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Early Selection in Hungary A Possible Cause of High Educational Inequality Daniel Horn research fellow Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

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Presentation on theme: "Early Selection in Hungary A Possible Cause of High Educational Inequality Daniel Horn research fellow Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences."— Presentation transcript:

1 Early Selection in Hungary A Possible Cause of High Educational Inequality Daniel Horn research fellow Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Department of Economics, Eötvös University Budapest horn@econ.core.hu

2 Motivation Age of selection is likely the best proxy for comprehensive schooling – The later the first age of selection the longer students will study in heterogeneous groups Comprehensive schooling is said to be decreasing inequality (Meghir and Palme 2005, Pekkarinen, Uusilato and Kerr 2007) – and tracking correlates with higher inequality across countries (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann 2005, Pfeffer 2008, Horn 2009) Why? – Teachers matter (Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain 2005; McKinsey 2007) – Peers matter (Sacerdote 2001, Hanushek et al 2003.) – … So the longer one studies in selected groups the larger the difference will be The Hungarian system is an „ideal” case for testing early selection

3 Inequality in the Hungarian education system is especially high Source: OECD PISA 2009 Vol. II, p 44. The system of education is certainly not comprehensive

4 The Hungarian public education system HUNGARY2009/2010 level ISCED 0ISCED 1ISCED 2ISCED 3 1st cycle2nd cycle Grade 12345678910111213 kindergartengeneral school academic secondary school track. ISCED 3a 1 vocational secondary school track. ISCED 3a (technikum) 1 vocational training track ISCED 3c (ex-apprentice training) Age3456789101112131415161718 Early-selective tracks 8-yr-ac and 6-yr-ac

5 Questions Are early-selective tracks status selective? Do early-selective tracks have a higher value-added? Do longer, 8-year-long academic tracks further increase differences, as compared to the 6-year-long academic tracks? Do others lose because of the early selection? If answers are affirmative the early selective tracks increase initial differences between students of different status. Thus, the Hungarian system is more unequal (ceteris paribus) because of the early selection.

6 Data National Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC) – Annually collected since 2006, PISA-like survey of all 6th, 8th and 10th grade students (see below) – Reading and mathematical literacy – Approximate mean: 1500, sd: 200 (before 2010: 500/100) Cross cohort and cross year comparable. Mean 1500 and sd 200 is only for 2008. 6th grade I standardize these, 0 mean 1 sd, for each year, cohort and subject – Detailed background questionnaires generated Socio-economic status (SES) index – 0 mean 1 sd – Individual panel since 2008

7 The NABC cohorts 4th grade6th grade8th grade10th grade 20030 20 students from every school0 20 students from each track from each school 20040 20 students from every school 20 students from each track from each school 2006full cohort every student from a sample of 195 schoolsfull cohort 30 students from each track from each teaching site 2007full cohort every student from a sample of 200 schoolsfull cohort 30 students from each track from each teaching site 2008* every student from a sample of 200 schoolsfull cohort 2009* every student from a sample of 200 schoolsfull cohort 2010* every student from a sample of 200 schoolsfull cohort * Individual identification numbers available

8 Descriptive statistics

9 HUNGARY2009/2010 level ISCED 0ISCED 1ISCED 2ISCED 3 1st cycle2nd cycle Grade 12345678910111213 kindergartengeneral school academic secondary school track. ISCED 3a 1 vocational secondary school track. ISCED 3a (technikum) 1 vocational training track ISCED 3c (ex-apprentice training) Age3456789101112131415161718 3,8% 96,2% 3,9% 5,3% 90,8% 3,0% 4,8% 30,3% 40,2% 21,7% Percentage of students in different tracks

10 HUNGARY2009/2010 level ISCED 0ISCED 1ISCED 2ISCED 3 1st cycle2nd cycle Grade 12345678910111213 kindergartengeneral school academic secondary school track. ISCED 3a 1 vocational secondary school track. ISCED 3a (technikum) 1 vocational training track ISCED 3c (ex-apprentice training) Age3456789101112131415161718 1673 1491 1782 1756 1615 1821 1807 1704 1608 1452 Average math test scores 1675* 1693* 1450* 1598*

11 HUNGARY2009/2010 level ISCED 0ISCED 1ISCED 2ISCED 3 1st cycle2nd cycle Grade 12345678910111213 kindergartengeneral school academic secondary school track. ISCED 3a 1 vocational secondary school track. ISCED 3a (technikum) 1 vocational training track ISCED 3c (ex-apprentice training) Age3456789101112131415161718 0,85 0,83 -0,059 0,8 0,39 -0,1 -0,81 Average SES index

12 ARE EARLY-SELECTIVE TRACKS STATUS SELECTIVE? 1st question YES! (DETAILS IN THE PAPER, DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINT – SORRY!)

13 DO EARLY-SELECTIVE TRACKS HAVE A HIGHER VALUE-ADDED? DO LONGER, 8-YEAR-LONG ACADEMIC TRACKS FURTHER INCREASE DIFFERENCES, AS COMPARED TO THE 6-YEAR-LONG ACADEMIC TRACKS? (6TH TO 8TH GRADE) 2nd and 3rd question

14 The model Model: where, i-individual, s – school (track), t – time Y – test score, X – student charactersitics – SES, Gender Z – school characteristics – track type, ed. provider (FE) Endogenity problem – if Z st = Z s(t-1) – Thus if students do not change tracks during observations, track has an effect on Y (t-1) as well – students start general tracks six years, and 8-yr-ac tracks two years earier than we measure them. Thus 6th grade test scores reflect the quality of the given track Note: 6-yr-ac value-added is unbiased

15 Endogenity problem Sollution: Instrumental variable estimation – instrument: distance from home to nearest 6-yr-ac and 8-yr-ac – assumption: distance has an effect on the chance to enter an early-selective track, but it does not affect test scores Problem with instrument: – correlates with average SES establishment of early selective tracks was demand driven – correlates with average teacher quality teachers are also selected; just as students Easing the problem – Spliting the sample decreases the bias 8-yr-ac vs. 6-yr-ac and 6-yr-ac vs. general – Track effects in IV estimation are underestimated: the stronger the correlation bw. distance and teacher quality the more effect the instument „absorbs”.

16 (7)(8) VARIABLESReadMath General school-0.0383***0.0221 (0.0145)(0.0208) 8-yr-ac0.0732***0.138*** (0.0188)(0.0304) Standardized reading score, 6th grade0.565***0.165*** (0.00496)(0.00555) Standardized math score, 6th grade0.230***0.630*** (0.00493)(0.00645) SES0.0832***0.0597*** (0.00379)(0.00441) female0.222***-0.131*** (0.00493)(0.00537) Education provider FE.yy Constant-0.100***0.0227 (0.0148)(0.0215) Observations82,21182,210 R-squared0.6380.596 Robust site clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 OLS

17 8-yr-ac vs. 6-yr-ac6-yr-ac vs. general (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6) First stageSecond stageFirst stageSecond stage VARIABLES8-yr-acReadMathGeneralReadMath 8-yr-ac 0.08100.228*** (0.0600)(0.0831) general -0.545**0.0114 (0.226)(0.311) Standardized reading score, 6th grade0.006940.545***0.188***-0.00970***0.561***0.165*** (0.0143)(0.0119)(0.0138)(0.00178)(0.00557)(0.00636) Standardized math score, 6th grade-0.02320.217***0.702***-0.0282***0.215***0.625*** (0.0185)(0.0106)(0.0138)(0.00359)(0.00840)(0.0113) SES-0.01830.0483***0.0744***-0.0194***0.0720***0.0591*** (0.0120)(0.00842)(0.00876)(0.00240)(0.00594)(0.00797) female0.02840.190***-0.244***-0.00673**0.219***-0.127*** (0.0174)(0.0138)(0.0145)(0.00283)(0.00545)(0.00593) distance bw. home and closest 8-yr-ac-0.0169*** (0.00155) distance bw. home and closest 6-yr-ac0.00198*** (0.000238) Ed. provider FEyyyyyy Constant0.515***-0.0240-0.04210.949***0.391*0.0305 (0.0598)(0.0299)(0.0435)(0.00602)(0.220)(0.301) Observations7,9867,9897,98678,74478,74378,744 R-squared0.1310.5360.6440.1860.6180.584 Robust site clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 IV – split sample

18 HUNGARY2009/2010 level ISCED 0ISCED 1ISCED 2ISCED 3 1st cycle2nd cycle Grade 12345678910111213 kindergartengeneral school academic secondary school track. ISCED 3a 1 vocational secondary school track. ISCED 3a (technikum) 1 vocational training track ISCED 3c (ex-apprentice training) Age3456789101112131415161718 M: 0,228*** R: n.s. Estimated differences bw. tracks, reference 6-yr-ac M: n.s. R: -0,545** M: 0,17** R: n.s. M: -0,226** R: n.s.

19 DO OTHERS LOSE BECAUSE OF THE EARLY SELECTION? 4th question YES, IN MATH. Students in general schools, where early-selective tracks are available perform worse in math bw. 6th and 8th grade, compared to students in general schools with no early-selective track around.

20 Conclusion

21 Early selective tracks are status selective (6-yr-ac tested) Early selective tracks have a higher value added – between 6th and 8th grade in reading – between 8th and 10th grade in math 8-yr-ac performs better than 6-yr-ac in math each year Students left in general tracks lose Early selection increases the gap between students of different social background

22 Thank you for your attention! Comments welcome! horn@econ.core.hu

23 Track type combinations within sites Number of sites general8-yr-ac6-yr-ac4-yr-actechnikum voc. train. 2463100000 228000011 162000010 95000110 91000100 82101100 78000001 72100100 52110100 50000111 43100001 23110000 101000 101110 15110110 14100010 8001100 8100011 8100110 7100101 7100111 5000101 3101010 3111100 2010100 2001110 2101111 1001111 1110010 1111000 1110101 1110111 1111110

24 Spatial distribution of early selective tracks

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