1. 1 ARGENTINA: CRISIS AND RECOVERY Mario I. Blejer

2. 2

3. 3 WHAT CAUSED THE CRISIS?

4. 4 HOW THE RECOVERY WAS MANAGED

5. 5 Real GDP (base 1993)

6. 6 CAUSES OF THE CRISIS THREE APPROACHES : 1. The loss of competitiveness of the Argentine economy 2. The “Sudden Stop” argument 3. Macroeconomic policy inconsistencies

7. 7 Loss of Competitiveness under the Fixed (Convertibility) Exchange Rate Regime

8. 8 The Trade Account (in current prices)

9. 9 -10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% IV 94IV 95IV 96 IV 97 IV 98 IV. 99IV. 00 IV 01 -35.000 -30.000 -25.000 -20.000 -15.000 -10.000 -5.000 0 5.000 10.000 15.000 Capital Flows and Economic Activity (Accumulated 4 quarters - U$Sm. GDP Cyclical Component) Capital Flows Private Sector GDP Growth Russian Crisis

10. 10 Fiscal Deficits Argentina 1975-2001 Convertibility Period

11. 11 The Use of Privatization Receipts to Reduce the Deficit Total Deficit Privatization Revenue

12. 12

13. 13

14. 14

15. 15 First Symptom: The Banking Crisis While the problems of convertibility and the consequent exchange rate uncertainty played a role, the banking crisis was largely caused by the government “abuse” of the banking sector, given its inability to to adjust the budget deficit

16. 16 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 Sep 00Dec 00Mar 01Jun 01Ago 01Nov 01Feb 02Apr 02Jul 02 " “Corralito” Devaluation Private Sector Deposits (in bn Arg. Pesos)

17. 17 The main cause for the banking crisis was the fear was that banks would be rendered insolvent by government policy and that deposits would be confiscated. An important reason behind this fear was the fact that private sector assets were being displaced by public sector assets in bank’s balance sheets.

18. 18 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Dec-99May-00Oct-00Mar-01Aug-01Jan-02Jun-02 Public SectorPrivate Sector Private Sector assets have been displaced by Public Sector assets in bank’s balance sheets $ 76 MM $ 43 MM

19. 19 The increasing banking exposure to the public sector was accompanied by 1. a rapid decrease in deposits and 2. a sharp increase in country risk

20. 20 EMBI Index Public Sector Loans / Net Worth (%) Private Deposists - Index Dec 00 = 100 (2nd axis)

21. 21 November 2001:withdrawal restrictions on bank deposits (“corralito”). December 2001: Riots and the De la Rua and Cavallo government falls. First two weeks of January 2002: --currency board is abandoned and the currency devalued --bank assets and liabilities are pesified asymmetrically - i.e. at different rates

22. 22 The Tradeoffs and the Dilemma for the Central Bank  Having regained the LOLR function the CB could provide the liquidity needed to finance the bank run. Pesos would fly to the exchange market – risk of hyperdevaluation and hyperinflation. OR

23. 23  The CB could restrain the rediscount facility and let banks deal with the deposit run. May prevent hyperinflation, at the risk of the total collapse of the banking sector.

24. 24 The Strategy Followed 1.Default on the Sovereign Debt 2.Provide liquidity support to banks to prevent massive bank closures. 3.Develop sterilization instruments at the Central Bank --the LEBAC-- to mop up liquidity and to compete with the U$S. 4.Utilize part of CB reserves to intervene in the foreign exchange market to slow the pace of depreciation and to avoid chaotic conditions.

25. 25 On the Fiscal Side Cut significantly fiscal expenditures, mainly through the non-adjustment of wages in the face of 40% inflation. Increase Export Taxes on Agricultural and Natural Resources

26. 26 Monetary and Fiscal Measures, plus regaining competitiveness, helped to achieve twin balance in the Fiscal and External Accounts. External (and crucial factor): Major improvement in terms of trade

27. 27 Soybean Prices - Index January 2001 – March 2011 130%

28. 28 Initially deposit withdrawals continued

29. 29 However, the trend reversed after four months

30. 30

31. 31 International Reserves In U$S millions

32. 32 Fuente:Indec Total GDP Quarterly – Seasonally Adjusted

33. 33 Fuente: Universidad Di Tella Labor Demand

34. 34 Fuente: Universidad Di Tella Consumers and Business CONFIDENCE

35. 35 In 2005 the Debt in Default was Exchanged for new debt with an average 75% haircut.

36. 36 Real GDP (base 1993) Debt Exchange

37. 37 A second exchange took place 5 years later. There is today around 10% holdouts The Debt to the IMF was fully repaid Debt with the Paris Club is being negotiated.

38. 38 COMPARATIVE DEBT ARGENTINA and RUSSIA (then) AND EUROPE (now)

39. 39 THANK YOU!