1. Juvenile Justice Reform in California Presented by: Elizabeth Siggins Chief, Juvenile Justice Policy California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

2. Juvenile Justice Reform in California The System In Context (2004): Juvenile Arrests: 206,201 Probation Department Dispositions: 169,681  Closed at Intake: 60,942 (36%)  Informal Probation: 5,444 (3%)  Diversion: 7,881 (5%)  Transferred: 8,848 (5%)  Petitions Filed: 86,283 (51%) Source: CA Department of Justice. Juvenile Justice in California, 2004

3. Juvenile Justice Reform in California Petitions Filed in Juvenile Court: 86,283 Dismissed: 17,411 (20%) Diversion/DEJ/Transferred: 5,396 (6%) Informal Probation: 4,842 (6%) Non Ward Probation: 3,255 (4%) Remanded to Adult Court: 252 (<1%) Wardship: 55,129 (64%) Source: CA Department of Justice. Juvenile Justice in CA, 2004

4. Juvenile Justice Reform in California Wardship Dispositions : 55,129 Own or Relative’s Home: 34,613 (63%) Secure County Facility: 13,223 (24%) Non-Secure County Facility: 1,966 (4%) Other Public/Private Agency: 4,668 (8%) Division of Juvenile Justice (CYA): 659 (1.2%) Source: CA Department of Justice. Juvenile Justice in CA, 2004

5. Juvenile Arrests 206,201 Probation Department Dispositions 169,681 51% of Dispositions 86,283 32% of Disposition 55,129 0.4% of Dispositions 659 The Juvenile Justice System in California 2004: Most Youthful Offenders Are Kept Locally Youth Committed to the State’s Division of Juvenile Justice Youth Adjudicated with Formal “Wardship” Petitions Filed in Juvenile Court Probation Department Dispositions

6. Juvenile Justice Reform in California The Historical Context Legislative Efforts to Keep Youth Locally Sliding Scale Fee Legislation (1995) Legislative Efforts to Enhance Local Services Challenge Grants I & II (1996-98), JJCPA (2000) VOI/TIS (beginning 1997/98) Despite these efforts, ongoing tensions between state and 58 counties Increasing Frustrations with CYA/DJJ SB 1793(attempted to eliminate YOPB) SB 459 (limited YOPB’s role)

7. Juvenile Justice Reform in California The Historical Context Very early in the Schwarzenegger Administration, problems at DJJ (then CYA) became high profile. Expert reports in Farrell v. Hickman revealed significant deficiencies throughout the department (Jan 2004):  DJJ’s failure to ensure safety from violence  Due process violations  Improper and illegal conditions of confinement  Inadequate medical and mental health care

8. Juvenile Justice Reform in California The Historical Context Problems at State Facilities Highlighted (cont’d )  Inadequate access to education, substance abuse treatment, and sex offender programs  Denial of religious rights  Disability discrimination Extensive legislative and media attention throughout winter and spring 2004 Inspector General’s Report Jan. 2005

9. Juvenile Justice Reform in California High Profile Commitment to Juvenile Justice Reform: Governor Schwarzenegger at N.A. Chaderjian in November 2004. Stipulated Agreement in January 2005.

10. Juvenile Justice Reform in California Incarceration Rates Note: Total at-risk population: 10-69 years of age; Adult at-risk: 18-69 years of age; Juvenile at-risk: 10-17 years of age. Source: CA Department of Justice, Crime in California, 2003

11. Juvenile Justice Reform in California DJJ Commitment Compared to the Arrest Rate Source: Office of Research, Juvenile Justice Branch, Information Systems Unit

12. Juvenile Justice Reform in California DJJ Institutions and Parole Populations 1974-2004 Source: Office of Research, Juvenile Justice Branch, Information Systems Unit

13. What does Juvenile Justice “Reform” mean?

14. CA COMPARED TO OTHER STATES Unusual Features of the California Juvenile Justice System Longer extended age for juvenile court jurisdiction (age 24) than most states. One of 6 states where length of stay is based on an indeterminate commitment with a maximum. One of 11 states which have the juvenile authority within an adult corrections agency. One of 7 states with a juvenile parole board.

15. Juvenile Justice Reform Working Group 2004 There was no consensus in significant areas:  Separate Juvenile Justice agency?  Reduce age of jurisdiction?  Make local courts responsible for release authority?  Replace sliding scale with an incentive system (realignment)?  Even transferring aftercare to counties was later abandoned. Note: Everyone agreed the State needed to take a stronger leadership role.

16. Juvenile Justice Reform in California Pressure in Farrell lawsuit continued to increase: State failed to implement early commitments.  Separate high and low risk offenders.  “Open programming.”  Reduce violence. State committed to transforming the state system to a rehabilitative model. Lots of pressure to eliminate the state juvenile justice system all together.

17. What does Juvenile Justice “Reform” mean?  Reform what happens in state system?  Reform who goes to state system?  Do we need a state system?

18. DJJ’s Population Trends: Primary Offense on First Commitment  The percentage of youth committed for a violent offense has increased significantly since the 1960’s, from less than 15% to over 60% today.

19. Juvenile Arrests 206,201 Probation Department Dispositions 169,681 51% of Dispositions 86,283 32% of Disposition 55,129 0.4% of Dispositions 659 The Juvenile Justice System in California 2004: Most Youthful Offenders Are Kept Locally Youth Committed to the State’s Division of Juvenile Justice Youth Adjudicated with Formal “Wardship” Petitions Filed in Juvenile Court Probation Department Dispositions

20. California Compared to Other States California houses a lower percentage of committed youth in its state facilities than the national average and other comparison states. Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook, 2005 (Chris Murray analysis of data)

21. State “Incarceration Rate”  The state “incarceration rate” for youth in California is lower than other comparison states. Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook, 2005 (Chris Murray analysis of data)

22. DJJ’s Population: Trends Length of Stay The increase in violent offenses has been accompanied by an increase in the average length of stay for initial commitments from 18.8 months in 1986 to 36.3 months in 2005. Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook, 2005 (Chris Murray analysis of data)

23. What does Juvenile Justice “Reform” mean?  Do we need a state system?  Reform who goes to state system? Need Risk/Needs Assessment  Reform what happens in state system?

24. Implementing an Effective Rehabilitative Model within State Juvenile Justice System Challenges: Applying research to an operational model that can be supported financially and politically. Staff Training Quality Assurance Evaluation

25. Cost of DJJ’s System DJJ’s COST PER YOUTH (Estimated) DJJ institutions cost more than $120,000 per youth in FY 05-06 2005-06 Expenditures Juvenile operations$178,589,000 Juvenile education & programs$138,523,000 Juvenile parole$ 40,468,000 Juvenile healthcare$ 56,135,000 Total$413,715,000 Less parole$ 40,468,000 Total for institutions$373,247,000 Average daily population for 2005 3,100 Cost per bed per year $ 120,402 Source: Governor’s Budget, Budget Year 2006/07 (Prepared by Chris Murray)

26. Cost of DJJ’s System Other States Cost Far Less The five comparison states that were visited generally cost less than half of DJJ costs. Missouri$57,170 Washington*$68,564 Florida$57,998 Texas$56,582 Colorado (waiting for data) *Washington costs do not include education Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook, 2005 (Chris Murray analysis of data)

27. Cost of DJJ’s System: Why is DJJ so much more expensive? The analysis is not complete but preliminary findings (subject to refinement) show that: In Washington State, the average salary for the position equivalent to a Youth Correctional Officer (YCO) is 55% of that earned by a typical YCO in California.  The average for the position equivalent to a Youth Correctional Counselor (YCC) is 67% of a YCC in California.  Adjusting for wage differences, the “Washington” program in California would cost about $113,000 per youth per year – a figure which does not include educational costs. Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook, 2005 (Chris Murray analysis of data)

28. Cost of DJJ’s System: (cont’d) In Missouri, the average salary for the position equivalent to a Youth Correctional Counselor is 41% of that earned by a typical YCC in California (Missouri does not employ Youth Correctional Officers).  Adjusting for wage differences, the “Missouri” program in California would cost about $141,000 per youth per year. (This calculation also subject to refinement.) Source: Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook, 2005 (Chris Murray analysis of data)

29. Juvenile Justice Reform Plan All six remedial plans have been filed in court. Safety & Welfare (the most comprehensive) Eliminates “general population” Risk/Needs Assessment Plans based on principles of effective intervention:  Need  Responsibility  Dosage  Treatment Reduces living unit size Enhances staffing Source: (Gendreau, 1997; Andrews& Bonta, 1998; Guerra 1995; Palmer, 1995; Miller& Rolnick, 1991, 2001; etc.)

30. Juvenile Justice Reform Plan Some Controversial elements of DJJ’s Plan:  Explores the possibility of placing female offenders in contract placements  New staff classifications  Requires significant resources  Ultimately seeks new facilities  Unfortunately, energy is not concentrated on effective implementation or quality assurance, but on trying to get support for the “reform plan.”

31. Juvenile Justice Reform Plan Why is it so difficult? What does “reform” mean? What would “success” mean? Field is reactive in nature. Stakeholders not educated about evidence (e.g., importance of risk/needs assessment, etc.).

32. How could we do (or should we have done) this differently?

33. Juvenile Justice Reform in California On a positive note… In many circles, evidence-based language is becoming the “norm.” State and counties are working together. California Juvenile Justice Accountability Project.  Survey of Current Practices  Common Indicators /Outcome Measures Moving toward a stronger continuum? Change takes time.