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UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009 Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO.

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Presentation on theme: "UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009 Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO."— Presentation transcript:

1 UN Intelligence Possibilities and limitations Presentation to Folke Bernadotte Thursday, 2 April 2009 Claire Bamber, Peacekeeping Situation Centre, DPKO

2 Bond in a blue beret? Not exactly…

3 Total deployment in September 2008: 111,600 88,754 uniformed personnel and 20,690 civilians From 119 countries DPKO HQ support Budget for 01 July 2008 – 30 June 2009: Near $USD 7.1 billion 1,000+ HQ staff supporting 100,000+ in the field

4 DPKO Directive on JOC and JMAC was approved by USG DPKO on 1 July 2006 upon the advice of the DPKO Senior Management Team. DPKO Directive on JOC and JMAC was approved by USG DPKO on 1 July 2006 upon the advice of the DPKO Senior Management Team. Issued to all DPKO-led missions on 12 July 2006. Issued to all DPKO-led missions on 12 July 2006. New Directive

5 Objectives of the JMAC approach are three-fold: Support integrated mission management. Support integrated mission management. Support mission security. Support mission security. Support informed decision-making across all components. Support informed decision-making across all components. Not a decision-making body and does not replace existing management or command structures at any level. Not a decision-making body and does not replace existing management or command structures at any level. It supports decision-making, operations management and mission security. It supports decision-making, operations management and mission security. The JMAC Approach

6 CASE STUDY: MINUSTAH The Capstone Doctrine: A PKO must continuously analyse its operating environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent… and must have the political and analytical skills… to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent.

7 Information provided by locals helped the UN in making arrests. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE:

8 Working with the HNP An opportunity and a challenge…

9 Imagery intelligence Aerial imagery allowed MINUSTAH to produce useful maps, identify weapons storage sites, hiding places for victims of kidnapping, the rebel leaders bases and to map out dozens of potential sniper positions.

10 Success… despite the lack of signals intelligence MINUSTAHs JMAC established the gold standard for intelligence support for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate. United Institute of Peace Report 2008

11 CASE STUDY: MONUC MONUCs JMAC: about military operations… and much more.

12 Stabilisation Plan for Eastern DRC – a JMAC plan

13 Transformed access to and by the local population.

14 UNOPS: building roads a kilometre at a time.

15 UN agencies and others benefitted from the more secure environment.

16 No SIGINT but…

17 Local staff have access to humint that international staff might otherwise lack.

18 JMAC: The Challenges Lack of clarity of concept Lack of buy-in by Mission leadership Competition and duplication with mission political affairs, civil affairs, military operations and intelligence and security Poor staff choices Inadequate mission direction

19 Questions & Comments?


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