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Y UGOSLAVIA II: E UROPEAN S ECURITY IN F OCUS PI5501 European Security after 1945.

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Presentation on theme: "Y UGOSLAVIA II: E UROPEAN S ECURITY IN F OCUS PI5501 European Security after 1945."— Presentation transcript:

1 Y UGOSLAVIA II: E UROPEAN S ECURITY IN F OCUS PI5501 European Security after 1945

2 T OPICS FOR D ISCUSSION European Security after the Cold War Questions of Intervention Questions of US withdrawal Dilemmas of intervention Dayton peace accords (1995) Peace-keeping and peace-building Europe, US, and Russia Kosovo and NATOs first out of area operations (1999) Where are we now? The Kosovo effect


4 T HE END OF THE COLD WAR Return to Mearsheimers argument: 1945-1990 was an essentially peaceful time for Europe. The end of the Cold War means a transition from a bipolar system to a multipolar system. The distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace

5 T HE END OF THE C OLD W AR Mearsheimer argues that peace in Europe is the result of three factors: 1. The bipolar distribution of military power across the continent. 2. The rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe (the importance of parity). 3. That each superpower was equipped with nuclear weapons.

6 T HE END OF THE C OLD W AR Domestic Factors: Important in generating conflict, such as the two world wars (and the dissolution of two federal states). Fall of hyper-nationalism in the Cold War International Factors: However, military power continues to remain an important factor in the peace and stability of Europe.

7 E UROPEAN S ECURITY AFTER THE C OLD W AR European Security and institutions What to do with NATO? From CSCE to the OSCE From CFSP to ESDP What role for the UN after the Cold War? Busy in other areas: examples, El Salvador, Ecuador, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique Delegating peacekeeping to regional organizations (Charter function) Shy away from humanitarian intervention

8 T HE S TATE OF I NTERVENTION The principle of state sovereignty Forms of Collective Security Pure – Maximum sovereignty Procedural – Power and Rule based Hegemonic – Power and no rules

9 D ILEMMAS OF I NTERVENTION Peacekeeping SC generally agrees to peacekeeping only when both parties have accepted third party mediation What happens when a party reneges on their commitment? Ex. Former Yugoslavia

10 T HE CONFLICT CONTINUES Bosnia (in 1990) Demographics Bosniaks 44 % Serbs 31 % Croats 17 % Independence April 1992 (after Croatia)

11 C OLLECTIVE I NTERVENTION UN Security Council SCR 713 Arms Embargo Effect on the Bosniaks Yugoslav arms and Serbs Yugoslavia initially called for the embargo SCR 743 Peacekeeping and Aid Mission Established UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) UN military escorts of humanitarian aid began in August 1992 SCR 757 Enforcement Measures Reaction to reports of concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, and the use of rape as a war tactic Banned air travel, financial transactions, sports and cultural exchanges, and scientific and technical cooperation with Yugoslavia

12 C OLLECTIVE I NTERVENTION UN and NATO SCR 787 Authorized NATO to enforce SCR 757 Also authorised NATO to begin maritime inspections in the Adriatic First time NATO was ever used as a collective security entity Splits in the Security Council Bosnian Serbs threatened to kidnap UNPROFOR troops if not neutral Thus, the UK and France were reluctant to see the UN step up collective security Russia and China refused to allow for the use of force or to provide humanitarian aid The US required a strong mandate for the use of force if it were to send troops

13 C OLLECTIVE I NTERVENTION Alternatives to the use of force SCR 764 Established the precedent of charging individuals for war crimes SCR 771 Stated that blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid was a violation of international law SCR770 and SCR 776 Increased the mandate for protecting aid convoys Tied to original rules of engagement and existing troop levels

14 C OLLECTIVE I NTERVENTION SCR 781 Banned all flights, but not enforced (Russia vetoed) Iraq no-fly-zone not authorised but enforced, Bosnia no- flyzone authorised but not enforced. SCR 808 (Revolutionised International Law) Created an ad-hoc court to try individuals of guilty genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes

15 O THER DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS The Vance-Owen Plan (January 1993) Confederation of 10 provinces split along ethnic lines Russia, France and UK favoured the plan, China did not have an opinion US (now Clinton) opposed it, calling it appeasement for Serb aggression Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan because they already controlled 70% of Bosnia

16 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE May 1993 Clinton Administration began to advocate lifting the arms embargo and conducting limited air strikes against Serb targets UK and France feared a backlash against UNPROFOR Russia vetoed, China did not have to Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan by referendum in May

17 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE What did it take? Throughout 1993, Serbs violated the no-fly-zone and began bombing Bosniak villages. SCR 816 Allowed NATO to enforce the no-fly-zone First authorization of the use of force in the former Yugoslavia Problem: each engagement had to be authorised by the Secretary General and the commander of UNPROFOR Engagement requests were denied throughout 1993 to prevent retaliation against UN troops on the ground

18 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE SCR 819 Made Srebrenica a safe area SCR 824 Further expanded safe areas SCR 836 In June 1993, NATO was authorised to use air strikes against Serb forces surrounding the safe areas. Russia and China abstained from all of these resolutions

19 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE July 1993 Serbs were about to take Sarajevo US prepared for air strikes against Serb positions on the hills surrounding the city HOWEVER, the UNPROFOR commander negotiated an arrangement that would place French peacekeepers on the front line between the Serbs and the city So close that they prevented any air strikes The US began to openly criticise UK and France US pointed to SCR 770 as authority to use force (enforced delivery of humanitarian aid delivery)

20 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE Getting past the impasse UK and France reluctant to use force US reluctant to go without allies NATO threatened on 9 August 1993 to undertake strategic air strikes unless the Serbs stopped their offensive Sarajevo Airstrikes would also have to be authorised by UNPROFOR command, all 16 NATO ambassadors and the UN SG. Serbs made token efforts to withdraw No airstrikes were carried out

21 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE The Owen-Stoltenberg plan Divide Bosnia into three ministries Serbs would receive 52.5% Croats would receive 17.5% Bosniaks would receive 30% UK, France and Russia supported it US did not because it rewarded a Greater Serbia to the Serbs Serbs and Croats agreed, Bosnians did not

22 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE Serbs were close to capturing three safe havens in Dec 1993. Serbs killed 69 at a market in Sarajevo in Feb 1994 NATO responded that it would use airstrikes within 20 kilometres around the city (Not UN approved) Feb 2004: NATO shot down four Serb warplanes violating the no-fly-zone This was the first use of force in the Bosnian war to enforce UNSC resolutions

23 F ROM D IPLOMACY TO THE U SE OF F ORCE Russian position was adamant against NATO strikes Yeltsin moved Russian peacekeepers into place near Serb positions to deter NATO strikes April 1994, NATO struck Serb tanks and an armoured personnel carrier near Gorazde This was the first ground strike in the conflict Yeltsin demanded to be included in any future military decisions Contact Group was formed in April 1994 to bring together the positions of US, Russia, UK, France, and Germany

24 NATO AND THE U SE OF F ORCE In August, Milosevic ordered a withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia in order to reduce the sanctions against the remaining part of Yugoslavia SCR 943 eased the sanctions on Yugoslavia Contact Group constructed a new plan to split the country, but the Bosnian Serbs rejected it US wanted to raise the weapons ban and begin to enforce weapons exclusion zones UK, France and Russia did not want to raise the risk to UN troops In September, the US unilaterally breached NATO policy by delivering weapons to the Bosniaks and enforcing weapons exclusion zones.

25 NATO AND THE U SE OF F ORCE By 1995, the Bosnian Serbs accepted that the split among the UN SC powers would prevent significant intervention by the international Community In August, the UN SC was drawing up withdrawal plans (SCR 998) However, once withdrawn, the UN was able to strike without harm to UN peacekeepers NATO began a sustained bombing campaign against Serb positions and facilities in Bosnia on 10 Sep 1995

26 F ROM F ORCE TO D IPLOMACY After two weeks of bombings, several things changed: The Croat/Bosniak forces took control of the nearly half of Bosnia (up from 28%) Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic combined into a joint negotiating committee to communicated with the Contact Group While the Serbs were willing to settle, the Croats and Bosniaks had to be pushed to accept any deal. The Dayton Peace Accords, based on the Owen- Stoltenberg plan, was signed on 5 October 1995.

27 I NTERNATIONAL P OLITICAL F IRSTS The war led to The first council resolution mentioning individual responsibility for war crimes The first time NATO acted as a United Nations authorised collective security entity The first time the council established an ad hoc tribunal The first time NATO used force in Europe The first time American and Russian troops worked together on the same mission The first preventative peacekeeping force (FYR Macedonia)

28 K OSOVO Context Kosovo declared independence in October 1991 Evidence of massive human rights violations Usual council split NATO was willing to use force without council authorisation

29 NATO IN K OSOVO Air strikes on Yugoslav forces 38 004 sorties flown 820 aircraft from 14 states Peace-keeping

30 R USSIA S RESPONSE Kosovo ended the dream of a European security system without the United States NATO was invoking rules of empire rather than of collective security Signed a joint-defence initiative with Belarus Expelled NATO representatives Withdrew from the PfP programme Withdrew mission to Brussels Withdrew communication with NATO forces in Kosovo Postponed a vote on START II Began talks with India and China on alliance

31 F ROM AUTONOMY TO INDEPENDENCE Autonomy Rambouillet talks Independence 17 Feb 2008 Kosovo effects Force without UN support Future secession: Cyprus, Georgia, Azerbaijan


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