1. TPWS Deployment – Indian Railways
Emerging trends in Train Protection Management and Electric Energy Management System
July 2014

2. Rail Accidents.. Occurrence is Rare –Impact is Huge
Trains potentially carry many people at high speed.
They can travel in built up areas.
They carry potentially huge volumes of hazardous material.
Media Publicity, and society’s expectations of safety are very high for the railway.
And Passenger Speed is ever increasing

3. Impact is Huge

4. Impact is Huge

5. ATP Preventable Accidents Worldwide, last 10 years
Canada, Russell Hill Subway
1995
3 killed, 140 injured
Australia, Hines Hill Train Collision
1996
2 killed, 1 injured
UK, Watford Rail Crash
1 killed, 69 injured
UK, Southall Rail Crash
1997
6 killed, >150 injured
UK, Paddington Ladbroke Grove Rail Crash
1999
31 killed, >520 injured
Australia, Glenbrook Train Disaster
7 killed, 51 injured
Belgium, Pécrot Rail Crash
2001
8 killed, 12 injured
Australia, Waterfall Train Disaster
2003
7 killed, 40 injured
Japan, Amagasaki Rail Crash
2005
107 killed, 555 injured
USA Chatsworth Metrolink Train Collision
2008
25 killed, 135 injured
Germany, Hordorf Train Accident
2011
10 killed, 43 injured
Argentina, Buenos Aires Rail Disaster
2012
51 killed, 703 injured
Argentina, Buenos Aires Rail Collision
2013
3 killed, 315 injured
Spain, Santiago de Compostela derailment
79 killed, 140 injured
340 People Killed, more than 3200 people injured

6. AWS – Low Cost Protection

7. AWS Operations
Permanent Magnet on track alerts the onboard system
Electromagnet on track indicates signal ahead is clear
If signal ahead is not clear, driver receives a warning horn and he must acknowledge it
The ‘sunflower’ indicator tells the driver he has received the warning and now he has full responsibility

8. TPWS (UK)

9. TPWS Operation
Track positioned electronic loops OSS (Over Speed Sensor) loops are placed ‘1 second’ apart on approach to a signal
A pair of loops positioned at the signal TSS (Train Stop System) will stop the train if it runs past the signal

10. Limitations of the Low Cost Options
AWS – has only two states, so it can only relay to the driver ‘green’ or ‘not green’.
Drivers can simply acknowledge out of habit and not react correctly
AWS has no speed restriction capability
TPWS has simple train overspeed sensing but only at fixed locations
In any degraded mode, TPWS is isolated and ineffective
AWS Limited
UK TPWS Limited

11. Hence the emergence of ATP
Essential component is a mechanism for continuously monitoring speed
Early systems developed for HST in Sweden, Italy, Germany, France became the basis for pan European ETCS
Several Levels of Implementation (allows an appropriate and staged degree of rollout)
Several Modes of Operation (allows for various levels of protection)

12. Track to Train, Speed Monitoring, DMI & Brake Interface

13. Levels of Implementation
ATP system has been overlaid on existing trackside installations.
Train detection and Train integrity are performed by the existing interlocking.
Lineside signals are retained, but interfaced to ERTMS balises situated at all signal locations.
The trackside equipment is responsible for determining the available movement authority
This is done at spot locations via balises, optionally at additional locations with infill balises, or continuously using radio or inductive loops.
The on board equipment protects against overspeed, overrun and gives comprehensive information to the driver.

14. Levels of Implementation
Digital radio-based system.
Train detection and train integrity remain the responsibility of trackside equipment
All trains automatically report their exact position and direction of travel to a Radio Block Centre (RBC) at regular intervals.
Train movements are monitored continually by the radio block centre. The movement authority is transmitted to the vehicle continuously via GSM-R together with speed information and route data.
Balises provide position reference information to the train

15. Levels of Implementation
No trackside train detection or integrity proving is provided.
The on board system is responsible for reporting train integrity.
The Radio Block Controller continuously knows the speed and position of all trains.
RBC implements a radio based train spacing methodology.

16. Modes of Operation Full supervision
ETCS has all required information and can give full protection against overspeed and overrun
Partial supervision
Limited Supervision. Partial protection against over speed and over run, but the driver must observe and obey lineside signals.
Unfitted – the line is not fitted with ETCS: the system will only observe master speed limit and train protection is left to older systems
On Sight – the train has a movement authority but the track ahead may be occupied
Staff Responsible – allows the driver to take full responsibility in an equipped area. The on board will monitor a ceiling speed only.
Shunting
Reversing

17. ERTMS Deployment Indian Railways TPWS Level 1:
In operation across Europe, China, New Zealand and India.
Level 2:
Planned for the whole of Denmark. Deployed on a number of High Speed Lines in Europe and China.
Level 3:
Currently under development.
“ERTMS Level 1 provides a consistent level of safety and protection. Levels 2 and 3 add better operational flexibility due to the fact that the radio block controller has knowledge of all the train positions and speeds. This allows better management of such functions as emergency stopping, boundaries for speed restrictions, and route cancellation”.

18. TPWS India in Action

19. On Board Cubicle

20. Drivers Display Over speed Brake Target Distance
Numerical Actual Train Speed
LED bar with colours of
Speed Target value – Red
Permitted Speed – Green
Actual Speed - Yellow
Brake intervention and
Release Speed – Orange
Mode Information (UN/SR/FS)
Level information (1 or 0)
Brake intervention SB or EB
Acknowledgements
Visual & audible warnings

21. TPWS South Implementation
Customer
Southern Railway, Chennai
End User
Southern Railway
Scope
Survey, Design, Supply, Installation and Commissioning of Car borne equipments and Line side equipments for Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) compliant to ETCS Level 1.
Section
Chennai Beach to Gummidipundi
- Korukkupet to Chennai Central
Number of stations 19
Length
50 Kms
On-board equipment
82 EMUs
Wayside equipment
150 Signals, 107 LEU, 323 Balises
Commissioned on

22. TPWS South - Availability Achieved between Jun 2012 and Dec 2013:

23. TPWS North Implementation
Customer
Indian Railways Project Management Unit
End User
Northern Railway, North Central Railway
Scope
Survey, Design, Supply, Installation and Commissioning of Loco Borne equipment and Line Side equipment for Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) in H Nizamuddin - Agra Cantt section on Northern and North Central Railway.
Section
Agra Cantt – Hazarat Nizamuddin (INDIA)
Number of stations 24
Length
192 Kms
On-board equipment
35 Locomotives
Wayside equipment
505 Signals, 107 LEU, 323 Balises, 303 Infill balises
Commissioned on
Baseline – 30/4/12, Infill in progress

24. TPWS North Project Status
Completed training for 703 technicians and running staff of both NR and NCR.
Regular trials at 110 kmph is conducted in 5 pairs of trains and ASTS engineers are manning four trains.
Planning to complete the installation of additional, Infill balises before Nov 2014
Plan is underway to upgrade the lineside and on board configurations to allow for 160kph operation.

25. TPWS North Availability Monitoring

26. Actions and Approaches for Introduction
Simple interface between TPWS system and wayside interlocking system – using spare contacts of an already operating lamp proving relay.
Close cooperation and collaboration directly between the user (Southern Railway) and the supplier with committed support from the user.
Effective training to the Loco pilots (Drivers) to enhance their understanding of the safety benefits and the operational requirements of the system and to gain acceptance.
Consistent effort to ensure that all locos are fitted and running with TPWS supervision operational.
Effective and timely feedback of TPWS failures to supplier engineer, and engineer rapid response to recover full operation of each train.
Regular Foot Plate attendance by supplier engineer to directly observe and understand failures or failure reports.
Routine, regular and correct preventive maintenance of trackside & onboard systems by supplier engineer.
Effective spares holding, repairs and replacement management
Routine monitoring of system availability with collaborative review to correctly allocate faults or incidents to root cause.
Timely reply to the queries raised by Client.

27. Thank you for your Attention