Presentation on theme: "Remedial Action Schemes Reliability Subcommittee"— Presentation transcript:
1 Remedial Action Schemes Reliability Subcommittee Vahid MadaniChairPacific Gas and Electric, Co.WECCPCC/OC/MIC MeetingJune 2004
2 Outline NERC Definition Application and Implementation Design development ProcessStandards and ComplianceSchemes Reviewed by SubcommitteeSubcommittee Function, Membership, and Benchmarking EffortsWide Area Monitoring and Challenges AheadQuestions ??
3 Special Protection System (SPS) NERC Defines SPS:Automatic protection system (also known as a remedial action scheme) designed to detect abnormal or predetermined system conditionsTake corrective actions other than and/or in addition to the isolation of faulted components to maintain system reliability.Actions may include changes in demand, generation (MW and Mvar),System configuration to maintain system stability, acceptable voltage, or power flows.Not included:(a) Underfrequency or undervoltage load sheddingFault conditions that must be isolatedOut-of-step relaying (not designed as an integral part of an SPS).
4 Planning, Application, and Implementation Increased TransfersAdded Reactive SupportUtilizing Reactive Supports Elsewhere in the RegionCascading OutagesRAS Failure would result in:Bulk transmission system performance outside the limits of the WECC performance requirements.Impact to the Interchanges, transfers capabilitiesImpact to contractual agreements in terms of flows and reactive margins
5 Development Process Special Protection Scheme (SPS) Definition and NeedDevelopment ProcessDesign and Analysis ToolsCommissioningFunctional ResultsPeriodic Automated MaintenanceOperator TrainingSmart Restoration ToolsNeedDevelopment Process (Ease of expansion, Ease of troubleshooting, Ease of information sharing amongst control areas, automated testing)Design and Analysis Tools (resource availability and tracking)CommissioningFunctional ResultsPeriodic Maintenance (These types of schemes generally do not get many exercise to operate, the schemes are intended to be reliable)Operator TrainingSmart Restoration Tools (Tools to provide real-time information such as frequency and voltage, along with restoration information, effects of CLPU, etc.)
6 Design and Implementation Standards Establish and Document Regional Review Process For Special Protection System (SPS) installationsSection III F (S1):An SPS shall be designed so that cascading transmission outages or system instability do not occur for failure of a single component of an SPS which would result in failure of the SPS to operate when requiredSection III F (S2):Incorrect operation or unintended operation of an SPS when considered by itself and not in combination with any other system contingency shall meet the system performance requirements as defined under categories A, B, and C of Table I of the I.A. Standards on Transmission Systems
7 Compliance Requirements Requirement to demonstrate that a failure of a single component of an SPS, which would result in failure of the SPS to operate when required, would not result in cascading transmission outages or system instabilityFor worst operating conditionRequirements that misoperation, incorrect operation, or unintended operation of an SPS, when considered by itself, shall meet the system performance requirements of Standard I.A. categories A, B, and C of Table IRequirements for periodic review and Regional re-certification of the process document and database
8 Planning Standards (Section III) RedundancySimilar to Protection and Control StandardsDesigned to allow equipment maintenanceDesigned so that cascading transmission outages or system instability do not occur for failure of a single system a SPS component which would result in failure of the SPS to operate when requiredThe need for redundancy in SPS should be based on an evaluation of the system consequences for the failure of the SPS to operate and the need to maintain overall system reliabilityTo meet the system performance requirements of NERC standard I.A.Standards on Transmission Systems and associated Table I
9 Which RAS should be reviewed? WECC Reliability Criteria:RAS required to be reviewed by RASRS are those schemes for which failure would result in bulk transmission system performance in a neighboring utility outside the limits of the WECC performance requirementsRAS for which failure may result in unacceptable bulk transmission system performance within the scheme owner’s system may be reviewed at the request of the owner of the scheme or as deemed necessary by other Regional technical committees
10 Subcommittee Function Principal function:Promote the reliability of remedial action schemes within the WECC region by providing multidisciplinary overviewReviews, make technical recommendations, and approves proposals for implementationWith potential widespread cascading outagesIncludes contingency N-1, N-1-1, N-2 type conditionsFocuses attention on major RAS within the WECCWork is coordinated and draws on the information developed by other WGOther PC and OC Subcommittee and Working Groups when necessary
11 MembershipComprised of industry qualified members familiar with various aspects of RASMany are knowledgeable representatives with remedial action schemes within the regionIndustry Participation Such as IEEE, IEC, CIGREProvides for reasonable geographic representationIncludes expertise in a variety of application and design disciplines (Engineering and Specialists)Communication and Network systemsInformation SystemsControl and Automation systemsTransmission planningOperations engineeringProtective relaying systems engineeringSubstation design
12 Some Industry Activities CIGRE TF Defense Plans Against Extreme ContingenciesDesign and Deployment of a Well Coordinated Overall Defense PlanWECC RAS Reliability TF - Design and Implementation Standards and Review CriteriaCIGRE TF System Protection Schemes in Power NetworkIEEE Power Systems, System Protection SCReport on “Wide Area Protection and Emergency Control” (WG C-6) Special Protection Schemes, Survey on Implemented SchemeSurvey of Power System Protection Schemes (WG C-4)
13 Benchmarking Exercises Review of the Guide For Design of Critical Communication Circuits and Reliability Measures – Prepared by the WECC Telecommunication WGFCC considerations for wider applications of 6GHz band - Update on Telecommunication WGRequirements For a Well Planned and Implemented Scheme IEEE and CIGRE EffortsUnderstanding of the European and NE outage US and Canada OutageReview of NERC Recommendations and RASRS Actions
14 Sample of Schemes Reviewed April 2003- April 2004 IPC, Hells Canyon Runback SchemePNM, Import Contingency Load Shedding Scheme (ICLSS)PG&E / SCE Path 26SCE, High Desert Power Project (HDPP)SCE, Pastoria GenerationBPA, Lower Snake RAS PresentationSRP, PV-COI Mitigation RAS - Phase 1
15 Challenges Ahead Cyber Security Unobstructed Visibility Standardization of min. requirementsPerformance / Throughput timing may be affectedUnobstructed VisibilityTelemetry (Flow, Voltage, Watts, Reactive voltage)FrequencyVoltagePhase angles and differentialsUse of multi-function devices for combined protection and SPS / RAS functionsCentralized vs. Distributed SystemsSmart Restoration
16 Use of a device such as a relay shared for both protection and RAS functionality simultaneously Different functional requirements and device set pointsDifferent maintenance, testing and operating needsPotential complications and confusion from operating and maintenance prospective when both RAS and protection using the same deviceDifferent maintenance intervals and maintenance priority levels - Based on intended application and levels of redundancyAvailability of the devices for routine system testing (Isolation or unavailability of the wide area monitoring devices may not cause system limitations while may not be acceptable from the equipment protection prospective)Communication network, interfaces, and routing are different between WAPC devices and those used for conventional equipment protection
17 Pat Wood, III - Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate November 20, 2003We need to invest in:Hardware and software that let operators manage the grid more effectivelyTools that improve system monitoring, evaluation, visibility, visualization and information sharing about grid conditions over a wide region …..