1. CYBER - PHYSICAL SECURITY
James Maki & Mason Vogel

2. WHAT IS IT?
Normally a system that monitors behaviour of physical processes and takes actions to correct those behaviors.
Two Major Components

3. Cyber Process Network of tiny devices (like sensors)
Can sense, compute, and communicate (wireless)

4. Physical Process Monitored by the cyber system Could be
naturally occurring phenomenon
Man-made
Combination of the two

5. Example Cyber-Physical Systems
Temperature/Humidity Controlled Labs
Sense Temperature
Sense Humidity
Act accordingly

6. ATTACKING Areas to Attack Physical and control (Physical)
Communication and Network (Cyber)
Supervisory and Management (Human)
Attack Types
Actuator
State
Data
Insert picture of six layer of hierarchical system
Common Attack:
Eavesdropping
Compromised-Key attack
Man-in-the-Middle
Denial-of-Service

7. Green Lights Forever broadcast on a similar protocol as 802.11 (WLAN)
unencrypted
Controller setting may be configured in person or cyber
default usernames and passwords
Integrate security into system and change from factory default

8. War Games film 1983
SHALL WE PLAY A GAME?

9. Drone Attacks Drones are basically flying computers
Incredibly hard to detect drones
Drone crash in Texas

10. Phase of Worm:
targeted Winodws machine
Siemens Step7 software
compromised PLCs
Some Features:
All actions were done in memory-no disk evidence
Self-scalability control-prevent spreading to more than three others
uninstall mechanism
Code for man-in-the-middle
Could have centrifuges tear themselves apart

11. STUXNET WORM
targeting highly specialized industrial systems in critical high-security infrastructures (at least 14 sites were infected).
Modifying the code running in PLCs in order to make them deviate from their expected behavior.
Believed to had sponsorship from a nation-state, it has been suggested it was United States and Israel
Other attacks 2000 Maroochy water breach, Brazil
2003 SQL Slammer worm Davis-Besse nuclear plant
2010 Stuxnet
Could derail trains, poison water supplies, and cripple power grids (2012 Leon Panetta)

12. DETECTING AN ATTACK Cross-correlator
technique to detect False Data Injection Attacks
Intelligent Checker
Layer 1: basic process control system
Layer 2: alarm and operators
Layer 3: safety instrumented systems
Secutiry Objective:
Integrity
Authenticity
Confidentiality
Big thing is Attack detection and identification

13. Update the system

14. REFERENCES
IEEE Control Systems Magazine Feb Cyberphysical Security
Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security, Stamatis Karnouskos SAP Research, Germany, IEEE 2011
The Real Story of Stuxnet, spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet Feb 2013
Countermeasures to Enhance Cyber-Physical System Security and Safety, Giedre Sabaliaukaite and Aditya P. Mathur, 2014 IEEE
Green Lights Forever: Analyzing the Security of Traffic Infrastructure, Branden Ghena, William Beyer, Allen Hillaker, Jonathan Pevarnek, and J. Alex Halderman, 2014 Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT)

15. REFERENCES
Security Issues and Challenges for Cyber Physical System, Eric Ke Wang, Yunming Ye, Xiaofei Xu, S.M. Yiu, L.C.K. HUI, K.P.Chow, 2010 IEEE
Cyber-Physical Security via Geometric Control: Distributed Monitoring and Malicious Attacks, Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, and Francesco Bullo, 2012 IEEE
Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, Kim Zetter, 2014