1. 1 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Secure Routing and Intrusion Detection in Ad Hoc Networks Supervisor: Mr.zaker Translator: fariba alamshahi

2. 2 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Outline Introduction Ad hoc networks Secure Routing Protocols Attacks SecAodv Intrusion Detection Conclusion

3. 3 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Introduction Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of mobile devices. Corporations and government agencies alike are increasingly using embedded and wireless technologies, and working towards mobilizing their workforce Ad hoc networks, as the name suggests, have no supporting infrastructure

4. 4 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Ad hoc networks Ad hoc networks are comprised of a dynamic set of cooperating peers, which share their wireless capabilities with other similar devices to enable communication with devices not in direct radio-range of each other, effectively relaying messages on behalf of others

5. 5 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Secure Routing Protocols a majority of the proposed routing protocols assume non-hostile environments

6. 6 / 18 Fariba alamshahi SecAodv SecAodv is a highly adaptive distributed algorithm designed for MANETs that does not require: prior trust relations between pairs of nodes time synchronization between nodesprior shared keys or any other form of secure association

7. 7 / 18 Fariba alamshahi The SecAodv implements two concepts which are: Secure binding between IPv6 addresses and the RSA key generated by the nodes themselves Signed evidence produced by the originator of the message and signature verification by the destination

8. 8 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Working of SecAODV S D D S

9. 9 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Although encryption and signed headers are intrusion prevention measures, vulnerabilities remain nonetheless. An IDS further strengthens the defense of a MANET Troubleshooting

10. 10 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Security objectives in Ad Hoc Networks Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authentication non-repudiation

11. 11 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Classification of attacks Types of attacks External attacks Internal attacks Types of attacks Active attacks Passive attacks Types of attacks Routing change Attack sources

12. 12 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Attack using the Modification Hostile node can falsify header content packages related to the routing of network traffic to each other that wants to divert Change the number of hop Change the value of the hop counter

13. 13 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Intrusion Detection In an ad hoc network, malicious nodes may enter and leave the immediate radio transmission range at random intervals A MANET is most likely not under a single administrative domain, making it difficult to perform any kind of centralized management or control

14. 14 / 18 Fariba alamshahi IDS (Intrusion Detection System) categorize host-based IDSs based on anomaly detection and misuse detection Each node monitors particular traffic activity within its radio-range

15. 15 / 18 Fariba alamshahi IDS An audit log of all locally detected intrusions is maintained as evidence of misbehavior A node can thus monitor most of the packet traffic of its neighbors in promiscuous mode, while they are in radio-range

16. 16 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Scalability issues It may be possible in certain situations to have a list of suspects that can be watched instead of all the nodes in the neighborhood. Another possibility is to monitor a random choice of neighbor nodes

17. 17 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Conclusion In this paper we briefly described the inherent vulnerabilities of mobile devices in MANETs and several attacks possible on such devices The IDS is routing protocol independent, though in this case we have used SecAODV for routing

18. 18 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Refrence 1) T. Aura. Internet Draft: Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA). http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04mar/I-D/draftietf send-cga-05.txt, February 2004 http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/04mar/I-D/draftietf 2) R. Hinden and S. Deering. RFC 3513: Internet Protocol Version6 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture, April 2003. 3) Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson. Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols. In Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Wireless security, pages 30–40. ACM Press, 2003. 4) R. Bobba, L. Eschenauer, V. Gligor, and W. Arbaugh. Bootstrapping Security Associations for Routing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, May 2002. 5) B. Lu and U. Pooch. Cooperative security-enforcement routing in mobile ad hoc networks. In Mobile and Wireless Communications Network, 2002. 4th International Workshop on, Vol., Iss., pages 157–161, 2002. 6) P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas. Secure Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In Communication Networks and Distributed Systems Modeling and Simulation Conference, pages 27–31, January 2002

19. 19 / 18 Fariba alamshahi Thank you for your attention ؟