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Best Practices for Delivering Safe, Secure, and Dependable Mission Capabilities Paul R. Croll Chair, IEEE Software and Systems Engineering Standards Committee.

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Presentation on theme: "Best Practices for Delivering Safe, Secure, and Dependable Mission Capabilities Paul R. Croll Chair, IEEE Software and Systems Engineering Standards Committee."— Presentation transcript:

1 Best Practices for Delivering Safe, Secure, and Dependable Mission Capabilities Paul R. Croll Chair, IEEE Software and Systems Engineering Standards Committee Convener, ISO/IEC JTC1/SC7 WG9, System and Software Integrity Computer Sciences Corporation pcroll@csc.com

2 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 2 Agenda l The Scope of System and Software Assurance l A Best Practice Approach for Delivering Safe, Secure, and Dependable Mission Capabilities l Mission Capability Requirements for Assurance l Assurance in the Context of the Life Cycle l The CMMI  and Assurance l Standards Supporting System and Software Assurance l Implementing Assurance Processes

3 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 3 System and software assurance focuses on the management of risk and assurance of safety, security, and dependability within the context of system and software life cycles. Terms of Reference: ISO/IEC JTC1/SC7 WG9, System and Software Integrity The Scope of System and Software Assurance

4 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 4 A Best Practice Approach for Delivering Safe, Secure, and Dependable Mission Capabilities 2. Look to Framework Standards for Assurance Objectives 3. Look to the CMMI  for Assurance-Related Process Capability Expectations 4. Look to Supporting Standards for Assurance Process Detail 1. Understand Your Mission Capability Requirements for Assurance 5. Build or Refine and Execute Your Assurance Processes

5 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 5 1. Understand Your Mission Capability Requirements for Assurance Mission Capability Requirements for Assurance What are your mission capability requirements for System and Software Assurance? Business process requirements Tactical doctrine requirements Legal and regulatory requirements Customer-specific requirements Product-specific requirements

6 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 6 How Does Assurance Fit in the System and Software Life Cycles? Assurance and the Life Cycle

7 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 7 Life Cycle Process Framework Standards l System Life Cycle u ISO/IEC 15288, Systems engineering — System life cycle processes l Software Life Cycle u ISO/IEC 12207, Standard for Information Technology —Software life cycle processes u IEEE/EIA 12207.0, Industry Implementation of International Standard ISO/IEC12207:1995 — (ISO/IEC 12207) Standard for Information Technology —Software life cycle processes IEEE/EIA 12207.1, Industry Implementation of International Standard ISO/IEC12207:1995 — (ISO/IEC 12207) Standard for Information Technology —Software life cycle processes – Life Cycle Data IEEE/EIA 12207.2, Industry Implementation of International Standard ISO/IEC12207:1995 — (ISO/IEC 12207) Standard for Information Technology —Software life cycle processes – Implementation considerations

8 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 8 Assurance in the ISO/IEC 15288 System Life Cycle Process Framework SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE PROJECT ASSESSMENT PROJECT PLANNING PROJECT CONTROL DECISION MAKING RISK MANAGEMENT CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISE(5) SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT QUALITY MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISE ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL (11) PROJECT (7) ACQUISITION SUPPLY AGREEMENT (2) TRANSITION STAKEHOLDER REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION INTEGRATION VERIFICATION VALIDATION OPERATION MAINTENANCE DISPOSAL (25)               Safety, Security, Integrity

9 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 9 Assurance in the IEEE/EIA 12207 Software Life Cycle Process Framework Adapted from: Raghu Singh, An Introduction to International Standards ISO/IEC 12207, Software Life Cycle Processes, 1997. (17+1)          Safety, Security, Integrity ISO/IEC 16085 Risk Management 

10 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 10 How do we know what the process objectives should be for System and Software Assurance? 2. Look to Framework Standards for Assurance Objectives Life Cycle Assurance Objectives

11 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 11 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 1 Project Planning Process l Establish the structure of authorities and responsibilities for project work, including, as appropriate, the legally responsible roles and individuals, e.g. safety authorization, award of certification or accreditation. Configuration Management Process l Define a configuration management strategy, in accordance with designated levels of integrity, security and safety. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

12 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 12 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 2 Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002. Stakeholder Requirements Definition Process l Specify health, safety, security, environment and other stakeholder requirements and functions that relate to critical qualities; Identify safety and security risk. Requirements Analysis Process l Specify system requirements and functions that relate to critical qualities, such as health, safety, security, reliability, availability and supportability.

13 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 13 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 3 Architectural Design Process l Determine which system requirements are allocated to operators, e.g., human actions critical to safety. Implementation Process l Realize or adapt system elements with regard to standards that govern applicable safety, security, privacy and environmental guidelines. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

14 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 14 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 4 Integration Process l Obtain system elements in accordance with agreed schedules. System elements are handled in accordance with relevant health, safety, security and privacy considerations. Verification Process l Define the strategy for verifying the systems throughout the life cycle. The nature and scope of the verification action depends on the perceived risks, e.g. safety. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

15 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 15 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 5 Transition Process l Prepare the site of operation in accordance with installation requirements. Site preparation is conducted in accordance with applicable health, safety, security and environmental regulations. Validation Process l Define the strategy for validating the services in the operational environment and achieving stakeholder satisfaction. The nature and scope of the validation action depends on risks, e.g. safety. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

16 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 16 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 6 Operation Process Activities l Monitor operation to ensure that the system is operated in accordance with the operations plans, in a safe manner and compliant with legislated guidelines concerning occupational safety and environmental protection, and environmental regulations. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

17 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 17 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 7 Maintenance Process l Prepare a maintenance strategy, including the skill and personnel levels required to effect repairs and replacements, accounting for maintenance staff requirements and any relevant legislation regarding health and safety, security and the environment. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

18 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 18 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 8 Disposal Process l Define a disposal strategy for the system, to include each system element and any resulting waste products, including schedules, actions and resources that take account of the health, safety, security and privacy applicable to disposal actions and to the long term condition of resulting physical material and information. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

19 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 19 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 9 Disposal Process (Cont.) l Deactivate the system to prepare it for removal from operation; Withdraw operating staff from the system and record relevant operating knowledge; Remove the system from the operational environment for reuse, recycling, reconditioning, overhaul or destruction; in accordance with relevant safety, and security, legislation and standards. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

20 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 20 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 10 Disposal Process (Cont.) l Confirm that no detrimental health, safety, security and environmental factors exist following disposal l Archive information gathered through the lifetime of the system to permit audits and reviews in the event of long-term hazards to health, safety, security Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

21 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 21 ISO/IEC 15288 – System Assurance Objectives – 11 Tailoring l Identify and document the circumstances that influence tailoring, including integrity issues such as safety, security, privacy, usability, availability. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002.

22 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 22 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 1 Acquisition Process l The acquirer will define and analyze the system requirements. The system requirements should include business, organizational and user as well as safety, security, and other criticality requirements along with related design, testing, and compliance standards and procedures. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

23 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 23 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 2 Supply Process l The supplier shall develop and document project management plan(s)... including management of safety, security, and other critical requirements of the software products or services. Separate plans for safety and security may be developed. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

24 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 24 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 3 Development Process l The developer shall develop plans for conducting the activities of the development process. The plans should include specific standards, methods, tools, actions, and responsibility associated with the development and qualification of all requirements including safety and security. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

25 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 25 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 4 Development Process (Cont.) l The system requirements specification shall describe: functions and capabilities of the system; business, organizational and user requirements; safety, security, human-factors engineering (ergonomics), interface, operations, and maintenance requirements; design constraints and qualification requirements. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

26 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 26 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 5 Development Process (Cont.) l The developer shall establish and document software requirements, including quality characteristics specifications such as safety specifications, including those related to methods of operation and maintenance, environmental influences, and personnel injury; and security specifications, including those related to compromise of sensitive information Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

27 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 27 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 6 Maintenance Process l The maintainer shall analyze the problem report or modification request for its impact on the organization, the existing system, and the interfacing systems with respect to criticality; e.g., impact on performance, safety, or security. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

28 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 28 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 7 Configuration Management Process l Control and audit of all accesses to the controlled software items that handle safety or security critical functions shall be performed. The code and documentation that contain safety or security critical functions shall be handled, stored, packaged, and delivered in accordance with the policies of the organizations involved. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

29 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 29 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 8 Verification Process l The requirements shall be verified to demonstrate that software requirements related to safety, security, and criticality are correct as shown by suitably rigorous methods. l The design and code shall be verified to demonstrate that they implement safety, security, and other critical requirements correctly as shown by suitably rigorous methods. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

30 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 30 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 9 Infrastructure Process l The configuration of the infrastructure should be planned and documented. Functionality, performance, safety, security, availability, space requirements, equipment, costs, and time constraints should be considered. Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

31 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 31 IEEE/EIA 12207 – Software Assurance Objectives – 10 Tailoring (to projects) l Determine which organizational policies are relevant and applicable, such as on computer languages, safety and security, hardware reserve requirements, and risk management Source: ISO/IEC 15288:2002, © ISO/IEC2002. Source: IEEE/EIA 12207.0-1997, © IEEE 2001.

32 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 32 How does the CMMI  support System and Software Assurance? 3. Look to the CMMI  for Assurance-Related Process Capability Expectations The CMMI  and Assurance

33 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 33 CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 1 Project Planning l Determine the technical approach for the project, including the functionality expected in the final products, such as safety and security l Estimate effort and cost using models and/or historical data including inputs related to level of security required for tasks, work products, hardware, software, personnel, and work environment. Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

34 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 34 Project Planning (Cont.) l Plan for the management of project data including data supporting safety. l Establish requirements and procedures to ensure privacy and security of the data. Project Monitoring and Control l Monitor resources provided and used, including the security environment l Collect and analyze issues and determine the corrective actions necessary to address the issues, including security issues. CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 2 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

35 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 35 Supplier Agreement Management l Evaluate the impact of candidate COTS products on the project's plans and commitments, including security requirements Risk Management l Identify the risks associated with cost, schedule, and performance in all appropriate product life-cycle phases, including risks associated with maintaining safety and security performance. CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 3 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

36 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 36 Requirements Development l Analyze needs and requirements for each product life-cycle phase, including factors that reflect overall customer and end-user expectations and satisfaction, such as safety, security, and affordability. l Ensure that the design adheres to applicable design standards and criteria, including safety standards. CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 4 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

37 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 37 Technical Solution l Design comprehensive product-component interfaces in terms of established and maintained criteria, including safety and security. l Adhere to applicable standards and criteria, including safety standards. l Train the people performing or supporting the technical solution process as needed, including safety standards. CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 5 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

38 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 38 Product Integration l Satisfy the applicable requirements and standards for packaging and delivering the product, including those for safety and security. Configuration Management l Perform reviews to ensure that changes have not compromised the safety and/or security of the system. CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 6 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

39 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 39 Decision Analysis and Resolution l Establish and maintain guidelines to determine which issues are subject to a formal evaluation process. For example, on design-implementation decisions when technical performance failure may cause a catastrophic failure (e.g., safety of flight item). CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 7 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

40 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 40 Organizational Environment for Integration l Plan, design, and implement an integrated work environment, including tradeoff of safety and security costs and benefits. Causal Analysis and Resolution l Determine which defects and other problems will be analyzed further, including safety impact considerations. CMMI  – Assurance Objectives - 8 Source: CMMI  -SE/SW/IPPD/SS, V1.1, Continuous Representation, © CMU SEI,2002.

41 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 41 Safety and Security Extensions for Integrated Capability Maturity Models Source: United States Federal Aviation Administration, Safety and Security Extensions for Integrated Capability Maturity Models, September 2004 9.Determine Regulatory Requirements, Laws, and Standards 10.Develop and Deploy Safe and Secure Products and Services 11.Objectively Evaluate Products 12.Establish Safety and Security Assurance Arguments 13.Establish Independent Safety and Security Reporting 14.Establish a Safety and Security Plan 15.Select and Manage Suppliers, Products, and Services 16.Monitor and Control Activities and Products 1.Ensure Safety and Security Competency 2.Establish Qualified Work Environment 3.Ensure Integrity of Safety and Security Information 4.Monitor Operations and Report Incidents 5.Ensure Business Continuity 6.Identify Safety and Security Risks 7.Analyze and Prioritize Risks 8.Determine, Implement, and Monitor Risk Mitigation Plan

42 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 42 CMMI  Process Areas Supporting Assurance Extensions l Process Management l Organizational Process Focus l Organizational Training l Organizational Innovation and Deployment l Project Management l Project Planning l Project Monitoring and Control l Supplier Agreement Management l Integrated Project Management l Risk Management l Integrated Supplier Management l Quantitative Project Management l Engineering l Requirements Management l Requirements Development l Technical Solution l Product Integration l Verification l Validation l Support l Configuration Management l Process and Product Quality Assurance l Measurement and Analysis l Organizational Environment for Integration Source: United States Federal Aviation Administration, Safety and Security Extensions for Integrated Capability Maturity Models, September 2004

43 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 43 What Standards Support System and Software Assurance? 4. Look to Supporting Standards for Assurance Process Detail Supporting Standards for Assurance

44 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 44 Standards Organizations Supporting Assurance ISOIEC JTC1TC176 SC1SC22 TerminologySoftware EngineeringLanguage, OS SC7 TC56SC65A QualityInformation TechnologyDependabilityFunctional Safety SC27 IT Security Techniques S2ESCIASC Software and Systems Engineering Information Assurance IEEE CS ISO IEC IEEE CS NIST FISMA Projects U.S. Gov’t DoD MIL-STDs Policy Memos

45 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 45 Dependability Standards Adapted from James W. Moore, Software Engineering Standards: A User's Road Map, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 1997 Risk Management IEC 812 Failure mode and effects analysis IEC 1025 Fault tree analysis IEC 300-2 Programme elements & tasks ISO/IEC 15026 Integrity levels IEC 300-3-9 Risk analysis of technological sys IEC 300-3-6 SW aspects of dependability IEC 300-1 Programme management Achieving Confidence Risk AnalysisRisk Control IEC 50-191 Dependability vocabulary ISO/IEC 16085 Risk Management ISO/IEC NWI 61720 Tech. & tools for confidence ISO/IEC 15288 System life cycle processes ISO/IEC 12207 SW life cycle processes ISO IEC

46 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 46 Safety and Security Standards IEC 61508 Functional Safety Sector-Specific Standards ISO/IEC 9796 Digital Security Schemes ISO/IEC 10181 Security frameworks for open systems ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation ISO/IEC 21827 Systems Security Engineering CMM IEEE P1619 Standard Architecture for Encrypted Shared Storage Media IEEE P2200 Baseline Operating System Security IEEE 1228 SW safety plans Safety Security IEEE P1700 Security Architecture for Certification and Accreditation of Information Military IEC IEEE CS ISO IEEE CS IEC 60880 SW in nuclear power safety systems MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety DO 178B SW considerations in airborne equip certification ISO/IEC 17799 Code of Practice for Information Security Management RTCA Military Standards DEF STAN 00-56 Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems P1667 Standard Protocol for Authentication in Host Attachments of Transient Storage Devices P2600 Standard for Information Technology: Hardcopy System and Device Security IEEE CS Under Development ISO/IEC 13335 Management of information and communications technology security

47 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 47 DHS Harmonization Efforts Impacting Systems and Software Assurance ISOIEC JTC1TC176 SC1SC22 TerminologySoftware EngineeringLanguage, OS SC7 TC56SC65A QualityInformation TechnologyDependabilityFunctional Safety SC27 IT Security Techniques S2ESCIASC Software and Systems Engineering Information Assurance IEEE CS ISO IEC IEEE CS NIST FISMA Projects U.S. Gov’t DoD MIL-STDs Policy Memos Who’s Collaborating

48 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 48 Harmonization Efforts Impacting Systems and Software Assurance What’s Being Harmonized IEEE/EIA 12207 SW life cycle processes IEEE 15288 System life cycle processes IEC Dependability and Safety Standards ISO/IEC 16085 Risk Management ISO/IEC 15288 System life cycle processes IEEE CS Supporting Standards ISO/IEC 12207 SW life cycle processes ISO/IEC 15026 System and Software Assurance IEC Security Standards Requirements Design V&V Test Risk Management Acquisition Architecture

49 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 49 FISMA Legislation “Each Federal agency shall develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program to provide information security for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source…” l - Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 Source: FISMA Implementation Project, Dr. Ron Ross, NIST, April 2004

50 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 50 NIST Enterprise Risk Management Framework Source: FISMA Implementation Project, Dr. Ron Ross, NIST, April 2004 In system security plan, provides a an overview of the security requirements for the information system and documents the security controls planned or in place SP 800-18 Security Control Documentation Defines category of information system according to potential impact of loss FIPS 199 / SP 800-60 Security Categorization Selects minimum security controls (i.e., safeguards and countermeasures) planned or in place to protect the information system SP 800-53 / FIPS 200 Security Control Selection Determines extent to which the security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing desired outcome with respect to meeting security requirements SP 800-53A / SP 800-37 Security Control Assessment SP 800-53 / FIPS 200 / SP 800-30 Security Control Refinement Uses risk assessment to adjust minimum control set based on local conditions, required threat coverage, and specific agency requirements SP 800-37 System Authorization Determines risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals and, if acceptable, authorizes information system processing SP 800-37 Security Control Monitoring Continuously tracks changes to the information system that may affect security controls and assesses control effectiveness Implements security controls in new or legacy information systems; implements security configuration checklists Security Control Implementation SP 800-70 Starting Point

51 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 51 FISMA Implementation Project Standards and Guidelines l FIPS Publication 199 (Security Categorization) l NIST Special Publication 800-37 (Certification & Accreditation) l NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Security Controls) l NIST Special Publication 800-53A (Assessment) l NIST Special Publication 800-59 (National Security) l NIST Special Publication 800-60 (Category Mapping) l FIPS Publication 200 (Minimum Security Controls) Source: FISMA Implementation Project, Dr. Ron Ross, NIST, April 2004

52 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 52 5. Build or Refine and Execute Your Assurance Processes 1. Understand Your Mission Capability Requirements for Assurance Implement, Execute, and Reassess: Do your assurance processes still meet your mission capability requirements for System and Software Assurance? Business process requirements Legal and regulatory requirements Marketplace requirements Customer-specific requirements Product-specific requirements Use Standards-Based Best Practices to Implement Assurance Processes

53 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 53 A Best Practice Approach for System and Software Assurance 2. Look to Framework Standards for Assurance Objectives 3. Look to the CMMI  for Assurance-Related Process Capability Expectations 4. Look to Supporting Standards for Assurance Process Detail 1. Understand Your Mission Capability Requirements for Assurance 5. Build or Refine and Execute Your Assurance Processes

54 SSTC 2005, Track 7, Monday, April 18 2005, 3:45 PM - 4:30 PM©2005 Paul R. Croll, All rights reserved Slide 54 For More Information... Paul R. Croll Computer Sciences Corporation 5166 Potomac Drive King George, VA 22485-5824 Phone:+1 540.644.6224 Fax:+1 540.663.0276 e-mail:pcroll@csc.com For IEEE Standards: http://computer.org/standards/sesc/ http://ieeeia.org/iasc/ http://computer.org/cspress/CATALOG/st01110.htm For ISO/IEC Standards: http://saturne.info.uqam.ca/Labo_Recherche/Lrgl/sc7/


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