1. Combined Maritime Forces Counter-Piracy Briefing CAPT Chris Chambers
19 May 2009
Overall Classification
UNCLASSIFIED

2. Combined Maritime Forces
Australia
Denmark
Netherlands
Coalition of the Willing
Primary Missions:
Counter violent extremists and terrorist networks
Work with regional and coalition partners to improve overall maritime security and stability
CTF 150
Established in support of Operation Enduring Freedom
CTF 151
Counter-piracy
CTF 152
Arabian Gulf maritime security
Bahrain
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Japan
Kuwait
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) patrols more than 2.5 million square miles of international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated operations with a common purpose: to increase the security and prosperity of the region by working together for a better future. CMF is working to defeat terrorism, prevent piracy, reduce illegal trafficking of people and drugs, and promote the maritime environment as a safe place for mariners with legitimate business.
New Zealand
Pakistan
Singapore
South Korea
Spain
Portugal
Turkey
United States
Saudi Arabia
United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates
Non-Members with staff presence
Jordan
Qatar
Yemen

3. Combined Task Force (CTF) 151
CMF established CTF 151 as a mission based Task Force:
12 Jan 09 under a UNSCR counter-piracy mandate
CTF 151 is a mission specific CTF not geographically constrained
Mandate based upon the range of counter-piracy UNSCRs
Provides significant flexibility to the command to undertake operations
Critical factors for mission success:
International force participation in coalition
Maritime merchant community participation and active self defense
Merchant marine active communication with UKMTO/US MARLO to maintain situational awareness
CMF established a new mission based Task Force (CTF 151) in Jan 2009 composed of forces from coalition nations who have agreed to deploy Naval forces and cooperate to the fullest extent to reprise acts of piracy and armed robbery in the CMF AOR.
CTF 151 is a mission specific CTF not geographically constrained that has the flexibility to operate across the CMF AOR as necessary to counter piracy.
The mandate on which CTF 151 was created is based upon the range of UNSCRs applicable to countering piracy within the maritime domain. This basis provides significant flexibility in the range and application of force available to the command to undertake operations.
The effectiveness of CTF 151 relies on a number of key factors:
International force participation in coalition
Maritime merchant community participation and active self defence, and
Merchant marine active communication with UK MTO/US MARLO to maintain situational awareness
UNCLASSIFIED

4. Area of Responsibility
CTF 152
RDML Tidd, USN
CTF 151
RDML Howard, USN
CTF 151
RDML Bener, TUR
FOCUSED OP
FOCUSED OP
CTF 151 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS MISSION-SPECIFIC TO COUNTER PIRACY AND IS NOT GEOGRAPHICALLY RESTRICTED WITHIN THE CMF AOR
RDML Howard will hand over command of CTF 151 to
CTF 150
RADM Hinden, FR

5. Countering Piracy - Strategic Aspects
Piracy is an international problem requiring an international solution
Solution is ashore in Somalia
Must establish conditions ashore that preclude criminal activity at sea
Enforce the rule of law in Somalia to deny pirates safe havens
Until the solution is reached ashore, counter-piracy must focus on three interrelated elements
Improved security and defensive efforts by the shipping industry
International naval presence to deter / disrupt / defeat pirate attempts
International legal framework for resolving piracy cases
These elements must be addressed in harmony
None will be successful individually
International problem that requires International solution
Ultimate solution is ashore in Somalia
Establish conditions that preclude criminal activity at sea and ashore
Stability, security, economic prosperity, governance, rule of law
Piracy is about money – no ties to terrorism -- yet

6. Piracy – Current Assessment
There is significant military presence in the GOA (CMF, NATO, EU, National)
CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating navies
CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize effectiveness of limited assets
Knowledge of piracy Pattern-Of-Life is still in development – military assets focused on deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection
Favorable weather in Somali Basin has enabled pirates to increase activity
Seasonal trend that follows the monsoon transition periods
Somali Basin area is 5 times larger than the GOA
Full military coverage of this area will not be possible
From 25th February – 31st March 2009, 7% of the unsuccessful piracy attempts were the result of direct military presence and/or intervention
The proportion of vessels being attacked is still below 1% in GOA, but has peaked at 1.4% in the Somali Basin

7. Piracy – Current Assessment
Pirate capacity and capability remains high
Number of ships being attacked and pirated has increased
Total number of ships pirates can hold for ransom unknown
Greater number of reports of attempts / false alarm calls noted by IMB
Assessed due to better awareness in the merchant shipping community
Military counter-piracy efforts in the GOA continue to have limited success
No direct correlation between coalition presence and piracy incidents, although greater military presence on whole has resulted in better chances of preventing a successful piracy attack
The most effective method for avoiding piracy is still through the merchant ship’s own defensive actions
Pirates do not give up unless they cannot board or are threatened
Speed with maneuver, charged fire hoses
Professionally trained security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks
Pirates unable to gain control of ship once onboard
Maximum number of ships held for ransom at one time has been 19. Total capacity is unknown.

8. Pirate Tactics Motherships Length of attack
Thought to be a requirement for the long range operations in the Somali Basin
One recent example of this not being the case
In GOA, may be a pirated vessel (Dhow, fishing vessel, etc) or an accomplice
Recent example of migrant smugglers acting as mother ship
Length of attack
GOA attacks tend to be 30 minutes or less
Threat of military intervention
Target rich environment (go after something easier)
Somali Basin attacks average one hour or longer
Less threat of military intervention
Fewer available targets
Recent piracy events have shown that different pirate teams communicate and coordinate

9. Piracy Statistics Through 31 March
Commodore’s Daily Morning Slide for reference.
SECURITY TEAMS ARE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-PIRACY CAPABILITY

10. REMAIN VIGILANT AT ALL TIMES
Attacks by Time of Day
93% OF ATTACKS OCCUR DURING THE DAY. THERE WAS A SUCCESSFUL NIGHT ATTACK LAST WEEK.
REMAIN VIGILANT AT ALL TIMES

11. Piracy Risk To Shipping
March in GOA, 0.51% of vessels have been attacked and less than 0.05% pirated
March in Somali Basin, less than 1.4% of vessels have been attacked and less than 0.65% pirated (47% of ships attacked)
In February, 0.049% of vessels were pirated in GOA and 0% in the Somali Basin
TRENDS SHOW TYPICAL SEASONAL INCREASE IN PIRACY, BUT PROPORTIONALLY INCREASED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS

12. Total Pirate Attacks
SPIKES IN PIRATE ATTACKS BROADLY COINCIDE WITH FAVORABLE WEATHER TRANSITION PERIODS BETWEEN MONSOON SEASONS

13. Piracy concentrated in “High Risk” box during most of 2008
2008 GOA Piracy Events
Piracy concentrated in “High Risk” box during most of 2008

14. Piracy evenly distributed across GOA in 2009
2009 GOA Piracy Events
Piracy evenly distributed across GOA in 2009

15. Most open ocean piracy events in 2008 were inside 400nm
2008 Somali Basin Piracy
400nm
Most open ocean piracy events in 2008 were inside 400nm

16. 2009 Somali Basin Piracy
400nm
In 2009, pirates have increased open ocean activity and followed vessels out to 600+ nm

17. Campaign Results – 243 Days
Campaign start – 22 AUG 08, 17 vessels currently pirated
Average Monthly Assets in CP Campaign
International Response
320 pirates encountered:
175 released
133 turned over for prosecution
8 killed
17 pending
Pirate vessels destroyed: 24
Pirate vessels confiscated: 12
Weapons confiscated: 162 small arms, 30 RPG launchers, 61 RPG projectiles
Other paraphernalia confiscated :
28 ladders
9 GPS
23 phones
UNCLASSIFIED

18. INDUSTRY MUST PRO-ACTIVELY PROTECT ITSELF
What Does it all Mean?
Piracy has increased in the Somali Basin
Spring and fall seasonal monsoon predicted this
Piracy is further off the coast of Somalia than in previous years
Merchant shipping has heeded advice to transit further east
Pirates have adapted tactics to pursue targets at a greater distance
Pirates in GOA are still very active
Learning to find the easy targets
Learning to coordinate in effort to counter effects of Naval presence
Current maritime force cannot defeat pirates alone
Avg number of ships per day is units available to patrol high risk areas
IRTC is a 480 x 12 mile corridor = 5760 sq miles of open sea
Does not account for the whole of the Gulf of Aden (~100,000 sq miles)
Somali Basin is a 1000 nm coast out to 600 miles = 600,000 sq miles of open sea
Traffic in Somali Basin does not follow a predictable route
Somali Basin is not as well suited as GOA for a transit corridor to manage traffic
Capture, imprisonment and death are not deterring pirates
Expect piracy attacks to remain effective in Somali Basin until SW monsoon season begins in June
INDUSTRY MUST PRO-ACTIVELY PROTECT ITSELF

19. Countering Piracy - Military Aspects
What we do now
Coordination / Deconfliction / Working together
CMF, EUNAVFOR, NATO, Malaysia, Russia, China, India, Japan
Current naval actions
Presence / deterrence / disruption / suppression of pirate activity
Intervening against pirate attacks in progress
Boarding suspected pirate vessels when encountered
Interdicting motherships
Collecting information to better understand piracy Pattern-of-Life
Providing warning to commercial shipping of potential pirate locations
Group transit plan for commercial shipping
Surveillance / communications support after ships have been taken
Providing piracy data and best practice recommendations to industry

20. Challenges and Opportunities
There is significant military presence in the region (CMF, NATO, EU, National), presenting...
National tasking makes inefficient use of limited assets
Navies answer to individual national authorities with varying rules of engagement (ROE)
NATO, EU, CMF, and other forces have independent chains-of-command
Incompatible communications hamper coordination efforts
Knowledge of piracy pattern-of-life is still in development – military assets focused on deterrence / disruption of pirates rather than intelligence collection
CMF hosts monthly coordination meetings with representatives of most participating navies – membership is growing
CTF 151 coordinates warship positioning with other maritime participants to maximize effectiveness of limited assets
CMF provides logistics and/or communications services to 20 countries engaged in counter piracy ops
Includes fuel, CENTRIXS secure computer network, and development of unclassified common operational picture (COP)
Challenges
… and Opportunities
UNCLASSIFIED

21. Counter-Piracy Information Sharing / Coordination
CTF 151 has assumed the role of tactically de-conflicting warships in GOA
CMF
UKMTO / MARLO
Communications Hub
INDEPENDENT
NAVIES
(RUS, CHN, MAL, IND, JPN)
EUNAVFOR
(MSC-HOA, FEXWEB)
MERCHANT / CIVILIAN SHIPPING
SHARED AWARENESS AND DE-CONFLICTION TALKS ARE KEY TO COORDINATED EFFORT

22. Military Coordination/Synchronization
CMF conducts monthly Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) meeting in Bahrain
Over 20 nations participate
EU and NATO participate
Developing shared UNCLAS picture
Developing shared UNCLAS database
Refining positioning of assets in the IRTC
Synchronized CMF, EU and NATO operations
Includes industry reps
30 nations participating in or planning to conduct counter piracy operations
CTF-151 lead in tactical coordination/de-confliction/synchronization
UKMTO (Dubai) and MARLO (Bahrain) link navies with industry
UNCLASSIFIED

23. Countering Piracy – Military Challenges
What limits our ability to respond
Navies answer to individual national authorities
Collective political will to take aggressive military action is needed
Rules of engagement vary between Navies
No unified political body under which to consolidate military effort
NATO, EU, & CMF and other forces each have an independent chain of command
Although a challenge, it is opening new avenues for military coordination between nations (SHADE, daily coordination between Task Forces)
This is a law enforcement operation
Does not fall under the law of armed conflict
Limits military options for the use of force
Strict rules of evidence for prosecuting pirates
Legal options are limited
Few countries willing to prosecute pirates captured by Naval forces
Limited military assets to cover a vast area
National tasking takes precedent over coalition tasking
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meeting held monthly
First military coordination between US and Russia
First military coordination between US and China
Development of an unclassified Shared Awareness and Deconfliction tool for all nations involved in counter-piracy to use.
Because it is a law enforcement operation, use of force is limited mainly to self-defense. You cannot shoot pirates after they have broken off the attack.
Convoy escort – two ships escorting 10 ships (nations who escort believe this is the most they can support at one time), assume two days to transit, 70/ships per day transit GOA. That is 28 ships dedicated just to escort in the GOA – what about Somali Basin.
THIS PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED BY NAVAL FORCES ALONE

24. Recommended Risk Mitigation Process
Conduct thorough piracy threat assessment
If at all possible, avoid transit through areas with pirate threat
If avoidance of piracy area is not possible…
Conduct timely and deliberate self-assessment to determine risk to vessel
Consider vulnerability factors such as vessel speed, low points of access, and time of exposure in piracy areas
Consider self-protection options to mitigate risk
Cost-benefit analysis will determine level of acceptable risk
Benefits of conducting safe transit must outweigh the cost of implementing protective measures
If costs outweigh the benefits (profits), ships are likely to seek naval escort
Ships must re-evaluate risk and decide to accept one of the following…
Cost of re-routing
Cost of sufficient protective measures
Risk of piracy
Industry must submit request for escort / protection to UKMTO

25. Vessel Risk Assessment
High Risk
Slow
Self Protection measures reduce the risk
Enhanced lookout
Physical measure taken on board the vessel (e.g. barbed wire, rigged fire hoses, etc.)
Trained, unarmed security team on board
Exposure Time in High Risk Zone
Speed
Fast
Trained armed security teams nearly eliminate the risk
Low Risk
Complexity
High
Lowest Point of Access
Low
UNCLASSIFIED

26. Industry Best Practices
Passive defense measures
Comprehensive security plan to include a risk assessment
Remove external ladders
Lookouts at all times
Speed and maneuver: speed up and take evasive action if pirates approach
Limited lighting
Register with Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
Stay in communication with MSCHOA, UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO), and/or Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)
Routing – avoid high-risk areas if possible
Participate in group transits
Active defense measures
Secure hatches, limit access to crew and control spaces
Rig fire hoses
Rig barriers such as barbed wire, fencing, etc., especially in low access areas
Non lethal measures such as LRAD, flares, etc
Professional security teams capable of repelling pirate attacks
Bottom Line: Do not allow yourselves to become easy targets
UNCLASSIFIED

27. Summary THE SOLUTION TO PIRACY IS STABILITY IN SOMALIA
Combined Maritime Forces / International Navies have taken action
Maritime Security Patrol Area and World Food Program escorts
Deter, disrupt, capture, and destroy pirate equipment
Coordinate, de-conflict, share intelligence / information
Provide best practices to shipping industry
Communications support to pirated vessels during negotiations
Suspected pirates have been captured by DK, US, UK and EU forces
Suspected Pirates taken by DK handed over to the Flag state of the attacked vessel
Suspected Pirates taken by UK, US and EU have been handed over to Kenya per MOUs
These actions alone will not solve the problem
More aggressive naval actions will not succeed until other elements put in place
Patrol area is enormous; requires coordinated tasking of naval assets from all countries
Shipping industry must follow recommended best practices
Shipping industry should consider embarking security detachments
Additional airborne reconnaissance required to increase probability of encounter
Retaking pirated ships involves high risk to the lives of hostages
There is currently no mandate for military action ashore against pirate bases
THE SOLUTION TO PIRACY IS STABILITY IN SOMALIA
UNTIL THEN, INDUSTRY MUST PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE

28. Counter-Piracy Global Maritime Partnerships
Questions?