1. Operation ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo 1999) Lethality: Only 52 (<5%) Serbian combat systems destroyed during the 78-day air campaign 1 –14 Tanks destroyed 1 –18 APCs destroyed 1 –20 Artillery/Mortars destroyed 1 Other Factors: 6766 Sorties planned 2 –3766 (56%) sorties were aborted due to weather 2 –990 of 3000 (33%) executed sorties were adversely affected by weather 2 –Less than 50% ATO targets were effectively engaged 2 1 Allied Force Munitions Assessment Team, Kosovo Strike Assessment Final Report, 14 OCT 99 2 Joint Intelligence Team Survey

2. Operation ALLIED FORCE Operation ALLIED FORCE Battle Damage Assessment Tanks & SP Artillery APCs Towed Artillery & Mortars DOD/Joint Staff 10 Jun 99 120220450 SHAPE 11 Sep 99 93153389 Allied Force Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team 15 May 00 141820 SOURCE: 2001 Draft RAND Report, “Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999” ASSESSMENT: Over 3000 strike sorties were flown over Kosovo … dropping over 14,000 weapons … destroyed 52 Serb military combat systems.

3. Kosovo - Additional Information “There was 50-100% cloud cover 72% of the time, and only 21 of 78 days had good overall weather. In all, 3,766 Sorties were aborted due to weather.” 1 “Almost completely unchallenged on land, Yugoslav forces could disperse and hide… When revealed, slowness in the sensor-controller-shooter sequence often gave them enough time to relocate [and hide] before the attacks began.” 1 “Last year NATO claimed that it had destroyed 120 tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers and 450 artillery pieces in 744 “confirmed” air strikes. In Washington, Secretary of Defense William Cohen said these attacks had “severely crippled [Serbian] military forces in Kosovo destroying more than 50 percent of [their] artillery and one-third of the armored vehicles.” The reality, according to the Air Force report, is that NATO Destroyed 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers and 20 artillery pieces – more or less what the Serbian government said at the time which was dismissed by NATO as Serbian “disinformation”… 2 “Precision guided is no longer good enough. We experience greater than 50% cloud cover more than 70% of the time… and it wasn’t the worst part of the year. Laser or EO-guided munitions cannot hit what pilots cannot see” 3 “We’re not going to bring the dead people back to life, we’re not going to restore virginity to the women raped or recreate the kinds of semi-normal lives those people were leading until now.” 4 1 Allied Force Munitions Assessment Team, Kosovo Strike Assessment Final Report, 14 OCT 99 2 International Herald Tribune, 11 May 2000 3 Admiral Ellis, commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL 4 Dr. Eliot Cohen, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Wall Street Journal, 4 Jun 99

4. Desert Storm Desert Storm Battle Damage Assessment Kills as reported by: TanksAPCsArtillery CIA…Air War52420%24515%25512% CIA…Ground War2,10980%142385%1,94188% Kills at End of War2,63316682,196 DIA…Air War68526%37322%62228% DIA…Ground War1,94874%129578%1,57472% 1 1 1* 1 1 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993 1* Extrapolated from Gulf War Air Power Study data Lethality: 799 (30%) Iraqi tanks killed by air (44 days) 2 1865 (70%) Iraqi tanks killed by ground (96 hours) 2 Other Factors: 2000 air strikes vs. mobile SCUDs, no known hits 2 2 Joint Intelligence Team Survey

5. USCENTCOM Estimate of Iraqi Losses During the Ground Campaign 1 USCENTCOM Estimate of Iraqi Losses During the Ground Campaign 1 1 Mar 99 TanksAPCsArtillery Destroyed by Ground Forces 1708 (79%)297 (57%)1112 (76%) Destroyed by Air Forces 451 (21%)224 (43%)353 (24%) Total21595211465 ASSESSMENT: Ground Forces accounted for over 75% of Iraqi combat forces destroyed during the ground campaign of Operation DESERT STORM. 1 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993

6. Desert Storm – Additional Information 2765 aircraft Total sorties flown = 111,500 –40,900 air interdiction (AI) – 5,150 close air support (CAS) – 8,000 offensive counter air (OCA) – 9,600 defensive counter air (DCA) – 4,850 suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) –43,000 support 824 million US gallons of jet fuel consumed (including 398 million during build-up) 140 million pounds of air-to-ground munitions SOURCE: OSD Briefing, 21 Mar 91

7. Desert Storm – Additional Information “… while aircraft devoted as many as 2000 air strikes against mobile Iraqi Scud missiles, they may not have hit a single one.” 1 “Limitations of weather had a large impact on sortie generation.” 1 “Presence of enemy Air Defense imposed major limitations on sortie profiles”… 1 “8% of air delivered munitions tonnage was guided, but was 84% of the total munitions cost” 1 “I went to Kuwait with 39 tanks. After 39 days of bombing, I had 32 tanks. After 20 minutes of battle against the M1A1 tank, I had none.” 2 1 Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993 2 Iraqi Battalion Commander