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ISA 662 IKE Key management for IPSEC Prof. Ravi Sandhu.

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Presentation on theme: "ISA 662 IKE Key management for IPSEC Prof. Ravi Sandhu."— Presentation transcript:

1 ISA 662 IKE Key management for IPSEC Prof. Ravi Sandhu

2 2 © Ravi Sandhu INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE (IKE) Hybrid protocol ISAKMP SKEME PHOTURIS SKIP MKMP OAKLEY IKE

3 3 © Ravi Sandhu ISAKMP Internet security association and key management protocol separates key management from key exchanges complex general protocol used in a specific way in IKE can apply to protocols other than IPSEC for IPSEC uses UDP over IP

4 4 © Ravi Sandhu IKE ISAKMP phase 1: establishes ISAKMP SA Main mode (DH with identity protection) Aggressive mode (DH without identity protection) Between phases New group mode ISAKMP phase 2: establishes SA for target protocol Quick mode

5 5 © Ravi Sandhu DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY ESTABLISHMENT A A B B y A =a x A mod p public key private key x A private key x B y B =a x B mod p public key k = y B x A mod p = y A x B mod p = a x A * x B mod p system constants: p: prime number, a: integer

6 6 © Ravi Sandhu PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY Use a different DH key-pair on each exchange DH public keys need to be authenticated authentication can be done by many techniques Loss of long-term (authentication) keys does not disclose session keys

7 7 © Ravi Sandhu PHASE 1 AUTHENTICATION ALTERNATIVES public-key signature preshared-key public-key encryption revised public-key encryption

8 8 © Ravi Sandhu COOKIE EXCHANGE Phase 1 employs cookie exchange to thwart (not prevent) denial of service attacks A -> B: Cookie_Request As cookie, 64 bit random number B -> A: Cookie_Response includes A and Bs cookies all further Phase 1 and Phase 2 messages include both cookies ISAKMP SA is identified by both cookies IPSEC protocol SA is identified by SPI

9 9 © Ravi Sandhu COOKIE GENERATION hash over IP Source and Destination Address UDP Source and Destination Ports a locally generated random secret timestamp

10 10 © Ravi Sandhu IKE DEFAULT OAKLEY DH GROUPS Group 1 MODP, 768 bit prime p, g=2 Group 2 MODP, 1024 bit prime p, g=2 Group 3 EC2N, 155 bit field size Group 4 EC2N, 185 bit field size private groups can be used

11 11 © Ravi Sandhu IKE NOTATION

12 12 © Ravi Sandhu IKE NOTATION

13 13 © Ravi Sandhu SKEYS, HASH AND SIG

14 14 © Ravi Sandhu MAIN MODE WITH DIGITAL SIGNATURES

15 15 © Ravi Sandhu AGGRESSIVE MODE WITH DIGITAL SIGNATURES

16 16 © Ravi Sandhu MAIN AND AGGRESSIVE MODE WITH PRE-SHARED KEY

17 17 © Ravi Sandhu MAIN MODE WITH PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

18 18 © Ravi Sandhu AGGRESSIVE MODE WITH PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

19 19 © Ravi Sandhu AUTHENTICATION WITH PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION does not provide non-repudiation provides additional security since attacked must break both DH key exchange public-key encryption provides identity protection in aggressive mode revised protocol reduces public-key operations

20 20 © Ravi Sandhu MAIN MODE WITH REVISED PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

21 21 © Ravi Sandhu MAIN MODE WITH REVISED PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

22 22 © Ravi Sandhu AGGRESSIVE MODE WITH REVISED PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION

23 23 © Ravi Sandhu PHASE 2 QUICK MODE

24 24 © Ravi Sandhu PHASE 2 QUICK MODE

25 25 © Ravi Sandhu PHASE 2 QUICK MODE

26 26 © Ravi Sandhu PHASE 2 QUICK MODE

27 27 © Ravi Sandhu NEW GROUP MODE sandwiched between phase 1 and 2 group can be negotiated in phase 1 new group mode allows nature of group to be hidden in phase 1 only group id is communicated in clear

28 28 © Ravi Sandhu NEW GROUP MODE


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