Presentation on theme: "Visualization Tools, Argumentation Schemes and Expert Opinion Evidence in Law Douglas Walton University of Winnipeg, Canada Thomas F. Gordon Fraunhofer."— Presentation transcript:
Visualization Tools, Argumentation Schemes and Expert Opinion Evidence in Law Douglas Walton University of Winnipeg, Canada Thomas F. Gordon Fraunhofer FOKUS, Berlin, Germany January 28, 2007
Outline The two main tools used in argumentation theory are the formal models of dialogue (of different types) and the schemes. Question: how can argumentation schemes best be used in argument visualization technology? Question: how much of the dialogue stuff can be put on argumentation diagrams with schemes without making the system too complex for the user? Discussion restricted to two argument visualization systems, Araucaria and Carneades, and to one scheme, argument from expert opinion. Argument from expert opinion put forward as an example of an existing argumentation scheme that may need to be modified for legal use. Three version of this scheme discussed.
Introductory In argumentation theory, arguments are identified, analyzed and evaluated by means of argumentation schemes representing stereotypical kinds of ordinary reasoning. The scheme is a form of argument (normative) that can be applied to a particular argument in a given text of discourse. The most interesting schemes at the moment are the defeasible ones that represent plausible reasoning, rather than deductive or inductive reasoning. Each scheme has a special set of critical questions matching it. An argument is evaluated using the critical questions. The argument holds as plausible unless critically questioned or attacked by an opposing argument. But there may be different ways different critical questions do this.
Argumentation Schemes Common schemes include such familiar types of argumentation as argument from sign, argument from example, argument from commitment, argument from a verbal classification, argument from position to know, argument from analogy, argument from precedent, argument from a rule to a case, argument from correlation to cause, practical reasoning, abductive reasoning, argument from gradualism, and the slippery slope argument. Other schemes that have been studied include argument from waste (also called sunk costs argument), argument from temporal persistence and argument from appearance. These schemes are called presumptive or defeasible, meaning that they can fail in some instances, for example by the asking of critical questions. They represent arguments that are necessary but dangerous (WilliamTwining).
Scheme for Argument from Appearance Major premise: If the object looks x then the object is x. Minor premise: The object looks x. Better explanation exception: there is a better explanation for the object's appearance. Conclusion: The object is x. Example (Pollock): This object looks red, therefore it is red. But a better explanation of why it looks red may be that it is illuminated by a red light. If this is known to be the case, it is an exception. Example (Prakken): This object looks like an affidavit, therefore (plausibly) it is an affidavit.
Another Argumentation Scheme Scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion Major Premise: Source E is an expert in field F containing proposition A. Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in field F) is true (false). Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false). The Six Basic Critical Questions Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source? Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in? Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A? Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source? Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? Backup Evidence Question: Is Es assertion based on evidence?
Argument from Expert Opinion with Scheme and Generalization
Problem with Representing Critical Questions What Happens When the Respondent Asks a Critical Question? Two Kinds of Questions 1. When the credibility critical question is asked, the burden shifts to the proponent to answer it. If no answer is given, the proponents argument fails. 2. When the trustworthiness critical question is asked, something else is needed to make the burden of proof shift to the other side. To make the proponents argument fail, the respondent needs to support the critical question with further argument. For example, the questioner might offer evidence that the expert is biased. Such evidence would cast doubt on the assumption that the expert is trustworthy.
The Credibility Question as a Rebutter in Araucaria
The Trustworthiness Question as an Undercutter in Araucaria
The Carneades Solution (Basic Idea) Arguments have four kinds of premises: Ordinary premises – for the minor and major premises of schemes. Assumptions – for critical questions to be answered by the proponent. Exceptions – for critical questions to be answered by a respondent. Negative Premises – like ordinary premises except that the proponent must prove that the statement is not the case.
Modeling Critical Questions with Carneades When instantiating an argumentation scheme, each critical question is modeled as an assumption or an exception. Modeling the critical question as an assumption places the burden of proof on the proponent, but only after the respondent has made an issue out of its statement. So long as the statement is undisputed, the assumption holds. Modeling the critical question as an exception places the burden of proof on the respondent. Even after the respondent has made an issue out of the exceptions statement, the exception continues to hold until sufficient arguments have been asserted to make the statement acceptable, given its proof standard.
Syntax of Argument from Expert Opinion in Carneades (argument arg-1 (scheme argument-from-expert-opinion) (premises (domain e d) (asserted e a) (within a d) (assuming (credible e)) (assuming (based-on-evidence (asserted e a))) (unless (not (trustworthy e))) (unless (not (consistent-with-other-experts e)))) (conclusion (pro a)))
Bias Allegation Supporting Trustworthiness Question in Carneades
Version 1 of Legal Argument from Expert Opinion Ordinary Premise 1: E is an expert in knowledge domain D. Ordinary Premise 2: E said that statement S is true. Assumption 1: S is in D. Assumption 2: E has depth of knowledge in D. Conclusion: S may plausibly be taken to be true. Problem: Assumption 2 seems to add nothing new (as stated), merely repeating ordinary premise 1. Whats the difference?
Version 2 of Legal Argument from Expert Opinion Ordinary Premise 1: E is an expert in knowledge domain D. Ordinary Premise 2: E said the sentence S*. Ordinary Premise 3: S is a reasonable interpretation of S*. Assumption 1: S is in D. Assumption 2: The knowledge of E about D is deep enough to know about S. Assumption 3: Es testimony about S* is based on his own careful analysis of the evidence in the case. Exception 1: S is inconsistent with what other experts say. Exception 2: E is not trustworthy. Conclusion: S may plausibly be taken to be true.
Version 2 of Argument from Expert Opinion Ordinary Premise 1: E is an expert in knowledge domain D. Ordinary Premise 2: E said the sentence S*. Ordinary Premise: S is a reasonable interpretation of S*. Assumption 1: S is in D. Assumption 2: The knowledge of E about D is deep enough to know about S. Assumption 3: Es testimony S* is based on his own careful analysis of evidence in this case. Exception 1: S is inconsistent with what other experts in D say. Exception 2: E is not trustworthy. Conclusion: S may plausibly be taken to be true.
Conclusions Both Araucaria and Carneades can be used to model arguments from expert opinion in a way useful for visualization of evidence in law. Araucaria has many useful features, but appears limited in how well it can deal with critical questions with different burdens of proof. There are three versions of the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion that might be adaptable to law. It appears that the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion can best be modeled in law using version 2. Carneades is especially suitable to using version 2 of the scheme for argument from expert opinion in law. The lessons learned with this scheme apply to other schemes, like the scheme for argument from appearance, and so forth.