1. Seizing the Signals

2. CSCE 727 - Farkas2 Reading List This class – Carr, Chs. 3, 4 – Introduction to TEMPEST, The Complete and unofficial TEMPEST Information Place http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempestintro.html http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempestintro.html – NSA, TEMPEST endorsement program, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/tempest.cfm http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/tempest.cfm – Federal Computer Intrusion Laws, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cclaws.html http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cclaws.html

3. Signal Intelligence Deriving intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic waves Types of intelligence: – Communication intelligence (COMINT) – Electronic intelligence (ELINT) – Imagery intelligence (IMINT) CSCE 727 - Farkas3

4. ELECTRONIC VISUAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY By Max Guirguis, Journal of Technology Law & Policy, 2004, http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol9/issue2/guirguis.htmla http://grove.ufl.edu/~techlaw/vol9/issue2/guirguis.html Positive results: reduced crime, efficient work place, etc. Negative results: potential misuse of recording, incorrect results, constitutional rights Surveillance of public vs. private (or reasonably expected to be private) places CSCE 727 - Farkas4

5. 5 Echelon Goal: – intercept large quantities of communication – Analyze (semi-automated) gathered data – Identify and extract messages of interest What messages are retained? – Key words – categories – Human verification Who has access to them?

6. CSCE 727 - Farkas6 The Positive Aspects Increased national security Preventive measures Global effects – Global commerce – Communication infrastructure

7. CSCE 727 - Farkas7 Negative Aspects Global (in)balance Privacy issues Misuse Law Error of analysis – Large amount of data – Sophistication of analysis – Use of results

8. Other Surveillance Issues

9. CSCE 727 - Farkas9 Eavesdropping Sender Recipient Tools: microphone receivers, Tape recorder, phone “bugs”, scanners, Radio receivers, satellite receivers, spy satellites, Network sniffing, etc.

10. CSCE 727 - Farkas10 Computer Communications TCP/IP Protocol Stack Application Layer Transport Layer Internetwork Layer Network Access Layer Each layer interacts with neighboring layers above and below Each layer can be defined independently Complexity of the networking is hidden from the application At what layer should we support security?

11. CSCE 727 - Farkas11 Security Needs Basic services that need to be implemented: Key management Confidentiality Nonrepudiation Integrity/authentication Authorization

12. CSCE 727 - Farkas12 Network Access Layer Security Dedicated link between hosts/routers  hardware devices for encryption Advantages: – Speed Disadvantages: – Not scalable – Works well only on dedicates links – Two hardware devices need to be physically connected

13. CSCE 727 - Farkas13 Internetwork Layer Security IP Security (IPSec) Advantages: – Overhead involved with key negotiation decreases <-- multiple protocols can share the same key management infrastructure – Ability to build VPN and intranet Disadvantages: – Difficult to handle low granularity security, e.g., nonrepudation, user-based security,

14. CSCE 727 - Farkas14 Transport Layer Security Advantages: – Does not require enhancement to each application Disadvantages: – Difficult to obtain user context – Implemented on an end system – Protocol specific  implemented for each protocol

15. CSCE 727 - Farkas15 Application Layer Security Advantages: – Executing in the context of the user --> easy access to user’s credentials – Complete access to data --> easier to ensure nonrepudation – Application can be extended to provide security (do not depend on the operating system) – Application understand data --> fine tune security Disadvantages: – Implemented in end hosts – Security mechanisms have to be implemented for each application --> –expensive –greated probability of making mistake

16. CSCE 727 - Farkas16 Surveillance Difficulties New Technologies – 1994: U.S. Congress: Communication Assistance or Law Enforcement Act (digital telephony bill” Encryption Data authenticity and integrity

17. CSCE 727 - Farkas17 TEMPEST U.S. government code : classified set of standards for limiting electric and magnetic radiation emanations from electronic equipments. Investigations and studies of compromising emanations.

18. CSCE 727 - Farkas18 Compromising Emanations Unintentional intelligence-bearing signals that if intercepted and analyzed can disclose classified information. Intercepted when transmitted, handled, or processed Tempest equipment: remotely mirror what is being done on a remote device, e.g., video monitor, cable wire, processing unit, etc.

19. CSCE 727 - Farkas19 Unintentional Emanations Normal operation of system Deliberate or accidental exposure to unusual environment Software induced Security Considerations: Traditional – Unauthorized access to the system – requires knowledge about the system, applications, configuration, can be detected, limited time frame, etc. Upcoming – Exploitation of compromising signals

20. CSCE 727 - Farkas20 TEMPEST History U.S. government concern about capture and reconstruction of emanations from high-security devices used to process, transmit, store sensitive data – 1950s: Introduce standards to limit “leakage” – NAG1A – 1960s: revise NAG1A to FS222 and FS222A – 1970s: revise standards – National Communications Security Information memorandum 5100 (NACSIM) – 1974: revise NACSIM 5100 – 1981: National Communications Security Committee Directive 4. – MACSIM 5100A (classified) – 1984: National Communications Security Instructions – NACSI 5400 (secret) – 1984: National Security Directive 145. by NSA NSA: Tempest: a signal problem, (http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/tempest.pdfhttp://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/tempest.pdf NSA: History of US Communications security, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/history_comsec.p df http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/history_comsec.p df

21. CSCE 727 - Farkas21 Military application WWII Enemy communications – German army eavesdropped on enemy communication while already implementing protection measures against the same attacks against German communications 1960: MI5 tempest attack on cipher machines Limited publications

22. CSCE 727 - Farkas22 Non-military Application 1966: open publication on the risk of tempest attacks 19821984: Swedish government publication on the business risk of tempest attacks 1985: van ECK – screen content disclosure 1985: Bank ATM – card info and PIN 1990: tamper resistant hardware – smart card

23. CSCE 727 - Farkas23 Electromagnetic Emissions Simplest form of electromagnetic fields: transmission and distribution lines, wall socket power: steady 60 hertz (U.S.), sinusoidal wave Electric devices: alter characteristics of electromagnetic waves (frequency, power level, wave form) – E.g., wave forms: sinusoidal, sawtooth, spike, square Capture and interpret: complex waves can be captured, interpreted, and replayed on similar device to create exact replica of the original device Field strength – Reduced with the distance from the electric device – Depends on the emanating device, e.g., type of screen, CPU,

24. CSCE 727 - Farkas24 COMSEC Four main parts: – Physical security  – Emission security – Transmission security  – Cryptographic security  Red equipment: handles plain text information with national security value Black equipment: protected (encrypted) information Unintentional emission: from Red systems

25. CSCE 727 - Farkas25 TEMPEST Attack Requires: – High level of expertise and equipment to decode captured waves – Proximity to the target – Long collection time Processing device: $5,000-$250,000

26. CSCE 727 - Farkas26 Tempest Protection Physical separation – Exclude unauthorized individuals from areas near the source of emanation Electromagnetic separation – Shielding, filtering, etc. to remove the leak Signal level minimization – Lowest feasible power-level use

27. CSCE 727 - Farkas27 TEMPEST Shielding NSA specifications – Ferrites, other frequency interference products – Shield equipment, cables, room, building, etc. – NSA standards, endorsed devices and contractors – Expensive – TEMPEST protected PC about double the price – Shielding and distance together

28. CSCE 727 - Farkas28 Threat-Based System Reduce the cost of TEMPEST efforts – Evaluation: sensitivity of information, risk of TEMPEST attack, etc. – Personnel control: physical control, unauthorized access – Compartmentalization: each sensitivity level is isolated from the others – Physical control of emanation: shield, power, noise, etc.

29. CSCE 727 - Farkas29 Tempest Procedures Government and organizational restrictions Products, installation, maintenance Reporting needs Certified TEMPEST technical authority (CTTA)

30. CSCE 727 - Farkas30 Need for TEMPEST Little public data on TEMPEST cases Government focus and funding – National security intelligence – Economic espionage Decoding device: hard to obtain Bandwidth of human intelligence vs. TEMPEST TEMPEST threat within U.S. – minimal??

31. CSCE 727 Cyber Attacks (Brief Overview)

32. CSCE 727 - Farkas32 Attack RFC 2828: “ An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat, i.e., an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of the system.”

33. CSCE 727 - Farkas33 Normal Flow Information source Information destination

34. CSCE 727 - Farkas34 Interruption Information source Information destination Asset is destroyed of becomes unavailable - Availability Example: destruction of hardware, cutting communication line, disabling file management system, etc.

35. CSCE 727 - Farkas35 Interception Information source Information destination Unauthorized party gains access to the asset – Confidentiality Example: wiretapping, unauthorized copying of files

36. CSCE 727 - Farkas36 Modification Information source Information destination Unauthorized party tampers with the asset – Integrity Example: changing values of data, altering programs, modify content of a message, etc.

37. CSCE 727 - Farkas37 Fabrication Information source Information destination Unauthorized party insets counterfeit object into the system – Authenticity Example: insertion of offending messages, addition of records to a file, etc.

38. CSCE 727 - Farkas38 Phases of Attack Improve detection by examining which “phase” an intruder’s behavior is identified Attack phases: – Intelligence gathering: attacker observes the system to determine vulnerabilities – Planning: attacker decide what resource to attack (usually least defended component) – Attack: attacker carries out the plan – Inside the system: Hiding: attacker covers tracks of attack Future attacks: attacker installs backdoors for future entry points

39. CSCE 727 - Farkas39 Passive Attack “Attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources” (RFC 2828) Sniffer

40. CSCE 727 - Farkas40 Sniffers How easy it is to sniff on – Local wired network – Wide-area wired network – Wireless devices What are the risks of sniffers? – Message content – Traffic flow

41. CSCE 727 - Farkas41 Passive attacks Interception (confidentiality) Disclosure of message contentsTraffic analysis

42. How can we protect against sniffers? CSCE 727 - Farkas42

43. CSCE 727 - Farkas43 Protection against passive attacks Shield confidential data from sniffers: cryptography Disturb traffic pattern: – Traffic padding – Onion routing Modern switch technology: network traffic is directed to the destination interfaces Detect and eliminate sniffers

44. CSCE 727 - Farkas44 Active attacks “Attempts to alter system resources of affect their operation” (RFC 2828)

45. CSCE 727 - Farkas45 Active attacks InterruptionModificationFabrication (availability) (integrity) (integrity) Give examples of attacks!

46. CSCE 727 - Farkas46 Active Attacks Masquerade Replay Modification of messages Denial of service Degradation of service Spoofing attacks Session hijacking

47. CSCE 727 - Farkas47 Degradation of Service Do not completely block service just reduce the quality of service

48. CSCE 727 - Farkas48 Intrusion Control It is better to prevent something than to plan for loss. Problem: Misuse happens!

49. CSCE 727 - Farkas49 Need: Intrusion Prevention: protect system resources Intrusion Detection: (second line of defense) identify misuse Intrusion Recovery and response: cost effective recovery models

50. CSCE 727 - Farkas50 Intrusion Prevention First line of defense Techniques: cryptography, identification, authentication, authorization, access control, security filters, etc. Not good enough (prevention, reconstructions)

51. CSCE 727 - Farkas51 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Looks for specific patterns (attack signatures or abnormal usage) that indicate malicious or suspicious intent Second line of defense against both internal and external threats

52. CSCE 727 - Farkas52 Intrusion Detection Systems Deter intruders Catch intruders Prevent threats to fully occur (real-time IDS) Improve prevention techniques IDS deployment, customisation and management is generally not trivial

53. CSCE 727 - Farkas53 Audit-Based Intrusion Detection Intrusion Detection System Audit Data Profiles, Rules, etc. Decision Need: Audit data Ability to characterize behavior

54. CSCE 727 - Farkas54 Audit Data Format, granularity and completeness depend on the collecting tool Examples – System tools collect data (login, mail) – Additional collection of low system level – “Sniffers” as network probes – Application auditing Honey Net Needed for – Establishing guilt of attackers – Detecting suspicious user activities

55. CSCE 727 - Farkas55 Audit Data Accuracy Collection method – System architecture and collection point – Software and hardware used for collection Storage method – Protection of audit data Sharing and Integration – Transmission protection and correctness – Availability

56. CSCE 727 - Farkas56 IDS Categories 1.Time of data analysis Real-time vs. off-the-line IDS 2.Location where audit data was gathered Host-based vs. network-based vs. hybrid 3.Technique used for analysis Rule-based vs. statistic-based 4.Location of analysis Centralized, distributed, network-based 5.Pattern IDS looking for Misuse vs. anomaly-based vs. hybrid

57. Incident Response

58. CSCE 727 - Farkas58 Incident Response Federal Communications Commission: Computer Security Incident Response Guide, 2001, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fasp/documents/incident_respo nse/Incident-Response-Guide.pdf http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fasp/documents/incident_respo nse/Incident-Response-Guide.pdf Incident Response Team, R. Nellis, http://www.rochissa.org/downloads/presentations/Incidence%2 0Response%20Teams.ppt http://www.rochissa.org/downloads/presentations/Incidence%2 0Response%20Teams.ppt NIST special publications, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html

59. CSCE 727 - Farkas59 Due Care and Liability Organizational liability for misuse – US Federal Sentencing Guidelines: chief executive officer and top management are responsible for fraud, theft, and antivirus violations committed by insiders or outsiders using the company’s resources. – Fines and penalties Base fine Culpability score (95%-400%) – Good faith efforts: written policies, procedures, security awareness program, disciplinary standards, monitoring and auditing, reporting, and cooperation with investigations

60. When to plan for incidents? CSCE 727 - Farkas60

61. CSCE 727 - Farkas61 Roles and Responsibilities User: – Vigilant for unusual behavior – Report incidents Manager: – Awareness training – Policies and procedures System administration: – Install safeguards – Monitor system – Respond to incidents, including preservation of evidences

62. CSCE 727 - Farkas62 Computer Incident Response Team Assist in handling security incidents – Formal – Informal Incident reporting and dissemination of incident information Computer Security Officer – Coordinate computer security efforts Others: law enforcement coordinator, investigative support, media relations, etc.

63. CSCE 727 - Farkas63 Incident Response Process 1. Preparation – Baseline Protection – Planning and guidance – Roles and Responsibilities – Training – Incident response team

64. CSCE 727 - Farkas64 How to Respond?

65. CSCE 727 - Farkas65 How to Respond?

66. CSCE 727 - Farkas66 How to Respond?

67. CSCE 727 - Farkas67 How to Response? Actions to avoid further loss from intrusion Terminate intrusion and protect against reoccurrence Law enforcement – prosecute Enhance defensive security Reconstructive methods based on: – Time period of intrusion – Changes made by legitimate users during the effected period – Regular backups, audit trail based detection of effected components, semantic based recovery, minimal roll- back for recovery

68. CSCE 727 - Farkas68 Incident Response Process 2. Identification and assessment – Symptoms – Nature of incident Identify perpetrator, origin and extent of attack Can be done during attack or after the attack – Gather evidences Key stroke monitoring, honey nets, system logs, network traffic, etc. Legislations on Monitoring! – Report on preliminary findings

69. CSCE 727 - Farkas69 Incident Response Process 3. Containment – Reduce the chance of spread of incident – Determine sensitive data – Terminate suspicious connections, personnel, applications, etc. – Move critical computing services – Handle human aspects, e.g., perception management, panic, etc.

70. Why is the Human Aspect Important? What can we do to limit damage? Are cover stories acceptable? CSCE 727 - Farkas70

71. CSCE 727 - Farkas71 Incident Response Process 4. Eradication – Determine and remove cause of incident if economically feasible – Improve defenses, software, hardware, middleware, physical security, etc. – Increase awareness and training – Perform vulnerability analysis

72. CSCE 727 - Farkas72 Incident Response Process 5. Recovery – Determine course of action – Reestablish system functionality – Reporting and notifications – Documentation of incident handling and evidence preservation

73. CSCE 727 - Farkas73 Follow Up Procedures Incident evaluation: – Quality of incident (preparation, time to response, tools used, evaluation of response, etc.) – Cost of incident (monetary cost, disruption, lost data, hardware damage, etc.) Preparing report Revise policies and procedures

74. Recent Concerns CSCE 727 - Farkas74

75. CSCE 727 - Farkas75 Recovery or Survivability? What is “Survivability”? To decide whether a computer system is “survivable”, you must first decide what “survivable” means.

76. CSCE 727 - Farkas76 Vulnerable Components 1. Hardware 2. Software 3. Data 4. Communications 5. People

77. CSCE 727 - Farkas77 Effect Modeling and Vulnerability Detection Cascading effects Seriously effected components Weakly effected component Not effected components

78. Incorporating Human Aspects? Traditional issues: password sharing, errors, fraud, insiders, malicious users, social engineering, etc. New issues: perception management, psychological operations, communication media – Egypt: role of the Internet, A. Alexander, Internet role in Egypt's protests, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 12400319 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 12400319 CSCE 727 - Farkas78

79. CSCE 727 - Farkas79 Legal Aspects National law International law Legal regime to apply Gray areas of law Legal response Evidence preservation

80. THEMIS: Threat Evaluation Metamodel for Information Systems Presented at the 2nd Symposium on Intelligence and Security Informatics, 2004 Csilla Farkas, Thomas Wingfield, James B. Michael Duminda Wijesekera Themis, Goddess of Justice

81. CSCE 727 - Farkas81 Cyber vs. Kinetic Attack Academic State-of-the-Art: Effects-Based Analysis Problem: Charter Paradigm Means-Based The Schmitt Reconciliation – Distinguishing Military from Diplomatic and Economic Coercion – Seven Factors Use of Force in Cyberspace

82. CSCE 727 - Farkas82 Severity Immediacy Directness Invasiveness Measurability Presumptive Legitimacy Responsibility Schmitt Factors

83. CSCE 727 - Farkas83 Severity People Killed; Severe Property Damage Armed attacks threaten physical injury or destruction of property to a much greater extent than other forms of coercion. Physical well-being usually occupies the [lowest, most basic level] of the human hierarchy of need. How many people were killed? How large an area was attacked? (Scope) How much damage was done within this area? (Intensity) People Killed; Severe Property Damage People Injured; Moderate Property Damage People Unaffected; No Discernable Property Damage

84. CSCE 727 - Farkas84 Immediacy People Killed; Severe Property Damage Over how long a period did the action take place? (Duration) How soon were its effects felt? How soon until its effects abate? Seconds to Minutes Hours to Days Weeks to Months The negative consequences of armed coercion, or threat thereof, usually occur with great immediacy, while those of other forms of coercion develop more slowly.

85. CSCE 727 - Farkas85 Directness People Killed; Severe Property Damage Was the action distinctly identifiable from parallel or competing actions? Was the action the proximate cause of the effects? Action Sole Cause of Result Action Identifiable as One Cause of Result, and to an Indefinite Degree Action Played No Identifiable Role in Result The consequences of armed coercion are more directly tied to the actus reus than in other forms of coercion, which often depend on numerous contributory factors to operate. The voluntary and wrongful act or omission that constitutes the physical components of a crime. Because a person cannot be punished for bad thoughts alone, there can be no criminal liability without actus reus.

86. CSCE 727 - Farkas86 Invasiveness People Killed; Severe Property Damage Did the action involve physically crossing the target country’s borders? Was the locus of the action within the target country? Border Physically Crossed; Action Has Point Locus Border Electronically Crossed; Action Occurs Over Diffuse Area Border Not Crossed; Action Has No Identifiable Locus in Target Country In armed coercion, the act causing the harm usually crosses into the target state, whereas in economic warfare the acts generally occur beyond the target’s borders. As a result, even though armed and economic acts may have roughly similar consequences, the former represents a greater intrusion on the rights of the target state and, therefore, is more likely to disrupt international stability.

87. CSCE 727 - Farkas87 Measurability People Killed; Severe Property Damage Can the effects of the action be quantified? Are the effects of the action distinct from the results of parallel or competing actions? What was the level of certainty? Effects Can Be Quantified Immediately by Traditional Means (BDA, etc.) with High Degree of Certainty Effects Can Be Estimated by Rough Order of Magnitude with Moderate Certainty Effects Cannot be Separated from Those of Other Actions; Overall Certainty is Low While the consequences of armed coercion are usually easy to ascertain (e.g., a certain level of destruction), the actual negative consequences of other forms of coercion are harder to measure. This fact renders the appropriateness of community condemnation, and the degree of vehemence contained therein, less suspect in the case of armed force.

88. CSCE 727 - Farkas88 Presumptive Legitimacy People Killed; Severe Property Damage Has this type of action achieved a customary acceptance within the international community? Is the means qualitatively similar to others presumed legitimate under international law? Action Accomplished by Means of Kinetic Attack Action Accomplished in Cyberspace but Manifested by a “Smoking Hole” in Physical Space Action Accomplished in Cyberspace and Effects Not Apparent in Physical World In most cases, whether under domestic or international law, the application of violence is deemed illegitimate absent some specific exception such as self-defense. The cognitive approach is prohibitory. By contrast, most other forms of coercion—again in the domestic and international sphere—are presumptively lawful, absent a prohibition to the contrary. The cognitive approach is permissive.

89. CSCE 727 - Farkas89 Responsibility People Killed; Severe Property Damage Is the action directly or indirectly attributable to the acting state? But for the acting state’s sake, would the action have occurred? Responsibility for Action Acknowledged by Acting State; Degree of Involvement Large Target State Government Aware of Acting State’s Responsibility; Public Role Unacknowledged; Degree of Involvement Moderate Action Unattributable to Acting State; Degree of Involvement Low Armed coercion is the exclusive province of states; only they may generally engage in uses of force across borders, and in most cases only they have the ability to do so with any meaningful impact. By contrast, non- governmental entities are often capable of engaging in other forms of coercion (propaganda, boycotts, etc.).

90. CSCE 727 - Farkas90 Overall Analysis People Killed; Severe Property Damage Have enough of the qualities of a use of force been identified to characterize the information operation as a use of force? Use of Force Under Article 2(4) Arguably Use of Force or Not Not a Use of Force Under Article 2(4)