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1  Carnegie Mellon University Protecting Information Infrastructures Rich Pethia Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh,

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Presentation on theme: "1  Carnegie Mellon University Protecting Information Infrastructures Rich Pethia Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh,"— Presentation transcript:

1 1  Carnegie Mellon University Protecting Information Infrastructures Rich Pethia Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 This work is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

2 2  Carnegie Mellon University Survivable Systems Initiative The SEI established, with DARPA sponsorship, the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center in 1988. The CERT/CC’s mission is to respond to security emergencies on the Internet, serve as a focal point for reporting security vulnerabilities, serve as a model to help others establish incident response teams, and raise awareness of security issues.

3 3  Carnegie Mellon University Activity Since 1988, the CERT/CC has responded to over 18,000 security incidents that have affected over 220,000 Internet sites; has worked over 1200 reported vulnerabilities, and has issued 255 advisories and bulletins. In addition, the CERT/CC has helped foster the creation of over 80 other incident response teams.

4 4  Carnegie Mellon University Initiative Goal Ensure that appropriate technology, systems management practices, and supporting infrastructures are used to resist, recognize and recover from attacks on networked systems, to limit damage and to ensure continuity of critical services in spite of successful attacks.

5 5  Carnegie Mellon University Focus Areas CERT/CC: Foster global security incident response and coordination by facilitating the creation of a self-sustaining incident response infrastructure. Survivable Network Management: Establish the use of security monitoring and improvement practices and tools as routine practice by network service providers and major Internet sites.

6 6  Carnegie Mellon University Focus Areas - 2 Survivable Network Technology: Reduce security incidents caused by errors in software architecture, design, or implementation.

7 7  Carnegie Mellon University Initiative Strategies Repaired Systems Research Results Technology Evaluation Survivable Network Technology Survivable Network Management CERT Coordination Center Protected Systems Improved Systems

8 8  Carnegie Mellon University Why?

9 9  Carnegie Mellon University Networks Are Indispensable to Business Networked systems allow organizations to: conduct electronic commerce provide better customer service collaborate with partners reduce communications costs improve internal communication access needed information rapidly

10 10  Carnegie Mellon University The Problem In the rush to benefit from using networks, organizations often overlook significant security issues. The engineering practices and technology used by system providers are often not sufficient to prevent the fielding of systems vulnerable to attack Network and system operators do not always follow best practices that would prevent such attacks or minimize damage

11 11  Carnegie Mellon University The Risks While computer networks revolutionize the way you do business, the risks computer networks introduce can be fatal to a business. Network attacks lead to lost: money time products reputation lives sensitive information

12 12  Carnegie Mellon University Examples Increasing damage from attacks high technology bank robbery loss of intellectual property - $2M in one case extensive compromise of operational systems - 15,000 hour recovery operation in one case medical records tampering altering results of diagnostic tests compromising the integrity of CAT scan data extortion - demanding payments to avoid operational problems

13 13  Carnegie Mellon University Strain on System Administrators There is continued movement to complex,client-server and heterogeneous configurations with distributed management There is little evidence of security improvements in most products; new vulnerabilities are found routinely Comprehensive security solutions are lacking; current tools address only parts of the problem

14 14  Carnegie Mellon University Strain on System Administrators Engineering for ease of use has not been matched by engineering for ease of secure administration ease of use and increased utility are driving a dramatic explosion in use system administration and security administration are more difficult than a decade ago this growing gap brings increased vulnerability

15 15  Carnegie Mellon University Internet Growth 1988-1998 BS and MS Degrees in Computer and Information Sciences 1988-1998 1988 1998 0 40,000,000 50,000 0 1988 1998 Source: Digest of Education Statistics 1997, US Office of Educational Research and Improvement, Washington DC, publisher: US Superintendent of Document, 1997 Source: Internet Domain Survey by Network Wizards, WWW.ww.com/zone

16 16  Carnegie Mellon University Yesterday’s Solutions Won’t Work in Today’s Systems Open, highly distributed systems Unknown perimeters No central administrative control No global visibility Unknown components (COTS, Java, etc.) Unknown participants Untrusted insiders Large-scale coordinated attacks

17 17  Carnegie Mellon University More Sophisticated Intruders Intruders are building technical knowledge and skills gaining leverage through automation exploiting network interconnections and moving easily through the infrastructure becoming more skilled at masking their behavior

18 18  Carnegie Mellon University Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge High Low 19801985199019951999 password guessing self-replicating code password cracking exploiting known vulnerabilities disabling audits back doors hijacking sessions sweepers sniffers packet spoofing GUI automated probes/scans denial of service www attacks Tools Attackers Intruder Knowledge Attack Sophistication “stealth” / advanced scanning techniques burglaries network mgmt. diagnostics

19 19  Carnegie Mellon University Vulnerability Exploit Cycle Advanced Intruders Discover Vulnerability Crude Exploit Tools Distributed Novice Intruders Use Crude Exploit Tools Automated Scanning/Exploit Tools Developed Widespread Use of Automated Scanning/Exploit Tools Intruders Begin Using New Types of Exploits

20 20  Carnegie Mellon University So What?

21 21  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse Explosive growth of the Internet continues continues to double in size every 10-12 months where will all the capable system administrators come from? Market growth will drive vendors time to market, features, performance, cost are primary “invisible” quality features such as security are secondary

22 22  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse More sensitive applications connected to the Internet low cost of communications, ease of connection, and power of products engineered for the Internet will drive out other forms of networking hunger for data and benefits of electronic interaction will continue to push widespread use of information technology

23 23  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse The death of the firewall traditional approaches depend on complete administrative control and strong perimeter controls today’s business practices and wide area networks violate these basic principles -no central point of network control -more interconnections with customers, suppliers, partners -more network applications -“the network is the computer” -who’s an “insider”and who’s an “outsider”

24 24  Carnegie Mellon University Its going to get worse Beware of snake-oil the market for security products and services is growing faster than the supply of quality product and service providers an informed consumer base needs understanding, not just awareness sometimes the suppliers don’t understand either “if you want it badly, you’ll get it badly”

25 25  Carnegie Mellon University Before it gets better Strong market for security professionals will eventually drive graduate and certificate programs Increasing understanding by technology users will build demand for quality security products; vendors will pay attention to the market Insurance industry will provide incentives for improved business security practices

26 26  Carnegie Mellon University Before it gets better Technology will continue to improve and we will figure out how to use it encryption strong authentication survivable systems Increased collaboration across government and industry

27 27  Carnegie Mellon University CERT Contact Information 24-hour hotline: +1 412 268 7090 CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m. — 8:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax:+1 412 268 6989 Anonymous FTP archive: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ Web site:http://www.cert.org/ Electronic mail:cert@cert.org US mail:CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University 4500 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA


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