1. Securing Fissile Materials

2. What are fissile materials and how are they made? U-235 is fissile but there isn’t enough pure U- 235 anywhere to worry about. Why not?

3. U-235 U-235 is less than 1% of naturally occurring uranium. “Enriching” can increase the concentrations of U-235 to what is called “highly enriched uranium” levels > 20% enriched. HEU of 80% or 90% is good enough for bombs. Nothing requires 100% U-235 so no large quantities of U-235 exist.

4. What are fissile materials and how are they made? Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is fissile. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) contains more than 20% U-235. Mined uranium must be enriched to produce HEU.

5. What are fissile materials and how are they made? Plutonium (Pu) is fissile. Pu is produced in nuclear reactors when U-238 absorbs a neutron.

6. How much fissile material is there? As of January 2013, the global stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is estimated to be about 1390 tonnes. The global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 490 tonnes, of which about 260 tonnes is the material in civilian custody.

7. Fissile Material Stocks, 2013 CountryHEU tonnesMilitary Pu tonnesCivilian Pu tonnes Russia69512850.1 United States604870 France31657.5 China161.80.014 United Kingdom21.23.591.2 Pakistan30.150 India0.85.20.24 Israel0.30.84- North Korea00.03- Others15-61 Total1390234260

8. Info from International Panel on Fissile Materials: www.fissilematerials.org Numbers for weapon plutonium for the United States and United Kingdom are based on official data. Most numbers for civilian plutonium are based on declarations submitted to IAEA and reflect the status as of December 31, 2011. Other numbers are non-governmental estimates, often with large uncertainties. HEU amounts are 90% enriched HEU equivalent (with the exception of the number for non- nuclear weapon states).

9. IPFM Production of military fissile materials continues in India, which is producing plutonium and HEU for naval propulsion, Pakistan, which produces plutonium and HEU for weapons, Israel, which is believed to produce plutonium. North Korea has the capability to produce weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.

10. IPFM France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and India operate civilian reprocessing facilities that separate plutonium from spent fuel of power reactors. China is operating a pilot civilian reprocessing facility.

11. IPFM Twelve countries - Russia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands (all three are in the URENCO consortium), Japan, Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran – operate uranium enrichment facilities. North Korea is also believed to have an operational uranium enrichment plant.

12. 1400 tonnes HEU A metric ton (tonne) is about 2200 lbs. It takes about 50 lbs of HEU to make an atomic bomb. One tonne of HEU could make 44 atomic bombs.

13. 500 tonnes Pu It takes about 10 lbs Pu to make an atomic bomb. One tonne Pu would make 220 atomic bombs.

14. Which bomb is easier to make? The HEU weapon is much easier to make than a Pu weapon. The HEU weapon that destroyed Hiroshima, Japan had never been tested.

15. How can HEU be permanently eliminated? HEU + DU = LEU DU is the U-238 discarded during the enrichment process. HEU can be “downblended” or unenriched to a lower level of enrichment that is not explosive and can be used to fuel existing nuclear reactors.

16. Why isn’t this being done? It has been done!

17. Megatons to Megawatts In February 1993, the Russian Federation and the United States signed a 20-year, government-to-government agreement for the conversion of 500 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium from nuclear warheads to low- enriched uranium to fuel U.S. nuclear reactors. The agreement became known as the Megatons to Megawatts program. Over the life of the Megatons to Megawatts program, the low-enriched uranium produced under the agreement provided about one-third of the enrichment services needed to fabricate fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors. The program was finished in December 2013. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13091

18. What is being done with US HEU? For its part, the US government initially declared just over 174 tonnes of HEU (of various enrichments) to be surplus from military stockpiles. Of this, USEC took delivery of 14.2 tonnes.

19. What is USEC? United States Enrichment Corporation USEC carried out the Megatons to Megawatts downblending of 500 tons of excess weapons HEU to reactor fuel from 1993 to 2013. USEC went bankrupt in 2014. USEC emerged from bankruptcy as Centrus Energy.

20. USEC Downblending of the UF6 was completed in 1998, to produce 387 tonnes of LEU. Some 13.5 tonnes of the HEU oxide or metal had been processed by September 2001 to produce 140.3 tonnes of LEU. In 2004 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a license for downblending 33 tonnes HEU by Nuclear Fuel Services in Tennessee.

21. What is Nuclear Fuel Services?

22. NSF is located in Erwin, Tennessee Erwin, Tennessee is just over the mountain north of Asheville. HEU TO LEU CONVERSION (DOWNBLENDING) A significant tool in America's non- proliferation effort, NFS' patented HEU-to-LEU conversion technology is now considered the best available technology for eliminating HEU as a potential target of terrorists.

23. Nuclear Fuel Services “Our Erwin, Tennessee operation is committed to manufacturing specialty nuclear materials for the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet and other customers while protecting its workers, the public and the environment.” US Navy submarines use HEU fuel and the fuel assemblies are produced by NFS. France’s submarines run on LEU which is better from a nonproliferation perspective.

24. NNSA DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 2005 announced plans to remove a further 200 tonnes of HEU from military stockpiles. Of this, 160 tonnes was retained for naval propulsion, thus postponing the need for building a new uranium high-enrichment facility for at least 50 years. An additional 20 tonnes was reserved for space missions and for research reactors. The final 20 tonnes was to be downblended to LEU for research reactors, power generation and for 17 tons, the new reliable fuel supply initiative.

25. Boring details Also in 2005, NNSA said that it was committing about 40 tonnes of off-specification HEU (with elevated levels of U-236) to the Blended Low- Enriched Uranium (BLEU) program. This material would be used by TVA. In 2008 NNSA was negotiating with TVA to release a further 21 tonnes of HEU under the program, which would yield about 250 tonnes of LEU, some of which might be sold to other utilities.

26. More boring details In mid-2007 the NNSA awarded contracts to Nuclear Fuel Services and Wesdyne International to downblend 17.4 tonnes of HEU from dismantled warheads to be part of a new international fuel reserve. NFS downblended the material in Tennessee to yield some 290 tonnes of LEU (4.95% U-235) by early 2012. Wesdyne, the prime contractor, is then storing 230 tonnes of the LEU at the Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in South Carolina to be available for the American Assured Fuel Supply (AFS).

27. What is the AFS? This first batch of LEU will be available for use in civilian reactors by nations in good standing with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have good nonproliferation credentials and are not pursuing uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies. It will also now be available to domestic utilities. The fuel – worth some $500 million – will be sold at the current market price.

28. Assured Fuel Supply (AFS) Access to the fuel reserve will be open to "eligible recipients that meet certain nonproliferation criteria in the case of supply disruptions in the nuclear fuel market." The notice, however, does not specify what these "certain nonproliferation criteria" are. In addition, the Department of Energy would have to confirm that "there is a fuel supply disruption that cannot be addressed by normal market mechanisms.” In case all the criteria are met, the recipient would be able to purchase the LEU through a U.S. intermediary. The fuel would apparently be considered "U.S. obligated," so the recipient would have to obtain U.S. consent regarding handling of the fuel after it is irradiated in a reactor.

29. Assured Fuel Supply (AFS) Down-blending of 17.4 tonnes will produce about 290 tonnes of LEU, of which about 230 tonnes will constitute the reserve. The rest will be used to pay for the costs associated with down-blending and processing of the material. Most of the down-blending has been already done, with the rest to be completed in 2012. DoE announced that it is ready to accept requests for purchase of the material from the AFS reserve. http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2011/08/united_ states_announces_d.html http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2011/08/united_ states_announces_d.html

30. In June 2009 NNSA awarded a further contract ($209 million) to NFS and Wesdyne for 12.1 tonnes of HEU which will yield some 220 tonnes of LEU by 2012. This second batch of LEU is to provide fuel supply assurance for utilities which participate in DOE's mixed-oxide fuel program utilising surplus plutonium from US weapons. (The AFS scheme is consistent with international concerns to limit the spread of enrichment technology to countries without well-established nuclear fuel cycles. Russia has agreed to join the initiative.) In the short term most US military HEU is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not useable for weapons. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel- Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source- of-Nuclear-Fuel/ http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel- Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source- of-Nuclear-Fuel/

31. How is Pu disposed of? Sad question! Let’s start with the US/Russia “dual track” program to try and dispose of 34 tonnes of excess weapons Pu belonging to each country. Basically the plutonium can be mixed with DU and made into mixed oxide reactor fuel (MOX) or it can be enclosed in glass logs and buried (vitrified). MOX or Vitrify? Russia wants MOX.

32. Dual Track Program In June 2000, the USA and Russia agreed to dispose of at least 34 tonnes each of weapons-grade plutonium by 2014. The USA undertook to pursue a dual track program (immobilisation and MOX), self-funded, while the G-7 nations were to provide some US$ 2.5 billion to set up Russia's program. The latter was initially MOX-oriented for VVER reactors, the high cost being because this was not part of Russia's fuel cycle policy. The USA agreed to allow the Russian plutonium to be used in BN-600 and BN-800 fast neutron reactors, and the timeline stretched to 2018. However, the G7 funding was not available on this basis and Russia is funding most of the program, with the USA contributing $400 million. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium- Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/ http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium- Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/

33. In Russia, a few existing reactors can use MOX In 1996, the United States and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study that evaluated the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons-derived plutonium in both countries. While Russia advocates building new reactors for converting weapons- derived plutonium to spent fuel, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of the existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia (and possibly in Ukraine) and the existing BN- 600 fast-neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia. The BN-600 reactor, which currently uses enriched uranium fuel, is capable with certain design modifications of converting up to 1.3 metric tons (MT) of surplus weapons-derived plutonium to spent fuel each year.

34. Promising beginning in US After environmental and safety reviews, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorised construction of a MOX fuel fabrication plant (MFFF) at the DOE Savannah River site in South Carolina. Construction started in August 2007. It would make about 1700 civil MOX fuel assemblies using DU and 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium unlike other MOX fuel plants which use fresh reactor-grade plutonium having around one third non-fissile plutonium isotopes. US reactors using MOX fuel will need to be licensed for it. European reactors run on MOX made of fresh Pu extracted from spent fuel. Excess weapons Pu has different characteristics and turns out to be more problematic.

35. Original cost projections were called high: $4.8 billion They didn’t yet know what “high” meant Shaw Areva MOX Services is under contract to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which will own the plant, originally expected to be in operation from 2016, then 2019. The high cost of the plant – $3.5 billion plus $1.3 billion contingency and $183 million per year to operate - is justified on non- proliferation grounds. Annual cost would be offset by revenue. However, early in 2014 the project was excluded from the DOE budget request for NNSA due to cost escalation, so faces being shut down while 60% complete. This will leave the USA in default on the 2000 bilateral agreement, while Russia has fulfilled its side. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium- Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/ http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium- Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/

36. Converting reactor to burn MOX The steps needed to convert BN-600 to a plutonium- burner core will be discussed. The step involving the hybrid core allows an early and timely start that takes advantage of the limited capacity for fabricating uranium–plutonium mixed- oxide fuel early in the disposition program. The design lifetime of BN-600 must safely and reliably be extended by 10 yr to at least 2020 so that a sufficient amount of plutonium ( ∼ 20 MT) can be converted to spent fuel. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016 8900298005245 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016 8900298005245

37. However Duke’s MOX did not work In June 2005 the first four fuel assemblies with mixed oxide fuel made from US military plutonium (plus depleted uranium) started generating electricity in Duke Power's Catawba-1 nuclear power plant in South Carolina, on a trial basis. They incorporated 140 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. The plutonium had been made into 2 tonnes of pellets at the Cadrache plant and then fabricated into fuel assemblies at the Melox plant in France Duke’s attempts to use MOX made in France from US excess- weapons Pu in the Catawba Reactor that was modified to burn it ultimately failed and Duke withdrew from the program.

38. MOX fabrication plant in SC grew absurdly expensive The older study led by John MacWilliams, an advisor to Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, estimated the lifetime cost of the so-called Mixed Oxide (MOX) plutonium elimination project in South Carolina at over $25.1 billion. But the new study, conducted by a U.S. Air Force- funded research and development center known as the Aerospace Corporation, says the effort could cost at least $30.7 billion to complete, according to a summary that was presented to lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

39. After the summary was obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear safety advocacy group, Energy Department officials confirmed that the study concluded this cost might even balloon to $47.5 billion. The higher pricetag would ensue if, as MacWilliams’ study assumed last year, annual spending on the program is capped at $500 million annually, which would drag out its completion. If spending were limited to $375 million a year — an amount close to what Congress has recently appropriated — the cost of the overall project could eventually reach $110.4 billion, the summary stated. http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/23/17218/projected-cost- governments-most-expensive-nonproliferation-effort-rises-again http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/23/17218/projected-cost- governments-most-expensive-nonproliferation-effort-rises-again

40. Cheaper to downblend and bury in WIPP, a new idea To downblend the plutonium, highly radioactive ground SNF would be added to plutonium oxide to inhibit recovery. This downblending process would involve mixing the plutonium with inhibitor materials to reduce the plutonium content to less than 10 percent by weight. Downblending would be conducted at SRS. Two additional gloveboxes would be installed for this option. The containers of downblended plutonium would be characterized (non‐destructive assay, digital radiography, and headspace gas sampling) to ensure that they meet waste acceptance criteria prior to shipment to a TRU‐waste repository.

41. What is WIPP? Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, NM Bedded salt is free of fresh flowing water, easily mined, impermeable and geologically stable – an ideal medium for permanently isolating long-lived radioactive wastes from the environment. However, its most important quality in this application is the way salt rock seals all fractures and naturally closes all openings.

42. WIPP Throughout the 1960s, government scientists searched for an appropriate site for radioactive waste disposal, eventually testing a remote desert area of southeastern New Mexico where, 250 million years earlier, evaporation cycles of the ancient Permian Sea had created a 2,000-foot-thick salt bed.

43. Underground Salt Cavern Burial

44. WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Once shipped to a repository, the packages containing the plutonium would be emplaced in the salt bed. Over time, high pressure on the salt formation would cause the salt to creep, filling in the voids in the disposal rooms, and entombing the packages permanently. This disposal method has been proven and continues to be used to dispose of surplus plutonium from various DOE sites. Approximately 4.8 MT of plutonium that was downblended have been shipped to WIPP, mostly from six sites: RFETS, Hanford, INL, LLNL, LANL, and SRS. http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04- 14-inlinefiles/SurplusPuDispositionOptions.pdf http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04- 14-inlinefiles/SurplusPuDispositionOptions.pdf

45. WIPP