Presentation on theme: "Systems Engineering: It’s the Law!"— Presentation transcript:
1 Systems Engineering: It’s the Law! An Overview of theDefense Acquisition Management System and Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)Geoff DraperHarris Government Communications Systems Division
2 Systems Engineering: It’s the Law! Topics:Performance issues in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)Summary of studies and reportsOverview of the Defense Acquisition Management SystemDoD policies and guidanceDODIWeapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)Potential Implications to the Defense IndustryReferences:P. L , Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.May 22,Defense Technical Memorandum, DTM“Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009”. DecDoDI , The Defense Acquisition Management System. Dec 2008.DoD Strategic Management Plan. July 2009.Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG), Chapter 4: Systems Engineering.https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=332951&lang=en-USImplementation of Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of Mona Lush, OUSD (AT&L). Oct 2009.DODI and WSARA Impacts on Early System s Engineering.Sharon Vannucci, OSD (AT&L) / DDRE. NDIA SE Conference, Oct ’09.Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) 2009.Mr. Nicholas Torelli, OUSD (AT&L) / DDRE. NDIA SE Div mtg, July 2009.A Multi-Level Approach to Addressing SE Issues in Defense Programs.NDIA SE Division, June27-Mar-17
3 The Problem – Improving Program Performance through SE Numerous studies and reports document program performance issues and the role of effective systems engineeringGAO T - Actions Needed to Overcome Long-standing Challenges with Weapon Systems Acquisition and Service Contract Management“DOD’s major weapon systems programs continue to take longer to develop, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned.”“costs … of major defense acquisition programs increased 26 percent and development costs increased by 40 percent from first estimates”“programs … failed to deliver capabilities when promised—often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems”“current programs experienced, on average, a 21-month delay in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter”NRC/USAF Study - Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Acquisition“Attention to a few critical systems engineering processes and functions particularly during preparation for Milestones A and B is essential…”“…critically dependent on having experienced systems engineers with adequate knowledge of the domain…”“Decisions made prior to Milestone A should be supported by a rigorous systems analysis and systems engineering process involving teams of users, acquirers, and industry representatives.”
4 Addressing SE Issues - Key Studies and Reports Study / ReportSummary Issues / FindingsPre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering[report] (NRC/USAF study)Inexperienced leadershipExternal interface complexitySystem complexityIncomplete/unstable reqts at MS BReliance on immature technologyReliance on large amts of new SWNDIA Top 5 SE Issues (2006)[report, briefing]Inconsistent SE practicesInsufficient SE early in life cycleLack SE resources (qty, quality)Requirements not well-defined and managedInadequate SE tools/environmentsNDIA Top SW Issues (2006)SE decisions without SW involvementIneffective SW life cycle plansLack SW resources (qty, quality)SW verification: costly, ineffectiveRequirements impact on SWSW assurance (predictable, secure)COTS/NDI impactsSystemic Root Cause Analysis (SRCA) (2008)(publication 2009, pending)Unrealistic acq. strategies and plansMilestone decision gates, criteriaStaffing shortfalls (quantity, skills, experience)Systems Engineering of Tactical Air Launched Systems: An Industry Examination (2008) [briefing](Air Armament Center, NDIA Gulf Coast Chapter)Incomplete design-to requirementsRequirements creep, not stableUnplanned reqts verification effortUnplanned performance/design testsConfiguration variation issuesComponent qualification testWeapon level integration testsWeapon level qualification testsWeapon flight testingRedesign for producibility/costField reliability, sustainabilityHouse Armed Services Panel on Defense Acq. Reform (final report, March 2010)Manage performance of acq. systemLacking good reqts process (JCIDS)Ad hoc acquisition of servicesDevelop/incentivize acq. workforceIneffective financial mgmt systemProtect the industrial base (all sizes)Responsiveness of core acq systemDetails
5 Systemic Issues of Big “A” Acquisition Resources (PPBE)Funding instabilityInsufficient resource trade spaceBudget not properly phased/magnitude to support planned developmentDefense AcquisitionSystem(DAS)Small “a” AcquisitionRequirements(JCIDS)Immature technologiesInadequate systems engineeringInadequate requirements flow-down/ traceability/ decompositionInsufficient schedule trade spaceInadequate implementation of Earned Value Management SystemLack of time and assets for testingTo deliver capable, effective, efficient material solutions, Requirements Managers must understand “Big A Acquisition” which is the combination of the Requirements, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) and acquisition processes. Program success depends on integrating the three components of “Big A Acquisition.”Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) states that the requirements process, the acquisition process, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process must work together to deliver capabilities to the warfighters. Our goals are to align the three processes, to make consistent decisions, and to avoid the mistakes of the past.Welcome. I am Major General William Troy, the Joint Staff J-8 Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment. One of our most important missions in J-8 is to be an advocate for the warfighter and assist the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in properly defining and validating future warfighting capabilities.The course you are taking will help you, a requirements manager, play your role in defining the requirements for future warfighting capabilities. While we are all committed to giving the warfighter the best possible solutions, there is often a gap in both experience and expectation between the warfighters on one hand and the acquisition and resource communities on the other. This may result in misinterpreted requirements and lead to systems which:do not perform to the level required by the warfighter, cost too much, or are not delivered when needed.This certification course will help address that challenge. With this training, you will be better able to establish a common understanding between these two communities on how the requirements are developed and how they are turned from performance requirements on paper into acquisition programs. Ultimately it will help you ensure the right capabilities are delivered to the warfighter.As requirements managers, we need to make sure we get the requirement right, and I think that means four things.First, we need to ensure the performance requirements defined by the warfighter are feasible given available or developing technologies. We have to be realistic about the amount of technological risk we are assuming.Second, the requirement must have an affordable solution. If it is too expensive, chances are we’ll never get it in the quantities we need.Third, the system must be delivered on time. An overly complex or rigid requirement can result in a system that’s late-to-need and may well be useless.Fourth, and most importantly, we need to make sure the requirement meets the needs of the combatant commanders.To meet these four imperatives, we must engage key players within the Services, Agencies, combatant commands, Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense early in the process. All have important roles, and we need to make sure their voices are heard. In doing this job you must think of yourself as the warfighter’s advocate, and understand the perspectives of the various players to find the right balance between capability investments and operational risk. Decisions to pursue new capabilities without sufficient engagement up front can result in:pursuing the wrong solutionmultiple efforts for the same capability, ornot delivering what the warfighter really needs.From a warfighter’s perspective, an approach or solution by one Service may not meet the needs of all combatant commanders. The Services often develop new capabilities based on their existing and future doctrine with a service-centric approach. Combatant command requirements, however, are based on their OPLANs and CONPLANs. And remember, the joint warfighter requires capabilities that can be operated across Service boundaries.As a Requirements manager we need you to help reconcile the natural tensions that exist in these two perspectives. By engaging with the Combatant Commanders and their staffs early you will ensure we understand how they intend to employ these future capabilities and make sure their needs are accurately represented to the services. The requirements manager must help ensure we deliver capabilities with joint operations and versatility designed in from the start.In the war we are now fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen many battles fought in extremely limited battlespace, with every Service directly involved in the fight. We have seen soldiers and Marines fighting side-by-side, calling in Navy and Air Force close air support with Special Operations Forces in critically close quarters, all taking place on a battlefield that includes non-combatants, religious shrines, and friendly indigenous forces. More than ever, the tools of our trade must be precise and must fit together. We need to be able to see each other and talk to each other and reduce the fog of war.We’ll never get there if we don’t get the requirements right at the outset of the process. As you proceed through this course, I ask you to remember the impact you have when you write, review, interpret, or develop new capabilities for the warfighter.Lack of JROC-validated requirements document for basic program (ORD, CDD, CPD)Inadequate requirements for basic program and any incrementsCritical dependence on external programs with developmental issuesLack of inter- and intra-departmental stakeholder coordination and supportJoint Capabilities Integration and Development System (CJCSI-3170)Program, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution (DoD-7000, FMRs)Defense Acquisition System (DoDI-5000)*Systemic Issues of Nunn-McCurdy “Class of 2007” ProgramsSynchronize JCIDS, DAS, and PPBE to deliver capabilities to Warfighters.
6 Summary of Key SE Initiatives and Reports Common program issues:-Poor program planning -Unrealistic estimates-Unstable requirements -Immature technology-Not following SE processes -Insufficient SE expertise-Ineffective reviews -Poor system reliabilityOther sources:Program Support Reviews (PSRs)Nunn-McCurdy breachesCongressional oversightDefense Science BoardOther studies, reviews, reports20032006200820092010NDIA Top 5SE Issues [1/03]DODI [5/03]Defense Acq Guide (DAG); Chap 4: SE [7/06]OSD policy, guidance, reviews: SEP; IMS; training; risk mgmt; PSRsNDIA Top SE Issues [7/06]NDIA Top SW Issues [9/06]NRC/USAF Study: Pre-MS A and Early SE [1/08]DODI updates [12/08]Systemic Root Cause Analysis (SRCA) [draft]PL (WSARA) [5/09]DTM Implementation of WSARA [12/09]QDR [2/10]House Armed Services Committee report [3/10]OSD WSARA report to Congress [3/10]NDIA ReportsDoD policy and actionsOther (Congress, studies, reviews)There is no shortage of sources confirming we have issues –How do government and industry collaborate to act upon solutions?
7 Secretary of Defense Direction Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is acquisition.”
8 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act “The key to successful acquisition programs isgetting things right from the start with soundsystems engineering, cost estimating, anddevelopmental testing early in the program cycle.The bill that we are introducing today will require theDepartment of Defense to take the steps needed toput major defense acquisition programs on a soundfooting from the outset. If these changes aresuccessfully implemented, they should help ouracquisition programs avoid future cost overruns,schedule delays, and performance problems.”–Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee“The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of2009 is an important step in efforts to reform thedefense acquisition process. This legislation isneeded to focus acquisition and procurement onemphasizing systems engineering; more effectiveupfront planning and management of technologyrisk; and growing the acquisition workforce to meetprogram objectives.”–Senator John McCain, Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
9 P. L. 111-23: Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) – May 2009 Key Elements of Legislation:OrganizationalEstablishes Directorates for SE and DT&E as principal advisorsJoint tracking of component and MDAP progress against plans and measurable criteria with annual reporting to CongressIndependent cost estimation and cost analysis (Director, CAPE)Provide adequate trained staff for SE and development planningConduct MDAP performance assessments and root cause analysisRole of SE across program lifecycleDevelopmental planning, lifecycle management, sustainabilityEnsure reliability, availability, maintainability (RAM)MandatesMeasurable performance criteria in SE/DT&E plansCompetitive prototypes for MDAPs; prime make/buy analysesSystem PDR before MS B, with formal MDA assessmentAssessment of technical maturity and integration risk of critical technologies during Technology Development (TD)Technical and cost oversightIndependent estimates, Problem Assessment Root Cause AnalysisTechnical analysis of cost/schedule breaches; presumed termination27-Mar-1727-Mar-1727-Mar-1727-Mar-17
11 Key Acquisition Business Process Changes XIncreased Emphasis on Milestone AMandatory for MDAPs with Technology Development ProgramsLikely for Most ProgramsWhen PDR is Conducted after Milestone B an MDA Post-PDR Assessment is RequiredPreliminary Design Review (PDR) before Milestone B to Enhance Understanding of Derived Requirements and Improve Cost EstimationPost-Critical Design Review Assessment – A Mandatory Decision Point to Review ProgressMS AMS BMS CXFRP DRICDMDDMateriel Solution AnalysisPCDRATechnology DevelopmentPDRP-PDRAEngineering & Manufacturing DevelopmentPDRCDDProduction & DeploymentCPDOperations & SupportCompetitive PrototypingRe-structured “EMD” PhaseEffective Contracting via Pre-Award Peer ReviewsMateriel Development Decision – Mandatory Process Entry PointEnhanced Emphasis on:Technology MaturitySystems EngineeringIntegrated Testing and Test PlanningManufacturing and ProducibilityLogistics and Sustainment PlanningCompetitive PrototypingConfiguration Steering Boards Established to Stabilize Requirements
14 Technology and Manufacturing Readiness Test and Demonstration BCIOCFOCMaterielSolutionAnalysisTECHNOLOGYDEVELOPMENTEngineering &ManufacturingDevelopmentPRODUCTION &DEPLOYMENTOPERATIONS &SUPPORTMaterielDevelopmentDecisionFRPDecisionReviewPost CDRAssessmentTRLs 1-3TRL 4TRL 5TRL 6TRL 7TRL 8TRL 9TechnologyReadinessLevelsDefense AcquisitionGuidebookparaAnalytical/ExperimentalCriticalFunction/CharacteristicProof ofConceptComponentAnd/orBreadboardValidationIn aLaboratoryEnvironmentComponentAnd/orBreadboardValidationIn aRelevantEnvironmentSystem/SubsystemModel orPrototypeDemonstratedIn a RelevantEnvironmentSystemPrototypeDemonstratedIn anOperationalEnvironmentActualSystemCompletedQualifiedThroughTest and DemonstrationActualSystem“MissionProven”ThroughSuccessfulOperationsMRLs 1-3MRL 4MRL 5MRL 6MRL 7MRL 8MRL 9MRL 10ManufacturingReadinessLevelsDraft MRA DeskbookMay 2008ManufacturingFeasibilityAssessed.Conceptsdefined/developedCapability to produceTechnology In LabEnvironment.Manufacturing RisksIdentifiedCapability toProducePrototypeComponentsCapability toProduce System/SubsystemPrototypesCapability to ProduceSystems, SubsystemsOr Components in aProductionRepresentativeEnvironmentPilot LineCapabilityDemonstrated.Ready for LRIPLow RateProductionDemonstrated.Capability InPlace for FRPFull RateProductionDemonstrated.Lean ProductionPractices In PlaceManufacturingCost DriversIdentifiedCost ModelConstructedDetailed CostAnalysisCompleteCost Model UpdatedTo System LevelUnit Cost ReductionEfforts UnderwayEngineeringCost ModelValidatedLRIP CostGoals MetLearning CurveValidatedFRP UnitCost GoalsMetSection 2366b of Title 10, United States Code, requires certification that: the technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment to enter Milestone B. [TRL 6]14
15 DoD Strategic Management Plan (7/09) Key acquisition-related excerpts GoalsMeasuresKey InitiativesImprove acquisition processes and execution to support warfighter reqts# of months to IOCAcquire systems through evolutionary acquisitionIncrease use of fixed price contracts% of contracts at MS B that are FP% of contracts at MS C that are FPMilestone decision reviewsIncrease % of MDAPs initiated with low technical risk# of MDAPs initiated in GFY% of MDAPs with technologies demonstrated in a relevant environment (i.e., TRL 6)Competitive prototypingPDR before MS BIndependent Technical Readiness Assessments (TRA)Assess programs as directed in WSARA% of Problem Assessment Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) offices% of programs assessedRoot cause analysisEnsure supportability, maintainability and costs are considered in lifecycle% programs meeting DoD sustainment metricsEstablish sustainment metrics reporting (availability, reliability, TOC)Implement recommended next-gen sustainment strategiesFocus R&D to address warfighting requirements% of completing demonstration programs transitioned per yearTrack programs transitioning with CYReview RDT&E funding for transitionSponsor technology leadership strategy outreach to industry, academia# of 2-day dialogues with academia technology leadersUnderstand investment drivers and strategies to sustain tech leadershipRight-shape and re-balance the acquisition workforce - goal to grow by 20,000 positions by FY2015% certification positions filled (annual)Annual increase in end-strength# contractor work-yr equiv in-sourcedGrow the acquisition workforceAchieve 10,000 acquisition positions through in-sourcing
16 What’s Next? Areas of emphasis: Defense workforce Defense StrategyDefense objectives, emerging threatsRebalancing the ForceCounterinsurgency, counterterrorism, WMD, cyberU.S. force structure: sizing, shaping, evolutionDefense workforceSupporting troops, deploymentRecruiting, retention, developmentStrengthening relationshipsU.S. defense posture, interagency, abroadReforming How We Do BusinessRapid acquisition, security, how we buy, exportsStrengthening the industrial baseStrategic approach to climate and energyDefense Risk Management FrameworkOperational, force management, institutional, future challenges, strategic, military, politicalA U.S. force “prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances.”
17 Summary DODI 5000.2 and WSARA are changing the game Questions? Early life cycle planning (SEP)Adherence to effective SE practicesIndependent cost estimatesCompetitive prototypingManaged technology risks (TRL)Increased emphasis on reliability and supportability (RAM)Congressional reporting and oversightMore fixed priced contracts and evolutionary acquisition likelyRevitalization of DoD SE and acquisition workforceQuestions?Geoff Draper )
20 Addressing SE Issues – Key NDIA Task Groups and Milestones Government Studies/Reports (GAO, NRC, DCMA, etc.)Reviews (QDR, etc.)Program Support Reviews (PSRs)Congressional oversight (Nunn-McCurdy, McCain-Levin, …)Working GroupsConferencesForums20032006200720082009NDIA Top 5SE IssuesNDIA Top 5 SE IssuesNDIA Top SW IssuesDefense Software Strategy SummitSE Effectiveness SurveySystemic Root Cause Analysis (SRCA) [draft]Industrial Committee on Program Mgmt (ICPM)SE of Tactical Air Launched Systems (Gulf Coast Chapter) (Air Armament Center)Top SE/SW Issues Update (planned)Industrial Committee on SE (ICSE) (planned)Common program issues:-Poor program planning -Unrealistic estimates-Unstable requirements -Immature technology-Not following SE processes -Insufficient SE expertise-Ineffective reviews -Poor system reliabilityThere is no shortage of sources confirming we have issues –How do government and industry collaborate to act upon solutions?
21 NRC Study – Pre-MS A and Early-Phase SE FindingsRecommendationsAttention to a few critical systems engineering processes and functions particularly during preparation for Milestones A and B is essential to ensuring that Air Force acquisition programs deliver products on time and on budget.Require that Milestones A and B be treated as critical milestones in every acquisition program and that … the “Pre-Milestone A/B Checklist” … be used to judge successful completion.The creation of a robust systems engineering process is critically dependent on having experienced systems engineers with adequate knowledge of the domain relevant to a contemplated program.Assess needs for officers and civilians in the systems engineering field and evaluate whether either internal training programs … or external organizations are able to produce the required quality and quantity of systems engineers and systems engineering skills. …The government, FFRDCs, and industry all have important roles to play throughout the acquisition life cycle.… Source selection for system development and demonstration should not be made until after the work associated with Milestones A and B is complete.Decisions made prior to Milestone A should be supported by a rigorous systems analysis and systems engineering process involving teams of users, acquirers, and industry representatives.The Air Force used to have a development planning organization that applied pre-Milestone A systems engineering processes to a number of successful programs, but that organization was allowed to lapse.A development planning function should be established in the military departments to coordinate the concept development and refinement phaseof all acquisition programs to ensure that the capabilities … as a whole are considered and that unifying strategies such as … interoperability are addressed.Reference: Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Acquisition.
22 NDIA Top 5 SE Issues NDIA SE Division (July 2006) Provides an update and status from a previous task group report conducted in 2003.IssuesRecommendations1. Key systems engineering practices known to be effective are not consistently applied across all phases of the program life cycle.Ensure institutionalization of effective SE practices into program planning and execution2. Insufficient systems engineering is applied early in the program life cycle, compromising the foundation for initial requirements and architecture development.Integrate engineering planning within the acquisition life cycle to ensure adequate time and effort for SE early in the program life cycle3. Requirements are not always well-managed, including the effective translation from capabilities statements into executable requirements to achieve successful acquisition programsEmphasize the application of SE practices and resources to the capability definition process to address warfighter needs and translation into executable programs.4. The quantity and quality of systems engineering expertise is insufficient to meet the demands of the government and the defense industry.Grow SE expertise through training, career incentives, and broadening “systems thinking” into other disciplines.5. Collaborative environments, including SE tools, are inadequate to effectively execute SE at the joint capability, system of systems (SoS), and system levels.Strengthen and clarify policy and guidance regarding use of collaborative environments, models, simulations, and other automated tools.Reference: NDIA Top 5 Systems Engineering Issues Report. July NDIA Systems Engineering Division. [report, briefing]
23 NDIA Top Software Issues NDIA SE Division (Sept 2006) Recommendations1. The impact of requirements upon software is not consistently quantified and managed in development or sustainment.Enforce effective software requirements development and management practices, including assessment of change impacts, for both the acquirer and the supplier organizations.2. Fundamental system engineering decisions are made without full participation of software engineeringInstitutionalize the integration and participation of software engineering in all system engineering activities.3. Software life-cycle planning and management by acquirers and suppliers is ineffective.Establish a culture of quantitative planning and management, using proven processes with collaborative decision-making across the software life cycle.4. The quantity and quality of software engineering expertise is insufficient to meet the demands of government and the defense industry.Collaborate on innovative strategies to staff to appropriate levels, and to attract, develop, and retain qualified talent to meet current and future software engineering needs in government and industry.5. Traditional software verification techniques are costly and ineffective for dealing with the scale and complexity of modern systems.Study current software verification practices in industry, and develop guidance and training to improve effectiveness in assuring product quality across the life cycle.6. There is a failure to assure correct, predictable, safe, secure execution of complex software in distributed environments.Collaborate with industry to develop approaches, standards, and tools addressing system assurance issues throughout the acquisition life cycle and supply chain.7. Inadequate attention is given to total lifecycle issues for COTS/NDI impacts on lifecycle cost and risk.Improve and expand guidelines for addressing total lifecycle COTS/NDI issues.Reference: NDIA Top Software Engineering Issues Report. Sep NDIA Systems Engineering Division. [report, briefing]
25 SE of Tactical Air Launched Weapons NDIA Gulf Coast Chapter (2008) SE DeficienciesRoot CausesProgram Structure and ControlInsufficient Maturity Of Design At Critical Decision Points•Insufficient Testing And Analysis Planned To Achieve Maturity•Late Integration Of Production Critical Processes And Controls•Program Funding Profiles Not Structured For Improved PracticesRequirements And VerificationLack Of Service Use Profile Leaves Interpretive Requirements•Insufficient Mapping Of Requirements To Design•Ineffective Maturation And Verification PlanningDesign Best Practices•Inadequate Design Analysis- Fault Tree Analysis On All Subsystems During Design- Single Point Failure Analysis During Design•Inadequate Maturation Analysis And Testing- COTS Integration- Design Margin And Sensitivity Development- Critical Manufacture And Assembly Process ID / Control•Use Of “Production Representative” Configuration For VerificationRisk Identification And Management•Inadequate Relationship To “Knowledge” Of DesignSupply Chain Practices•Inconsistent Approaches To Design CharacterizationReference: “Systems Engineering of Tactical Air-Launched Weapons: An Industry Examination.”Air Armament Symposium, [briefing]
26 A Survey of Systems Engineering Effectiveness (2007) Joint NDIA/SEI survey of 46 programs correlating the effectiveness of SE processes with program performance.SE processes most strongly correlated with better program performance:ArchitectureTrade StudiesTechnical SolutionIPT CapabilityRequirements Development and ManagementReport:documents/08.reports/08sr034.htmlProjects with better Systems Engineering Capabilities deliver better Project Performance (cost, schedule, functionality)
27 Defense Acquisition System Weighted Expenditures DoDI PerspectiveProgram InitiationABCIOCFOCMateriel Solution AnalysisEngineering andManufacturing DevelopmentTechnology DevelopmentProduction & DeploymentOperations &SupportMateriel Development DecisionFRP DecisionReviewPost-CDRAssessmentLRIP/IOT&EPre-Systems AcquisitionSystems AcquisitionSustainmentWarfighter and Sustainment Organization PerspectiveAB(ProgramInitiation)CMaterielSolutionAnalysisThe point of this chart s that the system is with the warfighter and supporter a lot longer than it was in development. So, a good reason to make sure systems are reliable and supportable up front.TechnologyDevelopmentEngineering andManufacturingDevelopmentProduction &DeploymentOperations & SupportMaterielDevelopmentDecisionFR5PReviewDecisionLRIP/IOT&EAssessmentPost-CDRPre-Systems AcquisitionSystems AcquisitionSustainment65-80%20-35%30+ YEARSNominal Life Cycle Cost Distribution