Presentation on theme: "Normal Operations Safety Survey (NOSS) Chris Henry The University of Texas Human Factors Research Project The University of Texas at Austin First ICAO."— Presentation transcript:
Normal Operations Safety Survey (NOSS) Chris Henry The University of Texas Human Factors Research Project The University of Texas at Austin First ICAO TEM & NOSS Week Luxembourg – 10 November 2005
Aviation Safety Envelope Safety Incidents Accidents Normal Operations
Safety Data Coverage Accidents Incidents Normal Operations Voluntary Incident ReportsNOSS Accident Investigation Mandatory Incident Reports
Aviation Safety Envelope Accidents Incidents Normal Operations NOSS Rationale Proactive snapshot of system / controller performance strengths and weaknesses in normal operations (just like a health checkup)
NOSS Success Factors NOSS success is dependent upon methodology and execution Low controller trust = Low quality data because there will be no differentiation between NOSS and proficiency checks Angel Performance Natural Performance Formal Check Nobody Regulator NOSS Observer - NOSS value Controller Trust + - +
NOSS: Gaining Controller Trust 1. Over-the-shoulder observations during normal shifts 2. Joint management / association sponsorship 3. Voluntary Participation 4. Trusted and trained observers 5. Anonymous, confidential, and non-punitive data collection 6. Trusted and secure data collection site 7. Systematic data collection instrument 8. Data verification process 9. Data-derived targets for safety enhancement 10. Feedback results to controllers
NOSS Operating Characteristics 1. Over-the-shoulder observations during normal shifts No observations of controllers who are undergoing training No observations while checks are being conducted 2. Joint management / association sponsorship Letter signed by management & association representatives sent to all controllers 3. Voluntary controller participation Controllers have a right to decline a NOSS observation Denial rates in NOSS trials were low – 1 per 50 observations
NOSS Operating Characteristics 4. Trusted and trained observers Trust and Credibility Selection process – management / association approval of candidates Most observers should be line controllers – but diversity of interested parties is good. Training Classroom training, test observations, recalibration session Curriculum TEM principles and exercises NOSS observation protocols Narrative guidelines
NOSS Operating Characteristics 5. Anonymous, confidential, and non-punitive data collection No names, employee numbers, dates, experience, or other identifying information Data used for safety purposes only – no punitive actions Observers identity is known only by the third party facilitator 6. Trusted and secure data collection site Third party or controller association gatekeeper Controllers and observers must be comfortable with the data collection site 7. Systematic data collection instrument No judgments – observers record data based on TEM events
NOSS Operating Characteristics 8. Data verification process TEM data checked to ensure coding accuracy and consistency with SOP Data analysis does not begin until verification has been completed 9. Data-derived targets for safety enhancement Serve as benchmarks for safety change Initial NOSS, safety change process, follow-up NOSS 10. Feedback results to controllers Results summarized for controllers Information on how organization intends to respond to the data
NOSS Defined The 10 characteristics that differentiate NOSS (LOSA) from other methodologies have been endorsed by ICAO IATA IFATCA (6) IFALPA US ALPA UT NOSS must have all ten characteristics
Methodological Considerations At which level were the NOSS trial observations focused? Groups Groups Individual Controllers Individual Controllers Positions Positions Interviews Threats, errors, and undesired states must be observable Threats, errors, and undesired states must be observable
Threat Management Worksheet
Error Management Worksheet
Threat Codebook - I
Threat Codebook - II
NOSS Report and Raw Data Most frequent and mismanaged threats Most frequent and mismanaged errors Strengths and weaknesses of Threat and Error Countermeasures Facility to facility or sector to sector differences Comparison to similar airspace of other air traffic service providers NOSS Report NOSS Raw Data Text from all narratives Listing and coding of every threat, error, and undesired state observed
Sample Final Report Charts
Raw Data: Narratives - Handovers NOSS Observation #17Handover/Takeover #1Time Stamp 14:36 XYZ Radar Sector Positions Staffed: Radar ControllerPosition Relieved: Radar Controller The oncoming controller was at the start of their shift, when they arrived they walked straight up to the console and started a conversation with the XYZ Controller about non operational matters, this distracted the controller whilst aircraft were calling resulting in a number of missed calls from aircraft being made to the XYZ Controller. The briefing commenced with the oncoming controller not reading any of the requisite briefing material. The controller giving the HO/TO did it from memory, the checklist provided was not referred to and not all the pertinent information was covered. The controller giving the HO/TO did not mention the RWY configuration in XXX or the fact that they were on ILS approaches. At the end of the HO/TO, the relieving controller plugged in and did not voice log on.
NOSS Raw Data - Narratives ABC47 crossed into the XYZ sector but did not contact the controller. At time 19:42, BB TMA called the XYZ sector controller requesting a non- standard level of FL350 for a flight, which was approved and properly noted. During this conversation, ABC47 called but was not heard due to the ongoing conversation with BB TMA. At this point the A/C was already 40 nm into the sector (this was a very late call). A minute later, ABC47 called again and this time the controller heard the call. At this point it was discovered that ABC47 was east of track by 3nm without prior authorization leading to a potential conflict with EDF54 who was in the vicinity climbing to FL160. ABC47 given a right turn to manage the situation and both A/C were given traffic information. Additionally, CVR310 was descending through the level of ABC47 while it was not on the appropriate frequency (inside the XYZ sector).
NOSS Observation #: 27Threat #3 XYZ Radar Sector Time Stamp: 17:42 Threat Description AAA4103,04,4003, and BBB405 were operating in the XYZ airspace at the same time with similar callsigns. Threat Management Description The XYZ controller made a general broadcast to the aircraft advising of the potential for confusion and was particularly careful to ensure the correct read-back and callsign with instructions. All calls where made to the appropriate a/c and the correct a/c responded to the calls each time. Threat TypeAirborne Threat CodeSimilar Call Signs Threat Outcome:Inconsequential Raw Data: Threats
NOSS Summary Primary features Purely diagnostic – no solutions – operations health check Captures system safety and controller performance issues prior to the occurrence of incidents Identifies system safety and controller performance strengths and weaknesses in normal operations using observations Analysis Aggregated TEM data provides a safety snapshot of operations on a typical day Organizational change Measure the effectiveness safety solutions with a follow-up NOSS
NOSS – Future UT Activities NOSS & LOSA: What can each add to the other? NAV CANADA radar trial Airservices Australia tower trial Multi-stage reliability studies in conjunction with the FAA & NOSS trial partners European trials?