1. Federated Defenses and Watching Each Other’s Back Scott Pinkerton (pinkerton@anl.gov) Argonne National Laboratory National Laboratory Information Technology Summit 2009 June 2, 2009

2. 2 Argonne National Laboratory Diverse population: –3,000 employees –10,000+ visitors annually –Off-site computer users –Foreign national employees, users, and collaborators Diverse funding: –Not every computer is a DOE computer. –IT is funded in many ways. Every program is working in an increasingly distributed computing model. Our goal: a consistent and comprehensively secure environment that effectively balances science and cyber security requirements. Argonne is managed by the UChicago Argonne LLC for the Department of Energy. IT Environment Challenges

3. 3 Emphasis on the Synergies of Multi-Program Science, Engineering & Applications Accelerator Research Catalysis Science Nuclear Fuel Cycle Transportation Science Computational Science Materials Characterization Structural Biology Fundamental Physics User Facilities Infrastructure Analysis... and much more.

4. A Comprehensive Cyber Security Program 4 Policy, Procedures; Training & Education Configuration Management Network Access Control (local & remote) Authentication & Authorization Defense (Federated Model) Incident Response & Forensics Vulnerability Assessment Firewalls/IDS Log Analysis & Anomaly Detection

5. A Risk Based Approach to Cyber Security 5 Skill & Sophistication of the “Bad Guys” Standardized Technology – common vulnerabilities Degree of Connectivity Criticality of Systems & Data

6. What is the Federated Model for Cyber Security ? Framework for sharing actionable information about threats and hostilities occurring right now Virtual neighborhood watch Collection of software tools allowing a site to: –Learn about active hostilities from other sites in near real-time –Do something about it – E.g. block an IP address, block outbound access to a web URL, block or copy in-bound e-mails, interrupt DNS look-ups Requires a foundation of TRUST 6

7. What is it – For the Techies Set of XML schemas (based on IDMEF standards – RFC 4765) –IP address –DNS domain name –Revocation (unblock an IP address) –E-mail address (coming soon) –URL (coming soon) Set of Perl scripts that support: –Upload and download of encrypted XML files –Block an IP address in a FW –Block an IP address with a BGP null route (requires a router), etc Web Portal to support coordination –Sharing pgp keys –Sharing local detection algorithms & tools –Sharing white list info, etc 7

8. Maps nicely into NIST controls and Best Practices 8 NIST ControlFederated Model IR-3 Incident Response Testing IR-4 Incident Handling IR-5 Incident Monitoring IR-6 Incident Reports Federated model aids in supporting and background information on malicious behavior to aide in response, handling, and reporting incidents. AC-17 Remote AccessRemote access to repository monitored and controlled. RA-3 Risk AssessmentInformation shared include severity of event. RA-4 Risk Assessment UpdateInformation shared includes history of bad actor. SI-4 Information System Monitoring Tools and Techniques Federated model is a conglomerate of results from system monitoring tools and techniques across federated sites. SI-5 Security Alerts and AdvisoriesFederated model designed to distribute security alerts and advisories.

9. Cyber Defenses – Business as Usual Local detection methods apply Local response actions apply Every single site learns via “school of hard knocks” 9

10. Cyber Defenses – Using the Federated Model Local & distributed detection methods apply Local response decisions apply Only one site learns via “school of hard knocks” (ideally) Based on an assumption that hostilities occur across related sites 10

11. How much data ? 11

12. Overlap 12

13. Value Proposition of Participating Note: Not a silver bullet – just one piece of a successful cyber security program Neighborhood watch programs requires only one site to experience the pain of an attempted exploit Access to variety of software tools that assist with the automation of actions Sites still retain local controls – share your information with sites you choose; information shared is merely advice; local decision still on what to do with the intel This infrastructure prepares us for future response strategies & techniques – bad guys are adapting -- we better be Improves OODA loop 13

14. Unique Challenges and Mitigations Sharing data has potential for Federated (group) response – double edged sword –Great when stopping “bad guy” –Greater risk against legit science work False positives – oops are magnified (a lot) –Revocation: used to rewind reported data –Due to false positive; typo – whatever –Important legit site for some members Adding QA functions to notify on local and global white lists Integration into varied local systems and processes When to take action locally based on Federated data, how severe, weighted approach 14

15. How to Get Involved Think about how you would like to speed up your OODA loop –Observe, orient, decide, act –Automate OODA loop where possible Create a federation - even if it is with just one other organization –Start with already trusted friends Think about what you have automated to date –What can you/should you automate in the future Get involved –Come as you are, using your already defined IDS analysis methodologies –To inquire or join send email to federated-admins@anl.govfederated-admins@anl.gov For additional info: –https://www.anl.gov/it/federatedhttps://www.anl.gov/it/federated 15

16. Next Steps Moving beyond IP addresses –DNS domain names (starting right now) –E-mail address handling (soon) –URL (soon) XML schemas are extensible – easy to adapt to new problems Important that you start building some level of automation in now Federations of federations 16

17. Questions ? 17