Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 17 Inflation, the Phillips Curve, and Central Bank Commitment.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 17 Inflation, the Phillips Curve, and Central Bank Commitment."— Presentation transcript:

1 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 17 Inflation, the Phillips Curve, and Central Bank Commitment

2 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-2 Chapter 17 Topics The Phillips curve, as observed in U.S. data. The Friedman-Lucas Money Surprise Model. Understanding the behavior of the inflation rate in the United States. Central bank learning Central bank commitment

3 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-3 Figure 17.1 The Phillips Curve

4 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-4 Friedman-Lucas Money Surprise Model Assume the central bank sets the inflation rate. Workers cannot observe all prices and so can misperceive their real wage. The central bank can fool workers into working harder – if the central bank sets the inflation rate higher than expected, then real output will be higher than its trend value.

5 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-5 Equation 17.1 Friedman-Lucas model can be summarized by:

6 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-6 Equation 17.2 Rewrite the previous equation:

7 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-7 Observed Phillips Curve Correlations Phillips curve relations do not exist in all U.S. data sets. We can observe a Phillips curve prior to 1980, but not after that. The Phillips curve shifts over time.

8 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-8 Figure 17.2 The Phillips Curve, 1947–1959

9 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-9 Figure 17.3 The Phillips Curve, 1960–1969

10 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-10 Figure 17.4 The Phillips Curve, 1970–1979

11 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-11 Figure 17.5 The Phillips Curve, 1980–1989

12 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-12 Figure 17.6 The Phillips Curve, 1990–1999

13 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-13 Figure 17.7 The Phillips Curve, 2000–2006

14 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-14 Figure 17.8 The Shifting Phillips Curve

15 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-15 Figure 17.9 The Inflation Rate in the United States, 1947–2006

16 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-16 Figure 17.10 Deviations From Trend in Real GDP, 1947–2006

17 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-17 Explaining U.S. Inflation: Central Bank Learning Story: Fed observes the Phillips curve relation that holds in the data in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and assumes that it can increase output at the expense of some extra inflation. After experimenting with high inflation and reading Friedman and Lucas, the Fed learns the error of its ways. In the early 1980s, the Fed commits to reducing inflation.

18 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-18 Figure 17.11 The Phillips Curve relationship in the Friedman-Lucas money surprise model

19 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-19 Figure 17.12 The Effects of an Increase in the Expected Inflation Rate

20 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-20 Figure 17.13 The Feds Preferences Over Inflation Rates and Output

21 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-21 Figure 17.14 The Fed Exploits the Phillips Curve

22 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-22 Figure 17.15 The Fed Attempts to Increase Y Permanently

23 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-23 Explaining U.S. Inflation: Central Bank Commitment The Fed cannot commit to low inflation. So long as inflation is low, there is a temptation for the Fed to create surprise inflation to increase output. In equilibrium with rational expectations, people cannot be fooled, so in equilibrium inflation is at a sufficiently high level that there is no temptation for the Fed to increase inflation further.

24 Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 17-24 Figure 17.16 The Commitment Problem


Download ppt "Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 17 Inflation, the Phillips Curve, and Central Bank Commitment."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google