Presentation on theme: "0 Tech Day VI Reston, Virginia 19 April 2006 IEEE Computer Society Identity Federation in Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG TM ) A Federated Identity."— Presentation transcript:
0 Tech Day VI Reston, Virginia 19 April 2006 IEEE Computer Society Identity Federation in Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG TM ) A Federated Identity Management Case Study Tim Weil – CISSP, CISA Ken Lin - CISSP Booz Allen Hamilton Identity Management Architect
1 Tech Day VI Agenda The Evolution of the Cancer Research and the Grid Infrastructure Grid Security Architecture and Federated Identity Management (FIM) FIM Use Cases and Architecture Technology Evaluation and Recommendations Summary
2 Tech Day VI Cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid builds the framework for sharing biomedical research information The deciphering of the human genome offers insight into the development of numerous therapies, predictors, and markers for cancer Annotated human biospecimens with detailed clinical information offers an unprecedented opportunity for the robust identification and accurate quantitation of molecular signatures of cancer, thereby accelerating the development and implementation of new cancer markers and therapies The lack of common infrastructure has prevented life science research institutions from being able to mine and analyze disparate data sources The inability to share technologies and data developed by different cancer research institutions can severely hamper the research process The NCI Center for Bioinformatics (NCICB) created the project cancer Biomedical Informatics Grid (caBIG TM ) and built the caGrid 0.5 prototype to satisfy simple data integration and sharing use cases
3 Tech Day VI Grid is a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) implementation to enable cross-organizational collaboration
4 Tech Day VI NCI Mission Statement
5 Tech Day VI
6 This effort focuses on the authentication and authorization of the Identity and Access Management Operating Model Focused Standardization Integration INFORMATION SHARING/PROTECTION Protect Intellectual Property Protect Privacy Data Protect Sensitive Data Physical Entity Management Credential Management StorageAuthenticationAuthorizationRisk Management Certification and Accreditation Verification Training and Awareness Governance and Oversight CORE IdAMSUPPORTING DATA STANDARDS LAYER Electronic Data Identity CAPSTONE POLICIES ENABLING IdAM STANDARS AND GUIDELINES ENABLING PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS DATA STANDARDS BUSINESS DRIVERS TECHNICAL & SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Medium Low High Maturity Assurance
7 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management Operating Model (Authentication & Authorization) Protect Privacy Data Protect Intellectual Property Protect Sensitive Data INFORMATION SHARING/PROTECTION BUSINESS DRIVERS CAPSTONE POLICIES Capstone policies provide overall guidance for managing compliance risk within the enterprise IT information sharing program. Derived from multi-jurisdictional regulations and standards including HSPD-12, FIPS 201, eAuthentication, HIPAA, and FDA 21 CFR Part 11, These policies reflect measures established through the best practices suggested by the various regulatory bodies.
8 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management Operating Model (Authentication & Authorization) Physical Entity Management Credential Management StorageAuthenticationAuthorization Risk Management Certification and Accreditation Verification Training and Awareness Governance and Oversight CORE IdAMSUPPORTING At the IT security layer, the IdAM Standards and Guidelines drive interoperability and serve as the operational baseline for inserting the capstone policies. Typical standard and guideline categories that apply include: Directory Services (LDAP), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Trust Domains (Federation), and Access Control Models (RBAC and ABAC). Enabling IdAM Standards and Guidelines BUSINESS DRIVERS
9 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management Operating Model (Authentication & Authorization) IdAM Enabling Procedures and Mechanisms are determined by the maturity of the organization, level of assurance and sensitivity of the data. Procedures - Key procedures must be identified to support the enterprise IT IdAM operating model. The procedures contain levels of maturity ranging from Low to High consistent with the needs of system information sharing efforts. Enterprise IT should have flexibility in implementing appropriate levels of maturity consistent with the complexity of their efforts. Mechanisms – The key mechanisms that must be identified to support the operating model and procedures which contain levels of maturity ranging from Low to High consistent with the needs of the enterprise IT information sharing efforts. Enabling Procedures and Mechanisms BUSINESS DRIVERS
10 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management Operating Model (Authentication & Authorization) Focused Standardization Integration Maturity TECHNICAL & SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Medium Low High Assurance Enabling Procedures and Mechanisms BUSINESS DRIVERS
11 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management Operating Model (Authentication & Authorization) Identity DATA STANDARDS LAYER Electronic Data Data Standards for Identity Management BUSINESS DRIVERS The IdAM Data Standards layer represents Identity and Electronic Data which may be modeled as business transaction data (SOAP messages), metadata (XML Schemas), or metalanguages (Data Dictionaries, Logical Data Model). Enterprise IT should leverage the data standards for identity management such as federated identity standards (i.e. SAML, Shibboleth, WS-*) and cryptography standards (i.e. PKIX - X.509 )
12 Tech Day VI This effort focuses on the authentication and authorization of the Identity and Access Management Operating Model Focused Standardization Integration INFORMATION SHARING/PROTECTION Protect Intellectual Property Protect Privacy Data Protect Sensitive Data Physical Entity Management Credential Management Storage AuthenticationAuthorizationRisk Management Certification and Accreditation Verification Training and Awareness Governance and Oversight CORE IdAMSUPPORTING DATA STANDARDS LAYER Electronic Data Identity CAPSTONE POLICIES ENABLING IdAM STANDARS AND GUIDELINES ENABLING PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS DATA STANDARDS BUSINESS DRIVERS TECHNICAL & SECURITY ARCHITECTURE Medium Low High Maturity Assurance
13 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management – Evolutionary Model
14 Tech Day VI caGrid 0.5 Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Architecture GUMS: Grid User Management Service
15 Tech Day VI Federated Authentication Scenarios Non-caGrid Certificate. John Smith wants to use the X.509 certificate obtained from a 3rd party Certification Authority to access caBIG services caGrid-Certificate. John Smith uses caGrid X.509 certificate to access caBIG services No Certificate. John Smith wants to use the username and password to access caBIG services Implications –caGrid needs to accept credentials of different assurance levels –Assurance levels are defined by 1) the identity proofing process, AND 2) the credential itself –In the identity federation environment, the architecture needs to accommodate existing credentials rather than creating new credentials –Credential management will fall on the organization who issues the credential
16 Tech Day VI Federated Authentication Architecture leveraging the EAuthentication architecture
17 Tech Day VI Assertion Based Scenario (Users without X.509 certificates)
18 Tech Day VI Certificate Based Scenario (Users with X.509 certificates)
19 Tech Day VI Federated Authorization Scenarios Mary Smith owns the Protein Database System (PDBS) at Rutgers University. –caBIG Users Access Policy. caBIG users must be Medical Doctors with 10 years of experience approved to be qualified PDBS users –Local Access Policy. caBIG qualified users can only use PDBS from 10:00am to 11:00am EST everyday. Other timeslots are reserved for Rutgers users. Joan Taylor owns the Cell Attachment Analytical Service (CAAS) at University of Pittsburgh. The CAAS is used in the Hope research project with participants from different organizations in caBIG. –Privilege Delegation and Group Membership. Only Hope project manager from caBIG have read and write privileges to the CAAS. The Hope project manager can delegate read and write privileges to Hope project members. –Provisioning/Auditing. The IRB at University of Pittsburgh needs to know who has read and write privileges to CAAS on the weekly basis.
20 Tech Day VI Federated Authorization Architecture using the attribute based authorization
21 Tech Day VI An illustrative example of federated identity management Authentication Service Validation Service Attribute Discovery Service Authorization Service Credential Service Provider Credential Service Provider Credential Service Provider Userid/password X.509 Certs Smartcards Tokens Users Varying assurance level credentials Userid/password X.509 Certs Smartcards Tokens GRID Service … NCICBFox Chase … User Project Attribute Org. … … Virtual Organization
22 Tech Day VI The following open source technologies were evaluated based on the notional architecture TechnologyVersionPurpose Globus Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)4.0.1 Provide service delegation, single-sign-on, and PDP chaining for grid infrastructure Shibboleth/GridShib 1.3 / Beta Providing attribute authority services with Web based authentication Pulling authorization attributes from the Shibboleth attribute authority service to grid services SAML (OpenSAML)1.x Provide authentication, authorization decisions and attribute assertions Grid User Management Service0.5User account management tool caGrid Authorization Management Service 0.5User attributes management tool Grouper0.5.6Enterprise group management tool Signet0.5Enterprise privilege management tool SAFE 2.0FDA 21 CFR Part 11 compliance credential Common Security Module (CSM)3.0.1NCI security library for developers
23 Tech Day VI Illustrative mapping of authentication technologies
24 Tech Day VI Illustrative mapping of authorization technologies
25 Tech Day VI The evaluation shows many technologies are still in early development stages TechnologyStatus of Current Release Globus GSI Proxy Certificate 4.0 is available Globus GridLogon/MyProxy Cannot generate end entity certificates (EECs) in our testing release. Importing a SAFE credential will violate the non-repudiation requirement in the SAFE Standard. Does not support assertion based authentication method. Globus GSI PDP Chaining 4.0 is available Shibboleth Attribute Authority Service 1.3 is available GridShib Beta. Pull mode is ready at the current release. SAML 1.1 is available GUMS 0.5 is available. Already runs as a caBIG service. Does not support assertion based authentication method. Cannot accept SAFE credentials. CAMS 0.5 is available. Already runs as a caBIG service. Integrates with caBIG data standards. Does not support SAML attribute assertion. Grouper & Signet Pre-Beta, does not have a grid service interface CSM works with LDAP and relational database as the back end. Cannot work with certificate back end currently. SAFE 2.0 is available
26 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management – Evolutionary Model
27 Tech Day VI Identity and Access Management (IdAM Framework)
28 Tech Day VI Architecture and Technology Recommendations Develop business-oriented security use and abuse cases. caBIG should develop business-oriented security use cases to represent community processes. The technical focus of the current security use cases (iteration 2) does not represent the actual security requirements from the caBIG community. Since identity federation relies more on process than technology, this white paper defines a set of federated authentication and authorization scenarios as a basis to develop the notional architecture. The caBIG community should conduct further scenario definition and refinement to promote a more comprehensive federation architecture. Vet the Federated Identity Management (FIM) requirements and the notional architecture. The FIM requirements and the notional architecture are straw man efforts that the caBIG community should vet extensively to validate that all security use cases are satisfied before the production implementation. The proposed notional architecture focuses solely on authentication and authorization. Other core identity and access management (IdAM) and supporting services will evolve as the business-oriented security use cases are developed. Proof-of-concept (POC) implementation. Due to the complexity of the evaluated technologies, a POC implementation of the notional architecture would provide greater clarity into the accuracy of the security use case development and how the notional architecture best applies. The POC should be built on top of the caBIG 0.5 release, however, many implementation requirements need to be evaluated. Consider the maturity of technologies. Very few technologies in the evaluation list have been deployed in a large scale of production environment. Many evaluated technologies have very limited development resources that would impact the quality and the capability of production support once the software is released.
29 Tech Day VI Policy and Regulatory Environment Recommendations Develop caBIG Governance Policies. A successful security implementation requires policies in many layers. For example, the capstone policies (e.g. HIPAA, 21 CFR Part 11 compliance, trust agreements), the enabling standards, guidelines, procedures (e.g. Identity proofing), and data standards (e.g. Authorization Attributes) should be developed along with the IdAM mechanism. Facilitate Cross-Cutting Policy Development. A successful security implementation requires policies in many layers. For example, the capstone policies (e.g. HIPAA, 21 CFR Part 11 compliance, trust agreements), the enabling standards, guidelines, procedures (e.g. Identity proofing), and data standards (e.g. Authorization Attributes) should be developed along with the IdAM mechanism. Identify the minimum security requirements from the regulatory mandates. Security and privacy requirements from regulatory mandates are the minimum security requirements caBIG needs to comply. Although HIPAA and 21 CFR Part 11 were reviewed in this whitepaper, its strictly from the identity federation point of view. A comprehensive review should be conducted to capture all security and privacy requirements. It is likely those requirements will impact many workspaces and working groups in caBIG. Consider separating regulated and non-regulated environments. Ensure a non-grid application to comply with regulatory requirements takes significant efforts and cost. Mixing regulatory and non- regulatory applications will elevate the required security controls, which is not necessary for many non-regulatory applications. caBIG should consider the design option of separating the technical architecture layer of regulated and non-regulated environments and enabling the data sharing at the semantic layer.
30 Tech Day VI Process and Execution Recommendations Create an Independent and Integrated cross-cutting security working group. –Domain workspaces are disconnected from security implementation –No consolidated (from domain workspaces) security requirements –Inconsistent security messages from different domain workspaces –Lack of resource for security architecture to bridge the caBIG security principles an implementation Develop a security engineering process. –The security engineering process (SEP) will specify roles and responsibilities, identify process steps, and define inputs and deliverables. The security working group (if created) should use the SEP to ensure security is integrated into domain workspaces, security architecture is defined and vetted, and implementation is aligned.
31 Tech Day VI Security Engineering Process ( )
32 Tech Day VI Security Engineering Process (cont) ( )
33 Tech Day VI The real challenges of cross-institutional data sharing is political and cultural not technical The Institutional Review Board (IRB) is the ultimate authority for defining security and privacy compliance policies. To share sensitive medical information among institutions would require IRBs approval and an individual trust agreement needs to be established (n^2 problem) Currently, two data sharing mechanisms among institutions: –Public data, no access control is required –Sensitive data, access control is required The concept of assurance level does not exist in the current practices of healthcare industry Healthcare SOA security problems are complex as epitomized by –Infrastructure Gaps: Some institutions are using Excel sharing data while some are using biomedical informatics systems –Scientific vs. Engineering Mindset: Enthusiastic about technologies, needs to understand the importance of having an integrated engineering process –Regulatory Compliance: IRBs are very conservative in crafting data sharing policies. Large scale agreement is difficult
34 Tech Day VI Thank you for joining us! For BAH Identity and Access Management Identity Federation Kenneth Lin Senior Consultant Booz | Allen | Hamilton Tel (703) Kenneth Lin Senior Consultant Booz | Allen | Hamilton Tel (703)
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36 Tech Day VI Example Security Architecture – SAFE From caBIG security whitepaper