1. Smart Grid Security Challenges Ahmad Alqasim 1

2. Agenda Problem Statement Power system vs. smart grid Background Information Focus Point Privacy Attack Privacy Attack Countermeasures Jamming attack Jamming Attack Countermeasures Conclusion Discussion Time 2

3. Problem Statement Analyze smart grid security challenges Focus on: Privacy attack: Aims to illegally reach to the customer’s load profile (CLP) Jamming attack: Aims to cause a denial of service to the wireless system in home area network (HAN) 3

4. Traditional System vs. Smart Grid Traditional Power system One-way Interaction Unable to meet the new energy demand Customers only have a physical access to their electrical devices Depends on complex distribution scheme and manual switching Smart Grid System Two-way Dialogue More Efficient, Reliable, Secure and Greener Allow customers to manage electricity usage and bill over the web Automatically rerouting and restoring power delivery 4

5. IT Systems and Power Systems Integration IT Systems Power Systems Smart Grid System 5 Integration

6. IT Systems and Power Systems Integration IT SystemsPower Systems Smart Grid Operating Systems WAN TCP/IP ICCP/DNP3 EMS SCADA EMS WAN Operating Systems TCP/IP ICCP/DNP3 6

7. Conceptual Model MarketOperationsService Provider CustomerDistributionTransmissionBulk Generator Electrical Flow Secure Communication Flow Domain 7

8. Focus Point 8 HAN Distribution Service Provider Smart Meter Jamming Attack Privacy Attack

9. Home Area Network (HAN) 9 ZigBee Wireless

10. Privacy Attack Customer’s Load Profile (CLP) stored in the smart meter Represent the reading figures by different appliances during different periods of time The service provider use the CLP to calculate the electricity price A behavioral information about customer can be extracted from the CLP For example: waking up or sleeping time The motivation to use these information can be: spying, burglary or business benefits 10

11. Privacy Attack 11 Wake up time – 8:00 am Evening Activities– 7 pm-10 pm Reference : [Molina-Markham et al., 2010] Customer’s Load Profile Graph

12. Privacy Countermeasures Trusted Third Party (TTP) High Frequency Encryption De-Pseudonymization Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL) 12

13. Trusted Third Party (TTP) The TTP Will not access to the smart meter. Rather, it will receive the reading figures and send them to the service provider 13 Smart Meter Service Provider Trusted Third Party (TTP)

14. High Frequency Encryption The service provider can access to the LF in order to calculate the electrical bill 14 Customer’s Load Profile High Frequency (HF) Low Frequency (LF) Unencrypted LF Encrypted HF Service Provider

15. De-Pseudonymization Customer Information DB1 Load Profile DB2 Personal Profile Aims to store customer personal information and load information in two different databases 15 Address, name and phone television, electrical consumption

16. Non-Intrusive load Levelling (NILL) Aims to mask the actual load profile without affecting the actual data 16 Actual CLP Mask CLP Masked CLP Actual CLP Masked CLP Final Load Profile Battery

17. Jamming Attack Performed against ZigBee wireless in HAN Hacker usually aims to prevent the smart meter from communicating with different appliances In smart grid, the priority for availability, then integrity and confidentiality Jamming attack affects the availability of data 17

18. Jamming Techniques and Types Techniques Spot Jamming Sweep Jamming Barrage Jamming Deceptive Jamming Types Constant Jammer Deceptive Jammer Random Jammer Reactive Jammer 18

19. pseudorandom Sequence Pseudorandom sequence is a key that only known by the sender and receiver And aims to hide the SFD 19 Start of Delimiter Frame (SFD) pseudorandom Sequence Packet Mask the SFD

20. Frequency Hopping Smart Meter The packet jumps between different frequencies. So, the jammer does not know exactly which frequency to jam 20 Washing Machine

21. Wormhole-based Anti-jamming 21 Jammed Area The wire cable is used in case the wireless range is jammed Node 2 Wireless Range Wire Cable Node 1

22. Conclusions Smart grid provide more reliable, efficient and greener energy than power system Privacy attack aims to develop a behavioral pattern about customers in order to perform a future action Jamming attack aims to affect the availability of data and wireless communication in HAN Current security tools are not completely suitable for smart grid. So, new tools have to be developed And, the cost of security system has to be justified to fit with the business requirement 22

23. Discussion Time 23 Questions and Answers