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Political Economy of Development Crises. How History Matters in the Congo Simon Hartmann Austrian Research Foundation for International Development, Vienna.

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Presentation on theme: "Political Economy of Development Crises. How History Matters in the Congo Simon Hartmann Austrian Research Foundation for International Development, Vienna."— Presentation transcript:

1 Political Economy of Development Crises. How History Matters in the Congo Simon Hartmann Austrian Research Foundation for International Development, Vienna Andreas Exenberger Institute for Economic Theory, Policy and History, Innsbruck Preliminary Draft Paper submitted to the DSA Annual Conference 2012 in London, 3 November 2012

2 Schedule Contemporary crises in the DRC Framework (and why it is relevant) Short historical overview Application of the framework. ie political centralization

3 Economic and Human Development Crises UNDP/HDI, Penn World Tables, forthcoming in Exenberger/Hartmann (2013)

4 Violent Crises (I): 1998-2007 Coghlan et al. (2007: 13)

5 Violent Crises (II): 1960-1998 Ndikumana/Emizet (2005: Table 3.1)

6 The Framework (I) Step II: Recontextualization of Crises Step I: How History Matters:Reorganization and Categorization channelscontinuityineffective institutional change institutional change non-institutional change institutionspersistencechange persistance outcomespersistance change informal norms persistence/very slow change recontextualization crises (poverty/violence)economic capabilities/limitation of violence (governmental/non- governmental) transmissioncontinuity/ineffective institutional change/institutional change/non- institutional change

7 The Framework (I) Step II: Recontextualization of Crises Step I: How History Matters:Reorganization and Categorization channelscontinuityineffective institution al change institution al change non- institution al change institutionspersistencechange persistance outcomespersistance change informal norms persistance/very slow change recontextualization crises (poverty/violence)economic capabilities/limitation of violence (governmental/non- governmental) transmissionscontinuity/ineffective institutional change/institutional change/non- institutional change

8 The Framework (II) Institutions and Outcomes Categories (see Acemoglu/Robinson 2012) categorizationindicators political centralizationmonopoly of violence (military, police …), taxation/public goods, non-governmental violence, secessions, inter- state/inter-regional wars, the ability to increase accountability of local rulers (versus despotismus), juristictional hierarchy, stratification … pluralityentry barriers, monopolies, respect for civil liberties (association, assembly … free media), number of organizations (non-elite), access to organization, empowerment … rule of lawaccess to courts, independence of judiciary, generality, abstractness and certainty … property rightsrisk of expropriation, property rights, efnorcement, the definition (private, community, land, labour (serfdom, slavery) or capital, entre barriers …

9 The Framework (II) Institutions and Outcomes Categories (see Acemoglu/Robinson 2012) categorizationindicators political centralizationmonopoly of violence (military, police …), taxation/public goods, non-governmental violence, secessions, inter- state/inter-regional wars, the ability to increase accountability of local rulers (versus despotismus), juristictional hierarchy, stratification … pluralityentry barriers, monopolies, respect for civil liberties (association, assembly … free media), number of organizations (non-elite), access to organization, empowerment … rule of lawaccess to courts, independence of judiciary, generality, abstractness and certainty … property rightsrisk of expropriation, property rights, efnorcement, the definition (private, community, land, labour (serfdom, slavery) or capital, entre barriers …

10 Short Historical Overview © Simon Hartmann, in Exenberger/Hartmann (2013: Table 1)

11 Political Centralization periodformal institutionsoutcomescategorizationinformal norms precolonialdiversity of political systems: relative centralized kingdoms, kings, councils, local rulers, tributes, army (kingdom of kongo > 20,000 soldiers), also decentralized social groups new class of warlords in the kingdom of kongo, luba and lunda, decentralized despotism,traditional rule weakened: disintegration of kingdoms (kongo …), increase in number of secessions (sonyo...), conquests (ndongo...), plurality in forms of control plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords age sets, secret socie- ties, … legal security backed by powerful chiefs, power transition from spiritual and traditional to economic and military, decentralized despotism on the rise colonialBerlin Treaty 1884/84, colonial doctrines, triple alliance(administration- business-church), colonial army (19,000-40,000 soldiers, admin.), mercenary armies (private), indigenous intermediaries, colonial tax system (non-monetary, monetary) replacement of old chiefs with new chiefs: 400 in the early 1890s, 6,000 in 1919, traditional chiefs sustained influence - straw man, weak centraliz- ation, non-monetary tax – direct raise of income, monetary taxation - labor mobil- ization, taxation played a minor role, public goods (railway, streets, schools, medical care), informal seces- sions/conquer of Eastern regions (Arabs) power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes, informal rules altered (alienation of leadership) unification of the territory through military conquest, and economic destruction of pre-exisitng kingdoms, decentralized despotism post-colonialConstitution&laws, personalistic, single party state, Armed Forces (50,000 soldiers + 15,000 DSP, 30,000 police), all executive powers for the president, nationalization program (zairianisation), taxation (income tax, etc.), directly controll of the DSP and let the rest deteriorate, appropriation/ distri-bution, public goods deteriorate, secessions: for example the katanga (1960-63), and south kasai (1960-61) secessions, the simba rebellion (1964), katanga (1977), mobutu (1965) and kabila (1997) coup,) … weak centralization, after 1998 de-facto secession of the eastern territories (1/3 of the country) power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes decentralized despotism

12 Political Centralization periodformal institutionsoutcomescategorizationinformal norms precolonialdiversity of political systems: relative centralized kingdoms, kings, councils, local rulers, tributes, army (kingdom of kongo > 20,000 soldiers), also decentralized social groups new class of warlords in the kingdom of kongo, luba and lunda, decentralized despotism,traditional rule weakened: disintegration of kingdoms (kongo …), increase in number of secessions (sonyo...), conquests (ndongo...), plurality in forms of control plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords age sets, secret socie- ties, … legal security backed by powerful chiefs, power transition from spiritual and traditional to economic and military, decentralized despotism on the rise colonialBerlin Treaty 1884/84, colonial doctrines, triple alliance(administration- business-church), colonial army (19,000-40,000 soldiers, admin.), mercenary armies (private), indigenous intermediaries, colonial tax system (non-monetary, monetary) replacement of old chiefs with new chiefs: 400 in the early 1890s, 6,000 in 1919, traditional chiefs sustained influence - straw man, weak centraliz- ation, non-monetary tax – direct raise of income, monetary taxation - labor mobil- ization, taxation played a minor role, public goods (railway, streets, schools, medical care), informal seces- sions/conquer of Eastern regions (Arabs) power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes, informal rules altered (alienation of leadership) unification of the territory through military conquest, and economic destruction of pre-exisitng kingdoms, decentralized despotism post-colonialConstitution&laws, personalistic, single party state, Armed Forces (50,000 soldiers + 15,000 DSP, 30,000 police), all executive powers for the president, nationalization program (zairianisation), taxation (income tax, etc.), directly controll of the DSP and let the rest deteriorate, appropriation/ distri-bution, public goods deteriorate, secessions: for example the katanga (1960-63), and south kasai (1960-61) secessions, the simba rebellion (1964), katanga (1977), mobutu (1965) and kabila (1997) coup,) … weak centralization, after 1998 de-facto secession of the eastern territories (1/3 of the country) power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes decentralized despotism

13 Political Centralization (I) periodformal institutionsoutcomescategorizationinformal norms precolonialdiversity of political systems: relative centralized kingdoms, kings, councils, local rulers, tributes, army (kingdom of kongo > 20,000 soldiers), also decentralized social groups new class of warlords in the Kingdom of Kongo, Luba and Lunda, traditional rule weakened: disintegration of kingdoms (kongo …), increase in number of secessions (sonyo...), conquests (ndongo...), plurality in forms of control plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords age sets, secret societies, … legal security backed by powerful chiefs, power transition from spiritual and traditional to economic and military, decentralized despotism on the rise

14 Political Centralization (II) periodformal institutionsoutcomescategorizationinformal norms colonialBerlin Treaty 1884/84, colonial doctrines, triple alliance(administr ation-business- church), colonial army (19,000- 40,000 soldiers, admin.), mercenary armies (private), indigenous intermediaries, colonial tax system (non-monetary, monetary) replacement of old chiefs with new chiefs: 400 in the early 1890s, 6,000 in 1919, traditional chiefs sustained influence - straw man, weak centralization, non- monetary tax – direct raise of income, monetary taxation - labor mobiliza- tion, taxation played a minor role, public goods (railway, streets, schools, medical care), informal secessions/conquer of Eastern regions (Arabs) power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes unification of the territory through military conquest, and economic destruction of pre- exisiting kingdoms, decentralized despotism. Rules of the game gradually shifted (,alienation of leadership)

15 Political Centralization (III) periodformal institutionsoutcomescategorizationinformal norms post-colonialconstitution&laws, personalistic, single party state, Armed Forces (50,000 soldiers + 15,000 DSP, 30,000 police), all executive powers for the president, nationalization program (zairianisation), taxation (income tax, etc.), directly control of the DSP (det. of the rest), appropriation/ distribution, public goods deteriorate, secessions: ie Katanga (1960-63), and south Kasai (1960-61) secessions, the Simba rebellion (1964), Katanga (1977), Mobutu (1965) and Kabila (1997) coup,) … weak centraliza- tion, after 1998 de- facto secession of the eastern territor-ies (1/3 of the country) power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes deterioration of public goods, decentralized despotism

16 Political Centralization (IV) pre-colonialcolonialpost-colonialcategorization plurality in forms of power and control, emergence of a new class of warlords power symbiosis among elites (triple alliance, local rulers), /institutional changes (colonial doctrines …) power symbiosis among elites (government, army, local rulers)/institutional changes persistent weak political centralization/chan ge in institutions = ineffective institutional change (IIC)

17 How history matters in the Congo: Political Centralization Weak centralization (as IIC) and poverty Societies with very different governance approaches were forced to align under a new set of political rules which were mainly extractive. Strong political centralization has never been a necessary condition for participation in rent- seeking See for example the role of taxation Non-institutional factor: geography (rimland country, Herbst 2000) Advanced question: Why the DRC persists as a collapsed state?


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