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March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI1 Top Ten Risks in Net- Centric Systems Donald J. Reifer Reifer Consultants, Inc. P.O. Box 4046 Torrance, CA 90510 Phone:

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Presentation on theme: "March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI1 Top Ten Risks in Net- Centric Systems Donald J. Reifer Reifer Consultants, Inc. P.O. Box 4046 Torrance, CA 90510 Phone:"— Presentation transcript:

1 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI1 Top Ten Risks in Net- Centric Systems Donald J. Reifer Reifer Consultants, Inc. P.O. Box 4046 Torrance, CA Phone: (310)

2 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI2 Introduction Identify the top ten risks Discuss what you can do about them Highlight others experiences Recommend that you tackle risks head-on Tell you that even with all the headaches that the move to net-centric systems is worth the pain

3 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI3 Net-Centric Defined Net-centric - Participating as a part of a continuously- evolving, complex community of people, devices, information and services interconnected by networks to achieve optimal benefit of resources and better synchronization of events and their consequences. –Involves more than interfaces and interoperability –Views the network as an enabler and distribution channel –Built on concepts like industry-wide standards and service- oriented architectures –Facilitates collaboration and real-time access to knowledge –Security, availability and quality of service directly impact the warfighters ability to succeed on the battlefield Source: Wikipedia

4 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI4 Net-Centric Creates New Challenges Commands Navigation Data Targeting Data Tracking Info Cooperative Engagement Data Navigation Data Shipboard CIC COTS-BASED

5 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI5 Top Ten Risks ( When Addressing these Challenges) 1.Poor system engineering 2.Inadequate security engineering 3.COTS incompatibilities 4.Impossible schedules 5.Malicious code nightmares 6.Incompatible/ immature processes 7.Unforeseen/unfunded requirements 8.Supply chain surprises 9.Unpredictable quality of service levels 10.High maintenance costs Source: review of twelve major recent programs

6 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI6 1. Poor Systems Engineering Risks –Poorly defined operational requirements/architecture –Inadequate attention given to non-functional details –Lack of early attention on test and integration needs Mitigation Actions –Develop system use cases (sys-ML) and scenarios Map to capability requirements

7 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI7 More Mitigation Actions Embrace service-oriented architectures to facilitate sharing and commonality Allocate non-functional requirements via end-to-end scenarios as quantitatively as possible using threads Consider elevating information operations to the subsystem level Tie threads to operational scenarios and then use them as the basis for regression test development Source: Sun

8 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI8 2. Inadequate Security Engineering Risks –Networks unreliable –Networks subject to infections/outages Mitigation Actions –Elevate Information Operations (IO) to subsystem status early in life cycle –Design security into the products –Focus on high return activities –Address vulnerabilities early in design stage Many Security Threats Poor engineering practices Regulatory hell –New requirements/no money Supplier chain vulnerabilities –Rootkits and other malicious code attacks Bad guys getting smarter New types of attacks –Use of bots as a Parasitic malware (malicious code) Mobile threats in shared networks Evolving convergence threats

9 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI9 Vulnerabilities Everywhere You Look Hardware vulnerabilities –RFID used to track movement –Physical security barriers –Protected links –Access controls/video surveillance Software vulnerabilities –Authentication mechanisms –Principle of least privilege –Identity protection/ biometrics –Behavior patterns/alerts Network vulnerabilities –Authentication mechanisms –Traffic/usage patterns/alerts –Voice loggers/Voice-over-IP –Vulnerability scans/ penetration testing –Wireless stack protection –Properly configured firewalls and intrusion detection devices –Web filters/gateway restrictions –Security settings updated as patches tracked and logged

10 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI10 More Mitigation Actions Automation vulnerabilities –Controls isolated, monitored and authenticated –Synchronization by variable time clocks Tampering vulnerabilities –Difficult to reverse engineer –Critical Program Information (CPI) protected –Difficult to tamper with Incident handling & response –Strategies to recognize attacks and pro-actively deal with them Budget for security –Involves much more than administrative functions –Cost for equipment and software is substantial –Focus is on keeping networks operational Staff for security –Requires skilled engineers who understand tradeoffs Implement a security as part of your culture –Lives are at stake

11 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI11 3. COTS Incompatibilities Risks –Suppliers unresponsive –Plug-and-play becomes patch- and-pray –Performance plagues –High maintenance costs –Licensing nightmares Mitigation Actions –Adopt and promote a modern, standards-based architecture –Make suppliers vested members of the team

12 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI12 More Mitigation Actions Embrace those standards, both current and future, that best support your needs –Maintain watch on evolving standards; try to influence their development Address dynamic interplay between COTS systems used across the network by focusing on services that implement plug-and-play Understand the games vendors play Team with those COTS vendors that you trust and can work with

13 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI13 4. Impossible Schedules Risks –Scheduled operational need date impossible to meet Nobody has the guts to admit it –Schedules do not focus on interim capabilities Mitigation Actions –Incrementally develop using capability builds and spirals –Conduct incremental demos to engage user community and maintain their confidence

14 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI14 More Mitigation Actions Run models to determine if the schedule continues to remain feasible –If not, adjust capability and build plan accordingly Monitor progress; assess status; conduct periodic assessments to determine if schedules remain feasible Remember, the easiest way to proceed according to your schedule is to lie to yourself –Avoid this by believing the metrics and indicators ISSUES Interfacing/integrating with legacy systems always takes longer than expected Reuse of legacy turns into a pipe-dream Networks require you to pay constant attention to testing and refactoring Testing networks forces you to upgrade your bench and develop regression test baselines

15 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI15 5. Malicious Code Nightmares Recognize that defense-in-depth and at the perimeter still leaves holes in network defenses –GOTS, COTS and ROTS often riddled with malware Much of this is unintentional –New vulnerabilities occur hourly that must be addressed Mitigation Actions –Check for malicious code in GOTS, COTS and ROTS

16 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI16 More Mitigation Actions Whenever possible, use components that are on the certified products list (per common criteria) Keep all of your critical software up-to-date Address false alarm rates by properly configuring your intrusion detection and/or prevention devices Keep abreast of new and known vulnerabilities by monitoring the CVE Initiate alerts/alarms using a situation awareness display via the network operations center Design your systems to prevent insider as well as outsider attacks

17 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI17 6. Incompatible/Immature Processes Risks –Current CMMI-compatible processes do not address many of the processes used for network-centric warfare –C&A and DIACAP add time and effort to the mix –Supply chain dynamics may not be in synch Mitigation Actions –Employ agile processes for integration and test

18 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI18 More Mitigation Actions Focus on the processes that drive your cost and schedule Recognize that common processes for the net-centric must be agreed upon by its many sources Try to manage the network as it evolves using a annual build and release process Use a demo-driven process to increase confidence in the releases and reduce risk Keep players involved via an ICWG You cannot survive without common CM/QC practices

19 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI19 Size Drivers Exponential Scale Factors Systems of Systems Definition and Integration Effort Calibration Interface-related equivalent KSLOC Number of logical interfaces at SoS level Integration simplicity Integration risk resolution Integration stability Component readiness Integration capability Integration processes COSOSIMO Operational Concept COSOSIMO Source: Jo Ann Lane, University of Southern California, 2006

20 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI20 7. Unforeseen/Unfunded Requirements Risks –New opportunities/threats lead to new requirements –Legacy and reuse shortfalls –More interfaces to mechanize than anyone thought –Standards will change as will interface specifications Mitigation Actions –Budget for a fixed level of volatility and change

21 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI21 More Mitigation Actions Maintain backup plans to cope with legacy and reuse shortfalls Incorporate changes into your build plans –Prioritize capabilities/incrementally deliver Seek additional funds when changes are needed to support development of needed capabilities Maintain visible reserves to address contingencies Do not be a good guy and do things for others for nothing Manage your resources tightly

22 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI22 8. Supply Chain Surprises Risks –Other government agencies may not live up to their responsibilities –Technology refresh –Vendor surprises Mitigation Actions –Maintain technology and vendor watch functions –Develop Plan Bs (and Cs)

23 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI23 More Mitigation Actions No matter what you do to prevent it, supplier issues will dominate –Vendors may go out of business –Government supplier may not live up to their obligations Negotiate a two-tier support agreement with critical vendors Look for fallback positions for critical items Maintain good relationships with your suppliers Be capable of maintaining government software organically as a last resort

24 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI24 9. Unpredictable Quality of Service Levels Risks –Poor performance (real or perceived) –Unreliable service (real or perceived) –High false alarm rates Mitigation Actions –Define quality of service expectations –Define metrics and measures that quantify your expectations –Develop benchmarks/assess usage –Identify heavy usage profiles/patterns

25 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI25 Metrics Important to Network Operations Percent of population thinking metric is important

26 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI High Maintenance Costs Risks –Lack of sufficient resources during maintenance –Service degradation and lack of support –Finger-pointing over who bears responsibility Mitigation Actions –Develop WBS for net-centric ops –Adequately budget for WBS tasks –Recognize COTS/GOTS is not free

27 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI27 Why Worry about NCO Risks? Rand, Net-Centric Ops Case Study, Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2005 Light Infantry Brigade Stryker Brigade Quality of individual and shared information - 10%- 80% Speed of command48 hours3 hours Ability to control the speed of command NoYes Blue-Red Casualty Ratio10:11:1

28 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI28 Summary and Conclusions Summary We identified the top ten net-centric risks and how to mitigate them In doing this, we highlighted past experiences and showed you how to capitalize on them to reduce risk We highlighted the fact that even though there was a lot of pain involved that the move was worthwhile Conclusions The path to network-centric warfare is paved but has many potholes Most of the risks discussed are managerial –Sound management practices should help eliminate them Many of the risks are inherent in any large system development –The mitigation actions discussed however are not

29 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI29 Todays Net-Centric Trends Lead to Tomorrows Challenges Todays Trends –Convergence –Interoperability –Legacy operations –Service-oriented architecture-based Applications servers Publish and subscribe protocols Standards-based –Spiral acquisition Tomorrows challenges –Security –Operational architecture –Layered frameworks –Net-ready standards Uniform measures of performance Measures of effectiveness Measures of readiness Measures of compliance –Spiral incentives

30 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI30 Parting Thoughts If development/fielding of such networked-centric systems were easy, everyone would have them –Would not be a differentiator in the battlefield The future battlefield raises the ante because getting enough bandwidth and performance remain major issues –Still lots of fun to have solving these problems Many other challenges –Information overload –Appropriate levels of automation –Adaptive automation –Distributed decision-making and team coordination –Decision biases –Mitigating complexity –Security –Trust and reliability –Accountability

31 March 2007Copyright 2007, RCI31 Contact Information Donald J. Reifer, PI Reifer Consultants, Inc. Phone: (310)

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