Presentation on theme: "Steve Walker Head of Offshore Division, UK Health & Safety Executive"— Presentation transcript:
1Steve Walker Head of Offshore Division, UK Health & Safety Executive UK response to Macondo & Montara incidents IOPRO Summit, Perth, Australia, August 2011Steve WalkerHead of Offshore Division,UK Health & Safety Executive
2Initial reactions in UK – media, public attention and politicians Montara – little notice apart from specialist pressMacondo - first few days, interest in UK was relatively narrow, BUT…..Media attention quickly developed because of :Focus on BP as a “British” company in USAAppreciation of financial and economic aspects - > moved to the financial pages!Initially quiet on political front (new Government, Parliament in recess), but then:Succession of Parliamentary QuestionsMinisterial interestSet up a Parliamentary Select Committee regarding deep water drilling in UK
3Initial response from Regulators Two key offshore regulators in UKHealth & Safety Executive (HSE) - safety integrityDept. of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) - environmental protection/response, plus exploration licensing and drilling consentQuick review of safety regulatory regimes
4Quick review Compare and contrast with U.S. UK multiple layers of safety regulatory protectionEstablished Safety Case regime for MODUsWells notification to HSEIndependent wells examinerIndependent verification of safety critical elements (e.g. BOPs)Duty Holder focused intervention by HSE wells specialists and other offshore HSE inspectorsWeekly drilling operations reports to HSEMature, goal setting safety regime – from Piper AlphaSafety culture/work force involvement in North Sea
5Initial response No “knee jerk” reaction – robust but no complacency!! Sensible reinforcement of our rigorous approach:Checks that existing systems were working (we were doing what we said we were doing!)Increased well control assessment during MODU offshore inspectionsIncreased number of MODU environmental inspections by DECC inspectors (requiring additional resources)Increase in HSE/DECC joint inspections of MODUsIncreased scrutiny of all E&A wells and in particular deepwater wells (>300 metres) at consent stageHSE Deepwater Horizon Internal Review GroupCommenced a formal independent review of UK’s offshore regulatory regime once clear lessons emerged from GoM
6Initial response - Industry Key area was the quick creation of OSPRAG, the Oil Spill Prevention & Response Advisory Group.UK offshore industry’s focal point for the review of its offshore practises in the light of both Macondo and MontaraStrong support/involvement from regulators and the Trades UnionsTaking forward:Technical Review (containment and well control issues)Oil Spill & Emergency ResponseInsurance and Indemnity IssuesTask & finish, but legacy of Wells Life Cycle Practices Forum and the Oil Spill & Emergency Response Review GroupWell control issues
7UK Parliamentary Select Committee Reported January 2011No moratorium of drillingConfirmation of regimeNow taking forward recommendations
8Wider International aspects – European Commission Deepwater Horizon initiated significant ramping up of European Commission interest in offshore mattersKey areas beingRelative comfort in North Sea regulation, but concern about Mediterranean and Black SeaLiability issuesAdequacy of cross-Europe oil spill responseTransparency /openness issuesEuropean Commission communication in October 2010 set out their views on way forwardWorking with the European Commission as it develops proposals for strengthening offshore oil & gas regulatory regimes set out in European law, and in particular who the law in applied in practice.
9Wider international aspects - others Lots of activity and influencers!G20OGPUS investigationsNSOAFIRFUS and Australian Ministerial ForumsUK working with colleagues across these fora…but real need to bring all this together!
10Three pillars for acceptable global offshore safety and environmental standards The legislative and standards frameworkThose who create the risk must manage themStrong and competent regulatorConstructively, and robustly challenges the risk creatorsTargeted, proportionate, consistent and transparent approachA committed industryUnderstands and buys into the regulatory frameworkDelivers obligations effectively and consistentCreates a safety cultureEngages with those exposed to risk – the workforce
11Current status in UK Legacy of OSPRAG for UK Capping device Wells Life Cycle Practises Forum – five sub-teamsBOP IssuesRelief Well Planning RequirementsWell Life Cycle Integrity GuidelinesCompetency/Behaviours/human FactorsWell examination/verificationOil Spill & Emergency Response Review GroupIncreasing international activity on Standards and “best practise” – e.g BOPs, cementing design etc?Still a lot more to come out of the USA investigations – continue watching!
12Current status - continued Legislative changes from Europe:North Sea/UK safety legislation = benchmarkPressures onFinancial liabilityMore sophisticated cross- Europe legislationContinuing environmental pressuresDraft proposals from Commission emergingRegulatory changesMore transparency (via EU)More consistency across national boundaries (via NSOAF & IRF) – hopefully not via the CommissionReview of HSE/DECC system in 2011
13We must all learn the lessons from Macondo and Montara Multiple barriers breached = change any feelings of invulnerability -> chronic unease“Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure – a failure of management.”Concentrate on all three “pillars” together:Framework of legislation and standardsStrong, competent, effective regulatorsCommitment of industry and its workforce.Lessons for operators, contractors and regulatorsMultiple barriers broached – any one of which could have prevented the blowout