Presentation on theme: "Origins of Operations Research: Science at War"— Presentation transcript:
1Origins of Operations Research: Science at War E. P. ViscoOrlando Chapter of INCOSE17 March 2011[with credit to Michael W. Garrambone]
2Agenda Earliest Beginnings & Men of Science From the Civil War to the Great WarThe Birth of Operations ResearchWorld War II & KoreaPost War-KoreaInsights and IdeasPleased to be here; breakfast will be served to those who stick it out for the whole session.Recall “The Bill Cosby” show? Heathcliff & Claire Huxtable; obstetrtician, attorney, 5 children. Episode celebrating 40th birthday; kids’ briefing with butcher paper charts: Things that are older than Dad: rocks are older than Dad; fire is older than Dad!Now here are some things that are younger than Gene!
3Things That Are Younger Than Gene The Great Depression, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam WarLawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover & Ravel’s BoleroMickey Mouse, Penicillin, YugoslaviaAudrey Hepburn and Sophia Loren(1934), Sean Connery (1930); Regis Philbin (1931); Leonard NimoyThe Empire State Building, Rockefeller Center, the Folger Library, the JeffersonMemorial, & the National Gallery of ArtColor television & commercial televisionHammett’s The Maltese Falcon & The Thin ManThe Star Spangled Banner as the US national anthemThe George Washington Bridge, the Lincoln Tunnel, the Golden Gate Bridge, Hoover/Boulder Dam, Heathrow & JFK airportsJet airplanes, helicopters, & US Navy aircraft carriersBaseball all-star games (1933) & the Baseball Hall of FameSocial Security (1935), minimum wages for women, & the 40-hour work weekLife magazine, Nylon, the ballpoint pen, electronic computers, transistors, chips, & magnetic recording tapeWithholding income taxes, the atomic bomb & guided missilesThe United Nations, NATO, & the Pentagon
4The Whole Story OR/OA are old Combat analyst was first; some work was at HqEarly: weapons, transport, communications (things)Later tactics, concepts of operation, organizationDominance of Hq analysisWide spread belief that OR and OA began in the late 1930s in the UK. Untrue. Scientists, engineers and inventors have contributed to warfare and military operations since the beginning of recorded history (and perhaps before).Most of the time (perhaps up to 19th century), the contributions came in the field at the side of the commanding general.Most of the time (perhaps up to the 19th century), the contributions were about things--hardware: weapons, transportation, communications; what we now call systems.In the 19th century, the operations analysts began looking closer at tactics, organization for combat, concepts of operations.From Korea to the very recent past, analysis at home (at the HQ) has dominated. Focus has been on management and procurement-acquisition rather than operations, tactics, concepts. The combat analyst had almost disappeared from the scene. The heritage was maintained principally by the UK. But the Middle East wars have resulted in a resurgence of the combat analyst, although much of the analytic effort in Iraq & Afghanistan has focused on the “winning the hearts & minds” side of the operations. More on that later, perhaps.
5From the Dawn of War and Science Diades (c. 330 BCE)Archimedes ( BCE)Bacon (1248)Leonardo da Vinci ( )Niccoló Tartaglia ( )John Napier ( )Benjamin Franklin (1775)US Civil War (balloon)The Great War (CW, tank)Scientists have contributed to war from the dawn of history.Diades: Engineer to Alexander the Great. Contributions: devices to knock down upper parapets of walls (forts) & to raise troops by way of a boom to lift them over obstacles & deposit troops on the battlements.Archimedes (mathematician and scientist). Contributed special engines (designs lost in antiquity) to defend Syracuse against the siege of Proconsul Marcus Claudius Marcellus & his Roman force ( ); when Syracuse finally was defeated, Archimedes was executed, a fate that modern practitioners on the losing side do not usually face.Roger Bacon: Secret formula for gunpowder; thought about flying machines & mechanically propelled ships.Da Vinci: Submarines, mines, tanks, breech-loading cannon, rifled firearms, balloons, rapid-fire catapults, flying machines, parachutes, steam cannon. Hid part of the design of the submarine: ‘This I do not divulge on account of the evil nature of men, who would practice assassinations at the bottom of the seas by breaking the ships in their lowest parts and sinking them together with the crews who are in them.’TartagliaNapier (natural logs)
6What Was The Beginning? WW II? WW I? Diades? Archimedes? 20th Century OR authorsMorse & Kimball, 1950Hillier & Lieberman, 1967Wagner, 1975When did it really begin?WW II? No, only the popular name for the collective activity. Some disagreement as to who said it first: Watson-Watt believed he authored the name [“…he believed that responsibility for the term ‘operational research’ rested with himself and that, in some measure, he shared with Mr. A.P. Rowe responsibility for the conversion of the varied and sporadic activities practiced in lieu of operational research prior to 1937 into something resembling an ordered discipline, which, while still too young to be definitive, did have certain recognizable characteristics.’ Quoted by P.M.S. Blackett, The Advancement of Science, Feb 1948, Vol 5, No. 17, pp ]E.C. Williams, Dept of OR, The Admiralty, letter to the Editor, Operations Research, published in Vol 2, No. 4 (Nov 1954), pp ), “Reflections on Operational Research”: “The term operational research was specifically coined, by A.P. Rowe, to describe the activities of a small section of the Air Ministry Research Station at Bawdsey in the years The word ‘operational’ was put into the title to distinguish the work of the Establishment on the various forms of radar; the word denoted, correctly, that the work to which it was applied was concerned with the using of the radars, in the widest sense, as a part of the air defense system as a whole…Military operational research is not new. It did not suddenly begin at Bawdsey in 1937, even though the phrase did. One is constantly struck, in reading military history, by examples, consciously or unconsciously applied, which are just as striking as any recent ones.”
7Operational Science The Great War LanchesterThe Equations: Bah! Humbug!Aircraft in Warfare,EdisonNaval Consulting Board>40 ‘ideas’: no impactGeorge Patton, Jr.No combat experienceCasualty potential of rifle ammunitionA. V. HillAnti-aircraft gunnery,As noted, it is commonly accepted that operational research began during the late 1930s with the work supporting the UK Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (often called the Tizard Committee) as it determined how to protect England in the air war to come. However, as I have said, there are earlier applications of the scientific method to military operational problems.How many of you recognize this name? If you have had anything to do with combat models (attrition-based), you have heard a great deal about Lanchester. When did Lanchester do his work? What was the focus of his research? If you answered “Differential equations to describe exchange ratios in combat,” you are wrong. His 1916 book, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm, contains 19 chapters, only two of which relate to the differential equations. Among the phrases identifying the other chapters are: primary & secondary functions of the aeronautical arm, aeroplane & dirigible in armed conflict, strategic & tactical uses of the aeronautical arm, the aeroplane in a combatant capacity, attack by aeroplane on aeroplane, gun-fire ballistics, aircraft in the service of the navy, the command of the air, air power as affecting combined tactics,…Patton: When the Lusitania was sunk (one of the actions that helped propell the US into The Great War), George estimated the casualties that would not be achieved by the British because of the loss of 4.2 million rounds of rifle ammunition carried in her hold.
8Many Men and Women Adolf Hitler Chamberlain H. E. Wimperis A. P. Rowe Robert Watson-WattBenito MussoliniWinston ChurchillMarconiF. A. LindemannA. V. HillSome important folks, around the time of the “creation” of operational research.
9European Situation Early 1930s Sep 1930Jan 1933Mar 1933Aug 1934Mar 1935Nazis become second largest political party in GermanyHitler becomes ChancellorHitler becomes DictatorHitler becomes FuhrerHitler introduces military conscriptionA quick look of the precursor events leading to World War II.
10The British Cause for Alarm Trends not going well in EuropeGermany is rattling swordsGermany is building a bomber fleet“The bomber always gets through” Stanley Baldwin, 10 Nov 1932Limited resources for defenseCities in England are:High density population centersHigh density industrial centersThe concern in Britain.
11Channel Distances 20 - 250 miles Home Land DefenseEuropean shoreline1,044 milesTotal shoreline2,275 milesKill/Defend Box300 x 600 milesThe problem: defending the British Isles from the expected air assault.Channel Distances miles
12The Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defense H. E. Wimperis: Scientific AdvisorAir MinistryA. P. Rowe: Research ScientistSecretarySimple mission statement; well-parsed to lead to decisions & actions to improve the defense against hostile aircraft.Wish we still had such simple directives!MissionTo consider how far advances in scientific and technical knowledge can be used to strengthen the present methods of defense against hostile aircraft
13Criteria for Committee Selection Have recognition as an eminent scientistBe of strong characterHave capacity for making decisionsHave “natural sympathy for and identification with, “military men”Able to provide a mutual give and take between serving officers and scientistsE. V. Appleton--Greatest English expert on propagation of Radio Waves
14Sir A. V. Hill 1922 Nobel Prize Medicine The Tizard CommitteeLord P. M. S. Blackett1948 Nobel Prize PhysicsSir A. V. Hill 1922 Nobel Prize MedicineConservative(Establishment)Military PilotOrthodox (Conservative) Army OfficerAnti-Aircraft GunneryRadical(Anti-fascist)Naval Officer28 Jan 1935
15Sir Henry T. TizardEducation: Westminster & Oxford (Rutherford’s Student)Fellow of the Royal Society (Physics)Secretary, Dept of Scientific & Industrial ResearchRector, Imperial College of Science and Technology (1929)Chairman of the Tizard Committee (28 Jan 1935)“The best scientific mind that … England ever applied ... to war”C. P. Snow, Science and Government, 1960
16P. M. S. Blackett (1897-1974) (Patrick Maynard Stuart) Education: Royal Naval College, University of CambridgeWW II, chief advisor on “operational research” British NavyNobel Prize (physics) 1948 for research in cosmic raysProfessor of physics at the Imperial College of Science and Technology of the University of London ( ).Author, Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations (1956) and Studies of War (1962)“The British father of Operations Research”
17An Inquiry to Science From: Air Ministry To: The (National Physical Laboratory)Is it possible to create some form of “death ray” using a radio beam to disable remote targets?From: The Radio Research Lab (National Physical Laboratory)To: Air MinistryNo, but we may be able to detect aircraft using radio methodsOne of the parsed questions, derived from the mission of the Tizard committee.There is a story about “death ray” development. There had been some success in killing laboratory mice with a beam—at a range of a few inches!
18Able to provide a mutual give and take between serving officers and scientists Air Marshal DowdingProfessor Tizard
19The Pairing of Teams Bawdsey Station (radar research and testing) Scientists & engineersServing officersFinding blips on the screenBiggin Hill Experiment (Fighter Intercept)Finding the targetVoice from the “Box”“Tizzy Equations”Fighter Command OR Section
25Results of the Tizard Committee Determined the range, bearing, and elevation of non- cooperative targetsProvided friendly signal marks for our own aircraftIntroduced concept of information fusion and ground control interceptGave aircraft the ability to hunt in black spaceMade possible submarine detection at nightIntro “blind” navigation, provided “magic eye” for A/CImproved accuracy for air defense weaponsCreated the radio fuzeMade effective use of the fighter force (Battle of Britain, beginning 10 July 1940)Not sure about the radio fuze—sometimes called the proximity fuze (to be checked)
28Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett (1897-1974) WWI BattlesFalkand IslandJutlandEducation: Royal Naval College, University of CambridgeWW II, chief advisor on “operational research” British NavyNobel Prize (physics) 1948 (cosmic rays)“The British Father of Operations Research”
29Operational Research “Scientists at the Operational Level” “… very many war operations involve considerations with which scientists are specially trained to compete, and in which serving officers are in general not trained.”Note on Certain Aspects of the Methodology of Operational Research“In the course of repeated operations … most of the possible variations of tactics will be effectively explored ... derivatives will eventually be discovered and ... improved tactics will become generally adopted.”Casual & somewhat flippant note written by Blackett to describe the linkage between the scientists (“boffins”) & serving officers, fall of Note was passed from the US Naval Attaché, London, to the CNO—which started the Navy thinking about operational research. US Army Air Force also interested.
30Blackett’s Influence at Bomber Command Limited # bombersLand bombingAgainst submarinesConfrontationOne of Blackett’s most significant studies was a “back-of-the-envelope” bit of work [the late Clay Thomas, distinguished US Air Force analyst, once said that hotels could make a major contribution to operations analysis if they would only provide larger envelopes in the rooms]. Blackett wanted to estimate the effectiveness of the British strategic bombing operations. He would need to know how effective RAF bombs were in resulting in casualty production (the apparent objective of the bombing campaign). Obviously, he could not get casualty data from the Germans. So, he looked at British casualties resulting from German bombing. Then, as a result of some limited test data, he had a comparison of the effectiveness of British bombs that allowed him to conclude that British bombs were about half as effective as German bombs. Making an allowance for the greater difficulty that RAF bombers had in finding the right targets in German (partially because of the distribution of German cities, the somewhat longer ranges for RAF bombers, & no good system for vectoring bombers to targets (as the German’s had), he concluded that British bombing would be about one-quarter German bombing in casualty production. German bombs produced 0.8 casualties per ton. His calculations led him to conclude that British bombs would produce about 0.2 casualties per ton; the bombing campaign resulted in about 2,000 tons of bombs per month; thus the expectation would be about 400 casualties per month. The post-war Statregic Bombing Survey by the US after the war concluded that the campaign produced about 200 casualties per month in 1941 & about 400 in 1942!
31Coastal Command Analyses Open Research onTargetsWeaponsTacticsEquipmentStrategyEffectiveness of Air AttacksShort Sunderland
32Blackett’s Circus (10) at Anti Aircraft Command Three physiologistsTwo mathematiciansOne Army officerTwo mathematical physicistsOne surveyorOne general physicistProbably one of the origins of the “mixed team” concept. I prefer to argue that OA benefits from the “mixed methods” concept.Story, perhaps apocryphal, to explain why so many lawyers were members of US AAF OA sections. When Blackett visited the US, he was asked what kinds of people he recruited for his “circuses.” He allegedly said that they added just about all kinds of people except, he guessed, lawyers. The AAF folks misunderstood his statement to mean that lawyers were a good source of analysts! [It is true that lawyers do make good analysts; they have a concern for evidence & an ability to draw inferences from data & information.]
33Contributions to Anti Aircraft Command Gun-Laying RadarApportionmentMaintenanceTrainingTogethernessEffectivenessLondon
34P. M. S. Blackett’s OR Thoughts For Military--you have to think scientifically about your own operationsFor Scientists--sound military advice only comes when the giver convinces himself that if he were responsible for action, he would act so himselfBlackett’s post war essays; considerable focus on nuclear weapons arms control; he was a firm believer that nuclear weapons were not a good idea & advocated disarmament, including unilateral disarmament. For a period, he was persona non grata in the US.
35Scope of Operational Research “Clearest lessons of war experience”“… really big successes of operational research groups are often achieved by the discovery of problems which had not hitherto been recognized as significant.”Recollections of Problems Studied“How can OR help”“Operations research groups can help to close the gap between the new instrument or weapons as developed in the R&D establishments and its use in the actual conditions of war.”
36Birthing in the US Mine Warfare ORG Anti-Submarine Warfare ORG Pearl, 7 Dec 41WargamingMine-layingAnti-Submarine Warfare ORGEarly emphasis on AtlanticArmy Air Forces OA26 Sections250 analystsOffice of Field Service, OSRDEmphasis on PacificOperation StarvationThe first US operations analysis groups were the Mine Warfare Operations Research Group, the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group, and the Army Air Forces operations analysis sections (by war’s end there were at least 26 sections with about 250 analysts in the numbered Air Forces, commands, areas, wings, boards, and schools). About 10% of the AAF analysts were attorneys. Recall the story about Blackett & recruitment.Other names: ASWORG--Morse, Kimball, Shockley, Lathrop, Koopman; AAF OA--Brothers, Fubini, Harlan (Supreme Court ), Youden, Miser, ErnstIn addition, particularly oriented to the Pacific theater of war, a large number of individual scientists and small groups, including some from ASWORG, under the management of the Office of Field Service, Office of Scientific Research and Development, were deployed to various commands, fleets, camps, and stations to conduct operational analyses of a wide-range of technical and tactical problems. Among the topics researched were: casualty production, impact of diseases and medical disorders (particularly tropical), psychological casualties, bomb damage assessment and targeting, tactical transportation (particularly over-the-beach), and jungle operations.
37Adoption of OR by US Forces Navy was firstMAJ Leach, AAF“Hap” ArnoldAAFEighth Air ForceCNO ADM Harold Stark received a copy of Blackett’s paper, Dec ’41.USN: Mine Warfare OR Group, spring 1942; Anti-Submarine Warfare OR Group, summer 1942Robert Watson-Watt asked to review US air defense systems, April 1942; severe criticism of poor state of application of radar, etcLTG Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, commanding AAF recalled Saville to set up air defences in US; Saville contemplated establishing an OR group, Jan ‘42.MAJ Walter Barton Leach (lawyer), with Con Ed dir of research Dr. Ward F. Davidson surveyed OR in UK, etc. Report Aug ’42 recommended OR in the Army. Ignored mostly by Army & Navy hierarchy—except for Arnold.Leach with AAF Director of Technology, BG Harold M. McClelland to UK to set up OA section for US Eighth Air Force, fall ‘42Meantime, Arnold sent letter to subordinate AF commanders and chiefs of Air Staff divisions, lauding the potential of OA in the AAF; concluding statement: “This method of using officers and civilians for purely analytical work has proven fruitful in many field, and the Army Air Forces should make use of it where appropriate.” Created an Operations Analysis Division, Management Control Division, Air Staff; Leach, on his return from England, was made chief of the division and promoted to LTC, Dec ’42.
38First AAF OA Section 8th Bomber Command, Oct 42 Chief: John Harlan Others: Arps, Alexander, Tuttle, Youden, RobertsonReported to Gen EakerWorked for CoSAccess to all information“How can I put twice as many bombs on my targets?”First 6 AAF “Op Annies” reported to VIII Bomber Command, London, 15 Oct ‘42. Section consisted of Chief John M. Harlan, lawyer (later Associate Justice, US Supreme Court), Leslie H. Arps, lawyer; James Alexander, mathematician; W. Norris Tuttle, radio researcher; William J. Youden, biochemist & statistician (later author of good book on statistics); Howard P. Robertson, physicist. Alexander & Robertson returned to US in January 1943 “under something of a cloud.” Anybody here know why?Team reported to Gen Eaker at Wycombe Abbey near London. ORS RAF Bomber Command helped new team get settled; maintained close personal & professional contacts. Eaker issued directive, 23 Oct, assigning section to work for Chief of Staff & have access to all information & elements of the command. Also provided a list of projects; set first task: “How can I put twice as many bombs on my targets?” Question became primary mission of OAS for the rest of the war..Analysis included: studies on bombing accuracy, bombing tactics, flight procedures, weapons selection, aircraft battle damage, radar, fuel consumption. Section consisted of subsections: Bombing Accuracy, Bombs and Fuzes, Loss and Battle Damage, Radar and Radio Countermeasures, Gunnery, General Mission Analysis, and Tactical Mission Reporting.
39Some Projects & Accomplishments Improved bombs on targetBomb on lead bombardierRadar countermeasuresImproved estimates of force requirements‘Position Firing’ for aerial gunnersStabilization of dust on African air fieldsOperation STARVATIONPerhaps most important contribution was measurement of accuracy of visual formation bombing. When first OAS arrived, Oct ‘42, <15% of command’s bombs were falling within 1,000 feet of AP. By Oct ‘44, command’s performance was >60% of bombs falling within 1,000 feet of the AP (four-fold improvement); by ‘ bombers were doing the work which in ‘42 required more than 1,000.Recommendation: put best bombardier in lead a/c; have everyone else bomb on leader. Result: bomb pattern length reduced from 4,600 feet to 3,200 feet; width reduced from 2,600 feet to 2,500 feet.Response to Eaker’s question more than satisfactory; instead of 100 percent increase in bombs on target, achieved more than 1,000 percent. Bombing accuracy techniques led to standard bombing tactics and procedures for the AAF throughout the remainder of the war.Improvements in radar countermeasures judged to have saved US strategic air forces in England 450 aircraft and casualties.Ninth Air Force OAS studied bombing accuracy; resulted in three-fold increase in bombing accuracy. Target analysis studies led to more efficient selection of weapons & tactics as well as more accurate estimates of force requirements.OAS, IX Bomber Command: developed “Position Firing” for AAF aerial gunnery; procedure later adopted by Navy, Marine Corps, & Chinese Air Force. Analysts in Libya found a magnesium brine in salt lagoons near Benghazi, was used to stabilize dust on airfields, with reduction of engine wear saving equivalent of 50 B-24 engines.OAS Fifteenth Air Force analyzed underground storage tanks in Vienna-Lobau area; concluded that tanks did not have bombproof covers, facilitating successful attack. One analyst flew on attack of Ploesti oil fields; took first radar pictures ever taken in combat.OAS XX Bomber Command, Pacific theater, analyst invented a slide rule-type device for estimating ship sizes; used on initial test flight to identify battleship Yamato & main Japanese fleet in Inland Sea, precipitating battle which finished Japanese Imperial Navy.OAS Thirteenth Air Force developed effective measures for attacking moving ships from low altitudes using radar.Stateside OAS discovered that CO2 fire extinguishers on most AAF aircraft fed fire instead of extinguishing fires in magnesium engines of B-29; led to changes resulting in saving a number of B-29s and their crews.
40Bombing TacticsProblem: Three bombing (sighting) techniques: 1. drop on group leader, 2. drop on squadron leader, 3. independent sightingQuestion: What is the “best” technique?1000’DMPITechnique PercentOn Group LeaderOn Squadron LeaderIndependent
41Bombing TacticsProblem: Three bombing (sighting) techniques: 1. drop on group leader, 2. drop on squadron leader, 3. independent sightingQuestion: What is the “best” technique?1000’DMPITechnique PercentOn Group Leader 24 %On Squadron Leader 11.8 %Independent %
429th Army Air Force Nick Smith, junior analyst Rail cutting algorithm “No Ball” targetsThe late Dr. Nicholas Smith, Chief of the Basic Research Division, The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office (the US Army’s first think tank, ).9th AAF: medium bombers & fighter aircraft for CAS (at variance with the dominant elements of the AAF: strategic bombing.9th AAF moved its command HQ to Normandy a few days after D-Day of Overlord—to provide close air cover for the invasion force as it moved onto the Normandy peninsula.
43Analyst’s NotebookOne of Nick Smith’s notebooks. Among other things, he described a meeting with MG Quesada, CG, 8th Army Air Force. Discussion included railroad cutting operations & No Ball targets—launch sites for V1 (possibly V2) missiles.
44NotesMore of Nick’s notebook, describing opportunity for testing his computations about rail line cutting by using a P-47 squadron for experimentation. Nick picked the Normandy peninsula for his description of rail lines for the experiments—not privy to Overlord planning!
46No More Notes (after this one) Some of his calculations of number of cuts necessary to affect rail movement for a minimum of 24 hours (repair time).
47Some Results of Rail Cutting: Impact on Overlord 2nd SS Panzer Division: 17 days/450 milesBattle Group, 275th Infantry Division: 3 days/30 miles + 3 more days to reach front2 Infantry Battalions arrived on bicyclesSame results of rail cutting (from British historian John Keegan, Six Armies at Normandy.A downside to the rail cutting: later, when the break-out at Normandy occurred and the Allies were streaming towards the French border, the combat units out ran the logistics supply line & without rail, the invasion force had to rely on the Red Ball Express, truck transport of ammunition, fuel & food—not as efficient has rail would have been. Sub-opptimization?
48Shipbuilding : Merchant Ships or Escort Ships Problem: Increase movement of war time supplies: limited shipbuilding capacityQuestion: Build more merchant or more escort shipsEach escort ship saves 2 to 3 merchant ships per yearFaster convoy speed decreases convoy lossesIncreased convoy size decreases ship losses significantlyAir escort protection decreases submarine effectivenessAnalysis to answer the question: Should merchant ships be armed with anti-aircraft gun; as convoys neared the European land mass, German aircraft, vectored out of France, bombed & strafed ships. First MOE: how many German aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft guns on merchant ships (also a problem of finding gun crews).But, wait: the object of the merchant ships is not to shoot down German planes; it is to get critical supplies to England. New MOE: comparison of number of ships with anti-aircraft guns arriving safely in port with the number of ships without AA guns arriving in port. German pilots avoided ships with guns & focused attacks on ships without guns!
49Operation Starvation, 1945LCDR Ellis Johnson, MWORG: “Mines are Weapons of Strategy”ADM Nimitz & MG LeMay (21st Bomber Command)21,000 sea mines laid; 4323 sorties5.7% of B-29 sorties961 Japanese ships damaged or sunk (2 million tons)Johnson, later to become the one & only Director of the Operations Research Office, worked in the first US ORG (Mine Warfare ORG, Naval Ordnance Laboratory, MD. Eventually, sent to the Pacific theater & put into uniform.Mission of 21st Bomber Command (LeMay): Blockade of all Japanese sea commerce. Aircraft from AAF (B-29: 2087 sorties), Royal Australian Air Force (PBY: 1128 sorties), Royal Air Force (631 sorties), US Naval air (486 sorties); total sorties: 4323; 21,000 mines.Results: 961 ships damaged or sunk (484) (2 million total tonnage of which 650,000 tons were sunk. Casualties were: 2 battleships, 8 cruisers, 2 escort carriers, 7 submarines, 46 destroyers & destroyer escorts, & 82 others; total warships: 147; balance of 814 were merchant shipping.21st Bomber Command targets were the inner zone (closest to Japan): 606 ships sunk or damaged; 283 sunk & 137 damaged so badly as to be out of the war. 1,250,000 tons sunk or damaged over a period of 4 ½ months by one Bomb Group of 40 aircraft (compared with 4,780,000 tons by a force of about 100 US submarines over a period of 3 ½ years! Cost: 1 B-29 lost for every 45 ships sunk.XXI Bomber Cmd: Also low-level sorties; LeMay concurred. Result: B-29 attrition from 10% to 1%.
50Operations Research Group Operations Analysis Sections US SuccessesOperations ResearchNavyArmy Air ForceArmyConvoy ProtectionSubmarine SearchSurface Ship DetectionDenial of Sea LanesBomb AccuracyBomb SelectionPursuit TacticsRadar EmploymentJungle WarfareAmphibious OpnsArtillery AccuracyBallisticsOther accomplishments: aviation gunnery tactics; spread from AAF to Marines & Navy (even I was taught how to fire my turret guns from the OA AAF development).The Navy ORG grew out of the ASWORG (Anti-Submarine Warfare ORG).Operations Research GroupOperations Analysis SectionsIndividualAnalystsOSRD
51Immediate Post WWII Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) WWII continuityThe RAND CorporationDefense of the nationSiting of air basesThe Johns Hopkins University Operations Research OfficeThe Army in the fieldKoreaHQ, USAF Operations AnalysisWeapons System Evaluation GroupOEG grew out of ORG (which was the name of the organization ASWORG grew into as its original role was expanded during the war; the name OEG was created as part of the first post-war contract with MIT to manage the organization). Later, OEG became part of a larger institution called the Center for Naval Analyses, its present name as an independent not-for-profit organization.RAND came into being in 1947 as an independent not-for-profit institution. Presently RAND has three FFRDC under its roof: Project Air Force, the Arroyo Center, and a national security group providing support to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.ORO was created out of pure cloth. Ellis Johnson, who was a key player in the Mine Warfare OR Group during the war and who played a major role in the western Pacific major mining campaign that was very instrumental in bringing the Japanese to the surrender table (highly classified for many years after the war), felt that the Army needed its own OR organization. In 1948 he got with Gen. Tony McAuliffe, famous for his command of the 101st Airborne Div. at Bastogne during the Second Ardennes Campaign (Battle of the Bulge, Dec 44), now Chief of Army R&D, who agreed with Ellis. First name of organization was the General Research Office. [Historical sidebar: When the Army closed out its relationship with the remaining FFRDC (Research Analysis Corp) in the late 1960s, it turned the remaining work over to the General Research Corp.!]. Army contracted with JHU (prestige, recruiting, etc).
52Combat Analyst After World War II KoreaORO + Canadian + UKOEG (the fleets)VietnamArmy Concept TeamARCOVMACOVVery early in the Korean War, Ellis Johnson, the founder and only Director of The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, visited the Army in Korea, September 1950, and made arrangements for combat analysts to be assigned to Eighth Army. By November 40 analysts were in the field in Korea. Canadian and UK analysts were also brought in, to provide support to the British Commonwealth Division. By war’s end, over 100 ORO analysts qualified for the theater service ribbon of the United Nations Command.In a similar way, analysts from the post-war Navy ORG, now named the Operations Evaluation Group, were assigned to the Far East fleets, albeit in fewer numbers--according to Joe Engel, one-time Director of OEG, the maximum number of analysts in the field was about 8, with considerably more involved in wartime studies but at HQ.During the Vietnam War, an Army Concept Team was set up in Saigon to carry out a variety of studies; I do not know much about the work.Army Combat Operations, Vietnam, 1966, was a Combat Developments Command study, made up of uniformed officers and a small number of civilian analysts from the Combat Operations Research Group, a Technical Operations, Inc. element assigned to support CDC. One of the analysts was E.B. Vandiver, FS, Director of the Center for Army Analysis for the past 20 years.Mechanized and Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam, 1967, CDC-CORG study. Among others: COL D. Starry, LTC G.S. Patton III, E.P. Visco.
53Other Early Institutions Private sector (for profit)Technical Operations, Inc.Arthur D. Little, Inc.Melpar, Inc.Ramo-Wooldridge Corp.Lockheed…UniversitiesThe Johns Hopkins UniversityCase Institute of TechnologyMIT...Some of the private, for profit, firms that were early on the scene. Ramo-Wooldridge later added a partner named Thompson and received one of the first major systems management contracts, from the AF for a major missile program; the name of the firm was shortened to TRW.Universities got in on the gold rush and began establishing departments of operations research and offering graduate degrees--leading to the downfall of the practice of operations research. Some say Case was first, some say JHU was. The JHU School of Engineering under Dean Rob Roy was offering a doctorate in engineering (with a specialty in operations research) by the time I came to Washington in The operations analysis staff at ORO were considered equivalent to faculty and had campus privileges at JHU, including access to the faculty club and fees remission for classes.
54The Combat Analyst Since Vietnam Gulf WarCENTCOM Hq team (staff)DNA WMD effects teamNo US operations analysts deployed until after the fighting1st UK Armoured Div OR teamFormer YugoslaviaARRC UK teamDuring the Gulf War, most of the US analysis was carried out in the states at HQ. No analysts were allowed into the theater by order of CINC, CENTCOM. He did have, in his own headquarters, a small cell of uniformed analysts--partly supported by CAA and others at home. The cell did some gaming and other simulations. Defense Nuclear Agency (now the Defense Threat Reduction Agency) had a field team providing regular forecasts of the possibly results of chem-bio attacks by the enemy.The only OA team I am aware of in the field during the war was the team under H. Richardson attached to 1st UK Armoured Division. The exploits of that group, with support from UK-based MOD and contractor teams, is well-documented in International Symposia on Military Operational Research papers, particularly 8 ISMOR (1991) and the MORS workshop on Analytic Lessons Learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm.Hugh Richardson received an Order of the British Empire for his work during Operation Grandby, the UK designation for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.The work of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps UK analysis team is also well-documented and has been presented at a number of ISMORs.
55What OR Analysts DoE. C. WilliamsDetermine the operational effectiveness of weapons and equipmentAnalyze the results of operations or exercises to determine the effectiveness of tactics, the influence of weapons on tactics and the tactics on weaponsPredict the results of future operationsAnalyze the efficiency of organizations or methods
56Characteristic of Outstanding Military Operations Research Analysts Has historical, tactical, and technical expertiseIs an outstanding gatherer, coordinator, and gifted speakerHas potent mathematical, logic, & Operations Research skillsUses superb imagination, graphic and artistic skillsDemonstrates overwhelming quantities of persistence and determinationLikes to drink beer (especially Guinness Stout)Happiness is being assigned as an “Operations Research Analyst”
57Operations ResearchCompilation of studies of the NW Europe ORG, supporting 21st Army Group. Publication: Terry Copp, ed., Montgomery’s Scientists. Operational Research in Northwest Europe, Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic & Disarmament Studies, Wilfred Laurier University Press, 478 pp, Covers the work of No.2 ORS with 21st Army Group, June 1944 to July 1945, compiled primarily by the late Prof. Ronnie Shephard.Sir Henry Tizard and General Sir Bernard Montgomery
58The Three DUSA(OR)sFrom left to right: Walter W. Hollis, third & last DUSA(OR), David Hardison, second DUSA(OR) & first civilian director of CAA (then Concept Analysis Agency, now Center for Army Analysis); the late Dr. Wilbur Payne, first DUSA(OR) and remembered as one of the brightest of Army analysts (representing “truth”).
59Some of the TrailsWayne P. Hughes, Jr, ed, Military Modeling for Decisions, Military Operations Research Society, 1997Philip M. Morse & George E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research, Military Operations Research Society, 1998 (reprint)James Pinney Baxter III, Scientists Against Time, Little, Brown & Company, 1948R. V. Jones, The Wizard War, Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978Charles P. Snow, Science and Government, Harvard University Press, 1961P. M.S. Blackett , Studies of War. Nuclear and Conventional, Hill &Wang,Ronald W. Clark, Tizard. The MIT Press, 1963David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange, The Tizard Mission and theScientific War, McGill-Queens University Press, 1996Useful references.
60More of the TrailsRonald W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins. Phoenix House LTD,1962Air Ministry. Origins and Development of Operational Research in the Royal Air Force. Her Majesty ’s Stationary Office,1949A. P. Rowe, One Story of Radar. Cambridge University Press, 1948J. G. Crowther, Statesmen of Science, The Cresset Press, 1965Keith R. Tidman, The Operations Evaluation Group: A History of Naval Operations Analysis, Naval Institute, 1984Bernard Osgood Koopman, Search and Screening: General Principles with Historical Applications, Military Operations Research Society, 1946 (reprint )Charles M. Sternhell & Alan M. Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II, Aegean Park Press, 1947 (reprint)J. G. Crowther & R. Whiddington, Science at War, Philosophical Library Inc., 1948Charles R. Shrader, History of Operations Research in the United States Army: Volume I: ; Volume II: ; Volume III: , Government Printing OfficeMore references
61Comments and QueryUS analysts now seen as needed in the field: Iraq & AfghanistanWhat we do now does not resemble what they did then!Either what we do now is not operations research or operations research is defined so loosely than any logical analytic process is operations research!What do you think is the correct answer?Where the OA world now stands.
62Some HomiliesI think the essential prerequisite of sound military advice is that the giver must convince himself that if he were responsible for action, he would himself act so.The first thing is to realize in war we have to do not so much with numbers, arms and maneuvers, as with human nature.The first comment is from P. M. S. Blackett, one of the founding fathers. C. P. Snow, I believe, repeated the comment in Science and Government, The Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1960.The second is by G. F. R. Henderson, an important British military historian and analyst of the late 19th Century; probably from The Science of War, published in 1905, posthumously. Henderson was the first analyst to identify the origin of the 3:1 attacker-to-defender ratio for attack success.
63Finally Read, specially military history. Have fun at what you do. What to read?C. P. SnowBlackettNeustadt & MayJohn KeeganErnest & Trevor DupuyS. L. A. MarshallMcCloskey & TrefethenMcCloskey & CoppingerMcCueAnything on nonlinearity, etc.C. P. Snow, Science and Government. The Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, 1960 (with the appendix).P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War. Nuclear and Conventional, Hill and Wang, NY, 1962.Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time. The Uses of History for Decision Makers, The Free Press, 1986.Everything by Keegan, specially A History of Warfare, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, although his history of WWII isn’t as good as everything else!R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present, Harper & Row, 1970.Everything by SLAM, including his history of WWI[S.L.A. Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War I, Dell Publishing Co., 1966 (originally American Heritage Publishing Co., 1964)]Joseph F. McCloskey and Florence N. Trefethen, eds., Operations Research for Management, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954.Joseph F. McCloskey and John M. Coppinger, eds., Operations Research for Management. Case Histories, Methods, Information Handling, Vol. Two, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956.Brian McCue, U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay. An Essay in Operations Analysis, National Defense University Press, 1990.
64Thanks for ListeningThose of you who stayed awake may have learned something newThose of you who dozed off didn’t miss muchStay awake for the second show!
65The second show starts now…! The Party’s OverThe second show starts now…!