Presentation on theme: "Embodiment and Enactivism Cognitive Computing; 2012+ 0. INTRODUCTION See: Professor Mark Bishop."— Presentation transcript:
Embodiment and Enactivism Cognitive Computing; INTRODUCTION See: Professor Mark Bishop
01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism2 Enactive perception Enactivism is a theoretical approach to understanding the mind proposed by Gregory Bateson, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and Eleanor Rosch, Kevin ORegan and Alva noe. It emphasizes the way that organisms and the human mind organize themselves by interacting with their environment. Enactive evokes the view that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism or connectionism. Under the enactive view individuals can be seen to grow into the world; it is not, a priori, represented. It is closely related to situated cognition and embodied cognition, and is presented as an alternative to cognitivism, computationalism and Cartesian dualism.
01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism3 Integrating perception, action and thought The classical, Cartesian, input-output view (Hurley, 1998) Intrinsic ontological separation of Subject of Object. Perception is input from the world to the mind Action is output from the mind to the world If input-output view is true then it must be possible, at least in principle, to dissociate our capacities for perception, action and thought. It is the main claim of the enactive view that this is not possible.
On seeing.. If seeing depended on rich, high fidelity internal representations of an out-there world, then the viewer should have access to all elements of the visual scene. But can you correctly count the number of times the players wearing white pass the basketball in the following video. 01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism4
01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism5 Experiential Blindness After surgical operation for a defective cataract some of those patients for whom whose visual sensitivity has been restored still cannot to see! For example the patient S.B. (Gregory, Eye and Brain 1977) perceived a visual impression but could not link visual sensation with movement and thought !
01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism6 Blinded by the light: inverting glasses Do inverting lenses simply invert vision? No! When first used the subject des not clearly perceive the world as simply upside down but undergoes a form of experential blindness. I.e. The subject is not completely blind but not completely able to see either. When first used the subject undergoes of period of experiental blindness until eventually vision snaps and perception is normalised the normal way up! During visual fixations, every movement of my head gives rise to the most unexpected and peculiar transformations of objects in the visual field. The most familiar forms seem to dissolve and reintegrate in ways never before seen. At times, parts of figures run together, the spaces between disappearing from view: at other times, they run apart, as if intent on deceiving the observer. Countless times I was fooled by these extreme distortions and taken by surprise when a wall, for instance, suddenly appeared to slant down to the road, when a truck I was following with my eyes started to bend, when the road began to arch like a wave, when houses and trees seemed to topple down, and so forth. I felt as if I were living in a topsy-turvy world of houses crashing down on you, of heaving roads, and of jellylike people. The fact that vision 'normalises' after adaption is supportive of the enactive view This position was explored in the AISB Workshop on Sensorimotor Theory, held at Goldsmiths on Thursday 26th September by Jan Degenaar in his paper, "A non-representationalist sensorimotor account: the case of experience with left-right inverting glasses".
01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism7 The joy of seeing The kitten test (Held and Hein 1963) Only through self- movement can one test and so learn the relevant patterns of sensorimotor dependence.
01/04/2014Embodiment and Enactivism8 Why enactive perception? Conventional blindness Damage to eye and/or the visual cortex. Experiential blindness Inability to integrate sensory stimulation with patterns of movement and thought. Cataracts, kittens, inverting glasses etc. Experiential [and inattentional] blindness are difficult to account for if perception is a simply passive activity (seeing is like a camera). A new view: enactive perception The view that perceiving is a way of acting [contra classical view that seeing entails building high fidelity representations to an out there world]. To be a capable perceiver is to understand... The effects of bodily movement on sensory stimulation when the observer moves towards an object...