1. Steve Walker Head of Offshore Division, UK Health & Safety Executive
UK response to Macondo & Montara incidents IOPRO Summit, Perth, Australia, August 2011
Steve Walker
Head of Offshore Division,
UK Health & Safety Executive

2. Initial reactions in UK – media, public attention and politicians
Montara – little notice apart from specialist press
Macondo - first few days, interest in UK was relatively narrow, BUT…..
Media attention quickly developed because of :
Focus on BP as a “British” company in USA
Appreciation of financial and economic aspects - > moved to the financial pages!
Initially quiet on political front (new Government, Parliament in recess), but then:
Succession of Parliamentary Questions
Ministerial interest
Set up a Parliamentary Select Committee regarding deep water drilling in UK

3. Initial response from Regulators
Two key offshore regulators in UK
Health & Safety Executive (HSE) - safety integrity
Dept. of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) - environmental protection/response, plus exploration licensing and drilling consent
Quick review of safety regulatory regimes

4. Quick review Compare and contrast with U.S.
UK multiple layers of safety regulatory protection
Established Safety Case regime for MODUs
Wells notification to HSE
Independent wells examiner
Independent verification of safety critical elements (e.g. BOPs)
Duty Holder focused intervention by HSE wells specialists and other offshore HSE inspectors
Weekly drilling operations reports to HSE
Mature, goal setting safety regime – from Piper Alpha
Safety culture/work force involvement in North Sea

5. Initial response No “knee jerk” reaction – robust but no complacency!!
Sensible reinforcement of our rigorous approach:
Checks that existing systems were working (we were doing what we said we were doing!)
Increased well control assessment during MODU offshore inspections
Increased number of MODU environmental inspections by DECC inspectors (requiring additional resources)
Increase in HSE/DECC joint inspections of MODUs
Increased scrutiny of all E&A wells and in particular deepwater wells (>300 metres) at consent stage
HSE Deepwater Horizon Internal Review Group
Commenced a formal independent review of UK’s offshore regulatory regime once clear lessons emerged from GoM

6. Initial response - Industry
Key area was the quick creation of OSPRAG, the Oil Spill Prevention & Response Advisory Group.
UK offshore industry’s focal point for the review of its offshore practises in the light of both Macondo and Montara
Strong support/involvement from regulators and the Trades Unions
Taking forward:
Technical Review (containment and well control issues)
Oil Spill & Emergency Response
Insurance and Indemnity Issues
Task & finish, but legacy of Wells Life Cycle Practices Forum and the Oil Spill & Emergency Response Review Group
Well control issues

7. UK Parliamentary Select Committee
Reported January 2011
No moratorium of drilling
Confirmation of regime
Now taking forward recommendations

8. Wider International aspects – European Commission
Deepwater Horizon initiated significant ramping up of European Commission interest in offshore matters
Key areas being
Relative comfort in North Sea regulation, but concern about Mediterranean and Black Sea
Liability issues
Adequacy of cross-Europe oil spill response
Transparency /openness issues
European Commission communication in October 2010 set out their views on way forward
Working with the European Commission as it develops proposals for strengthening offshore oil & gas regulatory regimes set out in European law, and in particular who the law in applied in practice.

9. Wider international aspects - others
Lots of activity and influencers!
G20
OGP
US investigations
NSOAF
IRF
US and Australian Ministerial Forums
UK working with colleagues across these fora
…but real need to bring all this together!

10. Three pillars for acceptable global offshore safety and environmental standards
The legislative and standards framework
Those who create the risk must manage them
Strong and competent regulator
Constructively, and robustly challenges the risk creators
Targeted, proportionate, consistent and transparent approach
A committed industry
Understands and buys into the regulatory framework
Delivers obligations effectively and consistent
Creates a safety culture
Engages with those exposed to risk – the workforce

11. Current status in UK Legacy of OSPRAG for UK Capping device
Wells Life Cycle Practises Forum – five sub-teams
BOP Issues
Relief Well Planning Requirements
Well Life Cycle Integrity Guidelines
Competency/Behaviours/human Factors
Well examination/verification
Oil Spill & Emergency Response Review Group
Increasing international activity on Standards and “best practise” – e.g BOPs, cementing design etc?
Still a lot more to come out of the USA investigations – continue watching!

12. Current status - continued
Legislative changes from Europe:
North Sea/UK safety legislation = benchmark
Pressures on
Financial liability
More sophisticated cross- Europe legislation
Continuing environmental pressures
Draft proposals from Commission emerging
Regulatory changes
More transparency (via EU)
More consistency across national boundaries (via NSOAF & IRF) – hopefully not via the Commission
Review of HSE/DECC system in 2011

13. We must all learn the lessons from Macondo and Montara
Multiple barriers breached = change any feelings of invulnerability -> chronic unease
“Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure – a failure of management.”
Concentrate on all three “pillars” together:
Framework of legislation and standards
Strong, competent, effective regulators
Commitment of industry and its workforce.
Lessons for operators, contractors and regulators
Multiple barriers broached – any one of which could have prevented the blowout