1. PSYC415 Early Cognitive Development: Theory of Mind Dr Jason Low School of Psychology Victoria University of Wellington

2. What is theory of mind (ToM)? The most liveliest area of research The most liveliest area of research Wellman et al. (2001): in 1998, around 178 studies on ToM (more and more every year) Wellman et al. (2001): in 1998, around 178 studies on ToM (more and more every year) How did it get started? How did it get started? Piaget: children begin development by being egocentric (e.g., visual perspective) (why was Piaget’s theoretical perspective abandoned?) Piaget: children begin development by being egocentric (e.g., visual perspective) (why was Piaget’s theoretical perspective abandoned?)

3. How did ToM research start? Premack and Woodruff (1978) in Behavioural and Brain Sciences – do chimps have a theory of mind? Premack and Woodruff (1978) in Behavioural and Brain Sciences – do chimps have a theory of mind? How do we test for ToM? How do we test for ToM? Unexpected Transfer Task first suggested by Bennett (1978), Dennett (1978) & Harman (1978) Unexpected Transfer Task first suggested by Bennett (1978), Dennett (1978) & Harman (1978)

4. FB Tasks Wimmer & Perner (1983): used unexpected transfer situation to test false belief understanding in young children Wimmer & Perner (1983): used unexpected transfer situation to test false belief understanding in young children Other tests of false beliefs were soon followed: unexpected contents (which also tests for representational change); appearance-reality Other tests of false beliefs were soon followed: unexpected contents (which also tests for representational change); appearance-reality

5. Theories and antecedents Theory theory account (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) Theory theory account (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) (an informal everyday framework that changes in steps from desire based to desire-belief based to adult-belief) (an informal everyday framework that changes in steps from desire based to desire-belief based to adult-belief) Harris (1992) – simulation theory (children compute mental states through role taking) (think of simulation like empathy) (what develops is accuracy of simulations) Harris (1992) – simulation theory (children compute mental states through role taking) (think of simulation like empathy) (what develops is accuracy of simulations) Modularity account (Leslie, 1994) – development in terms of neurological maturation of successive domain specific and modular mechanisms Modularity account (Leslie, 1994) – development in terms of neurological maturation of successive domain specific and modular mechanisms

6. Modular perspective IDEDD SAM ToMM Represents behaviour in terms of goals & wants on the basis of certain cues (e.g., self- propulsion); Outputs dyadic information (e.g., Jason wants the broccoli) Detect the presence of eye- like stimuli (visual modality); Represents eye direction as = ‘Agent sees X’; Outputs dyadic information (e.g., Jason sees the broccoli / David sees the broccoli) Represents if self and other are attending to same thing; Outputs triadic information (e.g., David sees Jason sees the broccoli); Note that ID is linked to EDD; allows eye direction to be read as rationalistic Interprets behaviour in mentalistic ways Outputs M-representations (Agent-Attitude-Proposition) (David believes that Jason sees/wants the broccoli)

7. More on other theories and antecedents Executive function perspective(s) – domain general processing factors such as attention regulation, building and consolidation of statistical regularities; inhibition, rule formulation allow children to acquire ToM Executive function perspective(s) – domain general processing factors such as attention regulation, building and consolidation of statistical regularities; inhibition, rule formulation allow children to acquire ToM Language Language Adult-child conversations make salient ToM; Adult-child conversations make salient ToM; Language as a vehicle for thought Language as a vehicle for thought Syntax - aacquisition of the underlying syntactic structure of complement clauses with verbs of communication and mental state ( “ say ”, “ tell ”, “ believe ” ) enable the representation of false beliefs Syntax - aacquisition of the underlying syntactic structure of complement clauses with verbs of communication and mental state ( “ say ”, “ tell ”, “ believe ” ) enable the representation of false beliefs [e.g., Jason said there was an insect in David ’ s hair. vs. [e.g., Jason said there was an insect in David ’ s hair. vs. Jason saw an insect in David ’ s hair and then went to his Jason saw an insect in David ’ s hair and then went to his PSYC415 class. ] PSYC415 class. ] Can thought be fugitive from language? Can thought be fugitive from language?

8. Steps to a meta-representational understanding of mind Precursors to ToM: shared attention, directed eye gaze, monitoring intent of others (approx. 9mths to 2½ years) Understanding desires, simple emotions, pretence as acting as if (approx. 2½ to 3½ years) Understanding link between seeing & knowing, implicit understanding of false belief (approx. 3½ to 4 years Explicit understanding of the representation nature of beliefs (e.g., false-belief) and pretence (approx. 4 to 5 years;

9. Where are differences and similarities in ToM development located? Intra-species (neurotypical development and autism) Intra-species (neurotypical development and autism) Inter-species (primates and birds) Inter-species (primates and birds) What do these differences and similarities teach us about: What do these differences and similarities teach us about: (1) whether ToM is modular or domain general; (1) whether ToM is modular or domain general; (2) extent of ToM development being continuous and/or discontinuous (2) extent of ToM development being continuous and/or discontinuous (3) the evolutionary roots of ToM and in what ways might interspecies context (e.g., cooperation vs competition; food vs. abstract reward) support ToM-like display?; (3) the evolutionary roots of ToM and in what ways might interspecies context (e.g., cooperation vs competition; food vs. abstract reward) support ToM-like display?; (4) whether language is necessary and sufficient (or necessary but insufficient) for higher-order rational thought? (4) whether language is necessary and sufficient (or necessary but insufficient) for higher-order rational thought?