1. The Peloponessian War 431 – 404 B.C. “ If one looks at the facts themselves, one will see that this was the greatest war of all.” Thucydides

2. The Peloponnesian War 431 – 404 B.C. The Archdamian War (431 – 421 B.C.) Peace of Nicias Sicilian Expedition 415 B.C. The Sicilian War The Ionian/ Decelean War (413 – 404 B.C.) Oligarchic Coup of Athens (411 B.C.) Defeat of Athens & End of Delian League (404 B.C.)

4. Contents Historical Background Thirty Years’ Peace * Greek World 431 B.C. * Spartan Society * Athenian Society Clash of Cultures? * Pericles * Declaration of War Battle of Sybota* The Potidaean Affair Cleon Alcibiades The Great Plague Death of Pericles The Archdamian War (431 – 421 B.C.) Peace of Nicias Sicilian Expedition 415 B.C. The Sicilian War The Ionian/ Decelean War (413 – 404 B.C.) Oligarchic Coup of Athens (411 B.C.) Defeat of Athens & End of Delian League (404 B.C.)

5. Historical Background Both Athens and Sparta had grown as empires throughout the latter part of the 6 th Century B.C. and early 5 th Century B.C. The First Peloponnesian War had broken out in 460 B.C. as a result of

6. Empires & Alliances Athens: Delian League Sparta: Peloponnesian League Phlius Orneae Megara Elis Mantinea Thebes Corinth

7. Thirty Years’ Peace Signed between Athens & Sparta in 445 B.C. which brought the First Peloponnesian War to an end. Lasted only 13 years. Arbitration was codified as a necessary precursor to any conflict between the two. Recognised both empires (alliances) as legitimate Allowed neutral city-states & regions to join either alliance, but none could switch alliances Neither alliance could interfere with other’s allies Athens had to give up a few territories, including Megarian ports

8. The Greek World 431 B.C.

9. Athens & Port of Piraeus

11. Clash of Cultures or Hellenistic Power Struggle? Athens Leader of the Delian League Democratic * Semi-Liberal Cosmopolitan Cultured & Artistic Maritime Empire Diverse Trade Links Sparta Leader of the Peloponnesian League Oligarchic Ultra-Conservative, Militaristic Society Insular & Isolationist Superstitious & Patriarchal Land Power Homogenistic

12. Spartan Society An Oligarchic, Demi-Monarchic Complexity King Spartans Helots Perioikoi Traders & manufacturers “like someone sitting in wait for disasters to strike the Spartans” Aristotle They would gladly eat the Spartans raw” Xenophon “most institutions among the Spartans have always been established with regard to security against the Helots” Thucydides Gerousia: Council of 28

13. Sparta ‘Mixed constitution’; containing monarchic, oligarchic & democratic elements

14. Sparta’s Allies: The Peloponnesian League

15. Athenian Society: Cosmopolitan, mixed, democratic society Literature, arts and evolution of 'free thinking': Socrates Since the ascent of Pericles, Athenian democracy had taken on a more ambitious, outward-looking zeal

16. The Delian League Founded in early 5 th Century B.C. to resist the Persian threat. Other city states joined. Treasury initially located in Delos Members gave money (not ships) to combine their efforts in resisting Persian threat Treasury moved to Athens in 454 B.C. Monies were used to strengthen the military (naval) power of Athens and also used to aid the construction of the Parthenon

17. Pericles’ Building Programme Pericles initiated an ambitious building programme in 455 B.C.

18. Pericles 495 – 429 B.C. “Freedom is the sure possession of those alone who have the courage to defend it” “We do not imitate, but are a model to others” “Just because you do not take an interest in politics doesn't mean politics won't take an interest in you” “Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now.”

19. Pericles Became leader of Athens in 461 B.C. establishing a popular vote in the Athenian Assembly which ultimately resulted in the exile of the Athenian leader, Cimon. A patron of the arts Hostile to Sparta Led the ambitious building programme of Athens – resulting in the timeless architectures of the Parthenon and the Acropolis Ambitious, democratic and a great orator Founded many of the democratic institutions of Athens Led the mission to recapture Delphi from the Spartans in 448 B.C. and the invasion of Samos ‘Age of Pericles’ = 460 – 429 B.C.

20. The Ecclesia

21. The Ecclesia: Pynx Here at the 'Pynx', usually about 6,000 Athenians would voted directly on Athenian policy, law and elect the 'strategoi' Pericles democratic reforms of 452- 451 allowed for payment of jurors, thereby opening up attendance to almost all levels of society. The Ecclesia usually met about forty times a year, deciding on public honours, ratifying peace agreements or declarations of war, electing strategoi, public construction, bestowal of honours etc.

22. Corcyra & Corinth: Emissaries in Athens Corcyra “A victim to the injustice of others” “your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in our hearts.” “yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval power in Hellas” “a power that comes in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and honour as she will receive” Corinth “Corinth is at least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in truce.” “Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less heavily on us than on yourselves” “When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels.”

23. Corinth v. Corcyra: Battle of Sybota 433 B.C. Athens receives emissaries from both Corinth & Corcyra over dispute Corcyra appeals for Athenian help BUT Corinth warns Athens of any involvement in internal Corinthian affairs Athens decides to help Corcyra, albeit in a defensive posture, sending ten ships to aid her defence. Just as the Corinthians were about to defeat Corcyra, a further 20 Athenian triremes arrived to bolster their defense. When questioned by Corinthians, Athenians steadfastly declare their willingness to defend Corcyra. Both Corinth & Sparta interpret this as a breach of the Thirty Years’ Peace treaty.

24. Battle of Sybota 433 B.C. Significance: 1)Known as the ‘first grievance’ between the Athenians & Spartans 2)Athenian response to Corinthian delegation at the Battle of Sybota: "Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her possessions, we shall do our best to stop you." 3)Both sides claimed victory in this battle.

25. Pericles’ Funeral Oration

26. In this funeral oration for the Athenian soldiers, Pericles makes his famous speech concerning the virtues of Athens, it’s citizens and their way of life. Pericles describes Athens as a “model to others” rather than an imitator. Pericles places Athens’ strength in its citizens, their character being a reflection of the society they inhabit. Pericles also makes subtle references to Sparta and the regressive nature of their military strength. Pericles extols the courage of the dead Athenians, imploring others to take their place to secure Athens’ destiny as the greatest, and most forward- thinking state in the Hellenic world.

27. Thucydides: Pericles “For as long as he was prominent in the city in peace- time he guided with moderation and preserved her in safety, and in his time she became very great...The fact is that he retained the power of his influence by reason of his reputation, the quality of his mind, and his utter integrity, and so was able to restrain his fellow-citizens by his moderation, free though they were: he was not led by the Many, he led them”

28. The City of Epidamnus

29. Spartan Declaration of War

31. The Potidaean Revolt 432 B.C. Colony of Corinth but a tributary ally of Athens.*

32. Three Phases of War The Archdamian War 431 – 421 B.C. The Sicilian War The Ionian/ Declean War

33. The Archdamian War 431 – 421 B.C. 431 – Outbreak of Plague in Athens 429 - Siege at Plataea - Death of Pericles 428 – Revolt of Mytilene 427 – Debate of Mytilene 426 – Battle of Olpae 425 – Battle of Pylos & Sphacteria 424 – Battle of Delium 422 – Battle of Amphipolis 421 – Peace of Nicias

34. Siege at Plataea 429 B.C. "If we begin the war in haste, we'll have many delays before we end it, owing to our lack of preparation." - King Archidamus II (Sparta)

35. Siege at Plataea 429 B.C. Archidamus beseiged the twon of Plataea, which only consisted of 800 citizens and 85 Athenians The Plataeans resisted courageously & Archidamus resorted to starving the city out Eventually, about half of the population escaped, but the other half eventually surrendered These were brought before a Spartan court, where they were asked simply "Whether, during the present war, they had rendered any assistance to the Lacedaemonians and their allies?" These 200 citizens & 25 Athenians were then executed. This is seen as one of the overt causes of the Peloponnesian War

36. Thucydides Account: Plataea "the treaty had now been broken by an overt act after the affair at Plataea" "Athens and Lacedaemon now resolved to send embassies to the King and to such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for assistance."

37. Periclean Strategy: Tactical Land Retreat & Naval War Pericles convinced his people to perform a tactical retreat behind the walls of Athens, supported and supplied by their powerful fleet through the port of Peiraeus Of a total population of 172,000, only 60,000 citizens lived within the city “..the upheaval was a harsh experience, for most of them had always been accustomed to live in the country...in their grave depression they took it badly that they were abandoning their homes and the shrines that had been theirs traditionally from the very earliest days of the community, and that they were about to change their style of life.”

38. The Great Plague

39. Effects of the Plague: Pericles' Strategic Flaw Pericles' strategy had depended on the Athenian Navy protecting their supply ships to the Port of Pireus This strategy proved to be their undoing; as the surrounding population of Attica retreated behind the walls of Athens, the over-crowding would contribute to the disease The supply ships apparently brought the plague with them and the whole city of Athens, walled in, became a hot-bed of disease As the disease spread, Thucydides writes of the physical, social and moral decay that beset the city. In his account, we see Thucydides depart from his usual scientific, dispassioned accounts.

40. Thucydides: Effects of the Plague Physical: “discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress...internally it burned so that the patient could not bear to have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description; or who plunged into the rain-tanks in their agonies of unquenchable thirst..... for it settled in the privy parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, some too with that of their eyes”

41. Thucydides: Effects of the Plague Social : “the bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the fountains in their longing for water.... sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had died there...... for as the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or profane.... they threw their own dead body upon the stranger's pyre and ignited it; sometimes they tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of another that was burning, and so went off....”

42. Thucydides: Effects of the Plague Moral : “Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had nothing succeeding to their property..... they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches as alike things of a day..... it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful..... Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them..... As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.”

44. Death of Pericles 429 B.C.

45. Revolt of Mitylene 428 B.C.

46. Why Mitylene Revolted Mytilenians saw an opportunity (plague in Athens, death of Pericles and continuing war) of removing themselves from the Athenian Delian League and of establishing their rule over the whole island of Lesbos. Mytilene hoped to unify the entire Island of Lesbos under its control Methymna, however, was a loyal ally of Athens Peloponnesian caution as always, had delayed the offer of Mytilenean revolt before the war Tenedians & Mytilenians informed Athens of impending insurrection against Athenian control

47. Revolt of Mitylene Athens, upon realising that rumours of Mytilene were true, dispatched forty ships to Lesbos. They were to demand the turnover of Mytilean ships and the tearing down of their walls. If not, all-out war was to be waged. Mytileans were informed of the coming of the Athenians and began barricading themselves inside their town After an initial skirmish with the Athenian fleet, the Mytilenians sued for peace. The offer was accepted and a Mytilenian ambassador was dispatched to Athens to plead their innocence and in hope of regaining their ships detained at Athens. However, in case of failure, the Mytilenians also sent an ambassador to Lacedaemon to plead for assistance. This duplicity would have profound implications for the citizenry of Mytilene.

48. Battle of Lesbos Mytilenian ambassador to Athens returns empty-handed; battle recommences Athenians & their allies formed a naval blockade of the island An Anthenian sortie meanwhile ravaged lands along the coast of the Peloponnese The Mytilenian Ambassador was instructed by the Spartans to come to Olympia, so that the Peloponnese Alliance could hear his request. The Mytilenian rationale in this speech is......

49. Mityleanian Request to Sparta "Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech, especially as we are asking for alliance;.......as long as the Athenians led us fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection of the allies, then our apprehensions began......but the same system also enabled them to lead the stronger states against the weaker first, and so to leave the former to the last, stripped of their natural allies, and less capable of resistance... We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made them court us in war, and us them in peace... Our revolt, however, has taken place prematurely and without preparation- a fact which makes it all the more incumbent on you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order to show that you support your friends, and at the same time do harm to your enemies.

50. Athens Invades Peloponnese invade Attica (after request of Mytilenians) Athens ravages Spartan coast Mytilenians attack Methymna (ally of Athens) Athens reponds with an invasion force; first by a naval blockade of the town, reinforced by 1,000 infantrymen under Paches, blockading Mytilene with a wall either side; by land and by sea. Salaethus was sent to inform the Mytilenians of forthcoming help from the Peloponnesians. (40 ships) Eventually, the Mytilenians realise that no help is forthcoming from the Peloponnesians, demand that the city authorities sue for peace with the Athenians. Salaethus' attempt to lead the citizenry in arms against the Athenians leads to this general consensus of peace-seeking.

51. Settlement in Lesbos Paches, the Athenian commander, now took control of Mytilene & seized Antissa. Paches sent Salaethus and over a thousand Mytilenians to Athens to await judegement Paches then settled in Mytilene with the remainder of his forces, dispatching most of them back to Athens with the prisoners

52. Debate of Mitylene (427 B.C.)

53. Debate in Athens: Mitylene Salaethus was immediately put to death, nothwithstanding his offer of removing the Peloponnesians from Plataea Great resentment & anger was felt at the Mytilenian revolt The Peloponnesian fleet, spotted on its way to relieve the Mytilenian insurrection against Athens, now became evidence of a long- planned treachery of Mytilene against Athens. Many felt that severe punishment should be brought against Mytilene: 1) Kill the entire male population of Mytilene, not just the guilty prisoners brought to Athens 2) enslave all the females and children of Mytilene A message was dispatched to Paches, at Mytilene, to carry out these orders.

54. Cleon: Warmonger & Demagogue? Cleon, a former opponent of Pericles in the Athenian Assembly and now one of its most powerful statesmen, advocated a total reprisal against the Mytilenian population as an example to the rest of the Delian League. Cleon had proposed the removal of Pericles in 430 BC for 'maladministration of Athenian finances' Described by Thucydides as a warmonger and demagogue: Thucydides was exiled due to a decree by Cleon for 'military incapacity' Cleon has become infamous in history for his proposal to genocidally-cleanse Mytilene both in reprisal and for the sake of setting an example to all of Athens' rivals Image:‘Bluster’, from Aristophanes’ Knights depiction of Cleon?

55. Mitylenian Debate: Cleon "I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire” “never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led by listening to their appeals” “bring you no thanks for your weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority given you by your own strength and not their loyalty” “ ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit in more important matters” “where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it and most amply requites it” “this is not revolt- revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and wanton aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies; a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the acquisition of power”

56. Mitylenian Debate: Diodotus

57. Mitylenian Resolution

58. Battle of Olpae 426 B.C.

62. Demosthenes & King Agis Battle of Pylos & Sphacteria 425 B.C.

63. Battle of Pylos & Sphacteria Demosthenes, on his way to put down a revolt in Sicily, was driven by a storm into Pylos. Here, Demosthenes, realising he was on Spartan territory, instructed his men to fortify the coast with whatever stone & wood they could find. Demosthenes then sent out 2 triremes (ships) to bring back the Athenian Navy- Eurymedon - to aid them. He had 5 ships left. The Spartan ships, seeing that they're territory was being held by Athenians, attempted to blockade them with ships in the Bay of Navarrino and placing troops on the island of Sphacteria

64. Battle of Pylos & Sphacteria The Spartans, somewhat distracted by a religious festival and their annual invasion of Attica(15 days) at this time, were slow to respond. When they did, the Peloponnese occupied the mainland and brought 60 ships in to surround the Athenian stronghold They occupied the island of Sphacteria with 420 men under Epitadas The Spartans intended to blockade both the inlet by Pylos (2 ships) and the entrance to the Bay of Navarriono (8-9 ships) Day 1: Demosthenes brought 60 of his heavy infantry and a few archers outside his fortifications to repel any assault by landing craft Spartan assault by land & sea: 43 ships under Thrasymelidas Brasidas led the most courageous of assaults on the fortification, but upon landing, was eventually severely wounded and beaten back – his shield was picked up by the Athenians and used as a trophy

65. Demosthenes' Speech at Pylos “In emergencies like ours calculation is out of place; the sooner the danger is faced the better......One of the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the landing......supposing that we succeed in repulsing him, which we shall find it easier to do, while he is on board his ships, than after he has landed and meets us on equal terms... Large as they may be he can only engage in small detachments, from the impossibility of bringing to... to stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the water's edge, and save yourselves and the place."

66. Battle of Sphacteria & Pylos Day 2:Day 3:

68. Battle of Amphipolis 422 B.C: Death of the 'War-Hawks'

69. Battle of Amphipolis March 422 B.C. Spartans Brasidas -2,000 hoplites Athenians Cleon - -1,500 Athenians -Some allies -Attack or Siege??

70. Battle of Amphipolis Cleon Hesitates while Brasidas takes the High Ground Cleon, attempting to launch an attack against Amphipolis, first took the town of Torone and captured up to 700 prisoners. Having set up a trophy, Cleon then sailed onto Amphipolis, where Brasidas was fortifying the defenses. Cleon then made his base in Eion, and called for reinforcements from Thrace. Brasidas observed the inaction of Cleon’s forces at Eion, and took an observation point at Cerdylium. This, according to Thucydides, was a point “commanding a view on all sides” Brasidas called up 1,500 Thracian mercenaries and Chalcidian targeteers, heavy infantry (approx. 2,000) & 300 “Hellenic horse” 1,500 were stationed on high ground with Brasidas at Cerdylium, the rest reinforcing the town of Amphipolis

71. Battle of Amphipolis: Cleon advances towards Amphipolis Thucydides states that Cleon was forced into premature action as: “His soldiers, tired of their inactivity, began also seriously to reflect on the weakness and incompetence of their commander, and the skill and calour that would be opposed to him, and on their own original unwillingness to accompany him.” Cleon apparently heard these rumours and decided to advance just as he had at Pylos Without waiting for his reinforcements, his plan to surround and besiege the city was now hopeless and advancing meant engaging with the enemy. There was, from his viewpoint, no apparent defences in the town. Posting his forces on a hill opposite Amphipolis, he again waited.

72. Battle of Amphipolis: Brasidas’ Counter-Strategem Brasidas came down from Cerdylium to the town upon seeing Cleon’s advance. Brasidas took 150 heavy infantry, leaving the rest under his subordinate, Clearidas, and decided to attack the Athenians just as they were retiring from their vantage point on the hill opposite. Brasidas instructed Clearidas to follow with the rest of the Amphipolitans once he had struck “terror” in “their centre” Brasidas decided on this ‘strategem’ as he knew reinforcements would not long be arriving for Cleon. Brasidas delivered a speech to his men, explaining why they were taking such a risky move:

73. Brasidas’ Speech Battle of Amphipolis “I imagine it is the poor opinion that he has of us, and the fact that he has no idea of any one coming out to engage him, that has made the enemy march up to the place and carelessly look about him as he is doing” “..the most successful soldier will always be the man who most happily detects a blunder like this..” “...by seizing the opportunity of the moment...” “do the greatest service to our friends by most completely deceiving our enemies...” “...while their careless confidence continues...more of retreat than of maintaining their position...while their spirit is slack...” “...take them by surprise and fall with a run upon their centre...”

74. Battle of Amphipolis Cleon was finally made aware of the great trap that was forming, and having been informed further of the waiting forces inside the gates of Amphipolis, gave the order for retreat to be effected by the left wing moving in the direction of Eion. Cleon, in his urgency, pushed the right wing into retreat as well and according to Thucydides, thereby; “..thus turning its unarmed side to the enemy..” Brasidas, upon seeing this general disarray and hurry within the Athenians’ retreat, shouted to his soldiers: “Those fellows will never stand before us, one can see that by the way their spears and heads are going. Troops who do as they do seldom stand a charge. Quick, someone, and open the gates I spoke of, and let us be out and at them with no fears for the result.”

75. Battle of Amphipolis Brasidas’ forces emerged from behind the gates and ran directly at the centre of the retreating Athenians, while Clearidas emerged with the remainder of the forces from the Thracian gates to support him. Attacked on both sides, the Athenians were routed by surprise, confusion and broken in two by their left flank advancing earlier to Eion. Brasidas was struck down in the fight, while Cleon, attempting to escape, was cut down by a Myrcinian targeteer. The Athenian infantry was entirely surrounded at one point, before being totally destroyed and/ or dispersed among the hills, escaping back to Eion.

76. Battle of Amphipolis: Aftermath Brasidas lived long enough to hear of the victory and Clearidas set up the tophy Brasidas was buried at the town’s expense, and thereafter was honoured by the people with sacrifices and the honour of the games Thucydides account regarding Brasidas’ stature after the Battle of Amphipolis: “...for they considered that Brasidas had been their preserver, and courting as they did the alliance of Lacedaemon for fear of Athens, in their present hostile relations with the latter they could no longer with the same advantage or satisfaction pay Hagnon his honours.” Thucydides describes the battle succinctly as an; “...affair of accident and panic that I have described”

77. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. From ‘Hawks to Doves’ Peace Settlement or Strategic Ceasefire?

78. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. From Hawks to Doves Why? Thucydides gives a number of reasons for both sides wanting peace at this time. - Spartans were eager for peace, having being reluctant to enter war in the beginning - With the death of Cleon, many Athenians felt that peace was a strategic positive - Resources?

79. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. Differing Motives Sparta -Strategem of annual invasions into Attica had proved fruitless -Humiliation at Pylos had greatly unnerved her resolve -Desparate to gain return of captured Spartan soldiers (Pylos & Sphacteria) who were related to ‘first families’ and therefore the governing body -Helots were deserting -30 Year Treaty with Argos about to expire: Argives demanding the return of Cynuria Athens -Two successive defeats at Delium (424) & Amphipolis (422) had left their ambitions in tatters -Death of Cleon had removed a ‘war-hawk’ from a principal position in Athens -Concerned about recent losses tempting her allies to rebel

80. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. Thucydides also makes another reference to the two great opponents of peace on both sides; Cleon, who according to Thucydides had opposed peace because; “he thought that, if tranquility were restored, his crimes would be more open to detection and his slanders less credited..” & Brasidas, who according to Thucydides had opposed peace because; “...from the success and honour which war gave him...”

81. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. Thucydides now makes reference to the two ‘heirs’ in both Athens & Lacedaemon; Nicias, who according to Thucydides, wanted to; “...secure his good fortune, to obtain a present release from trouble... Hand down to posterity a name as an ever-successful statesman...keep out of danger...commit himself as little as possible to fortune...” & Pleistoanax, whom Thucydides describes as being assailed by opponents at home; “...regularly held up by them to the prejudice of his countrymen, upon every reverse that befell them, as though his unjust restoration were the cause....accusation that he and his brother had bribed the prophetess at Delphi...”

82. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. Terms of the Treaty (1) Restore Athens’ territories taken in war * Restore Sparta’s territories taken in war (except Nisea) 1) Touching the national temples,....free passage by land and by sea to all who wish it...to sacrifice, travel, consult and attend the oracle or games, according to the customs of their countries 2) Temple & Shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians shall be governed by their own laws, taxed by their own state, judged by their own judges, the land & the people, according to the custom of their country 3) Treaty shall be binding for 50 years, by Athens & her allies, and by Lacedaemon & her allies, without fraud or hurt by land or by sea 4) It shall not be lawful to take up arms, with intent to do hurt, either for the Lacedaemonians & their allies against the Athenians & their allies, (vice-versa as per Athens) in any way or means whatsoever. But should any difference arise between them they are to have recourse to law and oaths, according as may be agreed between the parties.

83. Peace of Nicias 421 B.C. Terms of the Treaty (2) 5) Lacedaemonians shall return Amphipolis to the Athenians. In the case of cities given up by the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to go where they please & take their property with them: and the cities shall be independent, paying only the tribute of Aristides. 7) 8) 9) 10)

84. Biographies Pericles: Leader of Athens Cleon: Opponent of Pericles, ‘Hawk’, Demagogue Demosthenes: Strategoi, Master-Tactician Alcibiades: Nicias: Brasidas: Archidamus: Agis II: Thucydides

85. Pericles

86. Cleon: A Critical Account “Cleon, son of Cleaenetus,... the most violent man in Athens, and at that time by far the most powerful with The People, came forward....” (3.36.6) Commercial class – son of Cleaenetus – inherited a lucrative tannery business – reactionary – opponent of Pericles and his democratic reforms - indicted Pericles of 'maladministration of public finances in 430 B.C. - argued in favour of Mitylenian massacre in 427 B.C. - rabble-rouser, warmonger ('hawk') - powerful voice, natural orator – trebled the pay of jurymen (politicking) – hatred of nobility & aristocrats – hatred of Sparta – 'lost the peace' in 425 B.C. - exiled Thucydides for failed military campaign* - sent relief fleet to Demosthenes at Sphacteria – doubled the Delian League contribution of Athens' allies – killed at the Battle of Amphipolis, which paved the way for the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.) Can we trust Aristophanes' & Thucydides' account of Cleon?

87. Post-Periclean Athens Cleon: Warmonger & Demagogue? Mitylenian Debate: Cleon Mitylenian Debate: Diodotus Mitylenian Resolution Battle of Olpae 426 B.C. Demosthenes & King Agis Battle of Pylos & Sphacteria 425 B.C. Demosthenes Battle of Amphipolis: Death of the 'War-Hawks' The Uneasy Peace: 420 – 415 B.C. The Sicilian Expedition: Alcibiades, Nicias & Demosthenes The Oligarchic Coup 411 B.C. Spartan-Persian Alliance: Final Defeat of Athens

89. Sicilian Expedition 415 – 413 B.C.

90. The Generals Alcibiades ‘ambitious’ Demosthenes ‘to the rescue’ Nicias ‘cautious’

91. Prelude to Expedition Egesteans’ Request Athenian Motives & Influences “They were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently than ever.” Egestaeans at war with Selinuntines – who had made an alliance with Syracuse “Egestaeans reminded the Athenians of their alliance made in the time of Laches” “..urged as a capital argument that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, … and to get the whole power of the island into their hands… danger of their one day coming with a large force… as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethern, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out and joining these in pulling down the Athenian Empire.” Athenian Decision -Voted first to send envoys to Egesta (determine the existence of the 60 talents promised by Egesta) -Ascertain the extent of the ‘posture of the war’ with the Selinuntines

92. Prelude to Expedition Athenian Envoys Investigate Athenian Envoys Return from Egesta Returned with 60 talents of uncoined silver, for a month’s pay for 60 ships, which the Egestaeans requested Athenians held an assembly and heard from their envoys and Egestaens a report “as attractive as it was untrue” voted for to send 60 ships to Sicily under the command of Alcibiades, Nicias and Lamachus. Objectives of Sicilian Expedition (from Assembly): 1) “Help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines” 2) “Restore Leontini” 3) “Order all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens” 5 days later a 2 nd assembly was held: Nicias & Alcibiades Speeches

93. Debate in Assembly: Nicias “Chosen to command against his will” “I think, notwithstanding, that we have still this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment” “..or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do” “I affirm then that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and bring more back with you” “a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep quiet” Strategic Danger & ill-advised Ambitions “it is only too probable that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the Siceliots” “…of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already” “..others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience” “the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty” “The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible.”

94. Nicias: Charity begins at Home “instead, however, of being puffed up by the misfortune of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence” “how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon” “we are but now enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf”

95. Nicias: Beware the Ambitious (Alcibiades) “if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his own” “….specially if he be still too young to command….” “…who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses…on account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment…” “…to maintain his private splendour at his country’s risk…” “alarm seizes me…summon any of the older men that may have such a person sitting next to them… for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war”

96. Debate in Assembly: Alcibiades “The position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond what his real means would bear” “the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny” “individually, hi

97. Athens’ Decides

98. The Sicilian Expeidition Alcibiades, Nicias & set sail to Sicily

99. Sicily Prepares: The Arrival Of Gylippus