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POSC 2200 – The Individual Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science.

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1 POSC 2200 – The Individual Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science

2 Unit Four: The Individual (Feb 9 & 11) Required Reading: Mingst, Chapter 5 Mingst, Chapter 5 Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 189-199, Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 189-199,Outline: 1. Introduction 2. The Role of Elites 3. Individuals in Decision-making 4. The Role of the Public

3 1) Introduction: Role of individual open to debate... (?) Some see individuals as largely unimportant in international relations – including leaders Some see individuals as largely unimportant in international relations – including leaders Neorealists – National interest and international structure Neorealists – National interest and international structure Radicals – International capitalist system Radicals – International capitalist system

4 Some see large role for individuals Some see large role for individuals Liberals – as policymaking elites... Liberals – as policymaking elites... Lots of latitude of decision-makers to implement policies that pursue their interests Lots of latitude of decision-makers to implement policies that pursue their interests Constructivists – as holders of values Constructivists – as holders of values Major change in IR can be associated with new leaders bringing new values to forefront Major change in IR can be associated with new leaders bringing new values to forefront E.g. Gorbachev and Soviet security concerns E.g. Gorbachev and Soviet security concerns

5 In practical terms... Hard not to see a role for individuals in IR – particularly “heads of state” Hard not to see a role for individuals in IR – particularly “heads of state” However: However: Complicates analyses – hard to predict foreign policy – becomes more like History Complicates analyses – hard to predict foreign policy – becomes more like History At a general level, possible to overstate importance of individuals At a general level, possible to overstate importance of individuals E.g. Continuity in foreign policy regardless of who is in office E.g. Continuity in foreign policy regardless of who is in office Canada’s foreign policy may have more to do with international structure then individuals... Canada’s foreign policy may have more to do with international structure then individuals...

6 How can we clarify, or hypothesize, the role of individuals? Several strategies: Clarify the conditions under which individuals are more important Clarify the conditions under which individuals are more important Examine individual and group psychological effects that may allow us to predict responses to events Examine individual and group psychological effects that may allow us to predict responses to events Examine role in foreign policy decision making and diplomacy Examine role in foreign policy decision making and diplomacy

7 2) The Role of Elites: a) Under what conditions are the actions and values of individual leaders more important? 1) When political institutions are unstable Gives decisive leaders opportunity to pursue own goals Gives decisive leaders opportunity to pursue own goals Institutions new – Post colonial states and new democracies Institutions new – Post colonial states and new democracies E.g. Golda Miair E.g. Golda Miair E.g. Vladimir Putin E.g. Vladimir Putin Institutions in crisis or failing – Institutions in crisis or failing – E.g. Weimar Germany and Adolph Hitler E.g. Weimar Germany and Adolph Hitler

8 2) When institutional constraints are limited E.g. Totalitarian states – limited channels to put pressure on leaders E.g. Totalitarian states – limited channels to put pressure on leaders E.g. China and Nixon E.g. China and Nixon 3) When the situation does not result in a clearly defined national interest Issue is peripheral or unimportant Issue is peripheral or unimportant Issue is ambiguous – lack of information for a rational assessment of the national interest Issue is ambiguous – lack of information for a rational assessment of the national interest E.g. Surprise situations E.g. Surprise situations

9 Does this describe most situations in IR? Does this describe most situations in IR? If so, doesn’t this mean IR is driven by individual level???? If so, doesn’t this mean IR is driven by individual level???? Or, does this just mean individuals effect things that don’t matter Or, does this just mean individuals effect things that don’t matter

10 b) What is the role of leader’s personalities? Can they help us understand states’ behavior? Can they help us understand states’ behavior? Research underdeveloped – leaders won’t submit to detailed observation and psychological analyses!!!! Research underdeveloped – leaders won’t submit to detailed observation and psychological analyses!!!! However, Herman (1980) suggested a typology that some think can guide analyses However, Herman (1980) suggested a typology that some think can guide analyses Argued: Two main types of leader personality that may effect foreign policy Argued: Two main types of leader personality that may effect foreign policy The “Independent Leader” The “Independent Leader” The “Participatory Leader” The “Participatory Leader”

11 The “Independent Leader” Policy Orientations: Policy Orientations: High nationalism High nationalism High belief in control High belief in control High need for power High need for power High distrust of others High distrust of others Low understanding – conceptual clarity Low understanding – conceptual clarity

12 The “Independent Leader” Policy Orientations: Policy Orientations: High nationalism High nationalism High belief in control High belief in control High need for power High need for power High distrust for others High distrust for others Low understanding –conceptual clarity Low understanding –conceptual clarity Bush Chavez Stalin Bush Chavez Stalin

13 The “Participatory Leader” Policy Orientations: Policy Orientations: Low nationalism Low nationalism Low belief in control Low belief in control Low in distrust of others Low in distrust of others High need for friendly affiliations High need for friendly affiliations High understanding – conceptual complexity High understanding – conceptual complexity

14 The “Participatory Leader” Policy Orientations: Policy Orientations: Low nationalism Low nationalism Low belief in control Low belief in control Low in distrust of others Low in distrust of others High need for friendly affiliations High need for friendly affiliations High understanding – conceptual complexity High understanding – conceptual complexity TrudeauClinton ?

15 Risk of “circularity”(?) Risk of “circularity”(?) Problem: We don’t know their real personalities, only what they show in public roles Problem: We don’t know their real personalities, only what they show in public roles International structures and events make leaders exhibit “personality traits” International structures and events make leaders exhibit “personality traits” E.g. Clinton and Bush not so different... E.g. Clinton and Bush not so different...

16 2) Individuals in Decision Making: Individual decision making never totally rational Individual decision making never totally rational IR presents observer with information overload IR presents observer with information overload People use psychological shortcuts to “make sense” of what they observe People use psychological shortcuts to “make sense” of what they observe May influence foreign policy.... May influence foreign policy....

17 Psychological processing concepts or “shortcuts”: 1) “Belief System”:Organized, integrated perceptions of individuals in society about how the world “is” Influence leaders’ decisions Influence leaders’ decisions Constructivism – comes from history and norms Constructivism – comes from history and norms E.g. Cold War – seeing Soviet Union as a threat because of image of communism E.g. Cold War – seeing Soviet Union as a threat because of image of communism

18 2) “Cognitive Consistency”: Tendency to see images in a way that is consistent with belief systems or previous interpretation of facts Tendency to see images in a way that is consistent with belief systems or previous interpretation of facts E.g. US and the Falkland War.... E.g. US and the Falkland War....

19 3) “Evoked Set”: Tendency to look for details in current situation that are similar to those previously observed E.g. US and Chinese Relations E.g. US and Chinese Relations Realist view? Realist view? Liberal view? Liberal view? Both based on selecting details that confirm past lessons... Both based on selecting details that confirm past lessons...

20 4) “Mirror Images”: Tendency to see other individuals and groups as having opposite characteristics from oneself E.g. “Orientalism” E.g. “Orientalism” Jervis – “Hypotheses on Misperception” Jervis – “Hypotheses on Misperception” Also a tendency to see behavior of others as centralized and coordinated Also a tendency to see behavior of others as centralized and coordinated =A kind of paranoia?

21 5) “Groupthink”: Tendency of small groups to form a consensus and resist criticism of consensus Disregard contradictory facts Disregard contradictory facts Ostracize members who do not share view Ostracize members who do not share view E.g. US intelligence and Iraqi WMD’s E.g. US intelligence and Iraqi WMD’s

22 6) “Satisificing”: Tendency to accept minimally acceptable solution rather then best possible outcome In order to support consensus (“bureaucratic politics”) In order to support consensus (“bureaucratic politics”) Or, because people are lazy Or, because people are lazy

23 Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Classic piece on the “irrationality” of rational foreign policy Classic piece on the “irrationality” of rational foreign policy Argues: Argues: Decision makers fit new information into existing beliefs Decision makers fit new information into existing beliefs More likely when: More likely when: Facts ambiguous – situation complex Facts ambiguous – situation complex People think existing theory well proven People think existing theory well proven Result: Decision makers more likely to ignore new “discordant” information then to change their existing theories

24 Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Example: “Domino Theory” Example: “Domino Theory” Theory that communist revolutions spread like a chain reaction Theory that communist revolutions spread like a chain reaction I.e. Success in North Vietnam meant it would spread to rest of S. E. Asia I.e. Success in North Vietnam meant it would spread to rest of S. E. Asia Required “containment” Required “containment” Support for anticommunist allies Support for anticommunist allies Result: US intervention in Vietnam Result: US intervention in Vietnam

25 Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Example: “Domino Theory” Example: “Domino Theory” US supports corrupt, unpopular, anti- democratic regimes US supports corrupt, unpopular, anti- democratic regimes Supplant French colonial role in S. E. Asia Supplant French colonial role in S. E. Asia US suffers 60,000 casualties, ends war effort in defeat US suffers 60,000 casualties, ends war effort in defeat No Domino effect.... No Domino effect.... Theory was well established and situation complex Theory was well established and situation complex

26 Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Solutions? See Jervis’s Safeguards – good advice! 1) Be aware that observations are not unbiased 2) Be skeptical of supporting ideas that are not logically linked to one another E.g. Iraq: WMD and Democracy E.g. Iraq: WMD and Democracy WWII: Stalin and “Barbarossa”

27 Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” 3) Be sure concepts are clearly spelled out – makes it possible to know when your ideas are wrong or failing E.g. “Victory Conditions” E.g. “Victory Conditions” 4) Be sure to consider critical interpretations of new facts – don’t be surrounded by like-minded ideologues

28 4) Role of the Public: Traditionally little role for the public in foreign policy Traditionally little role for the public in foreign policy Perhaps... More impact in practice then in theory Perhaps... More impact in practice then in theory 1) Private individuals: Some people have “resources” necessary to have influence Some people have “resources” necessary to have influence Financial – Bill Gates Financial – Bill Gates Expertise – George Sorros Expertise – George Sorros Play a role in conflict resolution Play a role in conflict resolution E.g. Carter Foundation E.g. Carter Foundation “Track-two Diplomacy” “Track-two Diplomacy” Play a role in changing perceptions of foreign policy Play a role in changing perceptions of foreign policy E.g. “Hanoi” Jane Fonda and Sean Penn E.g. “Hanoi” Jane Fonda and Sean Penn

29 2) The “Mass Public” – impact on Foreign Policy? a) Psychological factors? “Filtering” and interpretation problems (“shortcuts”) may be similar to policymaking elites “Filtering” and interpretation problems (“shortcuts”) may be similar to policymaking elites E.g. “Groupthink” and “Mirror Images” E.g. “Groupthink” and “Mirror Images” May be specific mass psychology effects in IR: May be specific mass psychology effects in IR: “Territorial Imperative”: Humans’ innate desire to control territory “Territorial Imperative”: Humans’ innate desire to control territory “Frustration-Aggression Syndrome”: Societies whose desires are thwarted likely to become aggressive “Frustration-Aggression Syndrome”: Societies whose desires are thwarted likely to become aggressive Hard to predict much based on these – people do not always respond in the same fashion Hard to predict much based on these – people do not always respond in the same fashion

30 b) Public Opinion? Public orientations may have large impact on limiting range of policy options open to elites Public orientations may have large impact on limiting range of policy options open to elites Media coverage and opinion polling can be a big factor in what leaders may think is viable Media coverage and opinion polling can be a big factor in what leaders may think is viable E.g. Walter Cronkite and the Vietnam War E.g. Walter Cronkite and the Vietnam War However, public opinion never unified – creates opportunities to move opinion in “necessary” direction However, public opinion never unified – creates opportunities to move opinion in “necessary” direction Result – New techniques: Result – New techniques: Priming and propaganda Priming and propaganda E.g. The Kuwaiti victims... E.g. The Kuwaiti victims... “Public Diplomacy”: Diplomatic techniques designed to improve image of a state in other societies “Public Diplomacy”: Diplomatic techniques designed to improve image of a state in other societies E.g. Gorbechev’s “New York walkabout” E.g. Gorbechev’s “New York walkabout”

31 5) For Next Time... MID TERM EXAM(October 26 - In class) Format: Multiple choice & short answer definition questions Definitions do not need to be exact – just show you know what they mean... Definitions do not need to be exact – just show you know what they mean... Lectures & Mingst textbook – as well as items from the reader Lectures & Mingst textbook – as well as items from the reader Up to, and including Chapter 6 – “The Individual” Up to, and including Chapter 6 – “The Individual” Be sure to complete all of the reading! Be sure to complete all of the reading!

32 MID TERM EXAM(October 26 - In class) Do not look at other peoples’ exams! Do not look at other peoples’ exams! Do not write in pencil Do not write in pencil Guess... if you have no other answer... Guess... if you have no other answer...


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