Objectives Numerically describe fishers responses to (i) alternative enforcement regimes and (ii) changes in enforcement intensity Evaluate potential consequences of alternative regimes combined with other fisheries management methods Be used afterwards
Team CEFAS: overall responsibility for software and architecture IC: modules for calculating new functions (penalty prob.; enforcement cost) AZTI: links FLR to databases JRC: testing solutions for less experienced users (web access version)
Progress so far Version 1.4 (initial version as presented at the London progress meeting) 1. Input of enforcement effort – cost data and enforcement effort - probability of detecting infringement (π(e)) data, and fit appropriate models; Users can define their own effort – cost, effort - π(e) relationships Graphical illustration of the fitted relationships and data / user defined relationships 2. Investigate the quantitative relationships between costs and benefits (social benefits, private profits, level of harvesting) with changing system parameters and variables Customise the COBECOS object to any given case study (e.g. fines, lambda) Optimise for the most socially beneficial combination of enforcement efforts Include stochasticity in the prediction of illegal harvest, social benefits and private benefits Visualise the effect of all model parameters on the level of social or private benefits
Summary Tutorial meeting in London Prototype has been delivered Moving into maintenance phase Looking for feedback from users Do all Case Studies need to use it (even if they have implemented their own version)?
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