from environmental policy itself. This, I think, is the novel element which Prime Minister Blair is trying to inject into the international dialogue, via the G-8 and others, to move us ‘beyond Kyoto’.
48 Costs of Mitigation: % Change in Projected World Product (survey of Barker and Koehler, 2004) I mentioned that the costs of responding to climate change estimated in the UK were within the range estimated by many other studies. Here are the results of a meta analysis by my colleagues Barker and Koehler. They show the costs as a % of GDP as a function of % CO2 abatement from the baseline (which is usually emissions in 1990).
49 Costs of 50-70% CO2 reductions by 2050 < > 5% reduction in GDPsSource: Anderson and Leach review for DTIThis considers a cross-section of results for 50-70% reduction of CO2. The UK estimates fall into the lower half, around %.Estimates vary greatly with modelling approach. For example, most economic models have very restrictive assumptions on availability and costs of the backstop technologies—and some assume that no non-carbon technology is available!—so surprisingly they end up with higher costs.Engineering-economic models based on ‘bottom up’ systems analysis such as the approach we used for the UK make more realistic assumptions as to the alternatives available, and explore several pathways. These are associated with the lower cost estimates.The above estimates of -1.0 to 5.0% of GDP need to be compared with long run growth assumptions. For a world economy growing at 3% per year for the next 50 years, we are looking at % increases in world product; and even at 2% growth (quite a conservative assumption) the increase would be approaching 200%. Hence a sacrifice of say 2.5%GDP would still leave the world 3-4 times better off economically than it is today. This is why we have argued that there need be no significant loss of overall economic welfare in the transition to a low carbon economy, and there is a slight chance, depending on rates of innovation, and on the world prices of fossil fuels, that we may be economically better off.
50 World Incomes and Energy Demands 2001 Economies: Developing a/ RichPopulation, millions 4,Income Per Capita, $ , ,000Energy Use:--Total (EJ)--Per capita (GJ)--Electricity (kWh)/capita) ,500--Millions without elctrty , ~ 0Growth per decade:--per capita incomes %b/ 30%--total energy use 35% 15%a/excl. FSU & E. Europe b/100% per decade in India and ChinaWe are also aware of course of the impending growth of emissions from developing countries, whose population will soon be nearly 10 times greater than that of the rich countries, while their per capita consumption is barely 1/8th of that of the OECD. Putting these facts together points to very large demands emerging in developing regions—several times those of the US and Europe combined.
51 Technologies in Pacala-Socolow Analysis Vehicle fuel economy—e.g. hybrid+ vehicle at 60mpg instead of 30 mpgMore efficient buildings (buildings account for about 1/3rd of energy use)Natural gas for coal in power generationCarbon capture and storage from fossil power plantsCarbon capture and storage from fossil fuels—for hydrogen productionNuclear power—700 GW or 10-15% more of future electricity supply (450GW today)Electricity from wind and PVs — 1500 GW (~10-12% growth)Electricity energy from PVs — 3000 GW (~ 15% growth)Biofuels to replace fossil fuels for transport — 34 million barrels per day from 15% of the world’s cropland (world oil demand today is 75 mbd.)Fuel cell vehicles using hydrogen--Similar to Range of Options being pursued or under review in UKThese are only 10 of the fifteen technological and energy-management options they cover, each capable of 1 GtC of abatement by 2050.Several of the options, in efficiency, CCS, nuclear power, and in renewable energy are indeed capable of producing several 1 GtC wedges of abatement.These technologies are similar to the ones we considered in the Energy White Paper. We would add the following:Decentralised generation based on micro-turbines or fuel cellsDecentralised CHPOffshore wind and marine energyEnergy system management using new information technologies (including the ‘virtual utility’ for local level management)Small and large scale energy storage systems (crucial for dealing with intermittency in the long term)
52 Intergenerational Equity There are issues of inter and intragenerational equity.Intergenerational equity is captured in the discount rate. At 5%+ rates climate change is not a problem for the present generation.But high rates are not justified for such long periods (underlying growth over 100 years plus is not more than 1-2%)On the other hand solutions in next 100 years that make emerge that make renewable energy very cheap
53 Intragenerational Equity Rich industrialised countries are responsible for the emissions but developing countries face the impacts and the costs of adaptation. Solutions?Allocate targets to industrialised countriesNo targets to developing countriesAdditional funds to assist in meeting adaptation costsAdditional funds for long term development of sustainable strategyTechnology Transfer
55 Implications of Population Based Carbon Allocations RegionMT Carbon P.A. IN 2020Pop Based Allowance MT.Transfer at $10/Ton $BN.N. America2,31433914.9W. Europe11144784.7Ind. Asia4791632.1FSU & EE1024474.33.1All Developing48864553.2-37.4Nb. ODA in 2001 was $52 billion!
56 Recent DevelopmentsGreater agreement on the presence of significant impacts:Stern Report (UK)IPCC 4th Panel Report (forthcoming March 07)Statements by scientists.Recognition that action by developing countries will be needed and that ‘fast growing’ developing countries are different from other countries that have slower development – in Africa mainly.But the last CoP in Nairobi did not have any post Kyoto agreement.
57 Issues for discussionImpacts: Action in the face of huge uncertainty and very long term horizonsAdaptation: Programs with appropriate mix of public and private actions and aid.Mitigation: Flexibility mechanisms and how to exploit them to the best advantageExtension to LULUCFEquity: discount rates, sustainable development while meeting the climate challenge