Presentation on theme: "Audit Trail and Node Authentication / Consistent Time Robert Horn Agfa Healthcare."— Presentation transcript:
Audit Trail and Node Authentication / Consistent Time Robert Horn Agfa Healthcare
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop2 W W W. I H E. N E T Providers and Vendors Working Together to Deliver Interoperable Health Information Systems In the Enterprise and Across Care Settings
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop3 IT Infrastructure Profiles 2004 Patient Identifier Cross-referencing for MPI (PIX) Retrieve Information for Display (RID) Consistent Time (CT) Patient Synchronized Applications (PSA) Enterprise User Authentication (EUA) 2005 Patient Demographic Query (PDQ) Cross Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) Audit Trail and Note Authentication (ATNA) Personnel White Pages (PWP) 2006 Cross-Enterprise User Authentication (XUA) Document Digital Signature (DSG) – Notification of Document Availability (NAV) Patient Administration/Management (PAM) Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) – Centralized privacy audit trail and node to node authentication to create a secured domain Consistent Time (CT) – Coordinate time across network systems
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop4 IHE and PHI Protection User Identity PWP, EUA User Authentication EUA, XUA Node Authentication ATNA Security Audit Trails ATNA Data Integrity Controls CT, ATNA TLS option Data Confidentiality ATNA TLS option Access Controls Future item in IHE roadmap
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop5 Audit Trail and Node Authentication (ATNA) Abstract / Scope Defines basic security features for an individual system for use as part of the security and privacy environment for a healthcare enterprise. Extends the IHE radiology oriented Basic Security profile (defined in 2002) to be applicable to other healthcare uses. Provides host level authentication, which is used in conjunction with the user authentication from EUA and XUA.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop6 ATNA Value Proposition Protect Patient Privacy and System Security: –Meet ethical and regulatory requirements Enterprise Administrative Convenience: –Unified and uniform auditing system –Common approach from multiple vendors simplifies definition of enterprise policies and protocols. –Common approach simplifies administration Development and support cost reduction through Code Re-use: –Allows vendors to leverage single development effort to support multiple actors –Allows a single development effort to support the needs of different security policies and regulatory environments.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop7 ATNA Security Requirements Reasons: Clinical Use and Privacy –authorized persons must have access to medical data of patients, and the information must not be disclosed otherwise. –Unauthorized persons should not be able to interfere with operations or modify data By means of procedures and security mechanisms, guarantee: –Confidentiality –Integrity –Availability –Authenticity
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop8 ATNA Security Measures Authentication:Authentication: Establish the user and/or system identity, answers question: Who are you? ATNA defines: How to authenticate network connections. ATNA Supports: Authentication mechanisms, e.g. Enterprise User Authentication (EUA) or Cross Enterprise User Authentication (XUA).. Authorization and Access control:Authorization and Access control: Establish users ability to perform an action, e.g. access to data, answers question: Now that I know who you are, what can you do? ATNA defines: How to authorize network connections. ATNA requires: System internal mechanisms for both local and network access.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop9 ATNA Security Measures Accountability and Audit trail:Accountability and Audit trail: Establish historical record of users or system actions over period of time, answers question:What have you done? ATNA Defines: Audit message format and transport protocol
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop10 ATNA IHE Goal IHE makes cross-node security management easy: –Only a simple manual certificate installation is needed, although more sophisticated systems can be used –Separate the authentication, authorization, and accountability functions to accommodate the needs of different approaches. –Enforcement driven by a posteriori audits and real- time visibility.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop11 ATNA Integrating Trusted Nodes System A System B Secured System Secure network Strong authentication of remote node (digital certificates) network traffic encryption is not required, it is optional Secured System Local access control (authentication of user) Audit trail with: Real-time access Time synchronization Central Audit Trail Repository
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop12 ATNA Suitable Network Environments Physically secured networks Explicit physical security preventing access by other nodes, or VPN and VLAN technologies that provide equivalent network isolation. Protected networks Physical security that prevents modification or installation of unauthorized equipment The network is shared with other authorized nodes within the enterprise that should not have unrestricted access to patient information. Unprotected networks Not generally supported, although nodes with sufficient node level security and using encryption may be safe.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop13 ATNA Node Security ATNA specifies some of the capabilities that are needed, e.g. access control. ATNA does not specify policies ATNA does not specify mechanisms, although other IHE protocols like EUA are obvious candidates. This permits vendors and enterprises to select technologies and policies that are appropriate to their own purposes without conflicting with the ATNA profile.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop14 ATNA Node Authentication X.509 certificates for node identity and keys TCP/IP Transport Layer Security Protocol (TLS) for node authentication, and optional encryption Secure handshake protocol of both parties during Association establishment: –Identify encryption protocol –Exchange session keys Actor must be able to configure certificate list of authorized nodes. ATNA presently specifies mechanisms for HTTP, DICOM, and HL7
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop15 Many systems are shared access, e.g. CT systems, where the machine identity is more important than the operators identity for security purposes. A CT operator is only permitted to update CT records from a CT system. Some systems operate autonomously, e.g. PACS archive. Knowing identity of the PACS administrator on duty is not useful when monitoring PACS activity. There might be nobody logged in. Machine access is usually controlled by the site administration. Even authorized users are not permitted to use personal machines. Why node authentication?
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop16 ATNA Auditing System Designed for surveillance rather than forensic use. Two audit message formats –IHE Radiology interim format, for backward compatibility with radiology –IETF/DICOM/HL7/ASTM format, for future growth DICOM Supplement 95 IETF Draft for Common Audit Message ASTM E.214 HL7 Audit Informative documents Both formats are XML encoded messages, permitting extensions using XML standard extension mechanisms.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop17 ATNA Auditable Events Actor-start-stop The starting or stopping of any application or actor. Audit-log-used Reading or modification of any stored audit log Begin-storing-instances The storage of any persistent object, e.g. DICOM instances, is begun Health-service-event Other health service related auditable event. Images-availability-query The query for instances of persistent objects. Instances-deleted The deletion of persistent objects. Instances-stored The storage of persistent objects is completed.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop18 ATNA Auditable Events Medication Medication is prescribed, delivered, etc. Mobile-machine-event Mobile equipment is relocated, leaves the network, rejoins the network Node-authentication- failure An unauthorized or improperly authenticated node attempts communication Order-record-event An order is created, modified, completed. Patient-care-assignment Patient care assignments are created, modified, deleted. Patient-care-episode Auditable patient care episode event that is not specified elsewhere. Patient-record-event Patient care records are created, modified, deleted.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop19 ATNA Auditable Events PHI-export Patient information is exported outside the enterprise, either on media or electronically PHI-import Patient information is imported into the enterprise, either on media or electronically Procedure-record-event The patient record is created, modified, or deleted. Query-information Any auditable query not otherwise specified. Security-administration Security alerts, configuration changes, etc. Study-object-event A study is created, modified, or deleted. Study-used A study is viewed, read, or similarly used.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop20 ATNA Record Audit Event Reliable Syslog (RFC 3195) is the preferred transport for Audit Records, although BSD Syslog protocol (RFC 3164) is permitted for backward compatibility with Radiology Basic Security. Audit trail events and content based on IETF, DICOM, HL7, and ASTM standards. Also, Radiology Basic Security audit event format is allowed for backward compatibility.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop21 What it takes to be a secure node The entire host must be secured, not just individual actors. The entire host must have appropriate user access controls for identification, authentication, and authorization. All communications that convey protected information must be authenticated and protected from interception. This means every protocol, not just the IHE transactions. All health information activities should generate audit trails, not just the IHE actors.
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop22 What it takes to be a secure node The Secure node is not a simple add-on of an auditing capability. The complete work effort includes: Instrumenting all applications to detect auditable events and generate audit messages. Ensuring that all communications connections are protected. Establishing a local security mechanism to protect all local resources. Establishing configuration mechanisms for: –Time synchronization using Consistent Time (CT) profile –Certificate management –Network configuration Implement the audit logging facility
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop23 Consistent Time (CT) Network Time Protocol ( NTP) version 3 (RFC 1305) for time synchronization Actor must support manual configuration Required accuracy: 1 second Optionally Secure NTP may be used Required for use of ATNA, EUA, XUA
June 28-29, 2005Interoperability Strategy Workshop24 More information…. IHE Web sites: Technical Frameworks, Supplements ITI V1.0, RAD V5.5, LAB V1.0 Non-Technical Brochures : Calls for Participation IHE Fact Sheet and FAQ IHE Integration Profiles: Guidelines for Buyers IHE Connect-a-thon Results Vendor Products Integration Statements