Presentation on theme: "CSPP WHO PAYS FOR WHAT WHERE AND WHY? INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE OF CORRUPTION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT PROFESSOR RICHAD ROSE FBA Director, Centre for the Study."— Presentation transcript:
CSPP WHO PAYS FOR WHAT WHERE AND WHY? INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE OF CORRUPTION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT PROFESSOR RICHAD ROSE FBA Director, Centre for the Study of Public Policy University of Strathclyde Glasgow Quality of Government Institute, U. of Gothenburg 17 January 2012
PROJECT OUTLINE Data: Up to 500 sample surveys of individuals in 120+ countries in five continents, with most countries covered in two different samples, Criteria for inclusion: Key questions asked about contact with specific public services and whether a bribe is paid for the service. Four-year project: Funding: British Economic & Social Research Council Co-investigator: Prof. William Mishler, U. of Arizona Project partner: Transparency International Berlin 2
3 A STRUCTURED BOTTOM UP APPROACH TO AGGREGATION Data about individual experience can be aggregated within a nation, at national level, trans-nationally or multi-nationally Social groups: e.g. poor, women, old Specific public services: e.g. police, health care Context: Urban/rural. National. Categories of countries. Compare national scores as an composite of aggregate scores
4 FORMS OF SOCIAL CAPITALPRE-MODERN, MODERN or ANTI-MODERN Q. What should you do to get prompt admission to a hospital; a government- subsidized flat you were not entitled to; a permit or official document? HospitalHousingPermit (endorsing: more than one answer allowed) Wait, nothing can be done Beg, tell a story, write letter Use connections Offer a "tip" Buy in the market * *Percent saying do what you want without a permit Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer VII, 6 March – 13 April Number of respondents: 2,002.
BRIBERY DISTORTS QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW BUREAUCRATIC SERVICE DELIVERY: Provision of public services to individuals in accord with legal and institutional definitions without favouritism or corruption. PRE-MODERN VIOLATIONS. Favouritism, clientelism, patronage. BRIBERY: Payment of money to secure a personal benefit from a public authority through illegal activity (not entitled to a service) and/or unbureaucratic procedures (jumping queue, discretionary favours). LEVEL OF BRIBERY *Centralized, wholesale benefits: Bribes paid to high ups in central government for highway contracts, mineral rights, etc. *Individual, street-level benefits: Bribes paid to persons delivering services, e.g, police to ignore a speeding violation. Relevant to households and electorates. 5
HYPOTHESES ACCOUNTING FOR BRIBE-PAYING 1.CONTACT. Bribe-paying varies with an individuals contact with public services that provide entitlements or impose obligations. 2. SERVICES DIFFER. Bribe-paying varies with institutional characteristics. Bribery for a service more likely if: Local service providers Tend toward monopoly High on discretion Low on accountability Burdensome obligations 6
CONTACTS WITH SERVICES AND PAYMENT OF BRIBES Q. In the past two years have you or anyone in your household contacted any of the following public institutions? Q. (IF contact) In dealing with this institution, was it necessary to pay a bribe? No contactContact No bribe Bribe (% all respondents) Doctor, hospital Police Education Permit office Social security Army recruiting Tax inspectors Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, April Number of respondents: 1,606. 7
8 PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION GREATER THAN EXPERIENCE OF BRIBERY Q. To what extent do you see the following institutions as affected by corruption? Q. In dealing with any of these institutions in the past two years, was it necessary for you or anyone in your household to give a bribe? Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer XV, April Number of respondents: 1,606.
9 3. VULNERABILITY. Bribe-paying varies with socio-economic vulnerability e.g. income-education-class; gender, urban/rural. Percentage bribe-paying by lower income quartile differs from upper income quartile: Permits13% Utilities 8% Customs 8% Police 7% Education 7% Health 6% Land uses 3% Tax 2% Judiciary -4% Source: Transparency International 2010 Global Corruption Barometer Report, p. 15, 91,600 pooled respondents in 86 countries.
10 4. EVERYBODY IS DOING IT. The more corruption is perceived as normal, the more likely individuals are to pay bribes. (Not confirmed by Russian analysis) 5. NATIONAL CONTEXT INFLUENCES BRIBE-PAYING Colonial past Post-Communist European Union member state Media freedom Elections; democracy Urban or rural location Economic development; oil (To be tested with multi-level modelling within and between continents)
11 IMPACT OF PAYING BRIBES ON RUSSIAN REGIME SUPPORT Dependent variable: Support for political regime. Variance accounted for: 39.6% Bs.e. Beta Corruption Number of contacts Number of bribes paid General perception corruption Mean perception, corrupt services Bribery acceptable Political performance Evaluation current economy510254** Trust political institutions351009** Officials act fairly591609** Feel freer now381406* Regime is democratic160606* Political awareness Learn from friends Learn from what I see Learn from media Political interest Ability to pay Age Education Social status Income quartile Female ** Significant at.00 * Significant at.01
12 POLICY SUGGESTIONS Delivery to end users of public services needs More transparency Maximize impersonality through the Internet Bribery more common for non-market than for market services such as post office, shopping. Vouchers to create alternative sources to monopoly supplier? Reducing national corruption score requires specifying disaggregated targets
COMPARING APPROACHES TO CORRUPTION/ BRIBERY QoGCSPP DefintionCompoundSingular Topics Extensive Intensive DataAggregatedDisaggregated JudgmentalExperiential MethodsMixedModels supported by Historicalmulti-level modelling Geography:Intensive, EUExtensive, global Trans-nationalWithin societies, NUTS regionsLocal Policies InstitutionalService-specific SectoralIndividual 13