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Agnes Hajdu EpiTrain III, Jurmala, Latvia

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Presentation on theme: "Agnes Hajdu EpiTrain III, Jurmala, Latvia"— Presentation transcript:

1 Agnes Hajdu EpiTrain III, 24.08.2006 Jurmala, Latvia
Nosocomial outbreaks Agnes Hajdu EpiTrain III, Jurmala, Latvia

2 Content Nosocomial infections Health care setting
Antimicrobial resistance Nosocomial outbreaks History Characteristics Outbreak database Detection, Investigation An example: Dent-O-Sept Summary

3 Nosocomial infection …hospital-acquired infection, health-care associated infection… Infection acquired in the hospital due to exposure to the pathogen in the hospital Development of infection after 48 hours of hospital admission (CDC)

4 Burden of nosocomial infections
Increased morbidity, mortality 10% of in-patients acquire an infection in the hospital Increased costs Prolonged hospital stay, additional medical procedures and treatment 30% preventable

5 Health care setting Devices: endoscope, catheter, ventilator..
Medical procedures: surgery.. Medical personnel: doctors, nurses.. Patient: immunocompromised, susceptible maybe the source as carrier of pathogen Dangerous residents: MRSA, VRSA, VRE, ESBL*, C. difficile ribotype 027 *methicillin-/vancomycin-resistant S.aureus; vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus; extended spectrum beta-lactamases

6 Patients at risk Immunocompromised patient Other factors
Malignancy, immunosuppressive treatment, HIV infection Other factors Severe underlying disease, age, obesity Intensive care units Medical, surgical, neonatal, burn units

7 Antimicrobial resistance
1945 – Penicillin 1948 – Penicillin-resistant S.aureus 1959 – Methicillin 1961 – Methicillin-resistant S.aureus 1998 – Vancomycin-resistant S.aureus Use, overuse and wrong use of antibiotics Possible to reverse, but it takes time Knowledge Attitude Behaviour

8 What can be worse than a nosocomial infection?
A Nosocomial Outbreak!!! An unusual increase in the number of nosocomial infections (time, place, person)

9 History of nosocomial outbreaks
First well-documented outbreak Puerperal (child-bed) fever in a hospital in Vienna, 1847 Ignác Semmelweis, Hungarian physician gathered and analysed mortality data Autopsy room Maternity wards Handwashing intervention (chlorine solution) Modern epidemiology S. aureus hospital outbreaks worldwide, 1950s CDC projects from 1970s Intensive research from 1990s

10 1847

11 2006

12 Nosocomial outbreaks - examples
Unusual transmission ESBL Klebsiella pneunomiae – Maternity wards, contaminated ultrasonography gel (France, 1993) Rare pathogen Malassezia pachydermatis – Neonatal ICU, associated with colonization of health care workers’ pet dogs (US, 1995) Emergence of more virulent strain C. difficile ribotype 027 – Increased severity of diarrhoea, recent outbreaks in US, Canada, Netherlands, England

13 Nosocomial outbreak database
Database providing information to facilitate interventions A learning tool What kind of data to collect? Control selection? Search by pathogen, ward type etc. Osaka University, Japan

14

15 Characteristics of nosocomial outbreaks
Location Type of infection Pathogens Source Mode of transmission Preventive/control measures Gastmeier et al. How Outbreaks Can Contribute to Prevention of Nosocomial Infections: Analysis of 1022 Outbreaks. Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology; (4);

16 Location Hospital – 83% Outpatient care – 12% Nursing home – 5%
Gastmeier et al. Location Hospital – 83% 50% in intensive care units Outpatient care – 12% Nursing home – 5% Special problems: Hospital staff with part-time job in nursing homes (transmissing pathogens in both ways) Nursing home: no infection control personnel, underreporting of outbreaks, gastroenteritis, scabies

17 Type of infections Bloodstream – 37% Gastrointestinal* – 29%
Gastmeier et al. Type of infections Bloodstream – 37% Gastrointestinal* – 29% Pneumonia – 23% Urinary tract – 14% Surgical site – 12% Other lower respiratory – 10% Central nervous system – 8% Skin and soft tissue – 7% *Probable underreporting

18 Most frequently reported pathogens*
Gastmeier et al. Most frequently reported pathogens* Nosocomial infections Staphylococcus aureus Enterococci E. coli Pseudomonas aeruginosa Streptococci Enterobacter spp. Nosocomial outbreaks Staphylococcus aureus Pseudomonas aeruginosa Klebsiella pneumoniae Serratia marcescens Hepatitis B, C virus Legionella pneumophila *Probable underreporting: Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp., norovirus, rotavirus, respiratory viral infections

19 Nosocomial outbreaks in Norway, 2005
Internet-based outbreak reporting system 47 outbreaks reported from hospitals with 622 cases Outbreaks No. of cases Norovirus 25 463 MRSA 11 41 Gastroenteritis 5 61 Listeria 2 6 Influenza 1 22 Other 3 29 Grahek-Ogden et al. Varsler om mistenkte utbrudd av smittsomme sykdommer I Norge I MSIS rapport 2006;34:22 (in Norwegian)

20 Source of outbreak Patient – 26% Medical equipment / device – 12%
Gastmeier et al. Source of outbreak Patient – 26% Medical equipment / device – 12% Environment – 12% Medical personnel – 11% Contaminated drug – 4% Contaminated food – 3% Care equipment – 3% Unclear source – 37%

21 Mode of transmission Contact – 45% Invasive technique – 16%
Gastmeier et al. Mode of transmission Contact – 45% Invasive technique – 16% Inhalation – 15% (droplet, airborne) Ingestion – 4% Unclear mode of transmission – 28%

22 Managing hospital outbreaks
Gastmeier et al. Managing hospital outbreaks Patient, health personnel screening, surveillance Isolation, cohorting Handwashing, hand disinfection Sterilisation, disinfection (Change) antibiotic therapy Modification of care / equipment Protective clothing Restriction of work load Vaccination

23 CDC guidelines Standard Precautions
Contact / Droplet / Airborne Precautions

24 Detection of nosocomial outbreaks
Alert from an effective surveillance system Alert from – the physician – the nurse – the hospital microbiologist – the hospital epidemiologist

25 Nosocomial transmission?
Similar cases at one department / among similar patients Cases associated with invasive device Health personnel and patients with same infection Nosocomial pathogen

26

27 Problems with detecting outbreaks
No detection 2-3 patients with pneumonia in intensive care unit Detection No investigation Nursing homes Detection Investigation No reporting If sanctions against reporting doctors, nurses False detection: pseudo-epidemics (artefacts) E.g. consequent laboratory contamination May lead to unnecessary antibiotic treatment

28 A method for early detection
Reports from antibiotic susceptibility tests from each medical ward (at least 85% culturing proportion) Baseline data: frequency of each pathogen isolated from specimens over a 26-week observation period Threshold: Isolates ranked from the lowest to highest Divide the distribution into quintiles (fifths), and set the cut-off between the 4th and 5th quintile The number of isolates represented by the 22nd week item becomes the threshold value 80% (4/5)

29 Proteus mirabilis isolates
Threshold (80%) Baseline data

30 Evaluation of the method
Early warning mechanism for potential outbreaks Either unusual and common pathogens Minimum effort and time Hospitals with limited infection control personnel Establishing endemic nosocomial infection rates Sensitive if organisms are routinely tested Epidemics involving several locations might go undetected Epidemics with prolonged incubation might go undetected

31 Investigation of nosocomial outbreaks
Steps of an outbreak investigation..  Asset Diagnosis can usually be made rapidly Direct access to medical care, laboratory Patient’s records are available Easy cohorting of the cases Disadvantage Multidrug-resistent pathogens Complex environment Intra – interhospital transfer Temporary staff, working in shifts

32 Case ascertainment The investigation is dependent on clearly defined case definitions and case ascertainment strategies Molecular diagnostics PFGE, PCR.. – Demonstrating clonality among epidemic isolates Combinative approach Epidemiological study Genetic typing method

33 Steps of an outbreak investigation
Have an outbreak control plan Confirm outbreak diagnosis Define a case Identify cases and obtain information Descriptive data collection and analysis Develop hypothesis Analytical studies to test hypothesis Communication (outbreak report) Control measures

34

35 A Norwegian example: Dent-O-Sept
Antiseptic non-sterile single-use swab for mouth hygiene Largest Pseudomonas outbreak ever recorded in Norway 231 confirmed cases, 34 deaths Genotypically identical strains in production plant, swabs and patients

36 Alert to NIPH Late February 2002
Notification from the infection control personnel (not quantified by lab statistics) Impression of possible increase in the number of pseudomonas infections in clinical wards of Norwegian hospitals (ICU) outbreak investigation

37 Outbreak investigation
Objectives: Describe the outbreak Identify the cause Make recommendations for future prevention Outbreak Control Team: Members from NIPH and the hospitals

38 Initial investigation
March 2002: identical outbreak strain is shown in patients in 3 different hospitals No national surveillance system for P. aeruginosa in Norway Inquiry for increased awareness in regional centers for infection control Patient interviews/case notes with trawling questionnaires in the affected hospitals (common exposure?) Suspect: fluids and moist products samples

39 Environmental investigation
April 2002: laboratory identifies genotypically identical strains of P. aeruginosa in swabs control measures: information to the producer, hospitals, authorities and the public, product recalled, production ceased Hospitals were asked to report which batches of the product they had in store samples Inspection and sampling at the production plant Outbreak strain found in packing machine spraying moisturizing liquid into the bags Violation of regulations (no documented quality assurance system with microbiological testing..)

40 Case finding and descriptive study
Norway: routine storage of all clinical bacterial isolates from blood and cerebrospinal fluid Isolates of P. aeruginosa from to reference labs for genotyping (PFGE) For patients with P.aeruginosa (outbreak strain or other) questionnaire: Demographic and clinical data

41 Descriptive results 231 patients with outbreak stain from 27 health care institutions Median age: 65 yrs, 61% men 87 pneumonia, 42 sepsis, 70 colonization 31% died (all had severe underlying disease) 31% had not or probably not used the swab

42 Dent-O-Sept outbreak – epidemic curve

43 Analytical study 1. Case-control study
Case definition: person with the outbreak strain isolated from blood or CSF during Oct 2001-Dec 2002 Control definition: person with another strain of P. aeruginosa isolated from blood or CSF in the same period To identify risk factors for having the outbreak strain

44 Results – CC study Risk factor OR (95% CI) P-value
Use of Dent-O-Sept swab 5.3 (2.0-14) 0.001 Been on ventilator 6.4 (2.3-17) <0.001 Patients with the outbreak strain were more likely to be on ventilator / use the swab

45 Analytical study 2. Cohort study
Including all patients in the CC study To identify risk factors for a fatal outcome during hospital stay for patients with invasive pseudomonas infection

46 Results – Cohort study Risk factors for dying RR (95% CI)
Use of Dent-O-Sept 2.2 ( ) Patients with fatal outcome were more likely to be exposed to the swab Confounding? (severely ill patients –> mouth swab instead of tooth brush)

47 Lessons learned Direct transmission from swabs and indirect transmission through health personnel and contaminated environment Need to strengthen infection control routines and standard precautions E.g. for patient with severe underlying disease should only use sterile products Adherence to regulations in production of medical equipment

48 Oakland Daily Evening Tribune, 06 Nov 1939

49 Media The outbreak may cause serious damage to the hospital’s reputation Tool for education: ’message’ Public: antibiotics = anti-cold drugs Professionals: every hospital need a plan for antibiotic use Increased awareness: time to evaluate routines, existing guidelines (local/national/international level)

50 Summary Detection Investigation Prevention / Control
Effective surveillance system, vigilant hospital personnel Investigation Skilled hospital infection control practicioner, epidemiologist, microbiologist Prevention / Control Appropriate infection control practices Strategies to prevent and control antimicrobial-resistent pathogens (antibiotic-plan)

51 The ultimate goal: patient safety


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