Presentation on theme: "1 A trial of IP Traceback System in Interop Tokyo 2008 Hiroaki Hazeyama Nara Institute of Science and Tech."— Presentation transcript:
1 A trial of IP Traceback System in Interop Tokyo 2008 Hiroaki Hazeyama Nara Institute of Science and Tech.
2 What is IP Traceback ? Technique to track the true forwarding path of a packet –By querying packet capture agents –Even when the source IP address of the target packet is spoofed IP Packet Traceback is expected to track attack packets –DDoS attack, UDP exploit, spoofed DNS queries : traceback : attack packet
3 IP traceback R&D Project IP traceback R&D project * A research project offered by NICT(*), started 2005 by the Consortium of six parties * Goal of the project is Demonstration Experiment of IP packet traceback Research and development Preliminary ISP field test From October to December 2008 Experiment preparations Investigation / examination / document making Consortium (five other parties) Demonstration Experiment From July to December 2009 (*) NOTE: NICT stands for National Institute of Information and Communications Technology. (CY) Telecom iSAC Japan
4 Outline of IP Traceback system ISP(a) ISP(b) ISP(c) IDS TB-DB TB Manager Probe Real attack TB Control Center Incident Real attack path (AS map) Attack from spoofed IP addresses 2. Detect the real attack path After an incident be recognized, TB- Operator analyze TB-DB by attack PKTs HASH, and detect the real attack path. 1. Store suspicious information. Whenever IDS notify suspicious attacks, TB manager calculate the attack PKTs HASH, and automatically recursive analyze its AS map with neighbor ASs TB manager, and store it to TB-DB. 0. Store HASH data temporary. Each probe convert PKT to HASH, and store own cache automatically.
5 Toward the field test We have to consider –A small set of the traceback system in an actual network environment –The operational flow with the actual traceback system We tried to operate our traceback system in Interop Tokyo 2008
6 Interop Tokyo 2008 One of the biggest exhibition/conference for network equipment / service vendors. The Network Operation Center (NOC) team builds an experimental advanced network called "ShowNet" as a backbone of the event. The experimental network was connected to several peering points (Internet Exchange Point) by more than 120G bps links in this year. Our IP Traceback system was served as a part of "ShowNet".
7 Purpose of our trial in Interop The preparations for the preliminary field test in 2008 –Collect information necessary for One ISP environment in the field test Data, problems, know-how to be collected with a long-time consecutive operation in One ISP Set up actual machines at One ISP environment Data, problems, know-how to be collected at ISP field trial Define any function to be added or corrected
9 Rack Layout NICTER ( Traffic Monitor developed by NICT ) Traceback
10 Zoom-In to the Traceback System HW-Probe snort on linux SW-Probe (myri 10G) SW-Probe (Chellsio 10G) All-In-One server Snort on 4 embedded linux boxes TB-Manager TB-DB
11 Test Items on Interop Test A –Setting up and operating the traceback system Test B –Collaborating with traffic monitor tools Test C –Visualizing trace log with random sampling based requests
12 Test A (Testing the field test set) TB-DB TB-Manager SW-Probe (chellsio 10G-LR) SW-Probe (myri 10G-LR) HW-Probe (10G-LR) Upload Summary External Router (Alaxala) External Router (Huawei) External Router (NEC) External Router (Foundry) Snort SW-Probe (chellsio 10G-LR) mirrored traffic from exhibitors side Request Search Packet Signature
13 Result of Test A (cont.) The traceback system worked well in the conference and exhibition days –The alert signatures of snort contained well-known worm traffic, shell codes and DoS attack signatures –669,810 alerts were received from 5 snorts on exhibitors side during 5 days (from 8 th June to 13 th June) –169,843 alerts (25.35 %) were judged as found in external links Other % alerts were attacks derived from the internal of ShowNet
14 Test B (Tracing src spoofed packets) All-in-One Server Core Routers (Juniper / CISCO) Sink hole routed packets Request Traffic Monitor internet Pseudo Attacker TCP SYN attack The source address was 45.x.x.x (ShowNets address) External Routers Mirrored external traffic
15 Result of Test B Traffic Monitor (NICTER) –Judged all pseudo attack packets came from the inside of ShowNet Because the source address of attack packets are included in ShowNet address block Traceback –Judged all pseudo attack packets came from the outside of ShowNet Hash values of all pseudo attacks were cached in the SW/HW-probe
16 Result of Test B (cont.) Request from NICTER (pseudo attack packet) the packet Hash was found in the External Traffic
17 Test C (Visualization of Traffic) Visualization All-in-One Server External Router (Alaxala) External Router (Huawei) External Router (NEC) External Router (Foundry) Summary Regeneration Tap (Net Optics) L2 Switch (CISCO) 10G tcpdump sampling
18 Visualization on Test C
19 Summary A trial of IP traeback system in Interop Tokyo 2008 –Success !!! According to the result of Interop, we blush up our implementation and operational flow –Now, we are preparing the preliminary field test from this autumn in a Data Center environment
20 Future plans Field tests in domestic –Preliminary field test with Japanese commercial ISPs will start from this autumn –The actual field test is planned from July to December, 2009 Field tests in Internatinal –We are planning the international field test after the domestic filed test ( ) –We are now looking for collaborators in research networks –If you are interested in our work, please mail to hiroa-ha at is.naist.jp
21 Thanks your attention
22 Any Questions ?
24 Detail of Mirroring All-in-One Server External Router (Alaxala) External Router (Huawei) External Router (NEC) External Router (Foundry) Regeneration Tap (Net Optics) L2 Switch (CISCO) 10G tcpdump SW-probe HW-probe
25 Experiments in Lab We had large scale experiments on NICT hokuriku research center in 2007 –With 200 physical servers –Mapping JP domain AS (eBGP) topology –Software traceback Implementation ran on each AS –DDoS from 3 attack ASes to 1 AS –Tracing the AS path of an attack packets from dest AS to src ASes
26 Hardware Spec. Test A –NEC Express R XEON 2G x 2, 8GB memory, 250GB SATA Disk, IPMI enabled, four 1000TX I/F Used for TB-Manager, TB-DB, snort Also used for one SW-Probe with one myri 10G-LR card –Procide AmazeBlast Eco120 Athlon 2G x 1, 8G memory, 200GB SATA Disk, two 1000TX I/F Used for two SW-Probes with Chellsio 10G-LR card –OKI Electric HW-Probe box One 10G-LR I/F and ten 1000T I/Fs, one 1000T I/F for control
27 Hardware Spec. Test B, C –Procide AmazeBlast Eco120 Athlong 2G x 1, 8G memory, 200GB SATA Disk, two 1000TX I/F Two SW-Probe with Chellsio 10G-LR card Used for All-In-One Server –MAC mini Used for running a visualization tool
28 Software Spec. OS –Debian 4.0 Software Traceback Implementations –C++ –TB-Manager, SW-Probe Developed by NAIST and Matsushita Electric Works –TB-DB Developed by KDDI Lab. –HW friendly Packet Hash Algorithm Library Developed by OKI Electric –Client Agent Developed by NAIST Visualization Tool –C++ with QT4 –Developed by NAIST