Presentation on theme: "COBECOS Case study on Icelandic cod. Overview Common types of violations Modeling approach –Using COBECOS code –Using our own code Results Conclusions."— Presentation transcript:
The COBECOS code Set up for one quantity violation –What violation to include? –Should other violations be transformed into quantity violations? What about possible interdependence between different types of violations and different types of effort?
Our own model No limit to the number of management tools or enforcement measures Current version includes the following types of violations 1.Landing/quota violations 2.Mesh size violations 3.Utilization factor/ice percentage exagg. 4.Discarding
Private benefits Pure private benefits –where is a mesh size index and is relative discards and where –mesh size affects costs: –discarding affects price:
Private benefits Full private benefit function where is the relative exaggeration of utilization (or ice percentage) and were is the function relating the enforcement effort and the probability of getting fined
Conclusions The benefits from enforcement are much larger than the costs Enforcement effort should be increased to optimize social benefits –specifically for landing and utilization factor Optimal effort depends on the parameters of the model in complex ways
Conclusions It is feasible to model a relationship with multiple management measures and types of enforcement The biggest obstacle to building complex models of fisheries enforcement is the lack of data