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1 Topic-focus ambiguities in natural language Marie Duží VSB-Technical University Ostrava & Charles University of Prague

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1 1 Topic-focus ambiguities in natural language Marie Duží VSB-Technical University Ostrava & Charles University of Prague

2 2 Content Russell vs. Strawson: 100 years contension Russell vs. Strawson: 100 years contension Topic-focus articulation Topic-focus articulation Outline of the proper division of labour between Russellian and Strawsonian conceptions of definite descriptions Outline of the proper division of labour between Russellian and Strawsonian conceptions of definite descriptions Foundations of TIL Foundations of TIL The general analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition The general analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition Conclusion: the moral to be drawn … Conclusion: the moral to be drawn …

3 3 Proper names vs. definite descriptions Independently of any particular theory of proper names, it should be granted that A proper proper name (as opposed to a definite description grammatically masquerading as a proper name) is a rigid designator of a numerically particular individual. On the other hand, a definite description like, for instance, the Mayor of Dunedin, the King of France, etc., offers an empirical criterion that enables us to establish which individual, if any, satisfies the criterion at a particular state of affairs.

4 4 Bertrand Russell (1905): On denoting The contemporary discussion of the distinction between names and descriptions was triggered by Russell (1905). Russells key idea is the proposal that a sentence like (1)The F is a G is understood to have the logical form of (1) (1) x (Fx y (Fy x=y) Gx) rather than G( x Fx). Russell in 1907

5 5 On denoting – criticism elimination of Peanos descriptive operator deprived definite descriptions of their self-contained meaning the elimination of Peanos descriptive operator understood as the only, and deprived definite descriptions of their self-contained meaning. Russells translation of simple sentences like The F is a G into the molecular form There is an F and at most one thing is an F and this thing is a G is rather enigmatic (disregarding structural similarity between analysandum and analysans) no such thing as the unique F the contention is about that Russell simply got the truth conditions wrong in important cases of using descriptions when there is no such thing as the unique F.

6 6 Strawson, P. F. (1950): On referring This criticism was launched by Strawson: Russell's theory predicts the wrong truth-conditions for sentences like The King of France is baldThe King of France is bald. Russell Russell: currently False Strawsonneither true nor false, The King of France is not bald Strawson: neither true nor false, because if false then The King of France is not bald must be true, which in turn entails that there is the King of France, contra the assumption. Russell in 1950:

7 7 The King of France is bald Strawson Strawson: If there is no present King of France, then an utterance containing such an expression is somehow defective. not only entail presuppose Strawson held that sentences like these not only entail the existence of the present King of France, but also presuppose his existence. If the present King of France fails to refer, then the presupposition is false and the sentence fails to have a determinate truth value. sentences are meaningful in and of themselves (Nevertheless, for Strawson, sentences are meaningful in and of themselves, independently of the empirical facts like contingent non-existence of the King of France.)

8 8 Russell (1957) in response … the Ruler of the Universe is wise Suppose, for example, that in some country there was a law that no person could hold public office if he considered it false that the Ruler of the Universe is wise. he did not hold this proposition false I think an avowed atheist who took advantage of Mr. Strawsons doctrine to say that he did not hold this proposition false would be regarded as a somewhat shifty character. (Ludlow, 2007)

9 9 And the contention goes on … entailment versus presupposition could be settled by brisk little formal argument[s] Strawson himself in (1964) came to doubt whether the debate of entailment versus presupposition could be settled by brisk little formal argument[s]. both right (and both wrong) Donnellan (1966): there is a sense in which Strawson and Russell are both right (and both wrong) about the proper analysis of definite descriptions, because definite descriptions can be used in (at least) two different ways. On a so-called attributive use, a sentence of the form The F is a G is used to express a proposition equivalent to Whatever is uniquely F is G. Alternatively, on a referential use, a sentence of the form The F is a G is used to pick out a specific individual, a, and say of a that a is a G. Donnellan suggested that Russells quantificational account of definite descriptions might capture attributive uses, but that it does not work for referential uses.

10 10 And the contention goes on … Ludlow Ludlow in (2007): in some cases descriptions are Russellian and in other cases they are Strawsonian. entirely a matter of pragmatics Kripke (1977, in response to Donnellan): the Russellian account of definite descriptions could, by itself, account for both referential and attributive uses, and that the difference between the two cases could be entirely a matter of pragmatics, because there is an important distinction between what one literally says by an utterance and what one intends to communicate by that utterance. Russells view Neale (1990) supported Russells view Strawsons defense On the other hand, a number of linguists have recently come to Strawsons defense.

11 11 And the contention goes on … FintelWould you believe it? The King of France is Back! Fintel, Kai von (2004). Would you believe it? The King of France is Back! (Presuppositions and Truth- Value Intuitions). Here it might suffice to say that Strawsons concerns have not delivered a knock-out blow to Russells theory of descriptions, and so this topic remains very much active. Mind October 2005, vol. 114 Mind October 2005, vol. 114: A Century Later (Stephen Neale, ed.) a collection commemorating the 100th anniversary of the publication in Mind of Bertrand Russell's paper On Denoting

12 12 My proposal: the proper division of labour I am not goingKripkes pragmatic factors irrelevant to a logical semantic theory I am not going to take into account Kripkes pragmatic factors like the intentions of a speaker, for this is irrelevant to a logical semantic theory. Instead, I am going to show that: 1)definite descriptions are never Russellian 1)definite descriptions are not deprived of their self-contained meaning and they denote one and the same entity in any context. Thus they are never Russellian. definite description the F denotes a condition 2)Russell was nevertheless right in his insight that a definite description the F does not refer to a definite individual; rather, it denotes a condition to be contingently satisfied by the individual (if any) that happens to be the F. I will explicate such conditions in terms of possible-world intensions, viz. as individual roles or offices to be occupied by at most one individual per world/time pair.

13 13 My proposal: the proper division of labour 3)I am going to show that Donnellan was right that sentences of the form The F is a G are ambiguous. does not concern a shift of meaning 4)their ambiguity does not concern a shift of meaning of the definite description the F. Rather, the ambiguity concerns different topic-focus articulations of these sentences (or different suppositions in which one and the same meaning occurs: de dicto vs. de re).

14 14 My proposal: how to move beyond that dilemma; the proper division of labour Russell and Strawson spoke at cross purposes Russell and Strawson took themselves to be at loggerheads; whereas, in fact, they spoke at cross purposes. deemed incompatible The received view still tends to be that there is room for at most one of the two positions, since they are deemed incompatible. And they are, of course, incompatible – if they must explain the same set of data. they should not But they should not, in my view. One theory is excellent at explaining one set of data, but poor at explaining the data that the other theory is excellent at explaining; and vice versa. novel contribution how to move beyond that dilemma My novel contribution advances the research into definite descriptions by pointing out how progress has been hampered by a false dilemma and how to move beyond that dilemma.

15 15 topic-focus ambiguity a) Description the F may occur in the topic of a sentence and some G (the focus) is predicated about the topic: G(F). occurs with de re supposition Strawson This case corresponds to Donnellans referential use; using medieval terminology I will say that the F occurs with de re supposition. The sentence presupposes the existence of a unique F. Thus Strawsons analysis appears to be adequate for topic, i.e. de re cases.

16 16 topic-focus ambiguity b)The other option is G occurring in the topic and the F in the focus of the sentence: F(G). de dicto supposition Russelliando not presupposeonly entail This reading corresponds to Donnellans attributive use of the F and the description occurs with de dicto supposition. On this reading the truth-conditions as specified by Russellian analysis. They do not presuppose, but only entail, the existence of a unique F. Russellian analysis is not an adequate literal analysis However, Russellian analysis, though being equivalent to the one I am going to propose, is not an adequate literal analysis of de dicto readings, because it deprives the semantically meaningful constituent the F of its meaning. Neutral reading Kai von Fintel c) Neutral reading every definite description is connected with existential presupposition (Kai von Fintel)

17 17 Murali Ramachandran (2009) tackled a similar problem (but did not analyse it) Referring vs. Predicative use The tallest spy is John – referring John is the tallest spy – predicative John wants the murderer caught – predicative The murderer is wanted by John to be caught – referring

18 18 Topic – Focus articulation Semantic or pragmatic problem? I am going to demonstrate the semantic nature of the topic-focus difference by means of a logical analysis, using procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) the proposed solution of the definite description problem generalizes to any sentences differing in their topic-focus articulation. Moreover, the proposed solution of the definite description problem generalizes to any sentences differing in their topic-focus articulation. Topic presupposition Focus mere entailment

19 19 Presupposition vs. mere entailment (i) P is a presupposition of S: (S |= P) and (non-S |= P) Corollary: If non-P then neither S nor non-S is true; S has no truth-value. (ii) S entails but does not presuppose P: (S |= P) and neither (non-S |= P) nor (non-S |= non-P)

20 20 All students of Logic enrolled in TU Ostrava winter term 2010 passed the final examAll students of Logic enrolled in TU Ostrava winter term 2010 passed the final exam Scenario 1: Q.: What about the students who signed up for the Logic course, how did they do? A.: Oh well, they all passed the final exam. presuppositionThere are some students enrolled in the Logic course in winter semester presupposition: There are some students enrolled in the Logic course in winter semester; if not (for instance, because the course runs in summer term), then no truth-value. Some students who signed up for the Logic course did not pass the final exam For, the negated sentence cannot be true as well: Some students who signed up for the Logic course did not pass the final exam. mere entailment: The final exam has taken place. Because, the sentence can be false for two reasons: Either some of the students did not succeed, or none of the students succeeded because the exam has yet to take place.

21 21 All students of Logic enrolled in TU Ostrava winter term 2010 passed the final examAll students of Logic enrolled in TU Ostrava winter term 2010 passed the final exam Scenario 2: Q.: What about the final exam in Logic, what are the results? A.: Oh well, all students passed. presuppositionThe final exam have already taken place The final exam has not been passed by all students presupposition: The final exam have already taken place; if it has not then no truth-value, because the negated sentence cannot be true as well:The final exam has not been passed by all students mere entailment: Some students signed up for the course …

22 22 All students of Logic enrolled in TU Ostrava winter term 2010 passed the final examAll students of Logic enrolled in TU Ostrava winter term 2010 passed the final exam First-order logic; FOL regimentation: (SL – students of logic …; SFT – success in final test): x [SL(x) SFT(x)] But, every interpretation assigning an empty set to SL is a model ! No way to respect the truth-conditions concerning presuppositions in FOL The need for a richer framework TIL

23 23 TIL in brief Hyperintensional, typed, partial -calculus Infinite ramified hierarchy of types Construction Basic notion: Construction procedure abstract, algorithmically structured procedure C constituents, that consists of one or more particular steps, or constituents, that are to be individually executed in order to execute C. procedure procedure producing lower-order objects that can be Lower-order procedures, mappings, functional values

24 24 TIL semantic schema Expression expresses Procedure (sense) denotes produces Denotation (if any)

25 25 TIL Ontology (types of order 1) Types of order 1 (non-structured objects) Basic (atomic) entities Basic (atomic) entities truth-values {T, F} ( ) universe of discourse {individuals} ( ) times or real numbers ( ) possible worlds ( ) Functional (molecular) entities: Functional (molecular) entities: ( 1 … n )

26 26 Constructions Variables x, y, p, w, t, … v-construct Trivialization 0 C constructs C (of any type) 0 Prime Prime/( ), 0 Student Student/( ) Closure [ x 1 …x n X] ( 1 … n ) 1 n Composition [F X 1 … X n ] ( 1 … n ) 1 n Execution 1 X, Double Execution 2 X

27 27 TIL Ontology (higher-order types) Constructions of order 1 Constructions of order 1 ( 1 ) o construct entities belonging to a type of order 1 type of order 2 o / belong to 1 : type of order 2 Constructions of order 2 Constructions of order 2 ( 2 ) o construct entities belonging to a type of order 2 or 1 type of order 3 o / belong to 2 : type of order 3 Constructions of order n Constructions of order n ( n ) o construct entities belonging to a type of order n 1 type of order n + 1 o / belong to n : type of order n + 1 Functional (molecular) entities: Functional (molecular) entities: ( 1 … n ) / belong to n (n: the highest of the types to which, 1, …, n belong) And so on, ad infinitum

28 28 (i) hyperintensional contextsconstruction mentioned (i) hyperintensional contexts construction is not used to present an object, but is itself mentioned as functional argument (though a hyperintension of one order higher needs to be used to mention this lower-order construction); (ii) intensional contextsused function (ii) intensional contexts construction is used to present a function without presenting a particular value of the function; moreover, the construction does not occur within another hyperintensional context; (iii) extensional contextsused value (iii) extensional contexts construction is used to produce a particular value of the function at a given argument; moreover, the hyperintension does not occur within another intensional or hyperintensional context.

29 29 Construction context-invariant meaning Hyperintensional context Hyperintensional context construction (function-in-intension) is an object of predication (a functional argument) Tom is solving the equation sin x = 0. existuje něco, co řeší Sin w t [ 0 Solve wt 0 Tom 0 [[ 0 Sin x] = 0 0]]] w t c … Intensional context Intensional context function-in-extension is an object of predication Sine is a periodic function Sinf [ 0 Periodic 0 Sin] f [ 0 Periodic f] Extensional context Extensional context Functional value is an object of predication sin = 0 SinSin [[ 0 Sin 0 ] = 0 0] x [[ 0 Sin x] = 0 0] Types: Periodic/( ( )); Sin/( ); Solve/( ( 1 )) ; / ; Tom/ ; c n ; f ( ); x.

30 30 Partiality properly partial functions TIL involves properly partial functions undefined for some or all of their arguments, and improper constructions improper constructions, which fail to produce a product. Improperness basically arises from the procedure of applying a properly partial function f to an argument a, such that f returns no value at a. The procedure of functional application induces an extensional context. The procedure of functional application induces an extensional context.

31 31 Improperness (non-existence) Compositionextensional context stems from Composition used in an extensional context: F has no-value at a if F has no-value at a (value gap) then [ 0 F 0 a] is improper partiality is strictly propagated up: and so is any C occurring extensionally and containing [ 0 F 0 a] as a constituent; partiality is strictly propagated up: [… [ … [ 0 F 0 a] …] …] is improper hyper/intensional until the context is raised up to hyper/intensional intensional: intensional: x… [… [ … [ 0 F 0 a] …] …] is proper hyperintensional: hyperintensional: 0 [… [ … [ 0 F 0 a] …] …] is proper

32 32 All students signed up for Logic passed the final examAll students signed up for Logic passed the final exam The sense (scenario 1): If there are some students signed up for Logic than T or F according as all of them passed the exam, else Fail (to produce a truth-value) TIL analysis (schematic): w t If [ 0 [ 0 Students_signed wt 0 Logic] w t If [ 0 [ 0 Students_signed wt 0 Logic] than [[ 0 All [ 0 Students_signed wt 0 Logic]] 0 Passed_exam wt ] than [[ 0 All [ 0 Students_signed wt 0 Logic]] 0 Passed_exam wt ] else Fail else Fail

33 33 All students enrolled in Logic passed the final examAll students enrolled in Logic passed the final exam Types. /( the existential quantifier (applied to a set returns T if the set is non-empty, otherwise F); All/( restricted quantifier (applied to a set M returns the set of all supersets of M); Students_for/( empirical function that dependently on states of affairs (world and time ) assigns to an individual a set of individuals (who are signed for); Logic/ ; (for the sake of simplicity – individual) Passed_exam/ property of individuals

34 34 The King of France … Strawsonian The King of France Strawsonian reading:The King of France is bald Russellian bald baldies Russellian reading: The King of France is bald Among the baldies there is the King of France you would most probably protest, This cannot be true, for there is no King of France now. the sentence is about baldness (topic) focus On such a reading the sentence is about baldness (topic), claiming that this property is instantiated by the King of France (focus).

35 35 The King of France … Strawsonian (S) w t [ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ] The King of France is/is not bald The King of France exists de re Existential presupposition de re The King of France is bald The King of France is Louis XVI Louis XVI is bald de re Substitution of co-referring terms (de re)

36 36 The King of France … Strawsonian Proofs: a) Existential presupposition 1)[ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ] assumption 2) [ 0 Improper wt 0 [[ w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France]] wt ]] by definition of Composition 3) [ 0 Empty x [x = [ w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France]] wt ]] obvious from (2) 4)[ 0 x [x = [ w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France]] wt ]]existential generalization 5)[ 0 Exist wt [ w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France]]]by def. of Exist. The proof from [ 0 Watch wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ] is analogous. b) Substitution of v-congruent meanings (co-referring) 1)[ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ] assumption 2)[ 0 Louis = w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ]assumption 3)[ 0 Bald wt 0 Louis]substitution of identicals

37 37 The King of France … Russellian bald The King of France is bald True, if among the boldies there is the King of France False, if among those who are bald there is no King of France (either because the present King of France does not exist or because the King of France is not bald). (R)ussell: There is a unique individual such that he is the King of France and he is bald. co-entailing yet not equivalent Russellian and Strawsonian analyses are co-entailing yet not equivalent; they differ in those states-of-affairs where the office is vacant: (R) is False while (S) has no truth-value

38 38 Russellian vs. Strawsonian (R) |= (S) and (S) |= (R) but the two readings are not equivalent Propositions are properly partial functions: T F (Strawson) truth-value gap (Russell) F F (Strawson) truth-value gap (Russell) F

39 39 The King of France … Russellian (R)ussell: There is a unique individual such that he is the King of France and he is bald. TIL (R1): w t [ 0 x [x = [ w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ] [ 0 Bald wt x]]]. Does not deprive the King of France of its meaning: context-invariant meaning w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] the context-invariant meaning w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] Yet I am not content with TIL (R1). Russells analysis has another defect: it does not comply with Carnaps principle of subject matter (only those entities that receive mention in the sentence can become constituents of its meaning).

40 40 Russell argued for his theory in (1905, p. 3): The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possible theories which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an object. Thus the present King of France, the round square, etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.

41 41 We have such a theory at hand TILhyperintensional, typed, partial TIL, as a hyperintensional, typed, partial -calculus, is in a much better position to solve the problem. The difference consists in the way negated form is obtained. Strawsonian Strawsonian: The King of France is not bald lacks a truth-value in those w, t -pairs where the office is vacant Russellian Russellian: It is not true that the King of France is bald true in those w, t -pairs where the office is vacant

42 42 Negation Strawsonian Strawsonian: The property of not being bald in a is ascribed to an individual (whoever, … if any) Russellian Russellian: The property of not being true in a is ascribed to the entire proposition P true in those w, t -pairs were the office goes vacant. [ 0 Undef wt P] = [[ 0 True wt P] [ 0 False wt P]] [ 0 True wt P] = [[ 0 False wt P] [ 0 Undef wt P]] [ 0 False wt P] = [[ 0 True wt P] [ 0 Undef wt P]]

43 43 The King of France …Russellian (R*) w t [ 0 True wt w t [ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ]] w t [ 0 True wt w t [ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ]] neither (R*) nor its negation (R*_neg) w t [ 0 True wt w t [ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ]] w t [ 0 True wt w t [ 0 Bald wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ]] entails that the King of France exists, which is just as it should be.

44 44 Some more examples (topic-focus) The King of FranceThe King of France visited London yesterday Presupposes that the King of France exists now (at t) w t [ x t[[[ 0 Yesterday t] t] [ 0 Visit wt x 0 London]] w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt ] LondonLondon was visited by the King of France yesterday Merely entails that the King of France existed yesterday (at some t belonging to yesterday) w t t[[[ 0 Yesterday t] t] [ 0 Visit wt w t [ 0 King_of wt 0 France] wt 0 London]]

45 45 Some more examples (topic-focus) global financial and economic crisis (A) The global financial and economic crisis was caused by the Bank of America Presupposes that there be a global financial and economic crisis Merely entails that the Bank of America exists w t [if 0 Crisis wt then [ 0 True wt w t [ 0 Cause wt 0 Bank_of_America wt 0 Crisis]] else Fail] Bank of America (B) The Bank of America caused the global financial and economic crisis Presupposes that the Bank of America exists Merely entails that there is a global financial and economic crisis w t [if [ 0 Exist wt 0 Bank_of_America] then [ 0 True wt w t [ 0 Cause wt 0 Bank_of_America wt 0 Crisis]] else Fail]

46 46 If P then C else D [[P C] [ P D]] is not an adequate analysis, because both C and D are executed; if one of them fails, the whole Composition fails. If-then-else: a non-strict function, not complying with the principle of Compositionality? No cogent reason for non-strictness! We need a lazy evaluation.

47 47 If P then C else D: a two-phase instruction 1.Make a choice between C and D based on P: [ 0 The_only c [[P [c = 0 C]] [ P [c = 0 D]]]] 2.Execute the chosen construction c 2 [ 0 The_only c [[P [c = 0 C]] [ P [c = 0 D]]]] The_only is a singulariser function ({ n } n ) that returns the only construction, the member of a singleton; otherwise undefined c n : a variable ranging over procedures; 0 C, 0 D: procedures C, D are objects to operate on; Hyperintensional logic is needed to deal with procedures, not only with their products.

48 48 General analytic schema If Presupposition P then C else Fail If Presupposition P then C else Fail (to produce a truth-value) 2 [ 0 The_only c [P [c = 0 C]]] TIL-Script (computational variant of TIL); TIL-Script (computational variant of TIL); functional programming language -rule by value applicable to properly partial functions The inference machine is based on the generalized -rule by value applicable to properly partial functions

49 49 Concluding remarks Logical analysis cannot disambiguate any sentence, because it presupposes full linguistic competence. Yet, our fine-grained method can contribute to a language disambiguation by making these hidden features explicit and logically tractable. In case there are more senses of a sentence we furnish the sentence with different TIL constructions. Having a formal fine-grained encoding of a sense, we can then automatically infer the relevant consequences.

50 50 The moral to be drawn … The Babel tower God multiplied languages But even within one language we often do not understand each other due to ambiguities a lot of misunderstanding, confusion, … Holy Spirit gave us wisdom, tolerance, the ability to listen to each other … in Bible there are many such ambiguities and we cannot read it literally, we should read it carefully, taking into account historical situation

51 51 References: Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic; Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic. Duží, M., Jespersen, B., Materna, P.: Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic; Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic. Springer TIL as the Logic of Communication in a Multi- Agent System Duží, M. (2008): TIL as the Logic of Communication in a Multi- Agent System. In Research in Computing Science, vol. 33, pp Topic-Focus Articulation from the Semantic Point of View Duží, M. (2009): Topic-Focus Articulation from the Semantic Point of View, in CICLing Ed. Gelbukh Alexander, Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag LNCS, vol. 5449, pp : Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy Tichý, P. (2004): Collected Papers in Logic and Philosophy, V. Svoboda, B. Jespersen, C.Cheyne (eds.), Prague: Filosofia, Czech Academy of Sciences, and Dunedin: University of Otago Press.

52 52 If questions then answers else Fail Thank you for your attention


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