1. Federal Aviation Administration Commercial Space Transportation Human Space Flight Occupant Safety Telecon Telecon 5 – Aborts and Abort Systems. December 18th, 2012 Henry Lampazzi

2. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 2 Agenda Introduction Rules of Engagement Next Steps Last Month’s Topic Today’s Topic Wrap-up Today’s facilitator is Henry Lampazzi

3. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 3 Introduction The FAA may not propose regulations covering occupant safety until October 2015. We now plan to turn our efforts to drafting guidance and best practices. We'd like input from technical folks from industry and government to help us. We are hosting a series of one-hour telecons, each with a narrow focus on a specific technical topic to be held about once a month. We are using our industry advisory committee, COMSTAC, to help us. We are not soliciting any proposals for agency support on this topic at this time. This is background research.

4. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 4 Rules of Engagement 1. When speaking, please identify yourself so we can follow up with you if we have more questions. 2. We are recording this teleconference. We will publish minutes that summarize the discussion. 3. Please limit your time to 5 minutes of time to allow for greater participation. You are welcome to follow up with a phone call or email to Pam Melroy at pam.melroy@faa.gov or 202-267-7793.pam.melroy@faa.gov 4.Call-in information: Call-In Number: (605) 475-4000 Participant Access Code: 574039# Help Line (For Problems with Connection): 877-482-5838

5. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 5 Next Steps After today’s meeting, we will take some time to put together minutes and publish them on the AST website. The minutes will contain a list of attendees, the topic(s) discussed, and a summary of what was discussed. We look forward to you participating in the next conference call on January 15 th 2013 at 1 pm Eastern.

6. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 6 Key Terms and Definitions for Commercial Human Spaceflight Safety We worked to identify and define key terms and definitions relevant to commercial human spaceflight. To facilitate this process, we solicited input from the various parties who have a vested interest in the industry and discussed potential implications that might arise from ambiguous terms. Last Month’s Topic (13 November 2012)

7. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 7 Today’s Discussion Topic Aborts and Abort Systems. Abort systems have in the past been an element of many government human space flight systems for the purpose of enhancing occupant safety. Today’s discussion should move forward into the Commercial HSF era while utilizing lessons learned from previous operations.

8. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 8 Questions for Today’s Discussion Topic We will discuss the following questions from a guidance perspective: a)Does an abort apply to the launch/ascent phase only, or does it apply to other flight phases as well? b)Is an abort system a part of fault tolerance? c)For what types of vehicle designs should launch abort systems be recommended?

9. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 9 Today’s Discussion Topic Continued d)What should the reliability be for an abort system? e)Should operators have a different level of care for occupants during an abort? f)Which of these abort initiations would you recommend for a minimum level of safety? Manually by the crew, Manually by the ground, or Automatically?

10. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 10 Today’s Meeting Objective Upon completion of this meeting we will have discussed: Abort philosophies Which phases of flight are susceptible to aborts How various aborts pertain to various vehicle types Abort reliability Expectation of level of care during aborts Abort initiation

11. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 11 Launch Abort System Working Definition “An escape system used on launch vehicles, primarily vertical systems, used to separate occupants from the launch rocket stage(s) in the case of an imminent catastrophic event.”

12. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 12 Discussion Continued a)Does an abort apply to the launch/ascent phase only, or does it apply to other flight phases as well? (Example: downmode to ballistic on reentry)

13. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 13 Discussion b)Is an abort system a part of fault tolerance? If single fault tolerance is recommended, should the abort system be considered an additional level of safety? Which do you consider single fault tolerant: 1.One IMU and an abort system? the abort system accounts for one level of safety abort after a single IMU failure 2.Two IMUs and an abort system? the abort system is an additional level of safety abort after two IMU failures

14. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 14 Discussion Continued c)For what types of vehicle designs should launch abort systems be recommended? orbital vs. suborbital winged vs. capsule horizontal vs. vertical vs. air-drop

15. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 15 Discussion Continued d)What should the reliability be for an abort system? Should it be assumed one more thing cannot fail, allowing a lower expectation of abort reliability? Should the abort system cover all or most escape scenarios? Is there a recommended minimum abort system effectiveness?

16. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 16 Discussion Continued e)Should operators have a different level of care for occupants during an abort? AST thinks best practices may include three levels of care: 1.All occupants should be protected from major* injuries. (basic care for all, nominal through single failures) 2.Human protections should allow safety-critical tasks to be performed. (Conditional level of care based on task) 3.In a contingency or emergency, minimum capabilities should provide a reasonable chance of occupant survival. *Definition of “major” TBD

17. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 17 Discussion Continued e)(cont.) Should operators have a different level of care for occupants during an abort? Should there be a fourth standard of care for aborts? For example, major injuries are acceptable? Is it possible to design a launch abort system that will always bring the occupants home alive?

18. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 18 Discussion Continued f)Which of these abort initiations would you recommend for a minimum level of safety? manually by the crew? manually by the ground? automatically?

19. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 19 Wrap-up Thanks to everyone for participating! You can post comments, questions, etc. to Docket FAA-2012- 0818. If anyone has any new topics or suggestions on improving this discussion process, contact: Pam.Melroy@FAA.gov 202-267-7793 We look forward to you participating in the next conference call on January 15th. The topic will be “ Fault Tolerance, Margin, and Reliability ”.

20. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 20 15 January 2013 Topic Fault Tolerance, Margin, and Reliability. To allow for industry innovation, the commercial human space flight industry wishes to be free to the maximum extent possible to choose between fault tolerance, design margin, and reliability. We will explore the extent of this desire with the following questions:

21. Office of Commercial Space Transportation Federal Aviation Administration 21 15 January 2013 Topic Continued a)What would be an acceptable rationale at a functional level for a choice of fault tolerance, design margin, or high reliability to protect the safety of spacecraft occupants? b)What should the minimum level of fault tolerance be? Should it be different for orbital vs. suborbital? c)When is occupant risk high enough to warrant additional fault tolerance? d)What should determine whether fault tolerance is handled at the functional level or system level?