Presentation on theme: "Jan-Inge Svensson is today a colonel retired from the Royal Swedish Army. In 2002, his final active duty position, he was the Commanding officer."— Presentation transcript:
Jan-Inge Svensson is today a colonel retired from the Royal Swedish Army. In 2002, his final active duty position, he was the Commanding officer of the Swedish Armed Forces Intelligence and Security Centre In 1996 he developed and implemented a Swedish National Intelligence Cell in Sarajevo. In 1995 he was Head of the G-2 section (intelligence) of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Zagreb. Since retirement he has been the lead Course Director and strategic planner for Multinational Information Sharing and Sense-Making at the Folke Bernadette Academy in Sweden, and is among those in the senior ranks of the Nordic countries who have been asked to create the United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence curriculum. His original contribution to the literature, Peacekeeping and Intelligence Experience with UNPROFOR 1995, was published as Chapter 4 in the first book devoted to this vital topic, PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future (OSS, 2003). Intelligence is no longer a dirty word at the leadership level of the United Nations (UN). So said MajGen Patrick Cammaert, RN NL, speaking to the second Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference. In keeping with the Brahimi Report recommendations, he and many others have been working with great energy to both implement the recommendations, and to create the new discipline of Intelligence for Peace, one that must by its very nature rely almost exclusively on open sources and methods that can be easily shared with all Member states, with all non-governmental organizations, and with such private sector individuals and organizations as are relevant to achieving the strategic mandate. Intelligence is decision-support. Everything else is information. Without tailored decision- support at the strategic level, the mandate will not be correct. Without tailored decision-support at the operational level, the force structure and the timing of forces will not be correct. Finally, without decision-support at the tactical level, UN forces and the UN Mission will be at risk. Progress has been made. Especially important have been the emerging concepts, doctrine, and practical field implementation of both the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and the Joint Military Analysis Center (JMAC) capabilities. Those Secretary General Special Representatives (SGSR) who have had a JOC or a JMAC are now champions of these capabilities for they substantially improve what, when, and how UN forces can use intelligencedecision- supportas a substitute for violence, as a substitute for manpower and financial outlays Intelligence for Peace can also help harmonize the investments and behaviors of the (Continued on back flap) (Continued from front flap) many multinational participants, changing constantly, each with different priorities., but each attentive to unclassified intelligence helpful to avoiding waste and casualties.
?Multinational Police Operations who? 2004 conferenceMultinational Police Operations ?The SGSR from Norway was MOST impressive Akerlund, AnnaConflict analysis and conflict impact assessments - an NGO perspective Bamber, ClareUN JMAC (Slides Only) Borrie, Brehm, Cattaneo, Atwood Learn, adapt, succeed: potential lessons from the Ottawa and Oslo processes for other disarmament and arms control challenges Brown (UK PM)Tech has changed foreign policy Cammaert, PatrickUN Peacekeeping and Intelligence - no longer a secretUN Peacekeeping and Intelligence - no longer a secret Charters (CA)OSINT for Peace Support Operations: Perspectives from UN Operations Chitumbo (IAEA)The Role of Open Source Information in Enhancing Nuclear Transparency Cox (CA BGen)Reflections of the former NATO Deputy N-2 Dearth (US DIA)Peacekeeping in the Information Age Dearth (US DIA)Intelligence in the 21st Century: Re-focusing Intelligence to Shape the Strategic Environment Dorn, WalterPeacekeeping Intelligence Early WarningPeacekeeping Intelligence Early Warning (abridged) Dorn, WalterPeacekeeping Intelligence Tools of the TradePeacekeeping Intelligence Tools of the Trade (abridged) Durch (US)UN Peace Operations and the Brahimi Report Durch et alThe Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations Gabel, MedardEarthGame and the UNVisualizing MDG Progress Gillvray, MartinMilitary-Police Interaction: the need for specialisation and co-operation in PKI Heidenreich (US)Early Warning of Genocide: The Utlity of Open Sources & Methods Husberg, P.A.EU intel. Perspective EU intel. Perspective Maj SE (slides Only) Isberg (MONUC)Lack of intelligence hampers operations,Lack of intelligence hampers operations Lewis (UNIDIR)Creating the Global Brain: The United Nations Munson USNLooking for Anomalies in All the Wrong Places Palmer (US Amb)Achieving Universal Democracy by Eliminating All Dictators within the Decade Peleman, Johanhead of JMAC MONU Pombo, (ZA Col)INTELLIGENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS – SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCES Rod-Larsen, TerjeLEBANON AS A MICROCOSM OF THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION Sovereign (US NPS)Information Superiority for the Lower End of the Spectrum (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) Staud, Jean-PaulPEACE KEEPING IN AFRICA – THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE Steele (US)Information Peacekeeping: Innovative Policy Options StempeReligion and Intelligence IJIC 18/2 Summer 2005Religion and Intelligence Syren, HakenIntroductory remarksIntroductory remarks Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces Wiebes, CeesSREBRENICA: AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURESREBRENICA: AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE? Yekelo (ZA BGen)Continental Early Warning & Information Sharing: A Military Perspective ZREF Cline Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and Stability Operations, IJIC 15/2Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and Stability Operations ZREF DeMars Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars, IJIC 14/2Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars ZREF Ekpe Intelligence Assets of the United Nations: Sources, Methods, and Implications, IJIC 20/3Intelligence Assets of the United Nations: Sources, Methods, and Implications ZREF PolitiThe Citizen as Intelligence Minuteman, IJIC 16/1The Citizen as Intelligence Minuteman ZREF SteeleWorld Brain as EarthGame from COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCEWorld Brain as EarthGame ZREF SteelePeacekeeping Intelligence and Information Peacekeeping, IJIC 19/3Peacekeeping Intelligence and Information Peacekeeping