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US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 1 Understanding Insurgencies.

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Presentation on theme: "US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 1 Understanding Insurgencies."— Presentation transcript:

1 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 1 Understanding Insurgencies

2 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 2 If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. - Sun Tzu

3 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Knowing the Enemy 3 Kitchen Play Room Not Where is the enemy? Or even How are they organized? But Where am I? And Why is the enemy there?

4 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Underlying Causes Can be real or perceived – Base on actual societal contradictions – Based on misinformation Multiple causes – Deep-seated, strategic – Temporary, local 4 “…any successful COIN operation must address the legitimate grievances insurgents use to generate popular support.” FM 3-24, Ch. 1, p. 10

5 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 5 Insurgent Approaches Five main approaches – Conspiratorial – Protracted popular war – Military-focused – Urban – Identity-focused Insurgents may: – Change approaches based on circumstances – Use different approaches at the same time FM 3-24, Chapter 1

6 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 6 Conspiratorial Approach “A conspiratorial approach involves a few leaders and a militant cadre or activist party seizing control of government structures or exploiting a revolutionary situation.” FM 3-24, Ch.1, p. 5 Small group of insurgents control the government. Government institutions remain intact. The population acquiesces in insurgent control. Ex: Russian Revolution (1917)

7 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 7 Protracted Popular War “Protracted conflicts favor insurgents, and no approach makes better use of that asymmetry than the protracted popular war.” FM 3-24, Ch.1, p. 6 Insurgents wear down government (Three Phases). Government slowly becomes weaker over time. The population gives support to insurgents. Ex: Chinese Communists (Mao)

8 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 8 Military-focused Approach “Users of military- focused approaches aim to create revolutionary possibilities or seize power primarily by applying military force.” FM 3-24, Ch.1, p. 5 Attack Insurgents primarily use military force. Government falls (e.g., by revolution or overthrow). The population accepts insurgent control. Ex: US Civil War

9 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 9 Urban Approach “This approach uses terrorist tactics in urban areas…” FM 3-24, Ch.1, p. 6 Attack Insurgents use terrorism against population. The government loses credibility and legitimacy. The population is alienated from the government. Ex: Irish Republican Army

10 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 10 Identity-focused Approach “mobilizes support based on… common identity” FM 3-24, Ch.1, p. 8 Insurgents often lack political/ military hierarchy. The government loses support by identity group. Population support as communities. Ex: Kosovo Albanians

11 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 11 Dynamics of an Insurgency Leadership Objectives Ideology and narrative Environment and geography External support and sanctuaries Phasing and timing “These make up a framework that can be used to assess the insurgency’s strengths and weaknesses.” FM 3-24, Ch. 1, pp. 13

12 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Leadership Leadership provides: – Vision – Direction – Guidance – Coordination – Organizational coherence 12 “An insurgency is not random violence; it is directed and focused violence aimed at achieving a political objective.” FM 3-24, Ch. 1, p. 13

13 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Leadership: George Washington “Posterity will talk of Washington as the founder of a great empire, when my name shall be lost in the vortex of revolution.” Napoleon Bonaparte “Washington's is the mightiest name on earth… On that name no eulogy is expected. It cannot be. To add brightness to the sun, or glory to the name of Washington, is alike impossible. Let none attempt it. In solemn awe pronounce the name, and in its naked deathless splendor leave it shining on.” Abraham Lincoln

14 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 14 Common Organizational Structure Leadership (Command and Staff) Guerrilla Forces (Combat Arms) Auxiliaries (Combat Support) Population

15 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Objectives Strategic: desired end state Operational: destroy government legitimacy, progressively establish desired end state Tactical: immediate aims of insurgent acts – Physical – Psychological 15

16 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Ideology and Narrative 16 “[A] movement’s ideology explains its followers’ difficulties and provides a means to remedy those ills.” FM 3-24, Ch. 1, p. 14 Ideas motivate insurgent activities. Ideology is a recruiting tool. Narratives convey an ideology in story form.

17 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 17 Environment and Geography Physical environment – Terrain and climate – Infrastructure Human environment – Demography – Socioeconomic conditions – Political culture – Political system

18 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 18 External Support and Sanctuaries Often crucial to insurgent success Can take many forms: moral, material, political, sanctuary Source: RAND Terrorism Data Insurgent……win…loss External Support2420 No External Support 28 Of 73 insurgencies, 1945–2006…

19 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Phasing and Timing Strategic Defensive (Phase I) – Correlation of forces: favors government – Insurgent focus: building support Strategic Stalemate (Phase II) – Correlation of forces: approaches equilibrium – Insurgent focus: guerrilla activity Strategic Counteroffensive (Phase III) – Correlation of forces: favor insurgent – Insurgent focus: conventional operations 19

20 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 Dynamics of an Insurgency 1.Leadership: Provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organization 2.Ideology: The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal 3.Objectives: Strategic - Insurgent’s desired end state Operational - Initiatives designed to reduce the government’s legitimacy and support achievement of the desired end state Tactical - Immediate aims of insurgent acts 4.Environment and geography: Also, includes cultural, religion, tribal affiliation, and other demographic factors. Terrain to include factors in an urban and built-up area. 5.External support: These include (Moral, Political, Resources, Sanctuary) 6.Phasing and timing: Passing forward and backward into different phases of an insurgency depending on situation. Guerilla Leadership

21 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 21 Questions?

22 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 22 Many western nations stress tangible military factors: Arms, logistics, and manpower… …Versus… …Insurgents who focus on the intangible such as Space, Time, and Will Insurgents trade Space for Time; trade Time for Will Insurgent’s Perspective

23 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 23 Space Will Time Trade Space for Time (Military Challenge) Trade Time for Will (Political Challenge) Military salvation stems from political conversion (Note: conversion takes time) Control of people (Will) is more important than control of land (Space)

24 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 24 Popular Support Different types of support – Active – Passive – Support of intellectuals Not all insurgent approaches require popular support – More important in protracted popular war US counterinsurgent approach DOES require popular support – Building HN government legitimacy is key – Message-driven operations

25 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 25 Organization and Unity Leadership – Leaders important to insurgent viability? Operational structure – Reliable logistics – Military capability Cohesion – Operations security – Unity of command – Strategic narrative

26 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 26 Government Response Does the counterinsurgent correctly understand: – the insurgent’s approach? – what drives insurgent success? – insurgent strengths and weaknesses? “Of all the variables that have a bearing on the progress and outcome of insurgencies, none is more important than government response” (O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 155). Environment Organization and cohesion Popular support External support

27 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 27 Insurgent Strengths Intelligence Indigenous characteristics Knowledge Motivation and discipline Limited responsibilities Tactical flexibility Physical condition Source: FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations

28 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 28 Insurgent Weaknesses Limited personnel and resources Individual factors Operational factors Source: FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations

29 US Army Combined Arms Center UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 13 JAN 09 29 Thinking Like An Insurgent How can understanding an insurgency impact your mission?


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