Presentation on theme: "Market Enabling Network Architecture NSF FIND PI Meeting Arlington, VA June 27, 2007 John Musacchio Assistant Professor Technology and Information Management."— Presentation transcript:
Market Enabling Network Architecture NSF FIND PI Meeting Arlington, VA June 27, 2007 John Musacchio Assistant Professor Technology and Information Management University of California, Santa Cruz firstname.lastname@example.org Jean Walrand, Venkat Ananthram, Galina Schwartz EECS University of California, Berkeley Shyam Parekh Alcatel-Lucent
Shortcomings Inconsistent Service Quality Security John Musacchio
Missing Markets User with high willingness to pay For high rate, real time service. ISP Zzzz Negative externality John Musacchio
Approach Ideal architecture: – Enable Markets Service choice Security – Flexible to allow innovation at the application layer – Lightweight – strongpoint of current Internet Questions – What should be in the architecture? – What should not be in the architecture? John Musacchio
Service Choice Users offered real-time choice: red and blue – Red and blue not specified to users in detail – ISP incentivized to improve along dimensions that matter – Unlike ATM, IntServ, DiffServ, service definitions not standardized John Musacchio
Service Choice: Issues Coordination of service definitions Getting ISPs to invest – No one wants to be first mover  – Quantifying value of differentiation  Oligopoly pricing efficiency loss – Social welfare less than if social planner set prices – Studying effects of service choice on efficiency loss  John Musacchio
Net Neutrality: Issues Would allowing 2 to charge A – encourage 2 to invest? – discourage A to invest? What revenue sharing mechanisms should new Internet have? Ongoing work: game model  ISP 1 ISP 2 A B $ $ $ $ ??? John Musacchio Content providers pay their ISP Should A have to pay ISP 2?
Internet Today – Security Inadequacy Users do not bear full cost of poor computer maintenance Drivers do not bear full cost of reckless driving. Liability insurance incentivizes drivers to be careful. ANALOGY John Musacchio Zzzz
Markets for Security Example: – Users pay to be certified by a Certification Agency (CA) – CA takes on liability for attacks traced back to user – CA incentivized to encourage users to take due care $ Zzzz John Musacchio OS Update Antivirus Update
Markets for Security Possible incentives for users to go to CA – Network drops discards uncertified packets in crisis. – Adverse selection a problem Make insurance mandatory? Architectural Requirements: – Improve traceability of attacks – Mechanism for dropping uncertified packets John Musacchio
Conclusions Internet is both – an engineered system – an economic system We must consider engineering and economic issues jointly John Musacchio
References + Work in Progress J. Musacchio, S. Wu, A Game Theoretic Model for Network Upgrade Decisions, Allerton Conference 2006. S. Ayani, J. Walrand, Increasing Wireless Revenues with Service Differentiation, in submission. J. Musacchio, S. Wu, The Price of Anarchy in a Network Pricing Game, in submission.  J. Musacchio, J. Walrand, Economic Consequences of Weak Network Neutrality, to appear at Asilomar 2007. P. Honeyman, G. Schwartz, Interdependence of Reliability and Security, Workshop on Economics of Information Security, CMU, June 2007.