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SAFETY OBJECTIVES FOR GENERATION III NPP APPLIED TO EPR DESIGN OPTIONS PRESENTATION 26 – 29 September 2010, Nesebar, Bulgaria WATTELLE Emmanuel IRSN, France.

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Presentation on theme: "SAFETY OBJECTIVES FOR GENERATION III NPP APPLIED TO EPR DESIGN OPTIONS PRESENTATION 26 – 29 September 2010, Nesebar, Bulgaria WATTELLE Emmanuel IRSN, France."— Presentation transcript:

1 SAFETY OBJECTIVES FOR GENERATION III NPP APPLIED TO EPR DESIGN OPTIONS PRESENTATION 26 – 29 September 2010, Nesebar, Bulgaria WATTELLE Emmanuel IRSN, France

2 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 2 SUMMARY Context General safety approach Technical/regulatory safety approach : Technical guidelines Illustrations : Safety demonstration Safety function : confinement Defense in depth : severe accident

3 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 3 CONTEXT Nuclear energy renaissance worldwide : increases in energy demand in spite of the efforts for a more economic and effective use possibility of global climate changes But context has changed since Generation II nuclear reactors (late 60’s) : Increase in public awareness about radiological consequences Improvement of international standards of safety :  INSAG 3 (1988)  INSAG 12 (1999) “safety principles for nuclear power plants”  WENRA reference levels for reactor safety (2008)

4 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 4 FRENCH GENERAL SAFETY APPROACH significant improvement of the safety level Need for a significant improvement of the safety level of future plants at the design stage, compared to the safety level of existing plants evolutionary approach Choice of an evolutionary approach, taking into account: the large operating experience on PWR plants the results of in-depth studies performed on these plants, in particular the probabilistic safety assessments the results of research and development activities, notably on severe accidents Innovative features Innovative features to be considered.

5 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 5 EPR EVOLUTIONARY DESIGN Framatome N4 Siemens KONVOI PWR Experience feedback Evolutionary design

6 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 6 FRENCH TECHNICAL/REGULATORY SAFETY APPROACH TECHNICAL GUIDELINES TECHNICAL GUIDELINES (FOR THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEXT GENERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS WITH PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS) : Sum up safety principles and objectives : General approach Safety functions Prevention and control of accident (including severe accident) … Have been : Assessed by IRSN/GRS Adopted by French/German experts plenary meetings held in 2000 Addressed to French utility by Nuclear safety authority in France Are consistentinternational Are consistent with last international safety requirements

7 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 7 TECHNICAL GUIDELINES : SAFETY OBJECTIVES Reduction of : the number of significant incidents  hence to limiting the possibilities of accident situations developing from such events all types of failures and hazards being taken into account the global core melt frequency : less that 10 -5 per plant operating year, uncertainties and all types of failures and hazards being taken into account Significant reduction of potential radioactive releases due to all conceivable accidents : no necessity of protective measures without core melt : no necessity of protective measures for people living in the vicinity of the damaged plant (no evacuation, no sheltering) with core melt : practically eliminated high pressure core melt sequences  have to be  practically eliminated in case they would lead to large early releases. This objective applies notably to high pressure core melt sequences  low pressure core melt very limited protective measures  low pressure core melt sequences have to be dealt with so that the associated maximum conceivable releases would necessitate only very limited protective measures in area and in time for the public Objectives widening further than safety : reduction of individual and collective doses for the workers reduction of quantities and activities of radioactive wastes

8 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 8 TECHNICAL GUIDELINES : REINFORCEMENT OF DEFENCE IN DEPTH PRINCIPLE General : Reinforcement of all levels diversified use of diversified means shutdown states Special attention to be given to shutdown states Level 1/Prevention of abnormal operation and failure : “quality of design, manufacturing, construction and operation is essential” Level 2/Control of abnormal operation and failure to avoid escalation to accident conditions : reduction of the frequency of initiating event Level 3/Control of accidental conditions to limit radiological releases and to avoid core melt  should take into account both : Design basis accidents : single initiating event Multiple failures Beyond design basis accidents : Multiple failures core melt accident (severe accident) Level 4/control of core melt accident (severe accident) : severe accident is postulated at the design stage Level 5  not directly applicable to NPP (off-site emergency response in case of significative releases)

9 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 9 TECHNICAL GUIDELINES : SAFETY DEMONSTRATION deterministic Achieved in a deterministic way probabilistic Supplemented by probabilistic methods Appropriate research and development work are necessary Analyzes : single initiating events multiple failure situations internal and external hazards Possible links between internal and external hazards and single initiating events have also to be considered

10 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 10 EPR DESIGN OPTIONS – 3 EXAMPLES  3 ways to illustrate Safety demonstration : deterministic, probabilistic Safety function : confinement DiD Level : level 4 - severe accident

11 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 11 Safety demonstration illustration Safety injection system deterministic approach (1/2) How many trains needed : lost due to the break1 train lost due to the break single failure criterion1 train failed (single failure criterion) maintenance1 train in maintenance  1 train availabledesigned  1 train available designed to cope with accidents to cope with accidents Physical and spatial separation

12 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 12 Safety demonstration illustration Safety injection system deterministic approach (2/2) Internal hazard (fire, explosion, missile, flooding) one division lost External hazard (airplane crash) division 1 or 4 lost airplane protection

13 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 13 Safety demonstration illustration Safety injection system probabilistic insights (1/3) Common cause failure : heavy weight in probabilistic demonstration similar  More than 4 similar trains : not lead to important improvment  Diversified  Diversified means are very important 2 examples : Electrical supply Cooling system of low pressure injection motor

14 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 14 SBO 1 690V3~ Div. 1 Div. 4 Main Diesel 1 10kV3~ SBO 2 690V3~ Main Diesel 4 10kV3~ Div. 2 Main Diesel 2 Div. 3 Main Diesel 3 Addition of two diversified diesels generators to face common failure of the four existing main diesels Safety demonstration illustration Safety injection system probabilistic insights (2/3)

15 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 15 Safety demonstration illustration Safety injection system probabilistic insights (3/3) Low pressure injection motor  need to be cooled Component cooling water system is backed up by main emergency diesel generators  Motors cooled by : Component cooling water system And, if necessary : chilled water system

16 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 16 Safety function illustration Confinement (1/5) reduction releasesconceivable accidents Main challenge  Significant reduction of potential radioactive releases due to all conceivable accidents  simple presentation of the main principles Containment Containment Building Objectives can be achieved through the use of a double wall containment concept including: metallic inner wall in pre-stressed concrete and metallic liner outer wall in reinforced concrete, airplane protection sub-atmospheric annulus between them maintained at a sub-atmospheric pressure :  to collect all possible leaks through the inner wall  to filter them before release to the environment via the stack

17 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 17 Safety function illustration Confinement (2/5) Containment Containment Building metallic Inner wall with metallic liner  low leak rate airplane outer wall – airplane protection Venting system : Filtration Subatmospheric pressure sub-atmosphéric Annulus at sub-atmosphéric pressure  avoid direct leak due to leaktightness of building

18 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 18 Safety function illustration Confinement (3/5) Containment penetrations Containment building : only one part of confinement function  Possible leaks due to penetrations Through peripheral buildings Direct to atmosphere

19 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 19 Safety function illustration Confinement (4/5) Penetrations only between RB and PB Leaktightness criterion

20 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 20 Safety function illustration Confinement and severe accident (5/5) containment bypassing practically eliminated Accident sequences (core melt) involving containment bypassing have to be practically eliminated The residual heat after a severe accident must be removed from the containment building without venting device without containment heat removal device actuation The design pressure and design temperature of the containment building must allow a grace period of 12 hours without containment heat removal device actuation global deflagration or fast local deflagration of hydrogen The containment building must also withstand the global deflagration or fast local deflagration of hydrogen that may be generated during severe accident situations penetration avoided The penetration of the basemat of the containment building by a corium must be avoided (core-catcher)

21 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 21 DiD level illustration Severe accident (1/6) Mitigation of severe accident has to be addressed in the design practically eliminated Accident situations with core melt which would lead to large early releases have to be practically eliminated : containment by-pass Accident sequences involving containment by-pass :  Confinement design principles  Specific technical solution for hatch closing within 2 hours Reactivity accident Reactivity accident resulting from fast introduction of cold and deborated water High pressure core melt High pressure core melt situations :  Dedicated valves for severe accident depressurization Global hydrogen detonations and steam explosions threatening the containment integrity :  passive autocatalytic recombiners  Dry corium spreading room

22 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 22 DiD level illustration Severe accident (2/6) Core-catcher Reactor pit Reactor pit : Collect the corium in dry cavity (no risk of steam explosion) Transfer the corium :  initiated by the passive melting of a « gate » (a steel grid covered by concrete) under the effect of the corium  to the spreading room through a transfer channel protected by zirconia layer Spreading room Spreading room : Composed of steel cooling plates covered with a layer of sacrificial concrete. The steel cooling plates have cooling channels at their bottom Corium spreading  melting - by the corium - of passive fusible wires  opening of spring-loaded valve  the water from the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) flows through the cooling channels (cooling the bottom of the spreading room) to finally spread over the corium and flood its surface The evaporated water condenses in the containment building and returns to the IRWST

23 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 23 DiD level illustration Severe accident (3/6) Core-catcher

24 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 24 DiD level illustration Severe accident (4/6) Core-catcher

25 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 25 DiD level illustration Severe accident (5/6) Core-catcher : First stage (0 -12 hours, when CHRS is not actuated) - Passive cooling of the core catcher from the IRWST

26 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 26 DiD level illustration Severe accident (6/6) Core-catcher : Second stage (after 12 hours, CHRS actuated) Active cooling of the core catcher (1 file) and containment spray (1 or 2 files)

27 Safety objectives for Generation III NPP applied to EPR design options BgNS conference, 26-29 September 2010 Page 27 Thank you Благодаря

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