1. BLUE CASCADES III Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies Exercise Managing Extreme Disasters Bellevue, WA March 1-2, 2006

2. 2 ***BLUE CASCADES III Supporters*** MICROSOFT Concurrent Technologies Corporation King County ESRI CH2MHill Puget Sound Energy Bonneville Power Administration

3. 3 ***Scenario Design Team***  King County Office of Emergency Management  Snohomish County Division of Emergency Management  Microsoft  Bonneville Power Administration  Puget Sound Energy  BC Hydro  Cingular  Sprint  Premara Blue Cross  Boeing  City of Seattle  Bank of America  Washington Mutual  Washington Association of Sewer and Water  Port of Seattle  Navy Region Northwest  Seattle-King County Public Health  S-R Broadcasting  Federal Bureau of Investigation  Washington Department of Information Services  WA Depart. of Health

4. 4 ***Scenario Design Team, cont.***  Washington Military Department  Washington Office of Emergency Management  Washington Association of School Principals  City of Everett  Seahawks/Qwest Field  US Army Corps of Engineers  US Coast Guard  US Postal Service  Parsons Brinckerhoff  Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness Canada  Washington Department of Agriculture  U.S. Depart. of Trans- portation, Region 10  Pacific NW National Lab  Northwest Warning, Alert & Response Network  Technical advisors to Team:  Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW) and ESRI  US Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Div./US-CERT

5. 5 Exercise Objectives  Illuminate reconstitution and business continuity challenges and needs associated with long-term disruptions of critical infrastructures  Increase understanding of interdependency issues related to recovering from long duration outages  Underscore and validate the mutual value of public and private sector, cross-function and multidiscipline cooperation to deal with large-scale, prolonged disasters  Explore the development of plans for determining restoration priorities

6. 6 Exercise Objectives, cont.  Highlight the extent of cooperation and understanding of roles, responsibilities, and authorities--local, county, state, federal (civilian and defense), of jurisdictions and private sector organizations during regional disruptions  Further explore cross-border physical and cyber U.S. and Canadian interdependencies  Increase the level of collaboration among regional cyber security responders and experts, as well as cooperation along cyber and physical security and emergency management personnel

7. 7 Exercise Objectives, cont.  Explore and assess what approaches and plans are necessary for regional resource management  Recognize and examine jurisdiction boundaries and problems that arise from these artificial barriers  Examine and begin to better understand how to deal with the welfare of citizens  Demonstrate how the new Puget Sound Regional Portal on the US-CERT Website could improve preparedness  Highlight existing laws and gaps that may impede restoration or recovery efforts

8. 8 Exercise Process  Communal, Interactive Experience  Scenario of Events followed by Questions with Members of the Scenario Design Team as facilitators  Evaluators will observe Proceedings and Report Out  Earthquake Experts On-Hand to Answer Questions

9. 9 Exercise Process, cont. Four Phases  Today I Protection/Mitigation (Workshop within an Exercise) II Focus on Response (participants will be seated in their sectors; session will conclude with a short Hot Wash)  Tomorrow III Focus on Recovery (participants will be seated in mixed infrastructures) IV Focus on Restoration (exercise will conclude with a Hot Wash and brief discussion of Next Steps)

10. 10 Rules of the Game  Accept the Scenario  This is not a Test or Competition  Avoid Getting Bogged Down in the Details  Share Your Knowledge and Experience  Save Discussion on Solutions for the Exercise Report and the Follow-up Action Planning Workshop

11. 11 About the Scenario  The Scenario is Hypothetical  Based on Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW) 2005 Report  Information on damages and actions to address impacts from disruptions, including areas affected, damages and duration of infrastructure disruptions depend on many interrelated factors  Studies of the effects of earthquakes undertaken in collaboration with regional infrastructures are necessary to better understand how to make the Puget Sound region and Pacific Northwest resilient to this type of extreme disaster

12. 12 PHASE I—Protection and Mitigation Puget Sound Partnership Workshop on Earthquake Preparedness, January 18, 2007 8:00 AM  More than 250 participants from regional organizations, PNW states and Canadian provinces are meeting in Seattle for a half-day Workshop to explore disaster response and recovery issues related to a major subduction zone earthquake  The Workshop is an outgrowth of concern over the fact that such a quake has struck the region in the past on average every 500 years with the last one in January, 1700—meaning such an event could occur at any time

13. 13 Puget Sound Partnership Workshop on Earthquake Preparedness, cont.  Participants learn that the Cascadia subduction zone runs 800 miles from Vancouver Island to Cape Mendocino in northern California and that earthquakes generated along the fault have far more geographically widespread effects than other types of quakes  Impacts for an 8 to 9.0 quake include landslides, soil liquefaction, tsunamis, fires, hazardous material spills and building damage

14. 14 Puget Sound Partnership Workshop on Earthquake Preparedness, cont.  Especially vulnerable are tall and long structures--such as multi-story buildings, bridges, railroad tracks, tunnels and pipelines; also aging and degraded infrastructures  Participants are provided a briefing by earthquake experts on what they believe would be potential damage to the Pacific Northwest and more specifically to the Puget Sound Region and regional infrastructures

15. 15 8:45-10:00 A.M. – 1st Breakout Session  Workshop participants are divided into breakout sessions by infrastructure and provided a series of questions designed to enable them to share information and to provide a general baseline of existing measures to protect against or mitigate damage to their infrastructure’s cyber and physical systems and facilities

16. 16 Questions for Breakout Session 1 Session 1 – Sector-Specific  Vulnerabilities, Consequences, and Risk Assessment (Questions 1-6)  Interdependencies (Questions 7-13)

17. 17 Breakout Session 1, cont. All Groups  1. How well does your organization understand the impact of a major earthquake on its critical assets and facilities and on provision of products and services?  Expected damage for cyber and physical assets  Loss of public confidence  Loss of economic vitality  Impact to customers  Each Group will have two additional questions (see Question Assignment Sheet on your table and general instructions)

18. 18 10:15 -11:45 A.M. – 2nd Breakout Session  Participants are divided into breakout sessions of representatives of different infrastructures and organizations to look at “interdependencies outside the fence” in a major subduction earthquake and protection and mitigation challenges

19. 19 Questions for Breakout Session 2 Session 2 – Mixed Infrastructures  Response, Recovery Restoration Issues (Questions 14-24)  Legal, Proprietary, Cultural Issues (Questions 25-26)

20. 20 Breakout Session 2, cont. All Groups  14. Does your organization know who relies upon it for their short term and long term survival?  Each Group as in the previous session will have two additional questions (see Question Assignment Sheet on your table and general instructions)

21. 21 Workshop Closing Plenary Session  From 11:45 -12:30 P.M., the Workshop wraps up with a Plenary Session that allows participants to share the results of the discussions from the two breakout sessions  Participants are asked to share their views on the two questions (questions 1 and 14) that all breakout groups addressed and selected other questions  Recorders tasked with taking down the observations of their respective working groups are requested to provide their notes for inclusion in a summary of the general state of regional earthquake protection/mitigation measures

22. 22 Workshop Luncheon  The working luncheon focuses on lessons learned in extreme events that highlight the challenges raised by public expectations, as well as the importance of the media’s role in response activities  They are also asked to think about well the region could cope and whether civil disorder would be a factor  Participants are asked to consider the following questions:

23. 23 Questions  In what ways do the media play an essential role in major emergencies? What additional benefits can they provide for disaster management?  What steps have been taken to educate the public and the media on readiness for a major earthquake and local and state disaster plans?  How can information be conveyed by the media to the general public during a major emergency to forestall rumors or inaccurate information?  If civil disorder erupted, how would this be handled?

24. 24 PHASE II: Event & Post Event--Focus on Response DAY 1: March 1, 2007 1:45 PM  It is a cold, blustery day with occasional heavy downpours in the Seattle area and throughout much of the Pacific Northwest  Some areas have received 2 to 3 inches of rain from storms that are part of a weather trend that has been continuing for some time with flooding in low-lying areas  At the Space Needle in Seattle, a luncheon attended by more than two dozen top business leaders and municipal and county officials on regional disaster planning is just wrapping up

25. 25 March 1, 2007 1:45 PM, cont.  Suddenly, the Space Needle begins to sway--people freeze in place, others panic and run for the stairs as power is lost and emergency back-up does not automatically kick-in  Several luncheon guests who are emergency management officials instinctively reach for cell phones and speed dial their respective offices to no avail

26. 26 Questions  How would loss of communications and power impact immediate notification/response activities?  How are alert and warning handled and the Emergency Alert System activated?

27. 27 March 1, 1:49 PM – 4 minutes later  The rolling motion, which has seemed to go on for ages, ends in less than four minutes  In that few minutes, hundreds of thousands of individuals from Vancouver, B.C. south to Eureka, California have felt its impacts in varying degrees  In some locations there is damage that ranges from minor structural impacts to home, businesses, and infrastructures to major damage; in isolated cases destruction and fatalities, with landslides and liquefaction of the soil that has undermined structures, including pipelines and other buried infrastructure, covering or displacing rail lines, and damaging overhead electrical distribution and high voltage transmission lines and substations

28. 28 March 1, 1:49 PM – 4 minutes later, cont.  Damage to buildings along the coast is more extensive with the greatest damage to older multi-story structures  Structural damage and collapse of some unreinforced masonry structures and older concrete structures in the I-5 corridor has occurred and in areas of downtown Seattle some older structures have experienced significant structural damage with a few collapsing  Nonstructural damage, including broken pipes, ceiling damage, and water leakage has caused disruption in many buildings throughout the region

29. 29 March 1, 1:49 PM – 4 minutes later, cont.  Several transmission and power distribution lines and substations located along the I-5 corridor, from Vancouver BC to Northern California, have been damaged  Initial reports from the BPA Dispatch Control Center indicate the loss of service from the U.S.-Canadian Border south through the Portland area with damage extending further south to northern California  The control center also reports lost generation and communication from major Columbia River dams located downstream from John Day Dam  Cross Cascade high voltage (500kV) transmission into the Puget Sound and Portland metropolitan areas have been disrupted, dropping all load

30. 30 March 1, 1:49 PM – 4 minutes later, cont.  BC Transmission Corporation reports major damage to the Greater Vancouver electrical transmission system  Vancouver Island has been blacked out, with all on-island generation and supply lines from the mainland tripped  The major transfer lines from the interior of the province to the Lower Mainland are intact and the BC – Washington intertie north of Bellingham remains energized, but load transfers in either direction have been suspended pending a review of the system

31. 31 March 1, 1:49 PM – 4 minutes later, cont.  Roadways, bridges and tunnels not built to withstand earthquakes in the 7-9M range located in Vancouver, BC, Seattle, and Portland areas have major structural damage, with co-located cable, power lines, and other infrastructure assets, immediately congesting traffic in the region  The Alaskan Way Viaduct has collapsed, crushing cars, and people beneath, and the Massey tunnel under the Fraser River near Vancouver is flooding, with people and vehicles trapped in the tunnel  Damage to transportation systems west of the Coast Range is more substantial and landslides in the Coast Range have cut off many travel routes

32. 32 March 1, 1:49 PM – 4 minutes later, cont.  Certain pipelines and storage tanks carrying natural gas, fuel, chemicals, industrial waste, and sewage have been affected by liquefaction and literally risen to the surface and/or have ruptured, contaminating land and water areas  In some locations, water distribution systems have broken or the tanks toppled; pumps have ceased working unless they have on site backup power generators  Landline and mobile telephone services have become rapidly overloaded in most areas with few telephone calls getting through, especially for local calls

33. 33 Questions  Given infrastructure interdependencies what would be the expected cascading impacts?  How far would these impacts extend?  What critical services might still be functioning?  What is the chain of events that government (municipal. county/state and federal) and private sector critical service providers follow when an earthquake occurs?  What actions immediately take place under existing response plans and how long is this process expected to take?

34. 34 March 1, 1:55 P.M.  The NOAA weather radio, operating on back-up electricity supply, has broadcast a tsunami warning to all coastal areas that could be affected, but many listeners cannot receive the warning due to lack of power for their radios  A water surge anywhere from 5 to 30 meters is moving north and south along the coast  Water surge also has occurred along the Columbia River as far inland as Vancouver and Portland

35. 35 Questions  What capabilities does NOAA have to transmit a timely warning and will the coastal communities be able to activate their warning sirens without power?  What is the likelihood that coastal populations would have time to evacuate or get to higher ground to escape the coastal surges if they could receive a warning from the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center?  What other alert and warning mechanisms are there that could be used?

36. 36 March 1, 2:15 P.M.  Local and state government officials and their disaster response counterparts in utilities and other infrastructures are activating their disaster preparedness plans  In the White House Situation Room in Washington D.C. and in operations centers in federal agencies and departments, news is coming in on them but there are few details, and U.S. officials are contacting government officials in the affected states  The magnitude of the quake and the effects of the tsunami on the coast mean local resources including regional National Guard units will be insufficient to handle response needs

37. 37 March 1, 2:15 P.M., cont.  Military resources from the regional Air Force, Army, Navy and Coast Guard have been put on alert for support to relief efforts  Significant damage has occurred at Puget Sound Navy Shipyard and McChord Air Force Base  Kitsap and Jefferson County Emergency Management officials are seeking Navy assurance about any nuclear risks from the Bangor Submarine Base on Hood Canal

38. 38 Questions  How quickly could counties, states and organizations activate their respective emergency operations centers (EOC’s) given the magnitude of the damage, transportation system failures, while also dealing with personal and family needs?  How will federal assets be brought into the region, given the transportation gridlock, power disruptions, and disrupted road, rail, maritime and air transportation infrastructures?  How would the federal, state and local officials “sort out” roles and missions in theory—in reality?

39. 39 Questions  How do we integrate federal defense assets into the response effort and to whom would they report?  When would we expect federal (civilian and defense) assets to arrive -- how soon would they be requested by the Governors?  Re. the National Response Plan, will the normal chain of declaring a national emergency and enlisting federal assistance be required, given the obvious nature and extent of the disaster at this point?

40. 40 March 1, 2:45 P.M.  The Seattle seawall in the Puget Sound Region has failed resulting in flooding and extensive damage to waterfront piers and their buildings and some have collapsed  A large storage tank of petroleum products in the Tacoma bay area has ruptured and is on fire and fuel oil is running into the bay and has ignited in some places, endangering large shipping vessels, cargo ships, and other vessels and threatening further fuel oil contamination in the bay  Many bridges carrying hundreds of thousands of vehicles each day are being closed to traffic, deemed not safe until inspected

41. 41 March 1, 2:45 P.M., cont.  Some main roads along the coast are impassable and I-5 and other interstates are parking lots with several thousand vehicles abandoned along the roads and bridges  Ferries on the water during the earthquake are now docked, but cars are not able to be off loaded, stranding passengers; fueling points for the ferry are not operational  Sea-Tac Airport is closed and will not reopen until terminals and runways are inspected for damage and the fuel tank farm is operational; meanwhile smaller airports are closed due to power and communications outages and debris on runways

42. 42 Questions  What contingency plans does the U.S. Coast Guard have for this scenario and how do they interface with the rest of the first responder community and other response needs?  How do they get backup when their resources are overwhelmed?  What is the role of the Port in response and recovery?  How are communications and information disruptions affecting coordination of response efforts?

43. 43 March 1, 3:15 P.M.  In Snohomish County, the Culmback Dam has been damaged necessitating the evacuation of the cities of Sultan and Gold Bar, closure of Highway 2  There has been damage to the City of Everett’s electric power and water systems and landslides on the Snohomish County’s coastline affecting the cities of Edmonds and Mukilteo  Naval Station Everett pier and facilities have sustained damage and major highway bridges leading north and east out of Everett have been damaged  Responders, utility maintenance, healthcare and other essential personnel and are impeded by police roadblocks, stalled cars, and general traffic congestion

44. 44 March 1, 3:15 P.M., cont.  Thousands have tried to drive home or to schools to pick- up children, or to rush out for food and supplies, but found themselves forced to abandon their vehicles  Emergency managers are trying to devise plans to shelter these people and thousands who have had to leave high- rise homes, hotels and houses that may be structurally unsound, flooded by broken pipes or lack of heat/water  Industry in the area is virtually shut down and staff are not able to enter buildings for personal items (e.g., purses, briefcases) until site safety reviews

45. 45 Questions  How would EOC’s and their operations be impacted?  What contingency plans are there for County government to relocate operations if necessary?  How are emergency responder and utility maintenance personnel credentialed for access to damaged areas?  How are evacuations of affected individuals and communities determined and orchestrated, including evacuation of special populations, i.e., day care, schools, nursing homes, jails/prisons, disabled at home, isolated populations, etc.?

46. 46 March 1, 3:30 P.M.  Due to power failures and the resulting disruption of water pumps, sewage backup on streets is beginning to pose serious problems for buildings in low lying areas  Ruptured natural gas lines are causing numerous fires in the downtown areas  Electric utilities and telecommunications companies need to move debris and bring in equipment to make immediate system repairs

47. 47 March 1, 3:30 P.M., cont.  Bank facilities and branches have shut down and evacuated, or in some cases locked their doors are sheltering personnel inside  ATM systems are non-functioning and bank security personnel are worried of robbery attempts  There have been rumors of sporadic looting of stores in some areas

48. 48 Questions  What priorities do public sector (first responders including law enforcement, other government agencies) and private sector critical infrastructures owners have in the immediate aftermath of a major earthquake?  How would the widespread and diverse nature of the disruptions affect their disaster management priorities?  How can fires be suppressed given the infrastructure disruptions and the drain on limited emergency water supplies and who makes the decision on this tradeoff?.

49. 49 Questions, cont.  What, if any, is the role of the regional military resources in assisting at this point?  What should the private sector expect from the military?  How is it determined what state or regions receive this assistance and what type of help is involved?  What resources are available from the National Guard and how can these resources be obtained given their limits and the multi-state impact of the earthquake?

50. 50 March 1, 4:00 P.M.  President Bush declares a National Disaster for the states in the earthquake impacted region  The National Response Plan officially goes into effect  In Canada, the federal government is providing support in response at provincial request

51. 51 Questions  How would the process of securing federal assistance take place in both countries given the apparent large-scale nature of the disaster—apart from existing national plans?  Which federal, state, or local authorities would be in charge and in what capacities?  At what point would U.S. Defense assets be mobilized to assist and how long does this decision process take?

52. 52 Questions, cont.  What assistance could be expected from other states that have mutual aid pacts if these states have to deal with impacts from the earthquake and tsunami?  To what extent will the various levels of government, different states and jurisdictions and other public and private sector organizations be communicating and coordinating on response and initial recovery needs?

53. 53 March 1, 5:30 P.M.  The first of many periodic aftershocks have occurred, some at the 6-7M, causing additional damage and impeding response and recovery efforts  In the meantime, electric power outages now have affected millions of people throughout the Pacific Northwest and are likely to last weeks or months  Massive electrical outages that have occurred within the three-state areas (Washington, Oregon, California) are impacting the Western electric grid to the eastern parts of the states and southern California causing critical service providers to rely on alternate power and generators

54. 54 March 1, 5:30 P.M., cont.  Severe ground shaking and landslides have damaged several BPA high voltage (HV) transmission substations along the I-5 corridor and cross Cascade transmission lines and structures leading into the Puget Sound/Portland areas  Major hydro generation at Bonneville and The Dalles Dams has been disrupted as well as the DC and AC interties into California  There are too few repair crews to address all suspected damage areas and BPA and regional utilities is requesting the assistance of other utilities  BPA has requested that BC Hydro export as much power to the U.S. as possible

55. 55 Questions  At what point will BPA let government officials, other utilities and the general public know that the outages will be prolonged and service restoration is unclear  How are tradeoff decisions made on prioritizing restoring electricity or natural gas service to critical service providers and residential customers  What are some of the critical services that would have the highest priority for use of portable electric generators (diesel, hydrogen fuel, etc.)

56. 56 Questions, cont.  What Mutual Aid capabilities are available from other states and entities?  What barriers could exist to delay deployment of utility assistance across the Canada – US border, in either direction?

57. 57 March 1, 8:00 P.M.  The water treatment systems throughout Oregon and Washington have been significantly affected, and water distribution is limited  There continue to be concerns on the potability of water due to the flooding and debris within the water intake systems, with wells impacted and pumps to these wells are non- operational  Some hospitals that were not structurally damaged must now evacuate because of lack of water

58. 58 March 1, 8:00 P.M., cont.  Certain hospitals in areas where their casualties exceeded their patient surge capacity shortly after the quake are experiencing lack of supplies, inability to get staff in to work, and are being overwhelmed with walk-ins  A huge concern is the schools, where thousands of children and distraught parents that managed to reach them are isolated with limited or no food and supplies to sustain them for more than a short while  There are looming sanitation and potable water problems

59. 59 March 1, 8:00 P.M., cont.  A huge concern is the schools, where thousands of children and distraught parents that managed to reach them are isolated with limited or no food and supplies to sustain them for more than a short while and looming sanitation and potable water problems

60. 60 Questions  What is the mechanism to accommodate large numbers of in-state displaced persons/evacuees?  How will reception and processing centers be established, who is responsible and what should be provided at these facilities?  How will people get to them (transportation)?  How will families be rejoined?

61. 61 Questions, cont.  Due to the presumed large number of deaths, what capacity do we have to store, identify, and dispose of dead bodies, for cold storage, coroners, medical examiners, and morticians?  Where will staging areas be located to provide for necessary water, food, medicines, repair parts and replacement equipment, and other commodities to meet specific needs?  How will transportation to and from the staging areas be orchestrated given the disruptions to transportation and critical infrastructures?

62. 62 Questions, cont.  How is the response resource management mission accomplished and which agencies are in charge?  Does a coordination mechanism exist that can enable government and private sector critical infrastructure and service providers to collectively manage response activities and secure and allocate essential recourses?  How are resource management and service restoration priorities determined given that certain utilities need to restore services sequentially?

63. 63 DAY 2: March 2, 6:45 AM  The landline phone system remains out of service in much of the Puget Sound Region  Some microwave towers are not in operation due to damage or collapse and high-speed cable and fiber lines that run across bridges or are underground have been severed, causing loss of internet and phone communication  The 800 MHz repeater sites have been either damaged or have lost power and backup systems due to lack of batteries or fuel for generators

64. 64 March 2, 6:45 AM, cont.  People who have access to battery powered radios or have backup power generators turn to the broadcast media for information or are calling stations to report problems in their areas because they can't get through to 911  Radio station stations are fielding calls from people reporting fires in their neighborhoods, gas leaks, and injuries and asking for information about what they can do  Hospital doctors are calling radio stations making on-air radio pleas for specific supplies

65. 65 Questions  What ad-hoc communications and networking capabilities exist today that can be rapidly deployed to provide regional communications and networking capabilities?  What activities are underway to repair telecommunications and communications disruptions and how long it is envisioned to take?  What priority are these activities given?  How will congestion caused by thousands of people trying to use cell phones impact the restoration of the system?

66. 66 March 2, 8:00 AM  For many utilities and organizations, sensitive electronic and computer equipment has been damaged and services are off-line despite the availability of emergency power and battery backup  In other instances, limited backup power generation and telecommunications disruptions have degraded capabilities, impacting the provision of essential services

67. 67 March 2, 8:00 AM, cont.  An example is the City of Seattle, which is coping with response activities and trying to maintain critical services  The generator that is backup power for the City of Seattle data center has been temporarily disabled and will exhaust its fuel supply in 16-18 hours  Loss of fresh water supply has made it impossible to cool the data center resulting in closing the building  Because there is no alternative data center at this time, all City information technology (IT) functions and related business processes are now effectively shut down along with all City functions, including work to repair disrupted facilities and services

68. 68 March 2, 8:00 AM, cont.  Because power outages are still prevalent, the banking system cannot fully operate  Checks and credit/debit cards and account balances cannot be verified and credit cannot be extended  A few banks are trying to reopen branches on a very limited basis using manual procedures to try to help some customers  Banks have already activated distant backup data center sites, but this is not helping the region yet, due to lack of power, data lines and telecommunications

69. 69 Questions, cont.  What types of alternative communications are available to undertake crucial coordination of activities (e.g., satellite access systems, PDAs? the US-CERT Regional Portal, etc.)?  What priority does restoration of cyber systems have among the range of immediate restoration needs?  What federal or state agencies are responsible for cyber infrastructure recovery/restoration needs and providing technical advice and resources?

70. 70 March 2, 11:30 AM  A few national news media representatives using portable generators and satellite communications are beginning to set up operations in major PNW cities  Local municipal and county officials are dealing with local media requests for information and media are contacting earthquake experts and asking technical and scientific questions about the quake  The media is already speculating about an escalation of looting and the breakdown of law enforcement, while at the same time performing the vital function of responder/communicator for the general public

71. 71 Questions  How is the local media, which may have the only viable telecommunications capabilities, be utilized to convey warnings, instructions, and information to the general public to keep the rumors and confusion to a minimum?  What would be the role of the Emergency Alert System for this purpose?  What is the priority of ensuring fuel for broadcast station emergency transmitter and studio generators?  How might we utilize amateur radio groups in this type of event?

72. 72 Questions, cont.  What is the level of private sector involvement in regional public affairs and communication and is there a plan developed to coordinate their involvement?  How is the public information coordination mission handled, by what mechanism, and who is in charge?

73. 73 END FIRST DAY OF EXERCISE  Exercise participants are invited to participate in a short “Hot Wash” to share views on the highlights and lessons learned in Phase II  The Exercise Evaluator Team will provide highlights of their findings

74. 74 Preview of Second Day of Exercise: Phases III & IV – Recovery/Restoration  The second day of the exercise will address damage and disruptions to critical infrastructures from the earthquake with a focus on recovery and longer-term restoration challenges  Participants will be seated in mixed groups for the day- long proceedings  Lunch will be provided

75. 75 PHASE III: Recovery DAY 3: March 3, 2007 8:00 AM  As the magnitude of the effects of the earthquake continues to unfold, escalating infrastructure problems are highlighted by the continued power outages affecting most of the Pacific Northwest  City, county, state, and local officials throughout the affected areas are manning EOCs with private sector and other key organizations  In most regions, severely impeded communications is making coordination and obtaining essential resources and supplies difficult to impossible

76. 76 March 3, 2007 8:00 AM  Oil refineries and petroleum production have not resumed and their transportation and distribution has been shut down  Transportation network damage will severely delay re-supply of fuels to backup generators

77. 77 Questions  How long will it take to resume operations and what other infrastructures need to be up and running for petroleum production and distribution to resume?  What would be the procedures for re-lighting pilot lights and securing the necessary skilled staff to do this job?

78. 78 March 3, 8:15 AM  Most businesses remain shutdown  The damage and concerns about potential structure damage in many buildings has necessitated their evacuation until inspection and damage can be repaired.

79. 79 Questions  How long would it take to get the majority of businesses operating?  What assistance could essential businesses (grocery stores, drug stores, home improvement or hardware stores) expect in the short-term from government?

80. 80 March 3, 8:30 AM  U.S and Canadian officials have been holding conference calls and meetings since late yesterday afternoon  Damages on both sides of the border to critical infrastructures and populations require close coordination, especially in light of terrorism concerns and security safeguards  This must be been done to regulate cross-border travel for utility workers, first responders, and families with homes or relatives that need to get across the border quickly

81. 81 March 3, 8:30 AM  Because of the cascading impacts to cross-border interdependent infrastructures, including disruptions of services at airports, railroads, the transportation system, shipping and seaports and businesses, it is expected there will be major economic impacts as businesses and northwest imports and exports grind to a virtual halt  This will have worldwide impacts--the loss of jobs and dollars to the regional economy may take years to fully recover

82. 82 Questions  What mutual assistance plans and cooperative mechanisms are in place between the U.S. and Canada for civilian and defense cooperation to deal with a major earthquake?  How would cross-border security measures impede recovery, and what steps would be taken to avoid this?  What assistance (medical, utility maintenance, defense assets, water and other essential personnel, equipment, and supplies) would be required to transverse the border?  How is cross-border coordination handled at the provincial to state level and at the federal levels?

83. 83 March 3, 10:30 AM  The U.S. Postal Service has been grappling with how to restore services in communities affected by the quake, which is a multi-state, extensive area and a Herculean task  The Seattle USPS District Office, located in the Queen Anne area, is damaged and inaccessible  The USPS Inspection Service office, located downtown Seattle is destroyed and the Seattle Processing and Distribution building heavily damaged due to ground failure

84. 84 March 3, 10:30 AM, cont.  It is essential that the Postal Service begin delivery of mail and supplies as soon as possible to reassure the public, keep small companies from going out of business and to provide people social security, welfare and payroll checks  Many thousands of people have been either temporarily or permanently displaced that will need to receive their mail  Meanwhile, Postal employees need to be located and communications restored to facilitate public access to postal headquarter assistance and to determine damage to buildings and transportation capabilities

85. 85 Questions  What are the plans of US Postal and other delivery services (UPS, FEDEX, and DHL) that will have stockpiles of packages backing up in their warehouses?  What do they do in cases where there are no sites to which they can deliver?

86. 86 March 3, 4:30 PM  Businesses in the region and large national enterprises are seeking ways to offer their personnel, products, materials, and services to assist in the recovery activities

87. 87 Questions  What mechanisms exist to utilize private sector assistance? How are private donations managed (prioritized, acquired, and dispatched) to where needed?  What is the priority of use for privately and publicly owned resources for transportation such as of-road vehicles, helicopters, tractor-trailers, and other aircraft?  Will emergency powers be put into place to use private sector resources and pay for their use later, or might we expect some other mechanism be put into place?

88. 88 PHASE IV: Restoration DAY 7: March 9, 2007 8:00 AM  Federal, state and local officials involved in earthquake recovery meet to continue planning for longer-term restoration activities  Response efforts are ongoing where people are still in shelters and large segments of the population located in the major metropolitan areas of Vancouver, BC; Seattle/Tacoma, and Portland remain without power  There has been non-stop press coverage of the earthquake and two Congressional investigations are underway on the adequacy of preparedness/response activities and address costs of rebuilding and whether to rebuild in certain areas

89. 89 March 9, 2007 8:00 AM, cont.  Crews are rebuilding transmission towers and stringing new conductor and spares to replace critical components that have been damaged are being prepared for movement into the region  Some logistical delays are expected due to the shortage of special handling equipment and damage to overpasses, roads, bridges and rail lines  Thousands of electrical line and maintenance crews from utilities outside the disaster area are assisting BPA and the distribution utilities in the restoration effort  Outages most likely will continue for several more days, into weeks and damage assessments are still underway

90. 90 Questions  How are securing necessary resources--food, water, equipment, housing and other necessities handled and which agencies make the decisions?  How are these recovery activities coordinated to ensure they are effective and efficient and in what way is the private sector involved?  Which government organizations are responsible for cyber system recovery and restoration under the National Response Plan?

91. 91 Questions, cont.  How are resource needs identified and assessed, including for cyber restoration?  For special needs populations?  For the business community?  How is relocation of restoration resources (personnel and materials) into and out of regions handled and which organizations make these decisions?  Which agencies and organizations are responsible for damage assessment, in what time-frame and what is the level of involvement by the private sector?

92. 92 March 9, 8:00 AM, cont.  The officials release a status report of the restoration efforts to date which notes that there are still thousands of people requiring temporary shelter, food, water, and medical care, into the foreseeable future  Debris removal and disposal will be a huge challenge lasting for months  Few businesses in affected regions are functional, basic necessities are difficult for people to obtain, and communications remain limited or inoperable

93. 93 March 9, 8:00 AM cont.  The pace of restoration activities will depend on the expeditious restoration of critical services—particularly electrical power, water systems, and communications  A challenge will be that the same equipment needed to begin restoration is being used in rescue  Since it appears getting additional equipment from outside the affected area is problematic, there are some required policy decisions needed on who has priority for such equipment

94. 94 Questions  How are recovery and restoration decisions made when they involve a range of public and private interests— federal (both U.S. and Canadian), state/provinces, and local government, infrastructure owners and operators?  What criteria are used to make prioritization ad investment decisions?

95. 95 March 9, 8:00 AM  Because of the extent of damage across the Pacific Northwest, region, many utility repairs that would normally take only a few hours now take days  The highest priorities for power restoration are transmission substations, and switchyards at generation sites, emergency resources (hospitals, fire stations), and high-density population areas (residential, commercial, or industrial)  Until electricity is restored to water treatment facilities, there is no water

96. 96 March 9, 8:00 AM  Bridges and rail lines must be inspected, debris removed, and damage repaired or detours set up, before the corridor is open again  Most of the ports in this region suffer some damage and are of limited use because shipping lanes need to be resurveyed before rivers are again navigable  Cracked runways at airports built on areas of artificial fill or on liquefying soils are closed until inspection and repair, causing difficulties for small airports that may not be high on the priority list for repair

97. 97 March 9, 8:00 AM, cont.  For water systems, each utility, in conjunction with its policy people, will have to do the evaluation and, while they will be able to determine what is damaged, government will have to be consulted about areas that are not going to be rebuilt  There will also need to be discussions between local, state and federal environmental agencies regarding rebuilding in environmentally sensitive areas of sewer systems, major lines and lift stations as well as treatment facilities  Most financial institutions are beginning to process financial transactions and payroll /government checks and restore ATM functions throughout the impacted states and province

98. 98 Questions  How are authorities dealing with people who have still not received paychecks, Medicaid, social security or other income checks?  How are damage assessments for dams, bridges, roads, buildings, and infrastructures undertaken, by which organization, and in what priority?  How will the rebuilding efforts be organized and how will they be financed?  Will utilities be allowed to return to their sites or could they be required to move out of these areas temporarily?

99. 99 March 9, 8:00 AM, cont,  State, provincial, and local governments raise concerns about their continued inability to adequately provide traditional services, from fighting fires to issuing building permits  There is significant damage to communications and information capabilities  Some city halls, fire or police stations, jails, and schools will need repair or in isolated cases, rebuilding and funding, supplies, and personnel will be needed for months or years

100. 100 Questions  Where do states and local governments stand in terms of priority reconstitution activities?  What responsibility does the federal government have to help support state and local governments impacted by the earthquake in restoring physical and cyber systems that underpin basic services?

101. 101 March 9, 10:00 AM  In Washington, D.C., a Senate hearing is just commencing to assess long-term economic impacts of the earthquake  There is concern that the tax base for the Puget Sound Region is already eroding as most businesses are not in operation and major companies that still have headquarters in the region are already talking publicly of leaving  Businesses and government agencies that cannot operate their offices have set up temporary offices in eastern Washington and elsewhere  Losses to both profits and wages are already beginning

102. 102 March 9, 10:00 AM, cont.  Shipping lanes in the lower Columbia and in other affected rivers must be resurveyed before ship traffic can resume  This is critical because the Columbia River waterway is the primary transportation corridor for petroleum products moving into Eastern Washington and Oregon  Rail lines, trucking, and air traffic are overburdened by extra demands for products needed to rebuild in western BC, Oregon, Washington, and northern California  Alaska, which is dependent on west coast ports for essential products and supplies, is facing major problems in ensuring these shipments

103. 103 March 9, 10:00 AM, cont.  Restoration of communications, potable water, fuel, sewage treatment, etc. will take days, weeks, or months, depending on the amount of damage and access to the damaged area  Tourism to the region is expected to dramatically decline  A key concern of business and government leaders is that that people who have moved out of the area will not come back, impacting the future economic vitality of the region and influencing the extent to which infrastructure is rebuilt  An unprecedented level of federal assistance will be required that the localities and states will need to address

104. 104 Questions  What can be done to provide people with the level of assurance necessary to rebuild and remain in the region?  What types of incentives could be provided to the private sector to make the desired rebuilding investments

105. 105 DAY 31: April 4, 2007 10:00 AM  FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other key federal agencies testify at yet another Congressional hearing on progress made on restoration a month after the quake  Agency officials outline a continuance of priorities for at least another five months:  Continue damage inspections, and inspections of new construction  Continue rebuilding infrastructure and continue temporary shelter, food, water, and medical care, (including moving those in temporary shelters to more permanent housing)  Streamline resulting permit and land use planning processes  Manage debris removal  Prevent and treat health and environmental problems

106. 106 April 4, 2007 10:00 AM, cont.  Environmental groups in a press conference after the hearing demand environmental impact statements before the reconstruction of many facilities can commence  This impacts energy facilities, manufacturing plants, and other sites  Major environmental clean-up efforts are expected to delay construction and repairs

107. 107 Questions  What type of timelines will these activities require?  By this point, what is the extent of outages of critical infrastructures and what can be expected in terms of complete restoration of essential services? ******************************************************

108. 108 End of Exercise and Hot Wash  Participants, evaluators, and observers are invited to provide their observations of Phases III and IV and the overall exercise proceedings  Please make sure to complete your participant evaluation form, sharing particularly important points during the Hot Wash discussions

109. 109 Next Steps Towards Exercise Action Plan  Draft exercise report will be produced using participant and observer evaluations and evaluator comments  Post-exercise observations welcome and encouraged. Please provide to PNWER (Brandon Hardenbrook) at Brandon@pnwer.org. Brandon@pnwer.org  Draft Exercise Report will be reviewed by the Scenario Design Team Members and then sent to the Blue Cascades participants and observers for review and comment  An Action Planning Workshop will be held in late April (date TBD) for Blue Cascades III participants to prioritize the exercise report recommendations and determine which activities to include in an Action Plan to meet identified preparedness gaps

110. 110 Thank you For Your Participation in BLUE CASCADES III Please Make Sure to Hand In Your Evaluations As You Leave We Hope You Can Stay and Join Us for the Informal Reception