1. ION/GNSS 2011, 23 Sept. 2011 Mark L. Psiaki Sibley School of Mechanical & Aerospace Engr., Cornell University Developing Defenses Against Jamming & Spoofing of Civilian GNSS Receivers

2. ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 2 of 11 Approach of an Estimation Theorist: Reductionist Problem Solving Spoofers & jammers will be deployed against civilian GNSS receivers (mostly GPS at present) GNSS signal structures will not be modified to aid defenses Likely jammers can be bought & studied Likely spoofers can be designed/imagined/modeled Strategies for Developing Defenses: Problem Givens: Jamming:  Acquire, examine, test, & characterize jammers  Design detection, localization, & mitigation systems for known jammers (like computer anti-virus software) Spoofing:  Exploit encrypted military signals & known timing/phasing relative to defended civilian signals

3. ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 3 of 11 Jamming Mitigation Strategies Detection & localization  Deploy networked array of advanced GNSS receivers in defended region Each node is small phased-array; beam steering allows GPS tracking under jamming Example: on every New Jersey State police car near Newark Airport  Detection & localization strategies Solve layered sequence of problems 1 st detect 2 nd rough-locate based on power at several nodes, simple algorithms 3 rd fine-locate based on multi-node carrier-phase interferometry or TDOA to within meters – exploit fine-scale correlations between multiple nodes & precise inter-receiver timing from GPS 4 th interdict Develop scalable algorithms with potential to deal with 100 or more jammers simultaneously Receiver-based mitigation  Simultaneous frequency/time excision  Pose as Kalman-filter-based estimation problem & near/far signal reception problem Requisite information:  Jammer time/frequency models enable efficient/accurate detection & localization Generalized model-independent detection, localization, & mitigation for new/unknown jammer types  Like computer anti-virus software that looks for unknown viruses based on suspicious characteristics/behavior

4. Power & Spectral Time Evolution of a Cigarette- Lighter-Type Jammer * ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 4 of 11 * from Mitch et al. “Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS Jammers”, ION/GNSS 2011

5. Jammer Effective Ranges from Attenuation Tests * Faraday Box Victim Receiver GPS Signal Simulator Signal Combiner ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 5 of 11 * from Mitch et al. “Signal Characteristics of Civil GPS Jammers”, ION/GNSS 2011

6. Future Issues in Jammer Detection & Localization How can one exploit frequency-sawtooth structure of many known low-budget jammers … in detection? … in fine localization? … in receiver mitigation? (Kalman-filter-based coupled time/frequency excision?) … in an environment with many such jammers? ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 6 of 11

7. ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 7 of 11 UE with -receiver for delayed, digitally-signed P(Y) features -delayed processing to detect spoofing via P(Y) feature correlation Spoofing Detection via P(Y) Correlation * Secure antenna/receiver w/processing to estimate P(Y) features (or a single antenna or a distributed set of single-antennas) GPS Satellite Transmitter of delayed, digitally-signed P(Y) features GEO “bent-pipe” transceiver Broadcast segments of delayed, digitally- signed P(Y) features Secure uplink of delayed, digitally- signed P(Y) features * from Psiaki et al. “Civilian GPS Spoofing Detection based on Dual-Receiver Correlation of Military Signals”, ION/GNSS 2011

8. ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 8 of 11 Block Diagram of Generalized P(Y) Correlation Spoofing Detector GPS transmitter UE receiver with P(Y) fea extraction processing Secure ground- based antenna/ receiver Digital signer Secure link to broadcaster Wireless (or internet) broadcaster UE receiver (or internet link) for P(Y) fea Correlation registers Digital sig- nature verifier Spoofing Detector L1 C/A & P(Y) P(Y) fea P(Y) fea/est User Equipment New Infrastructure

9. ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 9 of 11 Early Codeless Spoofing Attack Detection * * from Psiaki et al. “Civilian GPS Spoofing Detection based on Dual-Receiver Correlation of Military Signals”, ION/GNSS 2011

10. Early Semi-Codeless Spoofing Attack Detection * ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 10 of 11 * from Psiaki et al. “Civilian GPS Spoofing Detection based on Dual-Receiver Correlation of Military Signals”, ION/GNSS 2011

11. Future Issues in Defense Against Spoofing Attack Real-time implementation  Codeless possible in 6-12 months w/internet transmission  Semi-codeless needs improved algorithmic efficiency for real-time ops Infrastructure  Capable & secure reference receivers  Help from military (declassify segments of P(Y) shortly after broadcast?)  Comm. infrastructure to transmit P(Y) data between receivers Defense against alternate attack scenarios  Sophisticated attack may seek to use pseudo- or estimated P(Y) code  Gaming analysis may guide designs that detect new attack types Other signals  M-code to defend GPS civilian codes  Encrypted Galileo signals to defend open-source Galileo codes Post-detection receiver actions ION/GNSS Sept. ‘11 11 of 11